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Abstract  
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the currency board 
arrangement (CBA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) is sustainable and desirable by 
assessing its credibility and its effect on the economy. A CBA is a rigid monetary 
regime under which a country fixes its exchange rate to some foreign currency and 
maintains 100 percent backing of its monetary base with foreign exchange. In 1997, 
BH adopted a CBA in its endeavour to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation in the 
post-war period. As BH is now moving towards accession to the EU, an important 
question concerns the desirability and sustainability of its CBA in the short to 
medium term.  Since there is no long data span for estimating the effects of the CBA 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the empirical analyses other countries are also 
investigated.  Using a survey database for Central and South-Eastern European 
countries the biprobit analysis finds that, other things being equal, a CBA is likely to 
increase the credibility of the monetary authority, even in periods of crisis, since the 
period for which credibility is investigated is the period of the global financial crisis 
and the euro crisis (2009-2011). The results also suggest that CBAs are more likely 
to increase the credibility of the monetary authority the lower the level of trust in 
government and the worse the perceptions about the economic situation in a country. 
In order to assess the desirability of a CBA its effect on macroeconomic performance 
is investigated. The results of panel analyses of 25 transition countries with a range 
of different monetary/exchange rate regimes, suggest that a CBA has a negative 
effect on inflation, over and above that due to the fixed exchange rate and high 
degree of central bank independence. The investigation of the effect of CBA on the 
subjective evaluation of national economic performance suggests a negative effect of 
CBA, presumably due to the strictness of the monetary authority under a CBA. The 
important additional finding is that this negative effect becomes significantly smaller 
the lower the trust in government. This again implies that a CBA is more effective in 
a low trust environment, where it is more likely to be viewed as necessary for 
stabilisation. Since the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is still complex 
and uncertain, the benefits of maintaining its CBA appear to be higher than the costs 
and the regime is sustainable and desirable in the short to medium run.  
 
  
 
 
iii 
 
Table of Content 
 
Table of Appendices .................................................................................................. vi 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................ ix 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................. x 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... xii 
Preface ....................................................................................................................... 13 
 
CHAPTER 1: MACROECONOMIC TRENDS IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA WITH A FOCUS ON MONETARY AND FINANCIAL 
SECTORS ................................................................................................................. 19 
 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 19 
1.2 The macroeconomic situation in BH – historical facts and recent trends 21 
1.2.1 The pre-war role of BH in ex-Yugoslavia, the impact of war and the 
country’s post-war constitution .......................................................................... 21 
1.2.2 The process of transition towards a market-oriented economy ................. 23 
1.2.3 Assessing the progress of transition – quantitative and qualitative   
approach .............................................................................................................. 27 
1.2.4 Key economic indicators ........................................................................... 30 
1.3 The monetary and financial sectors in BH ................................................... 37 
1.3.1 Origins and the reasons for the introduction of the CBA in BH................ 37 
1.3.2 Characteristics and the institutional framework of the CBA in BH .......... 38 
1.3.3 Operation of the CBA in BH ..................................................................... 39 
1.3.4 Commercial banks as the major “players” in BH’s financial sector.......... 50 
1.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 59 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMENT AS A 
MONETARY FRAMEWORK: A LITERATURE REVIEW ............................. 61 
 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 61 
2.2 The main characteristics of a CBA and its evolution .................................. 62 
2.2.1 The main characteristics of a CBA ............................................................ 62 
2.2.2 Evolution of currency board arrangements ................................................ 64 
2.2.3 Operation of CBAs .................................................................................... 66 
2.2.4 The economics of monetary and exchange rate regimes: where does the 
currency board fit in? .......................................................................................... 73 
2.2.5 A CBA as a monetary framework.............................................................. 77 
2.3 Strengths and weaknesses of a CBA ............................................................. 79 
2.4 The CBA in the context of transition ............................................................ 90 
2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 98 
 
 
iv 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE SUSTAINABILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF A 
CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMNET WITH REFLECTIONS ON BOSNIA 
AND HERZEGOVINA’S CURRENCY BOARD ................................................. 99 
 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 99 
3.2 The sustainability and desirability of a monetary regime/policy ............... 99 
3.3 A critical assessment of studies investigating the sustainability of a CBA102 
3.4 A short discussion of sustainability/desirability features of the CBA in BH111 
3.5 The credibility of a CBA as a source of its stability and sustainability ... 113 
3.6 Capturing the effects of a CBA ................................................................... 117 
3.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 119 
 
CHAPTER 4: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY OF CURRENCY 
BOARD ARRANGEMENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND 
BULGARIA ............................................................................................................ 120 
 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 120 
4.2 Indicators of confidence in and credibility of a CBA ................................ 121 
4.3 Determinants of the confidence and credibility of a monetary 
authority/regime ................................................................................................. 125 
4.4 Descriptive analysis of the survey data ....................................................... 134 
4.5 Econometric analysis .................................................................................... 142 
4.5.1 The endogeneity issue .............................................................................. 143 
4.5.2 Survey design characteristics ................................................................... 143 
4.5.3 Marginal effects computed using the ‘margins’ command ..................... 145 
4.5.4 Estimation of the ‘confidence’ and ‘credibility’ models as seemingly 
unrelated regressions......................................................................................... 148 
4.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 164 
 
CHAPTER 5: ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECT OF CURRENCY BOARD 
ARRANGEMENTS ON INFLATION PERFORMANCE ................................ 167 
 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 167 
5.2 Theoretical rationale and critical analysis of the empirical evidence ...... 168 
5.3 Characteristics of selected transition countries ......................................... 178 
5.3.1 Choice of sample and sample specifics ................................................... 178 
5.3.2 Major trends in selected transition countries ........................................... 180 
5.4 Estimation of the effect of CBA on inflation .............................................. 185 
5.4.1 Inflation determinants .............................................................................. 185 
5.4.2 Descriptive statistics and model specification ......................................... 198 
5.4.3 Static panel model estimations ................................................................ 199 
5.4.4 Dynamic panel model estimations ........................................................... 208 
5.4.5 Examining differences between CBAs .................................................... 214 
5.4.6 Comparison between preferred static and preferred dynamic estimations216 
5.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 217 
 
 
v 
 
CHAPTER 6: ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF CURRENCY BOARD 
ARRANGEMENTS ON MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ................ 220 
 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 220 
6.2 Estimation of the effect of CBA on growth ................................................ 221 
6.2.1 Growth theories and the effect of monetary/ER regimes on growth ....... 221 
6.2.2 Growth determinants in transition economies ......................................... 223 
6.2.3 Descriptive statistics and model specification ......................................... 235 
6.2.4 Methodology and results .......................................................................... 236 
6.3 Estimation of the effect of CBA on growth volatility ................................ 239 
6.3.1 Growth volatility as a proxy for macroeconomic performance in transition 
countries ............................................................................................................ 239 
6.3.2 Output and growth volatility measures and determinants ....................... 241 
6.3.3 Model specification and descriptive statistics ......................................... 252 
6.3.4 Estimation strategies and results .............................................................. 254 
6.4 The effect of a CBA on the subjective assessment of a country’s economic 
performance ........................................................................................................ 256 
6.4.1 Theoretical background and model specifications ................................... 257 
6.4.2 Estimation issues and results ................................................................... 262 
6.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 273 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS............................................................................ 275 
 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 275 
7.2 Main findings and contributions to knowledge ......................................... 276 
7.3 Policy implications ........................................................................................ 282 
7.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research ..................................... 288 
 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 292 
 
 
  
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Appendices  
 
Appendix 1.1: World Governance Indicators, 2011 ................................................ 325 
Appendix 2.1: Trends in macroeconomic variables in European transition countries 
(1998-2012) .............................................................................................................. 331 
Appendix 3.1: Interest rates on short-term and long-term loans in BH, Croatia, 
Estonia and Latvia and Macedonia .......................................................................... 341 
Appendix 4.1: General description of the survey data (socio-demographic 
characteristics).......................................................................................................... 342 
Appendix 4.2: Responses to the questions about the local currency stability and the 
stability of euro ........................................................................................................ 346 
Appendix 4.3: Correlation matrix between the questions of interest ....................... 360 
Appendix 4.4: Responses to the questions about the economic situation in a country 
and trust in government ............................................................................................ 361 
Appendix 4.5: SUR results of the 'credibility' model (country as cluster) ............... 368 
Appendix 4.6: Testing for the joint significance of the variables used in the 
'credibility' model ..................................................................................................... 381 
Appendix 4.7: SUR results of the 'credibility' model (region as cluster) ................. 382 
Appendix 4.8: Robustness check of the 'credibility' model - question about 
perceptions of financial stability in a country included (SUR, cluster country, 
weighted) .................................................................................................................. 391 
Appendix 4.9: Robustness check of the 'credibility' model - questions about 
perceptions of financial stability in a country and perceptions and expectations about 
the financial situation of a household included (SUR, cluster country, weighted) .. 395 
Appendix 4.10: Robustness check of the 'credibility' model - large database used, 
'trust in government' variable excluded (SUR, cluster country, weighted) .............. 399 
Appendix 4.11: Robustness check of the 'credibility' model - without interaction 
terms (SUR, cluster country, weighted) ................................................................... 403 
Appendix 4.12: Single equation (probit) – current local currency stability ............. 410 
Appendix 4.13: Single equation (probit) - future local currency stability ............... 419 
Appendix 4.14 Multinomial probit and probit without the interaction terms – ....... 429 
Appendix 5.1: Correlation matrix between explanatory variables........................... 435 
Appendix 5.2: Estimation of inflation regression by OLS ....................................... 435 
Appendix 5.3: Estimation of inflation regression by FE and RE model + Hausman 
test ............................................................................................................................ 436 
Appendix 5.4: Inflation model - Between and within variance for all variables ..... 438 
Appendix 5.5: Inflation model - FEVD (with 4 CBA countries) ............................. 439 
Appendix 5.6: Inflation model - System GMM (4 CBA countries) MSG and CCBI 
treated as endogenous .............................................................................................. 445 
Appendix 5.7: Inflation model - Calculation of the long-run coefficient on CBA .. 456 
Appendix 5.8: Inflation model - FEVD (strong and weak CBA) ............................ 456 
Appendix 5.9. Inflation model - Strong and weak CBA - System GMM ................ 460 
Appendix 5.10: Inflation model - Calculation of the long-run coefficients on 
strongCBA and weakCBA ....................................................................................... 475 
Appendix 5.11: Inflation model - Preferred dynamic model with ‘defactofix’ variable 
treated as endogenous .............................................................................................. 476 
Appendix 6.1: Growth model - Correlation matrix .................................................. 479 
Appendix 6.2: Growth model – OLS estimation and diagnostic tests ..................... 479 
Appendix 6.3: Growth model - OLS with country-time dummies for outliers – 
estimation and diagnostic tests ................................................................................. 483 
 
 
vii 
 
Appendix 6.4: Growth model – Fixed and random effects estimations ................... 485 
Appendix 6.5: Growth model - FEVD ..................................................................... 487 
Appendix 6.6: Growth model – separating a CBA to strong and weak - FEVD ..... 494 
Appendix 6.7: Dynamic estimation of growth model .............................................. 500 
Appendix 6.8: Growth volatility model - Correlation matrix .................................. 509 
Appendix 6.9: Growth volatility model - OLS and FE estimations and diagnostic 
tests ........................................................................................................................... 509 
Appendix 6.10: Growth volatility model - Between and within effects .................. 511 
Appendix 6.11: Growth volatility model - FEVD ................................................... 512 
Appendix 6.12: Growth volatility model - Dividing a CBA variable to strong and 
weak ......................................................................................................................... 516 
Appendix 6.13: Subjective assessments - Correlation matrix .................................. 520 
Appendix 6.14: Subjective assessments of economic situation (SUR estimation 
(country used as cluster)) ......................................................................................... 520 
Appendix 6.15: Subjective assessments of the economic situation in a country(SUR 
estimation (region used as cluster)).......................................................................... 543 
Appendix 6.16: Subjective assessments – Robustness check (SUR estimation 
(country used as cluster weighted)).......................................................................... 550 
Appendix 6.17: Subjective assessments - Single equations - Perceptions about 
economic situation in a country (country as a cluster) ............................................. 565 
Appendix 6.18: Subjective assessments - Single equations - Expectations about 
economic situation in a country (country as a cluster) ............................................. 573 
Appendix 6.19: Multinomial probits (with ‘do not know’ category and without 
interaction terms) and comparison with probits without the interaction terms ........ 581 
 
  
 
 
viii 
 
List of Tables  
 
Table 1.1: EBRD transition indicators (1995-2013) .................................................. 28 
Table 1.2: Selected economic indicators, Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000 – 2013) ... 33 
Table 1.3: Monthly Balance Sheet (final) of the CBBH as of 31st December of each 
year ............................................................................................................................. 41 
Table 1.4: BH's balance of payments (2000-2013) .................................................... 45 
Table 1.5: Average reserve requirements (2005-2013) .............................................. 50 
Table 1.6: Consolidated balance of commercial banks in BH: Selected items .......... 52 
Table 2.1: Differences in the role of a central bank in a CBA regime ....................... 63 
Table 2.2: IMF’s Classification of exchange rate arrangements and compatible 
monetary policy frameworks...................................................................................... 75 
Table 2.3: The main deviations of modern CBAs from orthodox currency board rules
 .................................................................................................................................... 92 
Table 2.4: Fulfilment of Maastricht criteria in EU but not yet EMU countries ......... 97 
Table 3.1: Summary of the studies investigating the CBA’s sustainability (in 
chronological order) ................................................................................................. 104 
Table 4.1: Percentage of ‘do not know’ answers and the level of education of those 
respondents ............................................................................................................... 124 
Table 4.2: Answers to the questions of interest in CBA and non-CBA countries (in 
percentages of total respondents in particular group) (controlled for weights) ....... 136 
Table 4.3: Perceptions and expectations about the stability of the local currency vs. 
the stability of the euro (controlled for weights) ...................................................... 139 
Table 4.4: SUR results - Estimation of the ‘credibility’ model (as specified in 
Equation 4.1 ............................................................................................................. 154 
Table 4.5: The effect of having a CBA compared to not having a CBA on 
perceptions/expectations about the local currency stability at different levels of trust 
in government, perceptions and expectations about the economic situation ........... 157 
Table 4.6a: SUR results (the first part) - robustness checks for the ‘credibility’ model 
(the results for the first two columns continue in Table 4.6b) ................................. 161 
Table 4.6a: SUR results (the first part - continuing) - robustness checks for the 
‘credibility’ model .................................................................................................... 162 
Table 4.6b: SUR results (the second part) - robustness checks for the ‘credibility’ 
model (the results of the first two columns from Table 4.6a continuing) ................ 163 
Table 5.1: Summary of the empirical research of the currency board effect on 
inflation and growth ................................................................................................. 171 
Table 5.2: Inflation regression variables – label, description, expected sign and data 
source ....................................................................................................................... 196 
Table 5.3: Comparison of average trends in inflation and inflation determinants 
between countries with a CBA and countries with other regimes ........................... 198 
Table 5.4: Results from the OLS and FEVD - Equations 5.1-5.4 ............................ 204 
Table 5.5a: Results from the one-step ‘system’ GMM - Estimation of Equation 5.10 
and 5.11 .................................................................................................................... 212 
Table 5.5b: Diagnostic tests for the estimations with one step ‘system’ GMM ...... 212 
Table 5.6a: Strong and weak CBA specifications estimated by FEVD and ‘system’ 
GMM ........................................................................................................................ 214 
Table 5.6b: Diagnostic tests for the estimations with one step ‘system’ GMM ...... 215 
Table 5.7: Comparison of the long run coefficients on CBA, strong CBA and weak 
CBA from the preferred static and dynamic model ................................................. 217 
 
 
ix 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of the empirical research of the growth determinants in 
transition countries ................................................................................................... 225 
Table 6.2: Growth regression variables – label, description, expected sign and data 
source ....................................................................................................................... 234 
Table 6.3: Comparison of average trends in GDP growth and growth determinants 
between countries with a CBA (four countries) and countries with other regimes 
(twenty one countries) .............................................................................................. 235 
Table 6.4: Summary of the empirical research on the effect of different ERRs on 
output growth and volatility ..................................................................................... 247 
Table 6.5: Growth volatility regression variables – label, description, expected sign 
and data source ......................................................................................................... 251 
Table 6.6: Comparison of average trends in GDP growth volatility and growth 
volatility determinants between countries with a CBA and countries with other 
regimes ..................................................................................................................... 253 
Table 6.7: SUR results - Estimation of the perceptions/expectations about the 
economic situation in a country (as specified in Equations 6.7, number of 
observations: 40,832) ............................................................................................... 265 
Table 6.8a:  SUR results (the first part) - robustness checks ................................... 270 
Table 6.8b: SUR results (the second part) - robustness checks (continuing results 
from the first three columns from Table 6.8a) ......................................................... 271 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Inflation rates in BH and the Eurozone ................................................... 34 
Figure 1.2: Monetary aggregates in BH – schematic illustration............................... 43 
Figure 1.3: Monetary aggregates in BH (2000-2013) ................................................ 44 
Figure 1.4a: Monetary multipliers for BH (2000-2013) ............................................ 46 
Figure 1.4b: Money multipliers (calculated as a ratio between the broad money and 
the monetary base) for selected Central and South Eastern European countries ....... 46 
Figure 1.5: Financial market development indicators (1-7 best) for the selected 
countries ..................................................................................................................... 47 
Figure 1.6: Changes in the reserve requirement rate and the total reserves held by 
banks in CBBH .......................................................................................................... 49 
Figure 1.7: Long-term interest rates in BH, Austria and Euribor 12-months ............ 56 
Figure 1.8: The structure of commercial banks’ loans and deposits by currency ...... 57 
Figure 2.1: CBA’s strengths/benefits and weaknesses/costs diagram ....................... 82 
Figure 3.1 Sustainability and desirability of a CBA ................................................ 101 
Figure 4.1: Determinants of the confidence and credibility in a monetary 
authority/policy ........................................................................................................ 128 
Figure 4.2a: Perceptions about the local currency’s stability in CBA and non-CBA 
countries ................................................................................................................... 137 
Figure 4.2b: Expectations about the local currency’s stability in CBA and non-CBA 
countries ................................................................................................................... 137 
Figure 4.2c: Expectations about the exchange rate between the euro and local 
currency in CBA and non-CBA countries ............................................................... 138 
Figure 4.3a: Perceptions about the economic situation in CBA and non-CBA 
countries ................................................................................................................... 140 
Figure 4.3b: Expectations about the economic situation in CBA and non-CBA 
countries ................................................................................................................... 140 
Figure 4.3c: Trust in government in CBA and non-CBA countries ........................ 141 
 
 
x 
 
Figure 4.4a: The average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of high current 
confidence and expectations about local currency stability conditional on the level of 
trust in government .................................................................................................. 155 
Figure 4.4b: The average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of high current 
confidence and expectations about local currency stability conditional on perceptions 
about current economic situation ............................................................................. 156 
Figure 4.4c: The average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of high current 
confidence and expectations about local currency stability conditional on 
expectations about future economic improvement .................................................. 156 
Figure 5.1: Regional patterns of progress in transition (according to the EBRD 
aggregate index) for CEB, SEE and CIS countries .................................................. 181 
Figure 5.2: Average Cukierman’s central bank independence index (updated) for 
CEB, SEE and CIS countries ................................................................................... 182 
Figure 5.3: Real GDP growth (in percentage changes) in CEB, SEE and CIS counties
 .................................................................................................................................. 183 
Figure 5.4: Real GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) in CEB, SEE and CIS 
countries prior to the sample period (1990-1998) .................................................... 183 
Figure 5.5: Inflation rates (measured as percentage changes in consumer price index) 
in CEB, SEE and CIS countries ............................................................................... 184 
Figure 5.6 The average marginal effect of CBA on inflation conditional on money 
supply growth ........................................................................................................... 213 
Figure 5.7 The average marginal effect of strong CBA on inflation conditional on 
money supply growth ............................................................................................... 216 
Figure 6.1: Volatility of real GDP growth in CEB, SEE and CIS counties ............. 240 
Figure 6.2: Volatility of real GDP growth in countries with CBA and countries with 
other regimes ............................................................................................................ 252 
Figure 6.3: The average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of high current 
confidence and expectations about the economic situation in a country conditional on 
the level of trust in government ............................................................................... 268 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AME - Average marginal effect 
BAM - The international code for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s currency 
BH - Bosnia and Herzegovina  
CA - Current account 
CBA - Currency board arrangement  
CBBH - Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CBI - Central bank independence  
CCBI – Cukierman’s Central bank independence index 
CEB - Central Eastern Europe and Baltic  
CEFTA - Central European Free Trade Agreement 
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States  
CP - Consumer price  
CPI - Consumer price index 
EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
ECB - European Central Bank 
EMU - European Monetary Union 
ER - Exchange rate 
 
 
xi 
 
ERMII - Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
ERR - Exchange rate regime  
EU - European Union 
Euribor- Euro interbank offered rate 
FBH - Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
FDI - Foreign direct investment 
FE - Fixed effect 
FED - Federal Reserve System 
FEVD - Fixed effect vector decomposition  
FMDI - Financial market development indicator 
FR - Foreign reserves 
GARCH - Generalised AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity  
GDP - Gross domestic product 
GFC - Global financial crisis  
GMM - General methods of moments 
HIBOR - Hong Kong Interbank Offer Rate  
i.d.d - Independent and identically distributed 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
IT - Inflation targeting 
LFS - Labour force survey  
LIBOR - London Interbank Offered Rates 
LLR - Lender-of-last resort  
LR - Long-run 
MB - Monetary base 
MER - Marginal effect at representative values 
OCA - Optimum currency area 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OeNB - Österreichische Nationalbank (Austrian National Bank) 
QM - Quasi money  
R - Reserves 
RE - Random effect 
REER - Real effective exchange rate  
RP - retail price 
RS - Republika Srpska 
SD - Standard deviation  
SDR - Special Drawing Right 
SEE - South-Eastern Europe 
SEs - Standard errors 
SFRY - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
SR - Short-run 
SUR - Seemingly unrelated regression 
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme 
US - United States 
USD - United States dollar 
VAR - Vector autoregression 
VAT - Value-added tax 
VCE - Variance component estimation   
 
 
xii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would like to thank OSI and Staffordshire University for giving me this great 
opportunity to do my PhD at Staffordshire University. There are no words to express 
my gratefulness to my principal supervisor, Professor Nick Adnett, who was giving 
me a great support through all four years of my PhD study. His commitment and 
constant encouragement gave me incentive to always aim to do the best I can. I am 
also very thankful for all the useful comments and long discussions with my second 
supervisor, Professor Geoff Pugh. The feedback and guidance of my supervisors are 
greatly responsible for the achieved quality of this research programme and it was a 
great pleasure and honour to learn from both of them. I am also thankful to external 
examiner, Professor Eric Pentecost and internal examiner, Professor Mehtap 
Hisarciklilar, for their useful comments and suggestions.  
 
I am very grateful to Thomas Scheiber from the Austrian National Bank for making 
it possible to get the access to some of the survey data from the Austrian National 
Bank (OeNB Euro Survey) which are used for some of the analyses in this research. I 
would also like to express my deep gratitude to my local advisor, Professor Fikret 
Čaušević and to Professor Sead Kreso, for giving me constant support, for reminding 
me to think within the context of specific local circumstances and for helping me 
better understand the local conditions. I would like to thank my grandmother, parents 
and sister for always being there for me and for giving me a great support in all my 
endeavours in life. Having my best friend Merima with me all the time during this 
PhD was one of the greatest things of this PhD. Many thanks to all PhD students, 
especially my housemates, and Staffordshire employees who helped me with their 
advice and made my stays in Stoke comfortable and enjoyable. This PhD was 
challenging and very useful for my professional maturing and I enjoyed almost every 
moment of it.   
 
 
13 
 
Preface 
 
Since the abandonment of the gold standard, there has been a continuing debate 
about the most appropriate monetary and exchange rate regime. Although it has been 
suggested that the appropriateness of a specific monetary and exchange rate regime 
depends on the country’s size, income, the level of openness and some other 
characteristics, there is little evidence that a particular regime is more appropriate for 
certain (types of) countries than others (Rose, 2011). The recent crisis confirmed the 
importance of monetary/exchange rate policy as a stabilisation tool. The monetary 
authorities of many economies, especially the large ones, reacted aggressively to the 
global financial crisis (GFC) in order to mitigate its effect on the real sector. 
However, most of the economies that had rigid monetary and exchange rate regimes 
before the crisis retained them during the crisis, even though these regimes prevented 
countries from insulating themselves from the spillover effects of foreign capital 
flows. According to Rose (2013), economies with very rigid regimes (hard pegs) 
performed similarly to those with more flexible regime (inflation targeting) during 
and after the GFC. Although one should not conclude from this finding that, the type 
of the regime does not matter. If the Federal Reserve System, European Central Bank 
and the Bank of England had pursued more rigid regimes during the GFC, which 
would have prevented them from reacting aggressively to mitigate the shock, the 
crisis may have had worse consequences on their and other countries’ economies. On 
the other hand, if countries with rigid regimes had had more flexibility they may 
have been better able to protect their economies.  
 
In European countries that experienced periods of high inflation at the beginning of 
their transition to market economies, the introduction of fixed exchange rate regimes 
helped in lowering their inflation rates and in establishing monetary stability (for 
more details see Inoue, 2005). Some European transition countries introduced an 
even stricter regime than a fixed exchange rate in order to establish and maintain 
monetary stability. Besides fixing the exchange rate to some foreign currency this 
regime, called a currency board arrangement (CBA), also requires maintenance of 
100 percent backing of its monetary base with foreign exchange. Under a CBA, 
central banks have very limited discretion and restricted ability to use monetary 
policy instruments. This regime was widely used in British colonies in the first half 
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of the twentieth century to facilitate monetary relationships between the colonies and 
the ‘mother’ country. It again became popular in 1990s in transition economies: 
Estonia introduced it in 1992, Lithuania 1994, Bulgaria 1997 and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1997. In BH and Bulgaria it is still in use, while Estonia and Lithuania 
implemented the regime until the accession to the European Monetary Union in 2011 
and 2015, respectively).  
 
Modern CBAs have been introduced in countries that needed to achieve 
macroeconomic stability and credibility and which are in the process of transition to 
a market economy and/or desire to integrate further with the country to whose 
currency they are pegging. Although it has frequently been associated with the 
achievement of these desired goals, its overall effect on economic performance is not 
straightforward, since a currency board may inhibit economic growth, especially in a 
period of financial crisis, as monetary policy actions are constrained. Therefore, it is 
likely that the sustainability and desirability of the regime depend on the specific 
circumstances in the country.  
 
The sustainability of a monetary policy (and a CBA specifically) may be defined as 
the capability of the monetary authority to maintain its announced policy (which is 
under a CBA the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate) in the medium-to-long run1, 
while sustaining economic stability, especially during a crisis. The latter is also 
related to the desirability of the regime since its effect on macroeconomic stability 
and performance affects the appropriateness and attractiveness of the regime. To 
investigate the sustainability and desirability of a CBA regime, its effect on the 
credibility of the monetary authority and macroeconomic performance needs to be 
analysed. If credibility is increased, as expected, inflation expectations should be 
lower and consequently inflation rates should be maintained at lower levels. 
Monetary stability and low inflation rates, if achieved, are further likely to increase 
overall macroeconomic stability in a country. On the other hand, under a CBA, a 
central bank cannot stimulate growth or provide a buffer to shocks. However, the 
overall effect of a CBA depends also on the initial state of the economy, specific 
(political and institutional) circumstances and the degree of exposure to crises 
                                                                
1 For European transition countries this 'medium-to-long run' period can be argued to be the period 
until EMU accession. 
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(Blackburn and Christensen, 1989; Desquilbet and Nenovsky, 2007). By estimating 
the effect on credibility and overall macroeconomic performance, we can draw 
conclusions regarding the appropriateness of the monetary policy for specific 
countries in a specific period. Although this empirical analysis is conducted for all 
European transition countries with a CBA for which the data is available, the 
implications of the analyses are discussed in more length for the country of interest, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH). 
 
In 1997, after the civil war (1992-1995), BH adopted a CBA as its solution to 
achieving monetary and overall macroeconomic stabilisation in the post-war period. 
As BH is currently moving towards accession to the European Union (the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed in June 2008), an important 
question concerns the appropriateness of the monetary regime that is currently in use. 
BH is a country that needs additional investment to build its infrastructure, support 
the development of the real sector and promote economic growth. However, 
commercial banks’ lending interest rates are high and conditions for receiving a loan 
are hard to meet. Under a CBA, a central bank cannot affect those interest rates and 
conditions, nor can it help to finance the government’s development projects. Since 
implementation of this regime prevents a country from using one of the most 
important macroeconomic tools for stimulating economic growth and buffering 
shocks, the maintenance of this regime can be justified only if its effect on 
macroeconomic stability is high, especially when the other tool, fiscal policy, is weak 
and limited. In BH fiscal revenues are limited due to the high level of unemployment 
and large shadow economy. On the expenditure side, most of the government 
spending is directed to financing the large government administration sector, 
reflecting the nature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and the high social benefits 
(partially due to a large number of war invalids and soldiers’ families which are 
supported from the governments’ budget). However, in a politically disintegrated 
country, that lacks high quality institutions and rule of law, like BH, discretionary 
monetary policy could have resulted in irresponsible decisions and direction of more 
expenditure into unproductive areas. This would eventually undermine monetary 
credibility, raise inflation and overall instability. Therefore, the sustainability and 
desirability of the regime depend on specific national circumstances that should be 
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investigated and controlled for in the empirical analysis and considered when making 
assessments about the appropriateness of a regime for a specific country.  
 
The research programme reported in this thesis addresses a gap in the literature. 
Studies of the CBA in BH are relatively scarce and lack any empirical analysis of its 
sustainability and desirability. There are some cross-country studies that have 
estimated the effect of CBAs on macroeconomic performance (proxied by inflation, 
growth and growth volatility), but they categorised this regime as a hard peg2, not as 
a monetary framework and included both developing and developed countries in 
their analyses (Gosh et al., 1998, 2000; Wolf et al., 2008). However, as noted above, 
a CBA is more than a hard peg regime, since the abilities and limitations of monetary 
policy are specified within the regime and it should therefore be treated as a unique 
monetary framework. Moreover, developed and developing countries have different 
characteristics and hence Frankel (2010) argued should be treated separately. Some 
studies have investigated the sustainability of a CBA regime in a particular country 
by observing differences in the money market interest rates in the CBA and anchor 
currency country (Alavez-Plata and Schrooten, 2003; Ho and Ho, 2009). Others have 
examined the macroeconomic performance of a country with a CBA subject to 
external shocks (Sepp and Randver, 2002a; Minea and Rault, 2011). We argue that 
the usage of subjective attitudes for the evaluation of a CBA’s sustainability and 
desirability is preferable, especially when only a short time span of data for 
macroeconomic variables is available, as is the case for most of the European 
transition countries. 
 
In order to investigate the sustainability and desirability of a CBA, with special 
reference to BH, this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 starts with an 
introduction to the main macroeconomic trends and the progress of transition of BH. 
The major part of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the monetary policy and 
financial sector in BH. The reasons for the introduction of the CBA and trends in the 
main monetary variables in BH are presented. By analysing the trends in the 
                                                                
2 Studies in which a panel of countries was used estimated the effect by including a full set of dummy 
variables for different exchange rate regimes, treating a CBA as a type of the hard peg (Ghosh et al., 
1998, 2000; Wolf et al., 2008). 
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financial and real sectors after the introduction of the CBA, the context for the 
estimation of the medium-run desirability and sustainability of the CBA in BH is set.  
 
In Chapter 2, the origins of the CBA from the gold standard and its evolution 
through time are examined. This chapter elaborates the main characteristics of a 
CBA and its strengths and weaknesses. The framework of a CBA is outlined and the 
approach to using this variable in the empirical analyses in the thesis is explained. 
The effect of a CBA is estimated by the inclusion of dummy variable, which allows 
us to compare its effect with that of all other monetary-exchange rate combinations 
used in other countries in the sample. In comparison with the cross-country studies 
mentioned above, this approach simplifies the model and saves degrees of freedom 
therefore gaining efficiency for the small sample properties. Finally, the CBA regime 
is discussed in the context of transition (CBAs in Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and 
BH).  
 
In Chapter 3, after examining the concepts of sustainability and desirability of a 
CBA, studies that have investigated the sustainability of a CBA are critically 
assessed. The main features of a CBA’s sustainability and desirability, and the 
interrelation between the two, are explored. The most important feature of a 
monetary policy’s sustainability, its credibility, is discussed in detail. The specific 
approaches to assessing the sustainability and desirability of a CBA, which are 
applied in the empirical analyses in the following chapters, are introduced and 
explained. Chapter 4 assesses monetary policy credibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Bulgaria. The increased credibility of the monetary authority is the most 
emphasised advantage of a currency board arrangement. This credibility is usually 
argued to be the main source of the regime’s stability and sustainability, since it is 
expected not only to reduce the time-inconsistency problem and therefore to provide 
lower inflation expectations, but also to lower speculative attacks, contribute to 
macroeconomic stability and attract foreign investment. As an indicator of the 
credibility of the monetary authority/regime the perceptions and expectations of 
residents about the stability of their local currency are used. Using a sample of 
transition countries with and without a CBA enables the estimation of the effect of 
CBA on the perceptions/expectations of currency’s stability, after controlling for 
other relevant factors. In addition, the effects of a CBA conditional on residents’ 
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level of trust in government and their perceptions/expectations about the economic 
situation in a country are investigated. These analyses are conducted through a 
biprobit model using the evidence from the surveys conducted from 2009 to 2011 by 
the Austrian National Bank (OeNB Euro Survey). This is a novel and, it is argued in 
this thesis, a superior approach to assessing the credibility of a monetary authority. 
The OeNB surveys were exclusively made available for this research by the Austrian 
National Bank and have not previously been used outside the Bank or indeed for this 
kind of research3. 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the concepts of sustainability and desirability are 
intertwined and a CBA’s positive effect on monetary credibility is likely to lower 
inflation rates and increase macroeconomic stability. In Chapter 5 the effect of CBA 
on inflation is investigated by comparing the inflation performance into countries 
with and without a CBA through a (static and dynamic) panel analysis that includes 
transition countries. Moreover, countries with CBA are divided to strong (more 
strict) and weak (more flexible) CBA in order to investigate whether more rigid rules 
improve inflation performance. This is just one part of the investigation of CBA’s 
desirability. In Chapter 6, its effect on growth, growth volatility and subjective 
perceptions/expectations about the economic situation in country are investigated. 
Since, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, there are reasons to doubt whether 
the effect of monetary regime (and CBA specifically) on growth and growth 
volatility can be accurately observed, in the second part of this chapter a new strategy 
for estimating the effect of CBA on macroeconomic performance is developed and 
applied. This strategy relies on the usage of residents’ subjective evaluations of 
national economic performance as an indicator of overall country’s performance, 
again using the Austrian National Bank surveys. In Chapter 7 the main findings, 
contributions and limitations of the analyses conducted in the thesis are elaborated. 
In addition, conclusions regarding the medium-run desirability and sustainability of 
the CBA in BH are drawn from the above analyses, taking the specific circumstances 
and future goals of BH into account.  
                                                                
3 Some of the data used in this analysis (in Chapters 4 and 6) are derived from the OeNB Euro Survey 
which have been provided by the OeNB solely for research purposes. These data are obtained under 
special contractual arrangements from the OeNB and are not available from the author. 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) is a small, open, Western Balkan country, which 
became independent in 1992. During the period 1992-1995 BH experienced a severe 
war, which resulted in human and economic losses. Since BH had no experience in 
discretionary central banking, confidence and economic stability in the country had 
to be restored, BH adopted a currency board arrangement (CBA) as a monetary 
regime. This regime was first introduced in some British colonies in order to 
completely anchor the monetary regime of colonies with Britain’s monetary policy. 
This regime in BH was set by the Dayton Arrangement, which was signed in 1995, 
which brought the war to its end. The implementation of the regime started in 1997. 
This type of regime was argued to be needed given the complex process of transition 
in unstable circumstances in a country after the war. Prasnikar et al. (2003) identified 
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three processes of transition that were happening simultaneously in BH after the war: 
a transition from a wartime economy to a peacetime economy; a transition to 
nationhood and a transition from a command economy to a market-oriented 
economy. In these circumstances a rigid regime was needed to assure the neutrality 
of the monetary regime from political influence and pressures. However, the low 
level of development and low flexibility of other sectors and mechanisms (such as 
the trade sector and price and wage flexibility) in the economy may question the 
sustainability and the desirability of the regime in the medium-to-long term. As noted 
in the Preface this chapter aims at investigating these other sectors and mechanisms 
in the country, which will contribute to drawing overall conclusions about the 
regime’s sustainability and desirability.  
 
In the first part of this chapter (Section 1.2) the main trends in the economy after the 
war to the present time and the progress of transition will be critically assessed. The 
specific circumstances, due to which the CBA was introduced at the first place, will 
be presented and assessed in the context of whether that regime should be maintained 
revised or abandoned after seventeen years of operation. Since this monetary regime 
is rigid, other flexibilities, such as the flexibility (and soundness) of fiscal policy, as 
well as flexibilities of prices and wages, will be appraised. Moreover, key trends in 
the economy, such as the level of external debt, current account deficits, the level of 
unemployment and movements of the real exchange rate, which may also affect 
sustainability and desirability of the CBA, will be investigated. In the second part of 
the chapter the main characteristics and operation of the CBA in BH will be 
analysed. Furthermore, the degree of convergence with the anchor currency zone will 
be investigated and the extent of financial sector (in)stability assessed. The main 
limitations and threats from the financial sector, which functions within the CBA 
framework, will be examined (Section 1.3), especially in the light of the latest global 
financial crisis (GFC).     
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1.2 The macroeconomic situation in BH – historical facts and recent trends 
 
1.2.1 The pre-war role of BH in ex-Yugoslavia, the impact of war and the 
country’s post-war constitution 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small, open economy with a population of 3,791,622 
people4. It is a multinational country with three major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs 
and Croats). According to the pre-war census, BH’s population was 4.4 million of 
which: 44 percent declared themselves as Bosniaks, 31 percent as Serbs, 17 percent 
as Croats, and 5 percent as Yugoslavs (Agency for Statistics of BH, 1991)5. From 
1963 until 1992 BH was one of the six socialist republics of Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, SFRY6. As a federal unit of the SFRY, BH was one of the 
major providers of raw materials and energy for the economic development of the 
country. Furthermore, it was one of the three Yugoslav republics which had a 
positive balance of foreign trade between 1985 and 1991, as a result of extensive 
production and export of medium and higher value-added industrial products 
(Dželilović and Čaušević, 2007). 
 
At the end of 1991 Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from the 
SFRY. In March 1992 BH also declared independence, as a result of a majority vote 
in the independence referendum. This resulted in a boycott by the great majority of 
Serbs which escalated into the open warfare in April 1992. Just after the beginning of 
the war, in May 1992, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted to the 
membership in the United Nations. During the period 1992 - 1995 BH experienced a 
war, which was described as the worst in Europe since World War II. The losses 
were huge: about 200,000 people were dead or missing; about a million people left 
the country; overall war damage was estimated US$60-80 billion; by 1996 GDP had 
shrunk to less than a third of its pre-war level (GDP per capita had collapsed to less 
than US$500); industrial production had fallen more than 90 percent; at the end of 
                                                                
4This is the preliminary result of the 2013 census of population, households and dwellings in Bosnia     
and Herzegovina (Agency for Statistics of BH). 
5 In preliminary results of the latest census, which was conducted in 2013, there is no data on ethnic 
groups. According to informal results published in the local newspapers this structure in 2013 was: 
48.4 Bosniaks, 32.7 Serbs, 14.6 Croats and 4.3 ‘others’.   
6 Until 1991 SFRY consisted of: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, 
and Slovenia. In this constitution it was first established in 1918 under the name of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and in 1945 it was renamed the Democratic Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and finally to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) since 1963.  
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1996 unemployment was about 45 percent, and those employed were infrequently 
and poorly paid (World Bank, 1997). Beside the massive destruction of physical 
capital, trade channels were disrupted, many people lost their jobs and savings, much 
agricultural land was mined and government, institutions and the legal system were 
destroyed (European Commission and World Bank, 1999).  
 
The war was brought to an end by the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. 
Although the Dayton Peace Agreement established BH as a sovereign country it did 
not bring economic or political unity or pacification to the country. As defined in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement BH is a state with two entities (the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, FBH, and Republika Srpska, RS) and these entities were given a 
range of responsibilities, including many which are typically held by national 
governments, such as: internal affairs, taxation and customs administration, 
agriculture, energy, health and social policies, which point to the complex political 
and institutional environment in the country after the war. FBH further consists of 
ten cantons, which also have a high range of responsibilities. Additionally, following 
a decision by the International Arbitration Commission for Brčko, in 2000, Brčko 
District became a third division, independent of both entities. Although without 
many crucial competences, the state-level institutional structure, as determined by 
Dayton Peace Agreement, is also complex, with a Presidency that consists of three 
(rotating) members, one from each ethnic group, a Council of Ministers (executive 
branch) and a Parliamentary Assembly that consists of the House of Representatives 
and House of Peoples. This political and economic fragmentation of the country has 
constrained the formation of a single economic space and the implementation of 
economic reforms.  
 
Synchronisation of policies in key areas has not yet been achieved by the entities and 
since ethnic parties still continue to dominate the political environment, the base for 
sustainable growth and development is still not fully established. Even though not 
specified in the Dayton Agreement, the High Representative, who was appointed by 
the United Nations Security Council, has played an important role in the post-war 
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period in BH, due to the inability of the BH government to agree on the major issues7 
(such as the enforcement of a new currency, the establishment of some of the key 
state institutions and laws at the state level). Although it was introduced as a 
transition institutional framework the High Representative is still present today 
which implies that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not yet functioning as an integrated 
state and that the international community still plays an important role in BH. When 
BH became a member of the International Monetary Fund, IMF, (in 1992) and the 
World Bank (in 1996) economic reforms and transition towards a market-oriented 
economy were a compulsory element of the internationally assisted reconstruction 
programme (Dželilović et al., 2004). Therefore, the process of transition towards a 
free market economy has been conducted at the same time as the process of 
reconstruction, before the grounds for an efficient transition were set. This process 
will be critically assessed in the next section as it is important for setting the 
framework in which the CBA has been functioning.  
 
1.2.2 The process of transition towards a market-oriented economy  
 
Although it was initiated immediately after the war, the process of transition towards 
a free market economy in reality did not start until the late nineties, due to 
infrastructural and institutional constraints, as well as political disagreements 
between the entities. The adoption of state-level laws and the implementation of 
policies which required some degree of state-level policy making were frequently 
boycotted by the entities’ governments, resulting in a failure of BH’s institutions “to 
provide a minimal framework of legislative, executive and judicial authority required 
for the introduction and implementation of reforms” in the first years after the war 
(Dželilović et al., 2004, p.5). Therefore, the international community continued to 
play a major role in supporting the process of transition. This process was primarily 
based on monetary, financial and fiscal reform, privatisation, and trade liberalisation. 
 
 
 
                                                                
7 The High Representative's power was increased from monitoring the implementation of the civilian 
aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement to enforcement of the reforms and progress of transition, and 
legal compliance to decree in the case of unresolved issues at the state level. 
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Monetary and financial reform  
 
During the war and in the following years BH’s monetary and financial sectors were 
unregulated and fragile: there were three agencies acting as central banks: the 
National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the National Bank of Republika Srpska 
and the Mostar ZAP; four currencies were in circulation only one of which, namely 
the deutsche mark, was accepted in the whole country and there were a large number 
of small, fragile commercial banks none of which operated over the whole country. 
All these characteristics, together with the specific economic and political 
circumstances after the war, indicated that there was a need for strict regulation, 
especially in the monetary field. Monetary reform included the establishment of a 
central bank at the state level, and issuing of a (one) national currency called the 
‘konvertibilna marka’ (BAM is the international currency code for the konvertibilna 
marka). Strict rules were set by the establishment of a CBA in 1997, which limited 
the monetary sovereignty of BH in order to eliminate political pressures in the 
monetary field. Additionally, for the first six years a foreign citizen was appointed to 
undertake the governor role. The establishment of a CBA seemed to be the best 
solution for establishing firstly monetary, and then overall, macroeconomic stability 
in a destroyed economy (Kreso, 1997; Kovačević, 2003). Although it can be argued 
that similar results could have been achieved through full euroization as was to be 
the case in Kosovo, the introduction of a national currency had a symbolic meaning 
in terms of the country’s sovereignty after the war (Kreso, 1997). On the other hand, 
the introduction of the CBA prevented the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(CBBH) from influencing the direction of domestic economic activity and from 
directly stimulating economic development. Nineteen years after the end of the war 
BH still operates a CBA which was introduced as a transitional mechanism. This 
suggests that political risks are still present in the country and that the monetary 
authority is still not ready to increase its discretionary powers and to independently 
manage monetary policy (this issue will be discussed more in Section 1.2.4 where 
recent trends in the country are presented). Another indicator of current political risk 
is evident in the structure of the CBBH. Namely, the members of the governing 
board are chosen by Presidency and were usually involved in politics prior to their 
nomination to the Board. Moreover, the members of the Board and vice governors 
(which are chosen by the Board) are chosen primarily on the basis of their ethnicity 
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(so that the main ethnic groups are represented) rather than their expertise in central 
banking. Furthermore, beside a head office in the capital, CBBH has three main 
units: one in Republika Srpska and two in FBH; and two branches; one in Brčko 
District and the other one in Republika Srpska.  
 
Financial sector reform was one of the most rapid areas of reform during early 
transition. It involved reform of the payments system (BH was the first country in the 
region to reform their system8), privatisation of the banks, elimination of the state 
control over interest rates, free entry of foreign banks and free international 
movement of capital. It was primarily based on commercial banking sector reform, 
as the commercial banks played the major role in the BH’s financial sector since the 
war, with the big share of foreign-owned banks (this will be discussed in more details 
in Section 1.3.4). Although the presence of foreign banks increased the quantity and 
quality of banking services, they remained largely unwilling to invest in projects 
which could stimulate the development of the BH economy (as will be shown in 
Section 1.3.4).  Due to its undeveloped capital market and other financial institutions, 
as well as limited government expenditure (and the very low share of these 
expenditures supporting economic activity), BH remained a very unfavourable 
environment for business development, which was almost totally dependent on 
commercial banks’ loans.  
 
Apart from the central bank, which was established at the country level, the rest of 
the process of financial liberalisation was implemented at the entities level: the 
establishment of entities’ banking agencies (which are in charge of bank supervision 
and issuing of banking licences), the establishment of the (relatively underdeveloped) 
capital market, with all regulating institutions established at the entity level as well, 
which again points to the problem of complexity and fragmentation of decision-
making in the BH economy. The trends and deficiencies of the monetary and 
financial sectors will be assessed in more detail in Section 1.3. Next, the reforms in 
other sectors will be elaborated.  
                                                                
8 The reform from the centrally organised (and in the case of BH entities based) payment system 
(conducted through entities' institutes for payment transitions, which were controlled by political 
structures) to banks (commercial banks and the Central Bank) led payment system was, on the 
initiative and support of international community, conducted within six months in 2001 in BH and is 
compatible with TARGET interbank payment system 
 (http://www.cbbh.ba/index.php?id=747&lang=hr, last accessed: 27/09/2014). 
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Other reforms and their weaknesses  
 
After the war fiscal policy was conducted wholly by the entities, without any powers 
given to the state. As a result fiscal reform was conducted at a slow pace and was 
driven by political interests rather than economic principles (Dželilović et al., 2004). 
Additionally, the fiscal system of BH is very complicated with a complex 
administrative structure, especially in the FBH, as it consists of ten cantons, which 
are also given high degree of competences. Consequently, the fiscal system in BH is 
usually considered a further obstacle to business development and economic growth, 
as it is too complicated, inefficient and unharmonized between entities. 
Consequently, reform and the process of transition faced many obstacles and were 
conducted at a slower pace and less efficiently than planned. The process of 
transition perhaps started too early, before the economy was recovered and before the 
needed institutional support for the efficient implementation of the process was 
established. A process of privatisation was planned in 1996, though it did not start 
until 1999. Although progress in the process of privatisation is evident, though it is 
not yet completed, there are some criticisms of the process itself. As the international 
community, in order to stimulate transition towards the market economy, directed its 
funds primarily to private companies, BH “rushed” into process of privatisation 
before the conditions for effective conduct of this process were established. These 
conditions primarily relate to the establishment of a capital market, which has an 
essential role in controlling managers through shareholders, as well as the 
development of financial intermediation and a money market (Čaušević, 2007). 
Another issue was a lack of expertise and institutional, technological and legal 
competence/frameworks prior to the introduction of the process of privatisation. The 
process of privatisation was also characterised as “ethnicized”, as it was based on 
entities’ laws and concentrated within the ethnic groups (Čaušević, 2007). 
Additionally, the new owners did not have a contractual obligation to invest in their 
companies which resulted in a lack of funds to finance company restructuring 
(Dželilović et al., 2004).  
 
In 1998 the Foreign Trade Law, which introduced a liberal trade regime in BH, was 
adopted at the state level. This Law set the conditions for bilateral free trade 
agreements (signed from 2001 until 2004), and subsequently multilateral agreement 
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CEFTA, signed in 2006, between South Eastern European countries, and for starting 
negotiations on the accession of BH to the World Trade Organisation. The economy 
started to open up rapidly towards neighbouring countries and the European Union 
(EU). However, trade liberalisation did not have the expected (positive) effects on 
BH’s balance of payment because, before this opening of its borders, the 
restructuring process has not yet been completed. Potential exporters lacked the 
necessary funds which would support their production growth: finance was only 
available under unfavourable conditions (after the war the interest rates were high 
and loans were only available up to 300,000 BAM (153,387.56 euros), which 
hindered the reestablishment of domestic companies and their expansion of 
production). Financial obstacles, together with the lack of supporting institutions 
(such as the institutions for quality control), as well as  the absence of any support 
from government or protection of domestic producers by adequate laws, resulted in a 
persistent trade deficit, which has put direct pressure on the monetary base and 
threatened monetary contractions and depression of the economy when capital 
inflows were insufficient (as under the CBA, the main source of money creation is 
through the balance of payments, as it will be explained in Chapter 2). These reforms 
were part of the overall process of transition that BH has been going through since 
the war. Although there are many weaknesses in this process some progress has been 
made.  
 
1.2.3 Assessing the progress of transition – quantitative and qualitative 
approach  
 
One of the ways of assessing the progress in transition is through observing the 
transition indicators. Even though they have some potential imperfections (the 
subjective nature of the scoring, possible non-transparency of the demarcation 
between categories, and disregard of quality of the assessed processes) the EBRD 
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) transition indicators are the 
most frequently used indicators of the progress in transition. Those indicators assess 
progress in the enterprise sector, markets and trade, financial sector and 
infrastructure (Table 1.1). These indicators imply that the main elements of a market 
economy are now present in BH, in terms of the dominance of private sector activity 
and the presence of price and trade liberalisation. The slowest progress, according to 
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the indicators, was achieved in enterprise reform, implementation of competition 
policy and reform of non-banking financial institutions (the progress in these reforms 
are assigned a grade 2, out of 4, in the last three years, indicating only a small 
movement from a rigid centrally planned economy). According to the EBRD’s 
assessment (EBRD, 2013) BH’s progress in transition in the last few years can only 
be described as very slow. Consequently, BH’s average transition score, as measured 
by the EBRD and reported each year in the Transition Report, is the lowest in 
Central or South Eastern Europe (EBRD, 2010).  
 
Table 1.1: EBRD transition indicators (1995-2013) 
  
Year/indictor 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 
Enterprises 
EBRD index of small-scale privatisation   1.0 2.0 3.0 3 3 
EBRD index of large-scale privatisation   2.0 2.3 2.7 3 3 
EBRD index of enterprise reform   1.0 1.7 2.0 2 2 
Markets and trade 
EBRD index of price liberalisation   1.0 4.0 4.0 4 4 
EBRD index of forex and trade 
liberalisation      
1.0 3.0 3.7 4 4 
EBRD index of competition policy   1.0 1.0 1.0 2 2+ 
Financial sector 
EBRD index of banking sector reform   1.0 2.3 2.7 3 3- 
EBRD index of reform of non-bank 
financial institutions   
1.0 1.0 1.7 2- 2+ 
Infrastructure 
EBRD index of infrastructure reform   1.0 2.0 2.3 3- 2.7 
Note: The transition indicators range from 1 to 4+, with 1 representing little or no change from a 
rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ representing the standards of an industrialised market 
economy.  
  Source: EBRD transition reports, various issues 
 
Although, according to the transition indicators, BH has made progress in many 
fields, there were (and still are) many weaknesses which have undermined the overall 
efficiency of transition and which inhibit further progress. These transition indices 
provide only an overview and do not assess the overall performance of the economy. 
They focus on a specific area at the moment of evaluation and do not assess whether 
the basis for the sustainable development is present. Moreover, these indicators do 
not take into account all specific circumstances and limitations which were 
emphasised in the previous section and which may undermine further progress and 
development. Therefore, a more descriptive approach is necessary which was 
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provided in the previous section where the weaknesses of the post-war reforms were 
examined. The general criticisms of the transition process in BH can be summarized 
as follows.  
 
First, the complex BH constitutional and political structure (established by the 
Dayton Peace Agreement) inhibits creation of a unified economic policy which could 
generate strong economic growth. Namely, the creation of a self-managed and 
sustainable economy is constrained by political obstructions due to the opposed 
interests of the ethnic groups and the difficulty of reaching a consensus between 
those groups regarding issues of interest to all citizens. Second, this division of the 
country was even reinforced during the process of transition by the adoption of laws 
and creation of the supporting institutions at the entities level, which resulted in 
inconsistent implementation of reforms. Third, the state “rushed” into the process of 
transition without sufficient knowledge and necessary expertise for carrying out 
reforms in a comprehensive manner, which resulted in a sporadic and slow reform 
process (Dželilović et al., 2004). Fourth, the process of transition was initiated and 
supported by the international community, which did not create grounds for the 
sustainable development as some necessary preconditions for economic development 
were not previously established. Those conditions included the establishment of the 
legal state, transparent institutions and the rule of law at the state level. The 
international community expected that the development of the market-oriented 
economy would automatically change the inhibiting political and social structures 
and lead to well-being and prosperity, which did not happen (Papić, 2001). The main 
weakness, in this sense, was the simultaneous implementation of the processes of 
transition, without taking into account specific post-war conditions and the absence 
of unity and concord within the country, which have resulted in the creation of an 
aid-dependent development. 
 
Although nineteen years have passed since the end of the war BH still continues to 
require support from the international institutions, mostly from the World Bank, 
IMF, EBRD and the EU institutions (the total donor aid in the most intensive 
reconstruction period, 1996-1999, is estimated to total between US$ 1.8 to 4.9 
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billion9)). Much of this support (especially from the IMF and the World Bank) is 
aimed at stabilising the fiscal position and filling budgetary gaps, as well as 
strengthening the level of reserves held at the central bank (EBRD, 2010). The 
question of funding BH’s economic development is still not solved as the country has 
limited access to international funding, and corporate funding conditions in the 
domestic market are unfavourable, with high lending interest rates and the absence of 
government incentives to stimulate business investment and with only a limited 
access to the domestic under-developed stock markets. Moreover, the development 
of transparent state institutions and the rule of law, as conditions for ending 
dependency, are still not achieved. According to the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report, which assesses the business environment based on 
surveys of managers and on statistical data, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the lowest 
ranked country in the region (Čaušević, 2013). Moreover, in the last three years, 
managers in BH ranked access to finance as the biggest obstacle to doing business, 
while the institutional obstacles have been consistently ranked among top five in all 
the reports published. Next, recent trends in the main economic indicators, which are 
also important in the setting of a framework for assessing the sustainability and 
desirability of CBA, will be investigated.   
 
1.2.4 Key economic indicators 
 
BH has experienced substantial economic growth during the transition period. GDP 
per capita grew from 560.17 US dollars in 1995 to 4,657 US dollars in 2013. 
However, this is expected, given the severe fall during the war (as presented in 
Section 1.2.1). This economic growth has been attributed predominantly to greater 
capacity exploitation in business and industry, privatisation, restructuring, 
strengthening of the financial sector and attracting foreign direct investment 
(Dželilović and Čaušević, 2007). According to the GDP data (Table 1.2), BH 
recorded continuous growth until 2009 when the economy entered a sharp decline 
due to the global financial crisis. This decline was a result of various factors, 
                                                                
9 Because of the absence of a general overview of all donations the data for the total donor aid in the 
most intensive reconstruction period (1996-1999) differ between different sources. The main reasons 
for these differences are the lack of transparency of domestic authorities and uncertainty about the 
misuse of these funds, on which there has been no serious investigation, but which was evidently 
present (Papić, 2001).  
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including the drying-up of bank credit, a severe contraction in foreign direct 
investment, lower demand from regional neighbours and the European Union for 
exports and a fall in remittances from workers abroad (EBRD, 2009). The current 
account balance has been negative throughout the post-war period due to the lack of 
competitiveness of BH products in regional and international markets, which is 
partially the result of the weaknesses in the process of transition elaborated in the 
Section 1.2.2. The decrease in the current account deficit which was evident in 2006 
and 2009 (Table 1.2) was not a result of increased exports and competitiveness but of 
lower imports of goods caused by the introduction of value added tax (VAT) and the 
decrease in domestic aggregate demand, respectively. However, more positively, the 
fall in the current account deficit in 2013 was a result of increased exports and 
decreased imports. The persistent current account deficit is especially dangerous for 
BH’s economy if there are no offsetting capital inflows, as under the CBA’s strict 
rules, balance of payments transactions are the major determinant of money supply 
stability. Moreover, there is a high level of imports of raw materials and intermediate 
goods, which makes the country dependent on imports. The only category in which 
exports are higher than imports is the ‘durable consumer goods’ group, namely, final 
consumption goods. The export to import ratio remains low, even though it increased 
from 29 percent in 2003 to 55.2 percent in 2013 (see BHAS, 2014, p. 13). This 
performance is important when assessing the consequences of the inability to devalue 
the currency, as is the case under a CBA, and this issue will be investigated in the 
concluding chapter before making conclusions regarding the maintenance of the 
CBA in BH. The remittances and the capital and financial net inflows decreased in 
2009 and 2010 as financial aid and foreign direct investments, which have been 
important factors in financing current account deficit, continued to fall (CBBH, 
2009a).  
 
The unemployment rate in BH is, after Macedonia, the highest in the region. 
According to the Labour Force Survey the unemployment rate in 2013 was 27.5 
percent, while the formally registered unemployment rate reached 45.9 percent. This 
is an acute problem, especially in countries with rigid monetary regime, such as a 
CBA, through which economic activity and the employment rate cannot easily be 
stimulated. This is a bigger problem the lower the capacity and efficiency of fiscal 
policy, which is the only macroeconomic tool for stimulating the economic activity 
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in the economy with a rigid monetary regime. Moreover, the high and persistent 
unemployment could be a potential threat for CBA’s credibility, since the residents 
might expect the regime to be abandoned if the unemployment rate is high for a long 
period of time (this issue will be investigated in Chapters 3 and 4). Observing the 
growth of average net salary we can conclude that it did not follow economic 
conditions in the country. While the GDP growth rate was either negative or below 1 
percent after 2008 (until 2013) and unemployment was increasing (reaching 12.8 
percentage increase in 2010 compared to 2009), the average net salary was 
increasing in real terms (Table 1.2). By comparing gross wages and productivity 
Kristić (2007) found that there was clear wage inflationary pressures, since in the 
observed period (1999-2005) wages were growing faster than productivity. Kristić 
further found that this trend is driven by the rise of wages in the public sector, since 
excluding the activities that are prevailingly state-owned, productivity grew much 
faster than wages.  
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Table 1.2: Selected economic indicators, Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000 – 2013)  
 
Variable/year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
GDP per capita (in USD) 1,471 1,523 1,754 2,211 2,634 2,837 3,265 4,017 4,865 4,496 4,383 4,773 4,406 4,657 
Real GDP (growth rate in 
percent) 
5.50 2.40 5.00 3.90 6.30 3.90 5.70 6.00 5.60 -2.70 0.80 1.00 -1.20 2.50 
Inflation* 4.80 3.10 0.40 0.60 0.40 3.80 6.10 1.50 7.40 -0.40 2.10 3.70 2.10 -0.10 
Trade balance (as a percentage 
of GDP) 
-49.80 -51.20 -49.40 -48.90 -45.10 -45.20 -34.00 -40.50 -42.70 -32.00 -30.70 -32.40 -32.80 -29.9 
Current account balance (as a 
percentage of GDP) 
-7.10 -12.90 -17.60 -19.20 -16.20 -17.10 -7.80 -9.00 -14.10 -6.50 -6.10 -9.70 -9.30 -5.50 
Unemployment rate**   22.90 21.10 19.60 21.50   31.10 29.00 23.40 24.10 27.20 27.60 28.00 27.50 
Change in unemployment rate     -7.86 -7.11 9.69     -6.75 -19.31 2.99 12.86 1.47 1.45 -1.79 
Expenditure of General 
Government   (as a percentage 
of GDP) 
52.10 46.30 37.20 40.80 38.80 39.10 41.10 43.40 45.80 47.00 46.10 45.30 46.60 45.60 
Overall balance of General 
Government (as a percentage of 
GDP)  
-6.00 -3.00 -0.10 0.70 1.60 2.40 2.80 1.20 -2.20 -4.40 -2.50 -1.30 -2.00 -2.20 
External Debt of Government 
Sector (as a percentage of GDP) 
34.30 34.90 30.70 27.30 25.20 25.30 20.80 18.00 17.00 21.50 25.30 25.80 27.80 28.20 
Real effective exchange rate 
(REER), (2005=100) 
          100.00 102.33 99.82 101.3 102.66 101.85 101.9 101.2 99.68 
Growth rate of net salaries   9.95 9.05 8.52 4.34 6.53 8.92 10.07 16.59 5.06 1.04 2.22 1.23   
Notes: Highlighted variables are those important for assessing the productivity and flexibility of wages 
*Growth rate of retail prices (RP) is presented until 2006, but for 2006 and following periods in the table is presented consumer price (CP) growth rate. For RP 
rates weights used represent FBH and RS shares in BH GDP.  
** The unemployment rate based on Labour Force Surveys   
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina annual reports (various issues), Agency for Statistics, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Labour Force Surveys, various 
issues 
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Prices in BH have been relatively stable. However, in the context of a fixed exchange 
rate monetary policy is usually argued to be ‘imported’ from the anchor currency 
country (zone) and the movements in the inflation rates in BH should therefore be 
assessed together with those in the Eurozone. Inflation rates in BH and the Eurozone 
have had similar trends since 2007, with a difference in sharper peaks and drops in 
BH (Figure 1.1), perhaps due to lower reserves and capacities in its economy to 
mitigate the effects of any factor that influences these movements. The high rate in 
2006 in BH was recorded due to introduction of the value added tax and in 2008 due 
to the increase of world prices of oil and food. As a result of the crisis inflation rates 
dropped in 2009 in both BH and the Eurozone, recovered in 2011 and then fell again 
in 2012 and 2013.  
 
Figure 1.1: Inflation rates in BH and the Eurozone 
 
  
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the CBBH website (www.cbbh.ba) and the Eurostat 
(www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/) (last accessed: 24/09/2014) 
 
The government’s budget has recorded a deficit since 2008. The problem is not the 
deficit itself, since BH is a developing country undergoing a process of transition and 
it can be expected that during this process its expenditure needs exceed its ability to 
collect funds from its citizens. The problem is how these funds are being spent and 
how (in)effective the government is in stimulating economic activity and mitigating 
the effects of shocks to the real economy.   
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Fiscal policy soundness and effectiveness  
 
The fiscal revenues are significantly lower than their potential due to underdeveloped 
production and economic activity in the country and the high level of the grey 
economy. Schneider et al. (2010) estimated that the average size of the grey economy 
in BH (over 1999 to 2007) was 33.6 percent of GDP10. On the expenditure side, there 
is a high share of ‘unproductive’ expenditures in total government expenditures (with 
the highest share of employees in public administration, defence and compulsory 
social security in the region: 10.8 percent in FBH and 9.5 percent in RS in 2011, see 
Kreso and Lazović, 2013). Moreover, the quality of government institutions is very 
low and BH is among the worst performers in South Eastern Europe according to the 
World Development Indicators. It is in the last place according to voice and 
accountability, political stability, one before the last if we observe the government 
effectiveness and ranked lowly when assessing the control of corruption, rule of law 
and regulatory quality (see Appendix 1.1). According to the Global Competitiveness 
Reports 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, government instability, policy instability and 
inefficient government bureaucracy were ranked as the biggest obstacle to doing 
business. These are still rated among the first four obstacles for doing business (even 
though, as noted above, in the last three reports access to finance was rated as the 
biggest obstacle). This assessment is important for setting the framework in which a 
CBA functions. Moreover, it is important for assessing the flexibility and 
effectiveness of fiscal policy, since, in order to assess the need for the CBA the 
viability of complementary and alternative policies have to be evaluated. As noted in 
Hardouvelis and Monokrousos (2009, p.7) “a CBA can facilitate stabilization 
programs in economies lacking credible institutions and when policy discretion is 
ineffective for monetary stabilization”, which is still the case in BH. Moreover, it is 
an effective tool for keeping the government spending “under control” since it 
imposes a hard budget constraint on the government. The effectiveness of fiscal 
policy is especially relevant in a period of crisis, since economic growth cannot be 
boosted through monetary policy. However, according to the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)’s Early Warning System the BH government did 
                                                                
10 To our knowledge there is no more recent estimate available. However, there are also some other 
estimates available which differ quite significantly: Tomas (2010) estimated the grey economy in BH 
in 2008 to be 23 percent of GDP, while Vladušić and Pantić (2008) estimated it to be 16 percent in 
2006.  
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not prove to be effective in mitigating the effects of the Global Financial Crisis. As 
they note: “This was a consequence of the absolute absence of institutional 
mechanisms which might be used to remove or at least mitigate the negative impact 
on institutional performance” (UNDP, 2009, p. 31). Moreover, Kreso and Lazović 
(2013) show that the level of average gross wages increased in BH during the crisis, 
while it was decreasing in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Croatia (EU countries that they 
included in their analysis). Moreover, “while GDP in BH grew from 2006-2011 by 
1.3 times, compensation for employees in the public administration and beneficiaries 
of budget funds increased by 1.5 times, and social benefits by 1.8 times” (Kreso and 
Lazović, 2013, p.8). Since government expenditures exceed revenues the resulting 
deficit was financed though foreign debt, which has been increasing from 2008 
(Table 1.2). According to the currency structure of public debt on 31/12/2013, debt 
denominated in the euro makes up 52.24 percent of the total public debt of BH and 
33.24 percent in special drawing rights (SDR), though the effective payments are 
again in euros (Ministry of Finance and Treasury, 2014, p.10). This is important 
when considering the potential future changes in the nominal exchange rate, since the 
burden of debt would be increased if the local currency is devalued against the euro.  
 
Since the currency is fixed to the euro the question about the potential currency 
over/under-valuation is frequently posed. According to the data on real effective 
exchange rate (REER), which takes into account the changes in the exchange rates 
with the trading partners (and weights it with the level of trade with each partner) 
from 2005 the REER has appreciated in all years except 2007 and 2013 (Table 1.2). 
In the annual report of CBBH the depreciation trend in 2013 is explained as a 
consequence of “favourable developments in the real sector and improved 
competitiveness” (CBBH, 2013, p. 27). However, the deviations in the REER can be 
considered not to be too large (compared to, for example Bulgarian lev, which 
appreciated 22.4 percent cumulatively for the period 2005-2008, see Hardouvelis and 
Monokrousos, 2009).  Another indicator of the overall situation in the country, which 
is especially relevant for assessing the level of interest rates and the attractiveness of 
the country for foreign investors is a country’s sovereign credit rating. The long-term 
rating is B3/stable (according to Moody's Investors Service rating) which is a 
category of speculative credit rating with high credit risk, which is the lowest rating 
in the region. The rating improved to B2 in 2006, but decreased again in 2012.  
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Given the economic and political situation in BH described above, the perhaps 
inevitable step after the war was to impose strict rules designed to eliminate potential 
abuse of discretionary monetary policy. These rules were imposed by the 
introduction of the CBA for the first six years after the war, a period which was 
extended mainly due to the persistence of political instability in the country. Reasons 
for the introduction of the CBA in BH and its main characteristics, as well as the 
main trends in financial sector under the CBA, will be presented in the next section. 
 
1.3 The monetary and financial sectors in BH 
 
The main characteristics of the reforms in the monetary and financial sector after the 
war were explained in Section 1.2.2 and the overview of the macroeconomic 
situation in which the CBA functions in BH was appraised in Section 1.2.4. Next, 
more details about the characteristics and functioning of the CBA in BH will be 
presented and the main characteristics of financial sector and its functioning critically 
assessed. 
 
1.3.1 Origins and the reasons for the introduction of the CBA in BH 
 
In June 1997, in accordance with the Law adopted by the Parliament of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, within the framework determined by the Dayton Peace Agreement, the 
Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the monetary institution for the whole 
country, was established. The Dayton Peace Agreement specified that the Central 
Bank will operate a currency board, without the possibility of extending credit by 
creating money. A new currency, konvertibilna marka, was introduced as the only 
legal tender in the whole country. It was pegged to the deutsche mark at the fixed 
exchange rate 1 DM = 1 BAM, as it was the most widely used currency prior to the 
introduction of the national currency. After the introduction of the euro, the 
konvertibilna marka became pegged to the euro at the fixed exchange rate 1 € = 
1.955830 BAM.  
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Beside the need for stability in a small, open, underdeveloped and unstable economy 
the CBA was also introduced in BH for political reasons (Kreso, 1997; Kovačević, 
2003) related to a country which was, as explained above: 
 
- exiting a war with severe traumas, divisions and mutual distrust, whose 
economy had been destroyed, and which was bounded by a state constitution 
with two entities with significant economic independence; 
- undergoing transition from being a part of a larger nation to being an 
independent, small country which lacked a monetary policy track record;  
- in a transition process from a socialist command economy dominated by the 
state to a market-oriented private sector economy. 
 
These characteristics indicate that in such a country it would be very difficult to 
establish credible, discretionary monetary policy whilst ensuring the stability of the 
domestic currency. Therefore, a currency board arrangement, which imposes 
discipline on the domestic monetary authorities, was introduced and embedded in 
law in order to assure its full implementation and to produce greater credibility and 
macroeconomic stability.  
 
1.3.2 Characteristics and the institutional framework of the CBA in BH  
 
The CBA in BH does not deviate much from the orthodox currency board rules. The 
Central Bank keeps more than 100% coverage of monetary base in foreign reserves 
(see Table 1.3); the national currency is pegged to the reserve currency in a fixed 
proportion; full convertibility of domestic currency into the reserve currency and vice 
versa is guaranteed. The Central Bank cannot act as a lender of last resort, and it is 
unable to finance government or commercial banks. The only deviation from the 
orthodox rules is reserving the right to use one monetary instrument, specifically 
reserve requirements. All of these rules are embedded in the Law on the Central 
Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (articles 31-37 of the Law on the CBBH). Beside 
those rules the Law also regulates the independence of the Central Bank from “the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, any public agency and 
any other authority in the pursuit of its objective and the performance of its tasks” 
(article 3 of the Law on the CBBH). 
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The major goals and objectives of the CBBH are also determined by the Law on 
CBBH. This Law defines CBBH as the “independent and sole authority in charge of 
establishing and supervision of monetary policy and monetary policy instruments, all 
according to the powers given to the Board by the Law”. The Central Bank “supports 
and maintains appropriate payment and settlement systems and coordinates the 
activities of BH’s Entity Banking Agencies which are in charge of bank licensing 
and supervision”11. Embedding the currency board and the Central Bank’s 
objectives, responsibilities and political independence in the Law, were considered to 
provide the grounds for the establishment of Central Bank’s credibility. The latter 
will be empirically investigated in Chapter 4. Within the boundaries set to the 
Central Bank by the Law, the Bank manages its assets and liabilities, acts as a 
banking agent for the entities Banking Agencies and has the power to change the 
reserve requirement rate.  
 
1.3.3 Operation of the CBA in BH  
 
Seventeen years after the introduction of the CBA in BH there have not been any 
major changes to the original regime. Reserve requirements are still the only 
monetary policy instrument available to the Central Bank of BH, though changes to 
the deposit basis on which the reserve ratios are calculated and reserve rate 
limitations12 have been made and will be addressed later in this section. The structure 
of the CBBH’s balance sheet has remained in accordance with the Law, with slight 
changes over time.   
 
The Central Bank’s balance sheet  
 
According to the rule of issuing currency (article 31 of the Law on CBBH) the 
balance sheet of the currency board may not contain domestic assets and the 
monetary liabilities should not exceed the net foreign exchange reserves. The asset 
side of the CBBH’ balance sheet consists of foreign exchange assets which include 
                                                                
11 http://cbbh.ba/index.php?id=13&lang=en (last accessed; 18/12/2014) 
12 The assets that are included in the base on which reserves are calculated has been changing over 
time. The limitis within which the reserve requirement rate had to be set were defined by law as well, 
but these limits have also been changed, by revisions to the Law (more details are provided below).   
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foreign currency in cash, deposits with foreign banks, SDR’s at the IMF, gold 
reserves (since March 2009) and selected securities denominated in euros (since July 
2006). Those securities are high quality instruments with a high degree of tradability 
and liquidity, with the credit rating of AAA (Standard & Poor, Fitch and Moody's). 
As indicated in the note to Table 1.3, since 2010 investments into securities with the 
credit rating BBB+ were also allowed, due to sharp decrease of earnings on AAA 
securities. The portfolio includes short-term and long-term debt securities with a 
fixed interest rate, which are issued by the governments of foreign countries (CBBH, 
2010a). The liability side consists of monetary liabilities (which include currency in 
circulation, deposits of resident banks and deposits of other residents), liabilities to 
non-residents, other liabilities and capital and reserves. The CBBH’s liabilities to 
non-residents are comprised of short-term liabilities towards non-residents, deposits 
of non-residents and other short-term liabilities towards non-residents and Accounts 
1 and 2 of transactions with the IMF (CBBH, 2010b). Foreign currency assets have 
been continuously increasing since 1998 (when they were 283 million BAM) until 
2007 (when they were 6,698 million BAM). In 2008, as a consequence of the 
financial turmoil, foreign exchange reserves fell to 6,296 million BAM and 
continued falling in 2009 (when they were 6,212 million BAM). After 2009 they 
were relatively stagnant until 2013 (Table 1.3).  
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Table 1.3: Monthly Balance Sheet (final) of the CBBH as of 31st December of each year 
 
(Amounts in millions BAM) 
Assets 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Foreign Exchange Assets    4196 5452 6698 6296 6212 6457.27 6423 6507.5 7067.7 
   Foreign currency in cash     40 55 40 212 107 102 94 133 92 
    Deposit with foreign banks 4155 5003 6052 4778 3300 3003 4385 2334 2217 
    SDR in the IMF   0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 5 0.27 1 4.5 2.7 
    Monetary Gold         63 67 151 159 164 
    Security investments/financial assets available for sale*   393 606 1305 2735 2904 1753 3770 4486 
    Held-to-maturity investments*           381 39 107 106 
Other Assets  85 57 56 54 57 68 70 79 80 
Total assets (1+2)          4281 5509 6755 6350 6269 6526 6493 6587 7148 
Liabilities  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2010 2011 2012 2013 
Monetary Liabilities 4008 5183 6304 5727 5705 4968 5915 5987 6659 
    Currency in Circulation 1907 2154 2440 2552 2268 2497 2645 2747 2910 
    Deposits of Resident Banks 2060 2892 3777 3144 3375 2393 3193 3041 3475 
    Deposits of Other Residents     40 137 87 31 63 78 77 199 274 
Liabilities to Non Residents  1 1 0.9 1 0.9         
Other Liabilities 27 24 63 122 59 22 30 23 22 
Capital And Reserves 245 301 386 499 503 533 547 575 466 
Total liabilities (3+4+5+6)  4281 5509 6755 6350 6269 6526 6493 6587 7148 
 
*Note: From 2010 security investments have been reclassified as financial assets available for sale which include quality instruments with a high degree of 
marketability and liquidity, with a credit rating from AAA to BBB+ (Fitch) and held-to-maturity investments all of which are with a credit rating of AAA (Fitch) 
and are denominated in EUR. 
Source: CBBH annual reports and financial statements for the end of the periods, as of 31 December of each year (from 2005 until 2013)
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Deposits held with non-residential banks have been falling since 2008, while the 
investments in foreign securities have been growing (with an exception in 2011). 
These changes in the structure of foreign assets held by the Central Bank were part of 
the reaction of the CBBH to financial crisis. Namely, as all types of deposits in 
commercial banks started decreasing in 2008 the CBBH was obliged to provide more 
foreign currency in order to be prepared to answer to the cash requirements of 
commercial banks. Thus, the deposits with non-residential banks in 2009 fell again 
by 1.5 billion BAM (30.2%), while investment in securities rose by 1.4 billion 
(109.6%). The holding of foreign currency fell by 104.8 million BAM or 49.4%, 
which was a result of fewer tensions in the banking sector in BH in 2009. On the 
liability side currency in circulation grew by 171.4 million BAM in 2008, as a 
consequence of demand deposits reduction by 374.4 million BAM, which was a 
result of deposit withdrawals by depositors and their conversion into cash, as a 
reaction on global financial crisis (CBBH, 2008, 2009a).  
 
The CBBH also maintains certain accounts in foreign currencies related to 
agreements concluded between the governments of B H and foreign governments 
and financial organizations. As these accounts do not represent either assets or 
liabilities of the CBBH, and because their recording in the Bank’s balance sheet 
would violate CBA matching requirements, they are recorded as off-balance sheet 
items. As its ”fiscal agent, the Bank acts on behalf of the Government in dealing with 
the IMF but does not have any responsibility for assets and liabilities related to the 
membership” (CBBH, 2010a, p.13). Therefore, the total gross position of 
Government with the IMF is recorded as an off-balance sheet item. However, the 
increase in the position of Government with the IMF13 eventually affects the foreign 
assets when tranches from the stand-by-arrangement are being reimbursed. The key 
trends in BH’s monetary aggregates will next be examined.  
 
Monetary aggregates and the process of the money supply creation  
 
Due to the limitations that the CBA imposes on the role and operations of the CBBH 
and the absence of a money market the broadest monetary aggregate in BH is M2. As 
                                                                
13 The latest stand-by-arrangement was agreed on August 2012 when 558.03 mil SDR (1264.80 mil 
BAM) was approved; up to September 2014 422.75 mil SDR (958.18 mil BAM) has been drawn. 
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defined by CBBH, the monetary base M0 (primary money or reserve money) 
consists of cash outside the monetary authorities, deposits of commercial banks and 
deposits of other domestic sectors (except for deposits of the central government) 
with the monetary authorities. The monetary aggregate M1 comprises cash outside 
banks and demand deposits in domestic currency of all domestic institutional sectors 
(except for deposits of the central government). The monetary aggregate QM (quasi 
money) consists of time and savings deposits in domestic currency, demand deposits 
in a foreign currency and time and savings deposits in a foreign currency of all 
domestic institutional sectors (except for deposits of the central government). 
Finally, money supply M2 comprises monetary aggregates, M1 and QM. These 
aggregates are presented schematically in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: Monetary aggregates in BH – schematic illustration  
 
 
As a CBA functions similarly to the gold standard, changes in the balance of 
payments have a strong influence on the money supply through changes to the 
monetary base (ΔFR (foreign reserves) → ΔMB (monetary base) → ΔM (money 
supply)) (this will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter 2). M0 has been increasing 
since the introduction of the CBA until 2008 when it started falling and only in 2013 
did it reach its pre-crisis level (Figure 1.3).  
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Figure 1.3: Monetary aggregates in BH (2000-2013) 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the CBBH website, www.cbbh.ba (last accessed: 
24/09/2014) 
 
The data presented in Table 1.3 implies that there has been a persistent deficit in the 
current account, which is usually described as one of the major threats to currency 
board sustainability and desirability. The observed positive trend in the monetary 
base until 2008 was achieved thanks to the positive trends in the capital and financial 
account (see Table 1.4). However, capital and financial net inflows have decreased 
since 2009 (with the exception of 2011 when it increased), as financial aid and 
foreign direct investments fell, which affected the growth of monetary base. 
However, the broad money supply (M2) increased even in this period, though at a 
slower pace than before the crisis (see Figure 1.3). 
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Table 1.4: BH's balance of payments (2000-2013)  
 
Year  Goods  Services 
(Primary) 
Income 
Current 
transfers 
(secondary 
income) 
Current 
account  
Capital 
account 
Direct 
investments 
Portfolio 
investments 
Other 
investments 
Reserve 
assets 
Financial 
account   
Net errors 
and 
omissions 
  
1 2 3 4 
5= 
1+2+3+4 
6 7 8 9 10 
11= 
7+8+9+10 
12 
2000 -5868 397 1253 3379 -840 116 310   -134 -165 11 -331 
2001 -6471 498 1163 318 -163 875 260   1925 -1665 519 236 
2002 -6891 454 1055 2933 -2449 849 551   584 245 138 221 
2003 -718 581 925 286 -2814 805 660   1142 -316 1486 523 
2004 -7193 679 760 2932 -2822 680 1042   1136 -677 1502 641 
2005 -7835 773 712 2991 -3358 646 821   1943 -738 2026 687 
2006 -6661 950 720 2949 -2041 532 661   1259 -1205 715 794 
2007 -8935 2318 670 3901 -2047 415 2506 -4 422 -1242 1682 50 
2008 -10665 2385 943 3827 -3510 383 1315 -29 1543 462 3291 164 
2009 -7786 1903 955 3341 -1587 350 344 -274 939 104 1113 -124 
2010 -7629 2159 413 3529 -1528 389 532 -173 875 -258 976 -163 
2011 -8346 2116 215 3504 -2511 357 669 -46 1383 33 2039 -116 
2012 -8445 2187 232 3643 -2383 336 534 -18 137 -73 580 -1467 
2013 -7802 2255 513 3599 -1435 337 507 -132 1167 -709 833 -265 
Source: CBBH website, www. cbbh.ba (last accessed: 24/09/2014) 
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Money supply may also be increased through a process of money multiplication 
(ΔM2=m*ΔM0, where m is a money multiplier). As the backing rule applies only to 
the currency issued by the CBA, and not to that created by the banks, commercial 
banks retain their power to create money of credit “ex nihilo” (Ponsot, 2006, p.36). 
By observing the data on monetary aggregates we can perceive a process of 
secondary money creation through deposit expansion and credit multiplication. 
Monetary multipliers for BH (m1 and m2), calculated as the ratio between the 
monetary aggregates (M1 and M2, respectively) and the monetary base (M0), are 
presented in Figure 1.4a.  
 
Figure 1.4a: Monetary multipliers for BH (2000-2013) 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the CBBH website, www.cbbh.ba (last accessed: 
24/09/2014) 
 
Figure 1.4b: Money multipliers (calculated as a ratio between the broad money and 
the monetary base) for selected Central and South Eastern European countries 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from websites of central banks of respective countries  
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Figures 1.4a and 1.4b indicate that the money multiplier m2 has been relatively low 
in BH compared to the monetary multiplier in the other countries from Central and 
South Eastern Europe. The main reason for such a low money multiplier is likely to 
be the undeveloped financial market in BH. If we observe the level of financial 
market development (proxied by the World Economic Forum’s financial market 
development indicator, FMDI14) (Figure 1.5), we notice that it is positively 
correlated with the level of the money multiplier (Figure 1.4b). Besides the influence 
of the underdeveloped financial market and slow reforms in BH, Kreso and Begović 
(2013) identified the high asset share of foreign-owned banks (which is the highest in 
the region) and the dependence of money multiplication process on foreign financial 
markets as the additional constraints. Namely, due to strict banking regulations 
(which will be investigated in the next section) and underdeveloped local financial 
markets the problem of maturity mismatch has to be solved through foreign markets.  
 
Figure 1.5: Financial market development indicators (1-7 best) for the selected 
countries 
 
 
Source: http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform/ (last accessed. 
24/09/2014) 
 
                                                                
14 The FMDI assesses the following factors: availability of financial services, affordability of financial 
services, financing through local equity market, ease of access to loans, venture capital availability, 
soundness of banks, regulation of securities exchanges and legal rights index based on a executive 
opinion survey.  http://www.weforum.org/issues/competitiveness-0/gci2012-data-platform/ 
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As noted above, CBBH cannot affect money supply by lending to government or 
banks. The only way the CBBH can potentially influence the money supply in 
current conditions is through changes in the banking sector’s reserve requirements; 
by lowering the rate of required reserves commercial banks are left with more assets 
available for credit creation and therefore they can increase money supply through 
increase in credits, and vice versa. Whether they react to the reserve requirements 
changes as expected depends on specific conditions, which will be addressed next. 
 
Reserve requirements and excess reserves 
 
The Law on the CBBH (article 36) sets the rules for the use of the sole monetary 
instrument available. The original article 36 determined the limits for reserve 
requirements to between 10 percent and 15 percent of deposits and borrowed funds 
denominated in BAM and set the penalties for contravention of the rule. The article 
has been changed several times through amendments and supplements to the Law. 
The major changes were the expansion of the base for reserve requirements to 
include both BAM and foreign currency deposits as well as borrowed funds and the 
abolition of the limits on the range for the rate of required reserves, as it is 
considered that the CBBH should have freedom to determine the rate according to 
the financial conditions (for changes in the reserve requirement rate see Figure 1.6). 
For example, in order to mitigate the negative (liquidity) effects of the financial 
turmoil, the CBBH decreased the reserve requirement rate from 18 percent to 14 
percent in October 2008 and to 10 percent in February 2011. In January 2009 the 
CBBH introduced a second (discounted) rate, which has been applied to deposits and 
borrowed assets with a contracted term of maturity over one year. It was initially set 
to 10 percent and then lowered to 7 percent in May 2009. In order to stimulate the 
inflow of capital from foreign countries into the local banking sector, additionally, 
from November 2008 all new parent banks’ credits were freed from the required 
reserve calculation. Furthermore, since 2010 the ”government deposits earmarked for 
development programs and new foreign borrowing (deposits and loans) were 
excluded from the basis for calculation of the required reserves” (CBBH, 2012a, 
p.52). 
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Figure 1.6: Changes in the reserve requirement rate and the total reserves held by 
banks in CBBH 
 
 
Source: The author’s illustration based on data from the CBBH website, www.cbbh.ba (last accessed: 
24/09/2014)  
 
However, these changes may not have the expected effect on banks’ willingness to 
provide credits. Beside those required reserves commercial banks have generally also 
been holding a large amount of excess reserves (see Figure 1.6 and Table 1.5). It can 
be noticed that the reduction in the amount of the average reserve requirements in a 
period of financial turmoil was followed by an increase in the amount of excess 
reserves that banks kept (which can be noticed by the difference between the average 
reserves in the CBBH and the average reserve requirements in Figure 1.6).  One of 
the reasons behind this is the absence of the lender of last resort function of the 
CBBH since banks want to assure higher liquidity as they know that liquidity cannot 
be provided by the central bank. Additionally, as the money and capital markets in 
BH are not developed, banks cannot invest the excess liquidity in less-risky securities 
in the domestic market or lend money to other banks under more favourable 
conditions. As noted in the CBBH’s annual report for 2009 “...in the shortage of 
adequate borrowers and sound investment projects, the banks preferred to hold their 
free funds in reserve accounts than to incur risks through lending to clients“ (CBBH, 
2009a, p. 59). There are also rigid rules regarding liquidity managing and maturity 
matching between deposits and credits posed by entities’ banking agencies on 
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beginning of the global financial crisis interest rates on the euro market have been 
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
In
 m
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
B
A
M
Average Balance on the Reserve 
Accounts with CBBH
Average Reserve Requirement
Reserve Requirement (RR) rate
Reserve Requirement differential 
rate
One RR rate Two RR rates
Chapter 1: Macroeconomic Trends in BH 
 
50 
 
falling (even negative in 2014), while the remuneration rate on excess reserves was 
always positive15. All of this can lead us to the conclusion that the reserve 
requirement instrument is not very effective in periods of financial downturns, as the 
lower requirement reserve rate did not lower the average balance of the reserve 
accounts with CBBH.  
 
Table 1.5: Average reserve requirements (2005-2013) 
 
Period average (in millions of BAM) 
Year 
Deposit Base for 
Required Reserve 
Calculation 
Average Reserve 
Requirement 
Average Balance on 
the Reserve 
Accounts with 
CBBH 
Balance 
(excess 
reserves) 
2005 8456.6 885.5 1516.2 630.7 
2006 10905.9 1635.9 2372.9 737.0 
2007 14328.5 2149.3 3309.6 1160.3 
2008 17320.1 2961.9 3630.6 668.7 
2009 15721.2 1605.8 2968.7 1362.9 
2010 15617.8 1624.9 3154.8 1529.9 
2011 15227.4 1323.9 2959.3 1635.4 
2012 14755.6 1257.9 2711 1453.2 
2013 15162.2 1290.8 3103.9 1813.1 
Source: CBBH website, www.cbbh.ba (last accessed: 26/09/2014) 
 
1.3.4 Commercial banks as the major “players” in BH’s financial sector 
 
As noted in Section 1.2.2, since the introduction of the CBA the financial sector in 
BH has undergone major, mainly positive, transformations. The financial sector has 
been liberalised, which resulted in the removal of all controls over interest rates, 
reform of the system of internal payments has been undertaken, and most of the 
barriers to current and capital account transactions have been removed. The system 
of bank supervision has been improved in the direction of accepting the international 
(Basle) standards, and in 2002 a deposit insurance agency was created at the state 
                                                                
15 From April 1st, 2009 the remuneration rate was calculated as: On the amount of required reserves is 
0,5%; on the amount of excess reserves on the rate calculated as an average of interest rates, which 
were earned by the Central bank on deposits invested up to a month. From July 1st, 2010 the 
remuneration rate on the amount of required reserves was changed and calculated as an average of 
interest rates, which were earned by the Central bank on overnight deposits in the same period, while 
the remuneration rate on the amount of excess reserves was not changed. From August 1st 2011 the 
remuneration rate was calculated by the weighted average interest rate which were earned by the Bank 
on deposits invested up to a month in the same period; 70% of this rate is calculated on the amount of 
required reserves while 90% of the same rate is calculated on the amount of excess reserves (CBBH, 
website, www.cbbh.ba, last accessed: 24/09/2014). 
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level. Insurance and leasing companies, investment funds, brokerage houses and 
micro-credit organizations have been opened, although they still have a minor role in 
the financial sector, while the banks remain the major “players”, as they hold 86.3% 
of total financial assets (CBBH, 2012a). The banking system in BH has been 
strengthened and the number of commercial banks has decreased from 76 in 1997 to 
30 at the end of 2008 (CBBH, 2009a, p.79), mostly as a result of the process of 
banking privatisation during the period 1998 - 2002. The number of state-owned 
banks has decreased and foreign banks now dominate the banking system, as the 
foreign banks hold the majority of the banking assets (this issue will be addressed 
next). This is not surprising as in the countries with a CBA foreign banks usually 
play an important role in providing liquidity, especially because of the potential 
problem of time-inconsistency between deposits and loans (the maturity mismatch 
problem, which will also be addressed further in the text). These banks are 
considered to be able to respond faster to changes in reserve requirements than the 
domestic ones in the CBA countries and to better cope with the demands of 
developing markets, since they have access to foreign markets. Banks in BH can be 
described as well-capitalized and liquid, with a capital adequacy ratio of 17 percent 
and a liquid assets to short-term liabilities ratio of 44.1 percent in 2012, which was 
slightly weaker than in 2011 (when it was 46.7) (CBBH, 2012b). Although not high, 
the ratio of non-performing to total loans increased from 11.8 in 2011 to 13.5 percent 
in 2012 (CBBH, 2012b).  
 
Since the introduction of the CBA in BH both outstanding deposits and loans have 
been increasing, with the exception of 2009 when they fell as a result of financial 
crisis (Table 1.6).  Deposits have been growing, indicating an increased confidence 
in the banking system until 2008, when a bank run started in BH as a result of 
adverse conditions in world financial markets.  
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Table 1.6: Consolidated balance of commercial banks in BH: Selected items   
 
Year 
Total 
reserves 
of banks 
Foreign 
assets 
Long term 
loans to non-
financial 
private 
enterprises 
Long term 
loans to 
households 
Short term 
Loans to non-
financial 
private 
enterprises 
Short term 
Loans to 
households 
Total 
assets  
Foreign 
Liabilities 
Transferable 
Deposits 
Other 
Deposits 
2005 2233.9 2096.6 2030.2 3057.0 1213.8 396.4 11874.6 3559.3 3876.1 3000.1 
2006 3063.6 2357.1 2592.7 3893.0 1453.4 466.6 14749.7 4074.8 4005.1 4758.1 
2007 4022.9 3558.6 3439.2 5104.4 1819.0 564.5 19603.2 5165.7 5106.5 6980.7 
2008 3393.3 3106.1 4142.2 6051.1 2579.8 645.7 21118.3 6361.9 4905.1 6970.0 
2009 3632.0 3190.3 4186.9 5590.8 2459.8 716.4 21009.6 5744.1 5215.1 6877.0 
2010 3679.8 2814.2 4309.5 5522.3 2624.0 801.9 21177.7 4783.2 5557.7 6972.4 
2011 3469.7 2724.5 4186.7 5846.4 2935.2 858.4 21898.1 4176.9 5518.1 7474.9 
2012 3370.4 2507.8 4248.8 5875.2 3188.4 919.5 22324.6 3947.0 5306.9 8019.6 
2013 3843.7 2637.3 4369.0 6123.0 3152.2 942.2 23446.3 3697.9 5771.9 8478.0 
Source: CBBH website, www.cbbh.ba (last accessed: 24/09/2014) 
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However, deposits started rising again after 2009, but long-term loans to households 
declined and those to private enterprises have been stagnating or increasing very 
slowly. On the other hand, short-term loans started increasing from 2009. It is likely 
that the banks withdrew long-terms funds and substituted more short-term loans in 
order for previous loans to be repaid by those new short-term ones. This is likely to 
be very detrimental to economic development, especially when there is no alternative 
financing. Foreign liabilities have been decreasing since 2008 indicating that funds 
from the parent banks have been withdrawn from their subsidiaries, making the 
situation in the country weaker and more fragile. Additionally, the level of excess 
reserves held in CBBH has been rising since 2009 (Table 1.5). Therefore, it could be 
concluded that this situation is likely to be driven by events in foreign markets, since 
foreign banks have a very high share of total financial assets in BH.  
 
The role of the foreign parent banks in financial (in)stability  
 
The number of foreign-owned banks has been increasing since 2000 and at the end of 
2012, 92 percent of banking assets were in foreign ownership (75 percent of BH’s 
GDP) and they shared 91.6 percent of banking sector profits (CBBH, 2012b). Beside 
the expected increase in credibility imposed by the introduction of the CBA (which 
will be empirically investigated in Chapter 4), the adoption of the BH Law on foreign 
direct investment and reform of the payment system (which was, as noted in Section 
1.2.2, transferred to banks in 2001 and insured additional, non-risky, earnings to 
banks), foreign banks are considered to be attracted by the potential growth of 
purchasing power of BH residents and by the expected infrastructural projects and 
foreign investment inflows (Čaušević, 2007). These banks have played a very 
important role in achieving and maintaining the stability of BH's financial system. 
On one side, allowing entry of foreign banks promoted competition between foreign 
and domestic banks by encouraging domestic banks to adopt modern banking 
practices (Koliadina, 2008) and forcing the local banks to “improve the range and 
quality of the services they provide in order to survive” (CBBH, 2001, p.16). They 
also contributed to the reduction in the average lending interest rates. Namely, 
foreign banks have increased competition in financial markets, and together with a 
reform of the banking sector, and increase of loans and savings deposits, contributed 
to the decrease of interest rates, though the rates remain well above those in the euro-
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zone. However, it is hard to make a comparison with the period prior the entrance of 
the foreign banks as the CBBH only started collecting data on average commercial 
banks' interest rates since 2002. Gedeon (2010, p.13) emphasises two important roles 
of the parent banks: “they serve to provide the long-term liabilities against which 
long-term domestic loans are issued, and they provide the funds to finance domestic 
consumption and investment demand“. Foreign-owned bank subsidiaries tend to rely 
on long-term foreign funding, mostly from their parent banks, to finance credit 
growth, as the short maturity of local deposits limits their role in funding credit 
growth (IMF, 2006). On the other hand, reliance of the financial sector on foreign 
parent banks may also pose threats to financial stability as it increases the potential 
channels for “contagion” from external shocks (IMF, 2006). Namely, in financial 
depressions foreign parent banks may withdraw capital from subsidiaries creating a 
liquidity crisis in financial institutions and further bank panics (Andersen, 2009). 
This happened first in 2008 when parent banks started withdrawing funds from 
subsidiaries, which could be observed through a decrease in the foreign liabilities 
(see Table 1.5). This trend continued after 2009 as well, which implies that the banks 
continued withdrawing money from the country even though the Vienna initiative, in 
which the parties agreed that parent banks in the EU would not withdraw their funds 
from BH banks (as well as other banks in the region) and would continue to make 
loans available to BH’s economy16. In April, May and June of 2012 foreign parent 
banks again started withdrawing money from their subsidiaries (which could also be 
observed through decrease in banks’ reserves and increase in foreign assets). This 
coincided with the deadline for fulfilling the new liquidity measures set by Basel III 
(a rise from 6 to 9 percent of risk weighted assets) of June 30th 2012. We can 
conclude that this high reliance on foreign banks and funds makes BH’s economy 
vulnerable to any sudden stop or reversal in net private capital flows. As those banks 
are the major players in the financial sector of BH that means that economic growth 
and development of country are highly dependent on the behaviour of those banks. 
According to the credit portfolio of commercial banks it can be seen that the amounts 
                                                                
16 On the 22nd of June 2009 a Memorandum of Understanding entitled the ‘Vienna Initiative’ was 
signed in Vienna with representatives of six banking groups (Raiffeisen International, Hypo Alpe 
Adria, UniCredit Bank Austria, Volksbank International, Intesa SanPaolo International, NLB Group) 
operating in BH. With this agreement, they undertook that the banks in BH would retain their current 
exposure levels and continue their activities as before the financial crisis. Subsequently, three more 
banks joined the ‘Vienna Initiative’ (Procredit Group, Sparkasse Bank and Turkish Ziraat Bank) 
(CBBH, 2009a). 
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lent to households and enterprises are almost the same (Table 1.5) However, loans to 
households do not, on average, have the same growth-enhancing effects as do those 
to the business sector and therefore are likely to produce lower positive social 
externalities. An additional threat is the heavy exposure of banking sector to a small 
number of banks, as 61.8% of the loan market and 57.7% of the deposit market are 
controlled by five largest banks in BH (CBBH, 2009b). This absence of alternative 
financing led to the creation of an oligopoly of the largest banks in the country 
setting the interest rates (which will be addressed next). From the above we can 
conclude that the banking system is not development oriented which is worrying as 
there is no other mechanism in the BH’s financial sector that could provide needed 
development stimulus.  
 
Convergence with the anchor currency zone  
 
As noted in Jeanne and Masson (2000) and Ho and Ho (2009) interest rates between 
CBA country and anchor currency country (zone) should converge in order to avoid 
devaluation pressures. Since there is no reference interest rate on domestic financial 
assets (as there is no money market in BH) there is no interest rate that could be 
directly compared with the representative euro-zone interest rate – Euribor. 
Therefore, the lending interest rates in Austria (Austria is taken as an example as it is 
a country with the highest equity in commercial banks in BH, 63.2%) will be 
presented, as well as the 12-months Euribor rate, as most of BH’s commercial banks 
have their parent banks in EMU member countries which have access to funds from 
the European money market. The trends in interest rates were quite similar (as could 
be seen from Figure 1.7 where interest rates on long-term loans are presented; the 
trends in the short-term rates were also very similar). As expected, due to higher 
country risk (which is noted in Section 1.2.4), BH’s interest rates are well above the 
Austrian interest rates and the Euribor. Another reason for the high interest rates in 
BH may be found in undeveloped money and capital markets which could provide 
the alternative (and cheaper) source of financing. An additional reason for relatively 
higher rates (given that the subsidiaries have access to cheaper funds on the 
euromarkets through their parent banks) is likely to be the “price” that foreign banks 
“charge” for the maturity matching transformation which is conducted through the 
foreign markets.  
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Figure 1.7: Long-term interest rates in BH, Austria and Euribor 12-months  
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the CBBH website (www.cbbh.ba), Austrian 
National Bank website (http://www.oenb.at/) and www.euribor-rates.eu (last accessed: 24/09/2014) 
 
The risk of maturity and currency mismatch in the banking system  
 
The risk of maturity mismatch in the banking system of BH can be assessed by 
looking at the amount of short-term relative to long-term deposits and loans (Table 
1.5). In 2009 nearly half of all deposits were held as short-term demand deposits, but 
three quarters of all loans were long-term loans. There is also a potential currency 
mismatch problem as approximately 45 percent of resident deposits were euro 
denominated (Figure 1.8), while nearly 70 percent of all loans were either euro 
denominated or euro indexed (Gedeon, 2010). The latter cannot be seen from the 
figure as the euro-indexed loans are treated as BAM loans, since in 2004 the IMF 
recommended that all credits in BAM which include those with a currency clause 
(tied to euro), should be classified as credits in BAM (CBBH, 2009c). However, in 
the 2006 IMF Country Report (IMF, 2006, p. 16) it is stated that indexed loans are 
treated like euro loans in the currency matching requirement which in June 2005 
constituted 70.7 percent of total loans. 
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Figure 1.8: The structure of commercial banks’ loans and deposits by currency 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the CBBH website (www.cbbh.ba) 
 
Additionally, entities’ banking agencies pose strict regulations on maturity matching 
according to which at least “85% of resources with maturity up to 30 days must be 
used for the loans with maturity up to 30 days, at least 80% of resources with 
maturity up to 90 days for loans with maturities up to 90 days, and at least 75% of 
resources with maturity up to 180 days in loans with maturity up to 180 days” 
(CBBH, 2009b, p.47) (until 2007 those regulations were even more rigid). According 
to the IMF (2006), this matching requirement results in a segmented bank balance 
sheet structure: euro-indexed loans are mostly funded through long-term euro 
deposits and loans from abroad (from parent banks) (since these long-term deposits 
are not sufficient to cover the long-term loans); local short-term BAM deposits fund 
banks’ excess reserves; and, resident short-term euro denominated deposits fund 
banks’ correspondent euro deposits abroad17.  
 
Gedeon and Đonlagić (2009, p.32) suggest that the relation between the parent bank 
and its subsidiaries may satisfy the matching requirement by “recreating the process 
of independent, private and decentralized open market operations”. This is how they 
describe the process of “quasi central bank intermediation”: “the first step for the 
Bosnian bank is to deposit the foreign assets held against resident demand and time 
                                                                
17 Kreso and Begović (2012, p. 427, 428) show that „more than 90 percent of the assets sent abroad 
(foreign assets) are short-term, while approximately 90 percent of the liabilities received from abroad 
(foreign liabilities) are long-term“.   
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deposits in the parent bank as collateral against a loan that the parent bank will create 
for the branch bank. The second step is to deposit the process of the loan that the 
bank has created into the Bosnian branch. It is recorded in Bosnia as a foreign 
liability, a non-resident deposit, against which required reserves are held. With the 
new long-term deposit, the Bosnian bank can create long-term foreign exchange 
loans – or BAM loans, holding the foreign exchange against them – thereby 
satisfying the matching requirement imposed by the currency board... Essentially, the 
parent loan is a guarantee against the long-term corporate loan that the bank has 
issued in BAM. On the liability side, the parent loan increases foreign liabilities, but 
on the asset side, it increases foreign assets. It may be moved to the parent bank, 
creating a second liability for the parent bank, as in the multiplier process.” This 
process partly explains how the broad money supply grew over recent years.  
 
This segmentation contributes to the vulnerability of the financial sector by 
contributing to a tight link between bank lending and capital flows, since the ability 
of domestic banks to provide long-term loans depends on foreign parent banks’ 
willingness and readiness to supply funds for those loans, as domestic deposits 
cannot fulfil matching requirements. It also leads banks to transfer euro deposits of 
residents abroad rather than use them to finance local lending. This has consequently 
resulted in paradoxical situation of BH becoming an exporter of capital (Dželilović et 
al., 2004). Namely, by sending short-term assets abroad and receiving long-term 
liabilities foreign banks takeover the liquidity risk which is “paid” by the surplus/gap 
between the assets sent abroad (foreign assets + reserves, which are also held abroad) 
and received liabilities (foreign liabilities) and by paying the interest rate difference 
(difference between the interest rates charged between the parent banks and their 
subsidiaries and those charged between subsidiaries and residents18). Although this 
maturity transformation through a foreign market allows an additional increase in the 
monetary and credit multiplication this approach has proved to be an expensive 
method of overcoming the maturity mismatch. Kreso and Begović (2012) suggest 
that the maturity matching requirement could be satisfied less costly by 
diversification and development of the structure of local financial markets and 
                                                                
18 Athough there is no data available on the interest rates that parent banks 'charge' their subsidiaries 
we can assume that those rates are much lower than those that subsidiaries change to residents, since 
parent banks have access to much cheaper financing (see Figure 1.7).  
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institutions. Namely, under the condition of liquid markets, companies and 
households would buy government and corporate bonds, treasury bills and 
commercial papers, potentially earning more compared to depositing money in the 
banks. This increase in competition for investing the short-term assets would 
additionally lower interest rates and provide greater access to financing.  
 
1.4 Conclusion  
 
The introduction of the CBA in BH was justified by the specific country 
circumstances before and after its adoption. It was argued to be justified as a means 
of ensuring increased credibility and macroeconomic stability, which were disturbed 
during the war period. Although it was introduced as a transitional solution it is still 
in operation nineteen years after the war finished. Therefore, the question should be 
raised about its sustainability and desirability in the medium-to-long run under the 
changed economic conditions. The task of the analysis presented in the following 
chapters is to address that question.  
 
While some argue that the CBA should be kept in BH until EMU accession, others 
argue that further retention of the regime may inhibit the growth process and pose a 
threat to financial sustainability. The persistent current account deficit is perceived to 
be the major threat because, as remittances and financial aid have been decreasing, it 
is becoming harder to finance. Exposure to external shocks and dependence on 
foreign parent banks, discussed in Section 1.3.4 make the financial sector vulnerable 
even though financial institutions function according to strict rules and do not engage 
in excessively risky operations. Moreover, too strict rules may lead to insufficient 
liquidity for financing business, as some firms (especially small and medium 
enterprises) willing to incur debt to finance the production are not able to obtain the 
needed funds. As money and capital markets remain under-developed, and since the 
Central Bank cannot pursue an expansionary policy the development of the business 
sector depends primarily on the commercial banks. These are currently not 
development-oriented, but rather prefer to invest in financing less risky clients 
(households) and business activities with rapid turnover and high short-term profits 
(Čaušević, 2001). This raises a question about the desirability of the CBA and its 
strict form that has been retained since its introduction. To address that question all 
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of the circumstances addressed in this chapter have to be considered and the gains 
from the rigidity of the regime (which is expected to result in increased monetary 
authority’s credibility and consequently lower inflation) have to be empirically 
assessed prior to drawing any conclusion about the CBA’s sustainability and 
desirability. Before doing that, the main characteristics of a CBA regime and the 
concepts of its sustainability and desirability will be examined in the following 
chapter.    
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2.1 Introduction 
 
A currency board is usually defined as an arrangement under which a country fixes 
its nominal exchange rate to some foreign currency and maintains 100 percent 
backing of its monetary base with foreign exchange. It is usually introduced in 
countries which need to achieve macroeconomic stability and credibility and which 
are in the process of transition to market economy and/or have desire to further 
integrate with a country to which they are pegging their currencies. Although it is 
known for its success in achieving these desired goals a currency board also imposes 
some constraints and threats that may obstruct economic development. The main 
characteristics of the regime, its historical evolution and different forms will be 
presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents and evaluates previous research on the 
strengths and weaknesses of currency board arrangement (CBA) and specifies the 
criteria for its successful implementation. Since many of the CBAs which are 
currently in use deviate significantly from the traditional (‘orthodox’) CBA and 
among themselves these differences are examined and evaluated in the context of the 
European transition countries of interest in Section 2.4. Moreover, since these 
countries of interest are in the process of European Monetary Union (EMU) 
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accession (except BH which is in the process of European Union (EU) accession) 
this section introduces general arguments for and against retaining a regime prior to 
accession to EMU. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 The main characteristics of a CBA and its evolution 
 
2.2.1 The main characteristics of a CBA  
 
Under a CBA a country has its own currency which is pegged to some other 
country’s (usually stable and widely used) currency. Under the traditional (so called 
‘orthodox’) CBA a country is obliged to hold 100 percent coverage of its monetary 
base in foreign reserves. Adoption of an ‘orthodox’ currency board means that the 
country has no discretion in monetary policy. Unlike the traditional central bank, in a 
currency board the bank is unable to directly control its own assets and therefore the 
monetary base is beyond its control (Gedeon, 2010). Hence it imposes discipline on 
the domestic monetary authorities regarding their management of domestic money 
and credit, which is likely to result in an increase in the credibility of announced 
policies and greater confidence that the target(s) of the monetary authority will be 
achieved. Another characteristic of this regime which makes it even stricter and 
potentially more credible than a fixed exchange regime is its embeddedness in the 
legal framework. Namely, as countries that are adopting CBA are usually those with 
low credibility, a commitment to the CBA rules is usually made through the law, 
although the extent to which the institutional framework of the CBA is implemented 
in the legal and regulatory system differs across countries19 (Anastassova, 1999; Ho, 
2002; Camillieri, 2004). An additional difference between a CBA and discretionary 
monetary policy can be seen in the structure of a central bank’s balance sheets. The 
balance sheet in a currency board regime contains only foreign assets against its 
                                                                
19 “The currency boards of the early 1990s (Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania) had separate “currency 
board laws” in addition to their respective central bank laws. The later currency boards (Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), which were externally imposed by multilateral agencies, had the relevant 
details directly incorporated into the central bank laws. Hong Kong, with neither a separate law nor 
incorporated provisions of comparable form and detail, is in a class of its own. However, it should be 
noted that Hong Kong’s currency board is no less lawful than the others, as it is fully consistent with, 
albeit not literally dictated by, the Exchange Fund Ordinance, which governs the establishment, 
objective and management of the Exchange Fund and the powers of the Financial Secretary over 
monetary matters.” Moreover, CBA rules (full backing, guarantee of convertibility, official parity and 
specification of anchor currency) which are embedded in the laws differ within those countries as 
well. (Ho, 2002, p.18). 
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liabilities of base money while the balance sheet of a ‘typical’ non-CBA central bank 
will contain both foreign and domestic-currency-denominated assets (Hanke and 
Schuler, 1991; Hanke, 2002), as under a CBA the central bank cannot finance 
government or commercial banks.  
 
Hanke and Schuler (1991) emphasised that the determinacy of money supply through 
the “automatic adjustment process” is the main difference between a CBA and 
‘typical’ central bank. Nenovsky et al. (2001, p. i.) defined this mechanism as “the 
presence of a positive cointegration relationship between the balance of payments 
and the reserve money (or money supply) and absence of discretionary variables in 
the model.” (this issue will be assessed in more detail later in this chapter). The most 
widely cited distinctions between a ‘typical’ CBA and non-CBA central bank are 
those presented in Hanke and Schuler (2000). Table 2.1 is adapted from this study 
with the difference that some characteristics from the original table that we argue are 
questionable are excluded and some other distinctions are added. The characteristics 
listed in the table are those of a ‘typical’ central bank, not those of a theoretically 
ideal one. However, CBAs have evolved through history and its form has changed 
and deviated from those orthodox CBA rules. 
  
Table 2.1: Differences in the role of a central bank in a CBA regime  
 
'Typical' ('orthodox') currency board 'Typical' central bank 
Usually supplies notes and coins only Supplies notes, coins, and deposits 
Fixed exchange rate with reserve currency Pegged or floating exchange rate 
Foreign reserves of 100 percent of monetary 
base  
Variable foreign reserves 
Full convertibility Limited convertibility 
Rule-bound monetary policy Discretionary monetary policy 
Not a lender of last resort Lender of last resort 
Does not regulate commercial banks Often regulates commercial banks 
Earns seigniorage only from interest Earns seigniorage from interest and inflation 
Cannot create inflation Can create inflation 
Cannot finance spending by domestic 
government 
Can finance spending by domestic government 
May only hold foreign currency assets against 
its liabilities of base money 
Holds foreign as well as domestic assets against 
monetary base 
Monetary base is beyond its control – market 
forces determine the monetary base 
Affect monetary base through open market 
operations and discount rate policy  
Source: Adapted from Hanke and Schuler (2000)  
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As noted above, modern CBAs deviate, to different extents, from these orthodox 
rules. These deviations and different reasons for adopting a CBA will be investigated 
next. 
  
2.2.2 Evolution of currency board arrangements  
 
Different forms taken and reasons for their adoption 
 
Currency board arrangements were first established in some British colonies to 
facilitate monetary relationships between the colonies and their metropolis. A reason 
for introducing CBAs in British colonies instead of allowing them to use pound 
sterling was “to provide the colonies with a stable currency without the associated 
difficulty of issuing sterling notes and coins that were costly to replace if lost or 
destroyed” (Frankel, 1999, p.18). The first CBA was established in the British Indian 
Ocean colony of Mauritius in 1849. Other countries followed and by the late 1940s 
the number of CBAs reached its peak when about 50 were in operation. This number 
declined in early 1960s as most of the colonies replaced currency boards with 
‘typical’ central banking after gaining independence20. In the 1980s CBAs returned 
not to mediate between a mother country and its colonies but to confront a set of 
specific economic challenges (Gustavo, 2001), such as: to facilitate transition of 
former state planned economies (Estonia, 1992 and Lithuania, 1994), to fight 
speculative attacks and hyperinflation after economic crises and regain credibility for 
domestic economic policies (Argentina, 1991 and Bulgaria, 1997), to restore 
confidence after a political crisis or a bank panic (Hong Kong, 1983), or to provide a 
stable post-war institutional environment (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997). In 
general, the main reason behind implementation of a CBA in those countries was the 
perceived need to achieve credibility and stability (Jakubiak, 2000), as these 
countries were economically and/or politically very unstable at the moment of CBA 
adoption. Another set of countries which also use CBA, primarily because they are 
small, open economies that had little experience in implementing monetary policy 
(Santiprabhob, 1997) are: Brunei (1967), Djibouti (1949), Bermuda (1915), the 
                                                                
20 Although currency board existed in independent countries as well (Argentina, Ireland, Yemen, 
Libya, Philippines, North Russia) most of the 'early' currency boards countries were British colonies.  
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Cayman Islands (1972), the Falkland Islands (1899), Faroe Islands (1940), Gibraltar 
(1927) and Saint Helena (1976).  
 
Those CBAs adopted in the 1980s and 1990s have more flexibility compared to the 
19th century’s traditional (‘orthodox’) CBAs and therefore Hanke (2002) argued that 
those regimes cannot rightfully be termed currency board but rather “central banks 
that mimic currency boards” or “currency board-like regimes” (term that was 
afterwards usually used for those ’new’ CBAs). This flexibility is associated with 
deviations from the 100 percent backing rule (Argentina) and usage of some 
monetary instruments. Namely, all new CBAs, except the one in Hong Kong, use a 
minimum reserve requirements instrument and all new CBAs, except the one in BH, 
perform the lender of last resort function, to some extent. All modern CBAs require a 
floor (minimum), but have no ceiling (maximum) on the foreign reserve coverage for 
monetary liabilities. The main deviations of modern currency board regimes from the 
‘orthodox’ CBA rules and between these modern CBAs will be examined in Section 
2.4. 
 
Reasons for the abandonment of the CBAs 
 
There are various reasons for the abandonment of CBAs such as changes in the 
external environment or occurrence of external and internal shocks which require 
more discretion in the implementation of monetary policy (Pautola and Backe, 1998). 
However, Hanke (2002) argued that the abandonments of CBAs in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s were mainly the result of political rather than economic reasons. Shuler 
(1992) also emphasised some reasons which have no economic justification such as 
nationalist sentiment for an independent national currency and perception of 
currency boards as vestiges of colonialism. However, it can also be argued that 
economic growth was obstructed by strict rules imposed on the monetary authority 
through the backing rule and restraints on the implementation of discretionary 
monetary policy. Another reason for the abandonment of ‘old’ CBAs was the 
volatility of sterling, which was the principal reserve currency for currency boards at 
the time.  
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Although some of these reasons might be justified, Schuler (1992) argued that the 
performance of most central banks has been worse than the performance of the 
currency boards they replaced. Schuler (1992) also argued that no currency board 
ever failed. He argued that fall of CBA in North Russia and Argentina was because 
their CBAs deviated from the ‘orthodox’ – the North Russian Board held 25 percent 
of its reserves in worthless North Russia government bonds and the Argentine Board 
held 33.4% of monetary base in domestic assets. However, as noted above, there are 
different types of CBAs. In order to better understand differences between different 
types of CBA their operation will be addressed next.  
 
2.2.3 Operation of CBAs 
 
CBA versus gold standard  
 
In most CBA studies the functioning of a currency board is usually compared to the 
gold exchange standard and explained as an automatic-adjustment process 
(Williamson, 1995a; Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1997; Berensmann, 2003). This 
automatic mechanism implies money supply adjustments to balance of payments 
imbalances or as Hanke (2008, p.277) described it: under a CBA the “money supply 
is on autopilot“. Hanke and Schuler are among the most cited economists who tried 
to explain the self-adjustment process under a CBA (Hanke and Schuler, 1991, 
2000). According to their schematic illustration, re-establishment of balance in the 
current account21 occurs through changes in money supply, interest rates and prices. 
The self-adjustment mechanism (which is based on gold standard adjustment 
mechanism) is described as follows: a trade deficit (surplus), through fall (rise) in 
bank reserves creates a contraction (expansion) in bank credit (the money supply). 
This causes interest rates to rise (fall), income to fall (rise), which result in lower 
(higher) domestic aggregate demand. This should lead to a fall (rise) in prices thus 
lowering (rising) imports and increasing (lowering) exports, consequently restoring 
the current account balance. Hence, the endogeneity of money supply growth 
through market forces. 
                                                                
21 Although they used the term ‘balance-of-payments’ they only considered changes in the current 
account assuming that capital and financial accounts do not change. 
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However, Hanke and Schuler (1991) compared a currency board to a ‘classical’ gold 
standard and their simplified model of self-adjustment process under a CBA is based 
on a few assumptions, some of which are not appropriate for the modern CBAs 
which are currently in use and for current conditions in the financial markets. First, 
they assume that there is no international branch banking between the CBA country 
and the reserve country, while in modern CBA countries, especially in the small 
ones, foreign banks frequently play an important role in providing liquidity for their 
subsidiaries (Williamson, 1997; Nenovsky and Dimitrova, 2002), especially because 
of the potential maturity mismatch problem between deposits and loans, which was 
described in Chapter 1. The latter is common in modern CBA countries as most of 
the deposits in those countries are short-term deposits while most of the loans are 
long-term (Andersen, 2009; Gedeon and Đonlagić, 2009). Therefore, parent banks 
are sometimes argued to have a role of lender of last resort which cannot be 
provided by the monetary authority in CBA countries (Williamson, 1997; Gustavo, 
2001; Gedeon and Đonlagić, 2009). Therefore, money supply growth has 
endogenous sources, which are linked to the liquidity needs of banks, rather than to 
the outcome of external trade (Gedeon, 2010). Second, they assume that the capital 
and financial accounts do not change. However, in an environment of free capital 
movement those changes considerably alter the amount of foreign reserves and 
subsequently money supply. Moreover, in most currency board countries a growth in 
the monetary base even in the presence of persistent trade deficit is observed (Hanke 
and Schuler, 1991; Gedeon, 2010). This can partly be explained through the presence 
of workers’ remittances and net foreign investment inflows which bring additional 
reserves into the country (Gedeon and Đonlagić, 2009). Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to argue that the monetary base is determined by the balance of payments 
than by the current account in the CBA countries. Third, they assume no binding 
minimum reserve ratio while reserve requirements exist in all modern CBA countries 
(with the exception of Hong Kong). 
 
Although gold standard regimes and CBAs have some similarities, as both types of 
monetary regimes pose restrictions on the monetary authorities regarding the issue of 
money and are considered to increase credibility and confidence due to fixed 
exchange rate and 100% backing of money (by gold and anchor foreign currency, 
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respectively), there are some differences between two regimes. Desquilbet and 
Nenovsky (2007) pointed out that a comparison of the two regimes is difficult due to 
different institutional forms within each regime, observed through time and across 
different countries in which they were in use. However, Desquilbet and Nenovsky 
emphasised a few distinctions that hold in all varieties of regimes. First, confidence 
in the gold standard regimes was determined by hundreds of years of its good 
performance, while in CBAs it is mostly a result of confidence in a foreign monetary 
institution to whose currency a CBA currency is fixed. Moreover, these authors also 
note that the gold standard emerged spontaneously while CBAs are usually enforced 
(or deliberately created) by some foreign institution (with the exception of Hong 
Kong and Estonia). Second, the automatic mechanism which is described above 
nowadays is much more complex and vulnerable. A current account deficit may be 
compensated by capital and financial account surpluses rather than automatically 
restored. Additionally, although CBAs should not use sterilization, Hanke (2002) 
argued that most of the modern CBAs do engage in sterilization and therefore violate 
the automatic correcting mechanism. The absence of this automatism is also 
empirically confirmed in some countries with modern CBAs (Bulgaria, Lithuania) 
which have some discretion in their monetary policies (Nenovsky et al., 2001). 
However, Nenovsky et al. emphasised that the automatic mechanism is theoretically 
not completely consistent and is empirically unproven even in the gold standard 
regimes. Third, the money supply is determined differently in those two regimes: 
while in the (full-fledged) gold standard regime the coverage exists for all money in 
circulation in the CBAs the coverage exists only for monetary base which is, in 
modern financial systems, just a part of total money supply (due to the credit 
multiplication process).  
 
Money supply under the ‘modern’ currency board arrangements  
 
Under an ‘orthodox’ CBA the domestic monetary authority had no direct control 
over the money supply. According to orthodox currency board rules in a central 
bank’s balance sheet there should be only cash and notes on the liability side and 
foreign reserves on the asset side (Hanke and Schuler, 2000). As in ‘modern’ CBAs 
commercial banks hold their reserves in a central bank account the liability side (the 
monetary base (MB)) consists of currency board notes – currency in circulation (C), 
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which contains currency outside central bank (currency held by banks, Cb, and 
currency held by public, Cp), and banks’ reserves held in a central bank (R). 
 
MB = Cp + Cb + R                                                                           (2.1) 
 
As noted previously, under a CBA the central bank must have 100 percentage 
coverage of the monetary base in foreign reserves (FX). A central bank’s balance 
sheet under CBA may be represented by the following identity: 
 
FX = Cp + Cb + R                                             (2.2) 
 
with FX on the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet and C and R on the 
liabilities side. Under the CBA the commercial banks’ balance sheet contains 
reserves (R) and loans (L) on the asset side and deposits on liabilities side (D).  
 
 R + Cb +L = D                                                                                                       (2.3) 
 
From the above equations it can be noted that there are no borrowings from the 
central bank to commercial banks on the asset (liability) side of the central bank’s 
(commercial banks’) balance sheets. Moreover, there are no other domestic assets in 
the central bank’s balance sheet, since it cannot lend to the government either. This is 
also evident from the balance sheet of the Central Bank of BH (Table 1.3) and the 
consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in BH (Table 1.6) in Chapter 1.  
  
A common money supply equation (M) is given below:   
 
M = Cp + D                                                                                                             (2.4) 
 
As reserves (R) are equal to r·D, where r is reserve ratio and D deposits and c is a 
ratio of cash (C) to deposits (D) Equation 2.1 can be written as: 
 
MB = r·D + cp·D + cb·D = D·(r+cp+cb)                                                                 (2.5) 
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From the above it follows that: 
 
D = 
1
𝑟+𝑐𝑝+ 𝑐𝑏
 · MB                                                                                                   (2.6) 
Cp = 
𝑐𝑝
𝑟+𝑐𝑝+ 𝑐𝑏
 · MB                                                                                                  (2.7) 
Cb = 
𝑐𝑏
𝑟+𝑐𝑝+ 𝑐𝑏
 · MB                                                                                                  (2.8) 
 
By integrating 2.6 and 2.7 into 2.4 we get: 
 
M = 
1+𝑐𝑝
𝑟+𝑐𝑝+ 𝑐𝑏
 · B                                                                                                     (2.9) 
 
where  
1+𝑐𝑝
𝑟+𝑐𝑝+ 𝑐𝑏
  represents the money multiplier, m, so the above equation could be 
written as: 
 
M = m · MB                                                                     (2.10) 
 
The money supply can therefore be altered by changes in the monetary base and 
money multiplier. As noted above, under a CBA, the monetary base can be altered 
only when the foreign reserves are altered (Equation 2.2). The money multiplier is 
altered by changes in cash, reserves and deposits. Finally, based on Equations 2.2 
and 2.3 the money supply equation (based on a consolidated balance of banking 
sector and central bank) under a CBA can be written as follows: 
 
FX + L = Cp + D                                                                                                  (2.11) 
 
Furthermore, as all modern CBAs deviate from the ‘pure’ (‘orthodox’) CBA rules 
(see Table 2.2 below) the money supply may also be altered by the use of available 
monetary instruments. First, all the new currency boards, except the one in Hong 
Kong, use a reserve requirement instrument. Berensmann (2003, p.9) emphasised 
five main functions of reserve requirements which makes them relevant for countries 
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in transition22: ”they provide a monetary tool for which the central bank does not 
need to create central bank money; they can limit the expansionary effects of capital 
inflows on domestic credit; they assume the role of a buffer and stabiliser of money 
market interest rates; they serve to control the liquidity of commercial banks; and 
they serve to avoid crises of confidence”. However, this monetary tool is usually 
argued not to be a very effective monetary policy instrument given its uncertain 
influence on money supply (Gedeon, 2010). Kanda (2006) argued that under 
conditions of open capital account and predominance of foreign-owned banks which 
are supported by their parent banks (which is, as argued above, often the case in 
small CBA countries), the effectiveness of a rate of required reserves is very limited 
as the presence of foreign banks is likely to make the subsidiaries less dependent on 
the local policy. Thus it may be argued that this instrument is not effective in 
countries with high participation of foreign banks, as parent banks can provide extra 
liquidity for loans to their subsidiaries, so that they do not have to lower their credit 
growth when reserve requirements are increased and they can withdraw money from 
their subsidiaries or subsidiaries may hold excess reserves (instead of increasing 
credit growth) when reserve requirements are lowered.  
 
Moreover, the asset side of modern CBAs’ balance sheets consists not just of foreign 
assets (as in ‘orthodox’ CBAs) but of domestic assets as well (Joksas, 2004). This 
implies that the ‘new’ CBA countries can use open market instruments and engage in 
sterilization23 to some extent. Sterilization, which is not possible under ‘orthodox’ 
currency board, is argued to be important in some new currency board countries. 
Hanke (2002) argued that all recent currency board-like systems, except the one in 
BH, have engaged in sterilization, behaving much like countries with a ‘typical’ 
central bank. He calculated sterilization coefficients which significantly deviate from 
zero24 in all countries except BH, implying that the link between the changes in the 
                                                                
22 When new CBAs are discussed (especially those in Europe) one has to keep in mind that those 
countries were at the beginning of transition process at the moment of adoption of CBA and therefore 
characterised by a high degree of overall economic instability. 
23 Sterilization means usage of open market operations to offset the effect of changes in net foreign 
assets on domestic money supply; “when the monetary authority tries to influence the money supply, 
it sterilizes the amount of base money which it sells (buys) for foreign exchange by buying (selling) 
domestic assets through open market operations“ (Joksas, 2004, p.8). 
24 Hanke (2002, p.208) “decomposed changes in the monetary base into domestic and foreign 
components to calculate the“ sterilization coefficient. “If a monetary authority is operating as an 
orthodox currency board, changes in the monetary base only contain a foreign component and the 
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net foreign assets and base money in those counties has been broken. Nenovsky et al. 
(2001) also argued that the inclusion of discretionary variables breaks the automatic 
link between the balance of payments and the money supply and results in 
“combined adjustment through automation and discretion” (p.18). Their empirical 
analysis also confirmed the absence of automatic adjustments in two (Bulgaria and 
Lithuania) out of three analysed (the third one is Estonia) modern CBA countries. 
 
Price and interest rate determination under a CBA  
 
In theory, if capital movements are liberalised and taxes are similar to those in 
anchor currency countries, as a result of a fixed exchange rate and asset arbitrage, 
there will be convergence tendency between prices and interest rates in CBA and 
anchor currency countries (Hanke and Schuler, 2000; Imam, 2010). However, in 
practice, prices and interest rates in CBA countries do diverge from the prices and 
interest rates in anchor countries. To understand these differences it should be noted 
that CBA countries are usually developing countries, while anchor currency 
countries are developed (and usually one of the worlds' strongest) economies. 
Differences in prices between those two types of countries are usually explained by 
productivity differences arising from different levels of development between the 
CBA and the anchor country (Imam, 2010, p.19). This phenomenon is known as the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect which Duisenberg (2001) described as a source of 
“potential inflationary pressure arising from higher productivity growth in catching-
up economies, which has also been held responsible for higher inflation in accession 
countries“. Namely, production capacity levels in developing countries are much 
lower than in developed countries and rates of these capacities tend to increase faster 
in developing countries which may be one of the sources of differences in inflation 
between those two types of countries (thus, the general price level is expected to 
grow considerably faster in developing than in developed countries). Furthermore, 
Nenovsky and Dimitrova (2002) emphasised differences in a number of 
microeconomic and structural factors as sources of inflation differentials, such as: the 
difference in the degree of development of the economies, in the economic and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sterilization coefficient is zero (or close to zero). Non-zero values signal that a monetary authority is 
deviating from currency board orthodoxy because the monetary base contains both foreign and 
domestic components.“ 
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industrial structure, in the rates of growth, the structure of corporate governance, 
government tax policy, customs duties and expenditures, the structure of goods and 
labour market etc. There is also a danger of real exchange rate misalignments (and 
overvaluation of a CBA’s currency) when the CBA country’s inflation rate differs (is 
higher than) from that of the anchor currency country (Jakubiak, 2000, Silajdžić, 
2005). As a government cannot change the exchange rate in order to help the 
economy to adjust to outside shocks (such as fall in export prices or sharp shift in 
capital flows), domestic prices and wages have to adjust. Furthermore, in order to 
adjust for monetary supply changes caused by changes in balance of payments, 
prices, wages, labour market and interest rates should be flexible in CBA countries 
(Santiprabhob, 1997). However, prices and wages in those countries tend to be sticky 
and rigid, which may cause additional imbalances in the economy, in particular high 
rates of unemployment.   
 
2.2.4 The economics of monetary and exchange rate regimes: where does the 
currency board fit in? 
 
The ability to pursue an independent monetary policy is closely related to the degree 
of flexibility of the exchange rate (Jakubiak, 2000). According to the Mundell-
Fleming in a world of high capital mobility, it is impossible to attain both exchange 
rate stability and monetary independence - the so called “Impossible Holy Trinity”. 
However, even though higher monetary independence (discretion) is related to higher 
exchange rate flexibility it does not necessarily mean that discretionary central banks 
do not control their exchange rates. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) noted that in countries 
with floating exchange rate regimes monetary policy is not completely independent 
from exchange rate policy. They assign this behaviour to the so called “fear of 
floating” and the need of a central bank to intervene in particular circumstances 
(during booms and crises). On the other hand, in the world of imperfect markets a 
fixed exchange rate may not lead to a complete loss of control of monetary policy 
(Imam, 2010). Kim and Yang (2009) showed that countries in East Asia with pegged 
exchange rate regimes enjoy a higher degree of monetary autonomy, presumably 
with a help of capital account restrictions. Therefore, a strict classification of 
countries’ monetary and exchange rate policies, such as the one made by the 
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International Monetary Fund (see Table 2.2. below) which is frequently used in 
empirical analyses, is not fully accurate as it takes at face value that countries 
actually do what they say they do (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). 
 
In classifications of exchange rate regimes (monetary policy frameworks) a CBA can 
be allocated between a monetary union (and full dollarization) and other 
conventional fixed arrangements (see Table 2.2). A CBA is less rigid than a 
monetary union and dollarization, as the country keeps its own domestic currency 
and it can abandon the regime (by changing the convertibility law) and transform the 
exchange rate regime into a more flexible one. On the other hand, it is more rigid 
than other fixed parity regimes as there is a 100 percent reserve requirement and the 
fixed exchange rate commitment is embedded in law, and therefore is less vulnerable 
to speculative shocks than a central-bank administered peg (Selgin, 2005; 
Santiprabhob, 1997). Moreover, a change in the fixed rate is much harder under a 
CBA than under other fixed regimes, as the fixed rate in CBA countries is enshrined 
by law so it cannot be abandoned at short notice (Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006). 
Furthermore, under a CBA there is less discretion, more rules-based set-up, stronger 
legal barriers, and no ability to monetise fiscal deficit, even in the short run (Sepp 
and Randveer, 2002b).  
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Table 2.2: IMF’s Classification of exchange rate arrangements and compatible 
monetary policy frameworks 
 
Exchange rate 
regime 
Characteristics 
Monetary 
(in)dependence 
Compatible 
Monetary Policy 
Framework 
Monetary union 
and dollarization/ 
euroisation 
Exchange arrangements with 
no separate legal tender. 
Complete 'surrender' of 
the monetary authorities' 
independent control over 
domestic monetary 
policy. 
Exchange Rate 
Anchor 
Currency Board 
Arrangements 
A monetary regime based on 
an explicit legislative 
commitment to exchange 
domestic currency (which is 
fully backed by foreign 
assets) for a specified 
foreign currency at a fixed 
exchange rate. 
Elimination of the 
traditional central bank 
functions with little or no 
discretionary monetary 
policy. 
Other 
Conventional 
Fixed Peg 
Arrangements 
The country (formally or de 
facto) pegs its currency at a 
fixed rate to another 
currency or a basket of 
currencies within a band of 
at most ±1 percent around a 
central rate. No particular 
reserve requirements 
Flexibility of monetary 
policy, though limited, is 
greater than in the case 
of exchange 
arrangements with no 
separate legal tender and 
currency  
Pegged Exchange 
Rates within 
Horizontal Bands 
Pegs with bands larger than 
±1 percent 
Limited degree of 
monetary policy 
discretion, depending on 
the band width 
Crawling 
(adjustable) Pegs  
The currency is adjusted 
periodically in small 
amounts at a fixed rate or in 
response to changes in 
selective quantitative 
indicators 
There are constraints on 
monetary policy in a 
manner similar to a fixed 
peg system 
Exchange Rates 
within Crawling 
Bands                    
Allows for interventions 
when the exchange rate hits 
a band of either side of 
parity 
Constraints on monetary 
policy, with the degree of 
policy independence 
being a function of the 
band width 
Managed Floating 
with No 
Predetermined 
Path for the 
Exchange Rate 
The monetary authority 
attempts to influence the 
exchange rate without 
having a specific exchange 
rate path or target 
Discretionary monetary 
policy  
Monetary 
Aggregate Anchor 
 or 
Inflation 
Targeting 
Framework 
Independently 
(Free) Floating 
 
There are no  interventions 
on the foreign exchange 
market, but private supply 
and demand for currency 
clear the market 
Discretionary monetary 
policy 
Source: Table is based on IMF Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy 
Frameworks, http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2004/eng/0604.htm, (last accessed: 03/09/10) 
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Because of the strong fix of domestic currency to the anchor currency and because of 
the resulting loss of monetary discretion, the CBA and full dollarization are quite 
similar, but still there are some differences between the two. What makes the CBA 
different from dollarization/euroisation, apart from satisfaction of national sentiment, 
is that it yields seigniorage to the issuer (which is equal to the interest generated by 
its foreign currency assets). Under dollarization there are no foreign exchange 
reserves (Fabris and Kalezić, 2008; Imam 2010) and the foreign currency has the 
exclusive status as the full legal tender. Therefore, it relies upon a foreign central 
bank to satisfy the local demand for paper currency which generates a risk of a 
foreign embargo on currency shipments (Selgin, 2005). On the other hand, 
dollarization is a stronger guarantee against any risk of devaluation and therefore is 
considered a more credible regime. Furthermore, any local-currency denominated 
assets in modern currency board systems tend to bear a risk premium relative to 
similar dollar-denominated assets, as under a currency board there is still a potential 
risk of devaluation if the statutory law changes, while dollarization eliminates any 
risk of a devaluation of the monetary base relative to the dollar (Selgin, 2005). As 
emphasised by Frankel (1999), an interest rate differential25 which can undermine the 
sustainability of a CBA is less likely with dollarization as the currency premium 
vanishes and the country premium should diminish over time due to the more stable 
currency. Alternative exchange rate regimes and their main characteristics alongside 
their monetary policy framework are presented in the Table 2.2. In the table it can be 
noticed that adoption of an exchange rate anchor is identified as a monetary 
framework and a CBA as a type of exchange rate regime. In the next section, it is 
argued that a CBA should be classified as an exchange rate-monetary regime 
(framework) combination, since the regime defines not only the type of the exchange 
rate, but also the set of rules imposed on the monetary authority, as emphasised in the 
previous sections.  
 
  
                                                                
25 The interest rate differential consists primarily of a country premium, supplemented by a small 
currency premium. The country premium is compensation for the perceived risk of default, and the 
currency premium is compensation for perceived risk of a change in exchange rate policy (Frankel, 
1999, p. 23). 
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2.2.5 A CBA as a monetary framework 
 
Previous studies which aimed to estimate the effect of a CBA on macroeconomic 
performance treated a CBA only as an exchange rate regime (ERR) and compared it 
with the other ERRs. Most of the early studies which estimate the effect of different 
ERRs on macroeconomic performance used the IMF’s ‘de jure’ classification of 
ERRs. As noted above, this classification is based on the ERRs which countries 
report they are utilising, which is not necessarily the ERR which they employ in 
practice. In order to facilitate the assessment of the ERR, Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) developed their own 
classifications which are based on consideration of the actual behaviour of nominal 
exchange rates. Although widely used, both classifications were criticized for not 
capturing all relevant features that represent the actual ERR26. Moreover, Domac et 
al. (2004, p.5) argued that ‘de facto’ classifications fail “to capture the distinction 
between stable nominal exchange rates resulting from the absence of shocks, and 
stability that stems from policy actions offsetting shocks” and “to reflect the 
commitment of the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market”, which 
is reflected in the ‘de jure’ classification. Kuttner and Posen (2001) argued that ‘de 
facto’ classifications do not account for the differences in the (inflationary) 
expectations which are usually affected by announced/declared policies. They argued 
that “whether the implications of different declared regimes for central bank 
behaviour and relevant macroeconomic outcomes indeed differ is an empirical 
question requiring investigation” (p.16), the results of which should indicate whether 
the announced fixed ERR is actually credible and what are the relevant 
macroeconomic outcomes. Ghosh et al. (2011) argue that there is a significant 
difference between ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ ERR classifications and there is also a 
difference in the effect of ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ pegged ERRs on inflation 
performance since “de facto pegs that are not supported by a formal commitment 
may not deliver the full disinflationary benefits of pegs” (p.16). Clearly, both 
                                                                
26 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) classification includes measures of exchange rate volatility, 
volatility of exchange rate changes and volatility of reserves to capture the actual behaviour of 
exchange rate. However, this classification is criticised for not accounting for capital controls and for 
classifying ERR in countries which do not exert much volatility in these variables as inconclusive 
(Petreski, 2011). On the other hand, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) incorporated data on parallel and dual 
exchange rate markets and data on exchange controls and currency reforms. However, this 
classification is criticised for not accounting for foreign exchange reserves which may signal a 
government’s commitment to maintain peg (Petreski, 2011). 
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classifications have some disadvantages and are likely to result in relatively different 
inferences. However, neither classification separates a CBA from pre-announced 
pegs and regimes with no separate legal tender and none of the classifications takes 
into account the combination of ERR and monetary regime, which are interrelated 
and  jointly determined.  
 
Beside the adoption of a rigid ERR there are other methods used by the monetary 
authorities to anchor inflationary expectations, such as an announced monetary target 
and (increased) central bank independence. Assessing whether the effects of these 
policies (additional to rigid ERR) will be supplementary, negligible or 
counterproductive in increasing the credibility of monetary authority is not 
straightforward27. Kuttner and Posen (2001) argued that in order to answer this 
dilemma one should take all three elements of the monetary framework (namely, the 
type of ERR, announced domestic target and the degree of central bank 
independence) into account. They argued that “… the partial view taking exchange 
rates alone is misleading” (p.9). Although monetary and exchange rate regimes are 
likely to be highly correlated and interdependent, the same ERR may not have the 
same effect on macroeconomic performance due to different domestic targets and 
rules and rules and different level of central bank independence in compared 
countries. Sepp and Randveer (2002b), who estimated the effect of alternative 
(combined) regimes on macroeconomic performance in Estonia, specified the 
monetary regime as a “combination of a specific exchange rate regime with the 
concrete monetary rule” and monetary rule as “a specific monetary instrument setting 
designed to keep a target variable close to its specified target path” (p.369). Kuttner 
and Posen (2001) called this augmented (combined ER-monetary) regime the 
monetary framework. Beside the monetary rule (or as Kuttner and Posen called it the 
domestic target) and ERR, Kuttner and Posen also considered the degree of central 
bank independence when defining the monetary framework. In their analysis they 
included 41 countries from the OECD, Latin America and East Asia. Their results 
                                                                
27 As Kuttner and Posen (2001, p.12) argued: “One could argue that the effect would be nil, because 
the exchange rate commitment already credibly limited the central banker’s discretion. One could 
instead argue the effect would be still greater credibility, albeit perhaps with diminishing returns, 
because inflationary government officials are escape artists, and the more restraints the better. Or one 
could argue that the additional restraints are counterproductive, because just handcuffs in the form of 
inflation targeting leave a necessary limited amount of discretion as well as a clear release method, 
while the excessively tight duct tape of exchange rate targets, let alone multiple constraints, interferes. 
Theory gives no single answer to this empirical question.” 
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implied that the combination of inflation target plus exchange rate float and high 
central bank autonomy would appear to be a full substitute for a hard exchange rate 
commitment in terms of the resulting inflation level. Souza (2002) obtained the same 
results for the 10 European Union countries prior their accession in 2004. Therefore, 
taking into account only the effect of ERR, without its interactions with the domestic 
target/monetary rule, might be misleading. Rose (2011, p.7) also notes that ”the 
academic profession should move away from considering 'Exchange Rate Regimes' 
and instead classify countries by 'Monetary Policy Frameworks'”.  
 
In the case of CBA the choice of monetary and ER regimes are jointly determined 
since beside the commitment to keep the domestic currency fixed to the anchor 
currency a CBA sets rules which restrain the discretion of the monetary authority. In 
Kuttner and Posen’s (2001) (ERR-domestic target) combined classification a CBA is 
set as both a domestic target and ERR.  
 
CBAs are usually introduced as a means of restraining the monetary authority from 
stimulating output or financing government debt. The strict rules imposed on the 
monetary authority aim to increase credibility of announced monetary policies, 
anchor inflationary expectations and promote market discipline. On the other hand, 
constraining discretionary monetary policy prevents the monetary authority from 
stabilising output in response to shocks and from mitigating the effects of liquidity 
crises. As a CBA can be both beneficial and costly for a country which operates it in 
order for benefits to prevail certain conditions have to be fulfilled. 
 
2.3 Strengths and weaknesses of a CBA  
 
Strengths of a CBA 
 
The level of credibility of a monetary authority, which is expected to be increased 
after the introduction of CBA, is usually emphasised as the main advantage of CBA. 
It can be argued that the main sources of increased credibility are the strict rules 
imposed on the monetary authority, as there is no option to devalue a currency given 
that it is fixed to another country’s currency (Batiz and Sy, 2000) and the time-
inconsistency problem is resolved, as monetary authorities cannot create surprise 
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inflation (Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006). Furthermore, as CBA is enshrined by law it 
cannot be abolished at short notice (Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006) and the costs of 
exiting such a regime are high (Ghosh et al., 2000), which should make it more 
credible than other fixed exchange rate regimes. Keefer and Stasavage (2000) argued 
that the independence of the central bank and the legal status of the currency board 
are the sources of policy commitment and not the peg itself. One more benefit for a 
country which is likely to result from adoption of a CBA is the increase in 
confidence in the domestic currency. Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2007) identified this 
increase in confidence as the main strength of CBA as they consider it to be essential 
for achieving macroeconomic stability. Desquilbet and Nenovsky emphasised that 
this increased confidence is a result of convertibility which affects confidence 
through the adoption of two anchors, namely the fixed exchange rate and coverage of 
monetary base by foreign reserves. They further argued that this increased 
confidence is imported as it is derived from the confidence in the (future stability of) 
foreign currency (assuming that countries with a CBA peg their currencies to 
currencies which are strong and internationally recognized). Moreover, currency 
risk, although not removed, is lower in CBA countries than in countries with more 
flexible monetary and exchange rate regimes thanks to the fixed exchange rate, 
backing rule and the embeddedness of both in law (Imam, 2010).  
 
Wolf et al. (2008) distinguished one more beneficial effect of CBA besides the 
‘confidence’ effect and that is the ’discipline effect’. This effect occurs as a result of 
constraints posed on a monetary authority regarding money growth as the central 
bank under an orthodox CBA has no control over the monetary base and cannot use 
most monetary policy instruments (although, as  noted in previous sections, in many 
modern CBAs reserve requirements have been used as an instrument). However, it 
can be noted that the ‘discipline’ effect is strongly related to the ‘confidence’ effect 
and that it is also likely to contribute to an increase in credibility. Moreover, the 
absence of a lender of last resort function is usually argued to increase (financial) 
market discipline and to reduce moral hazard in the banking system, as commercial 
banks are less likely to engage in extremely risky operations knowing that there is no 
monetary authority which could support them if they face liquidity problems (Pautola 
and Backe, 1998). Frankel (2010) argues that this issue is even more important for 
developing markets whose banking systems tend to be more prone to problems of 
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asymmetric information, illiquidity and moral hazard than developed markets. 
Moreover, the fixed parity and backing rule tend to keep inflation and interest rates 
closely aligned to those in the anchor currency country (Imam, 2010), which is also 
likely to induce credibility (as explained in Section 2.2.3). In modern CBA countries, 
especially in the small ones, foreign banks frequently play a dominant role in 
providing liquidity for their subsidiaries (Williamson, 1997; Nenovsky and 
Dimitrova, 2002). Their presence may partially be explained by existence of CBA as 
these banks may be attracted by the expected increased monetary credibility. The 
presence (and prevalence) of foreign banks in CBA countries might be assessed as 
desirable since parent banks usually resolve the potential problem of maturity 
mismatching between short-term deposits and long-term loans that subsidiaries in 
CBA countries are usually facing, as showed to be the case in BH (see Chapter 1).  
 
It is argued that a CBA promotes sound fiscal policy and overall macroeconomic 
stability of country as it places a constraint on fiscal policy and should encourage 
more responsible government planning (Osband and Villanueva, 1993), since under a 
CBA the central bank cannot finance a government deficit. Although some may 
argue that limited fiscal policy could be costly as it cannot provide a stimulus for 
demand it has also been argued that deficit financing “has been abused far more 
often than it has been used constructively” (Williamson, 1995a, p.15). The potential 
strengths that can arise from a specific CBA characteristic are presented in Figure 
2.1. However, as emphasised above, all CBA characteristics may also represent 
weaknesses for a country. These are also shown in Figure 2.1 and will be assessed 
next. 
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Figure 2.1: CBA’s strengths/benefits and weaknesses/costs diagram 
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Weaknesses of a CBA  
 
The rigidity of the CBA regime and its features described above, may have some 
beneficial effects but may also bring costs to a country. In the previous section the 
convertibility of domestic currency is stressed as the main cause of the increase in 
confidence in the domestic currency. However, there are two groups of critics with 
the opposite views regarding the 100 percent backing of monetary liabilities. The 
first group of critics emphasises that retaining 100 percent of foreign reserves 
represents a clear loss of resources, as a portion of those reserves could instead be 
safely used for the purchase of foreign assets (Hazlewood 1952, as cited in Schuler, 
1992; Ghosh et al, 2000). The second group of critics emphasise that convertibility 
only refers to the monetary base not to the entire money in circulation (the entire 
stock of liquid monetary assets is usually a large multiple of the monetary base) 
hence financial panics can still occur if the public try to convert domestic currency 
into the anchor currency (Williamson, 1995a; Ponsot, 2001).  
 
Although the strict rules imposed on the monetary authority are expected to increase 
credibility they are usually criticised for preventing the monetary authority from 
offsetting contractionary shocks and stabilising output (Schuler, 1992). As the 
domestic currency is fixed to the anchor currency there is a danger that external 
shocks may cause an economic slowdown and high unemployment, if prices and 
wages are not flexible, as those shocks cannot be absorbed through changes in the 
exchange rate (Pautola and Backe, 1998, Silajdžić 2005; Gedeon, 2010). Regarding 
the fixed exchange rate there is also a threat of real exchange rate misalignments 
when the CBA country’s inflation rate differs from the inflation rate of the anchor 
currency country (Jakubiak, 2000, Silajdžić, 2005).  
 
Given that the backing rule and inability of monetary authority to influence the 
monetary base limit the monetary authorities from sterilizing capital flows, a current 
account deficit or rapid capital outflows will automatically be translated into 
domestic liquidity tightening and higher relative interest rates (Santiprabhob, 1997; 
Ponsot, 2001). Moreover, due to the exclusion of domestic assets from CBA’s 
balance sheet monetary expansion is limited compared to expansion under 
discretionary monetary authority that can create money backed by domestic assets. 
Chapter 2: The CBA as a Monetary Framework – A Literature Review 
 
84 
 
As there is no lender of last resort and the monetary authority cannot use most 
monetary policy instruments to offset liquidity crises, banks have to be more cautious 
and therefore they usually keep excess reserves which additionally restrain monetary 
growth. One more disadvantage is the loss of the portion of seigniorage which could 
have been derived from the creation of new monetary base backed by domestic assets 
(Pagano, in Ghosh et al., 2000). Seigniorage in CBA countries may only be obtained 
from interest revenue on central bank’s reserves (invested in foreign securities). 
Furthermore, the exclusion of domestic assets from CBA’s balance sheet imposes a 
financing constraint on the government as it prevents the central bank from financing 
a government deficit by purchasing government securities (Camilleri, 2002). Hence, 
the constraints imposed on fiscal policy together with the constraints imposed on 
monetary policy are argued to impart a deflationary bias (Treadgold, 2006) and to 
have net contractionary effects on the economy (Ponsot, 2001). However, 
Williamson (1995b)28 argued that “the ability of a currency board to discipline fiscal 
policy is critically dependent upon the political willingness of the government to be 
disciplined”, especially when it has access to international financial markets where it 
can finance additional debt (Jakubiak, 2000). This may also be argued for financial 
restraints imposed by a CBA, which cannot finance financial institutions, because in 
CBA countries, as elsewhere, foreign banks have access to international financial 
markets. Although they may provide needed liquidity for their subsidiaries, the high 
dependence of financial stability on foreign banks may also pose a threat to money 
market stability in the periods of both financial upturns and downturns. Potential 
threats may arise in a period of financial development when foreign parent banks 
inject extra liquidity into a currency board country’s banking sector. This is likely to 
affect money supply and if the currency board does not use any monetary instrument, 
and does not impose any capital controls, this may eventually lead to a credit boom. 
Another threat may arise in a financial depression if foreign parent banks withdraw 
capital from their subsidiaries, creating a liquidity crisis in financial institutions and 
further bank panics, which may lead to an unsustainable current account deficit and 
hence a balance of payment crisis (Andersen, 2009). As argued in Chapter 1, this 
happened in BH during the GFC. Although argued to have a lender of last resort role, 
foreign parent banks are primarily led by profits and their needs, and not by a 
                                                                
28 News Release: Currency Boardsare not the answer, at: 
http://www.iie.com/publications/newsreleases/newsrelease.cfm?id=20 (last accessed: july 2014) 
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willingness to help in emergences (which is the main purpose of the lender of last 
resort function). As illustrated in Figure 2.1 the characteristics of a CBA can be both 
beneficial and at the same time costly for a country. The overall net effects of a CBA 
regime on a country’s macroeconomic performance depend on a country’s specific 
circumstances and fulfilment of particular pre-conditions. These conditions will be 
examined in the next section.    
 
Evaluating the conditions under which a CBA will be beneficial 
 
Whether the adoption and retention of a CBA will be beneficial for a country 
depends on the specific circumstances in a country and the fulfilment of certain 
conditions before and after its introduction. Those circumstances and conditions are 
similar to those for an optimum currency area29 (OCA), as the country adopts a fixed 
exchange rate regime and loses its monetary policy discretion. In this context, among 
other conditions, Frankel (1999) emphasised that benefits from the fixed exchange 
rate will be higher the stronger the need to import monetary stability in a country 
(due to either a history of hyperinflation or an absence of credible public institutions) 
and the higher the desire for further integration with a particular neighbour or trading 
partner. Moreover, when choosing an anchor currency a country should consider 
whether: 
 
- the economy to which the currency is to be pegged is actually or potentially 
an important trading partner (in order to benefit from lower transaction costs), 
- the currency to which domestic currency is to be pegged should already be 
widely used in the country, 
- the country has an access to an adequate level of reserves, 
- the central bank of the country to which the domestic currency is to be 
pegged is independent and the anchor currency is strong and widely used. 
 
The traditional OCA conditions emphasised by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) 
and Kenen (1969) refer to price, wages and labour mobility, openness and product 
diversification (respectively), which are argued to be preconditions for benefiting 
                                                                
29 A currency area is traditionally defined as area that adopts an irrevocably fixed exchange rate 
regime or a signle currency within its area, and maintains a flexible exchange rate regime with the rest 
of the world. 
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from the fixed exchange rate and/or monetary union. Furthermore, it is emphasised 
that in order to fully benefit from pegging exchange rate or joining a monetary union 
the domestic and anchor currency countries should be exposed to similar (symmetric) 
shocks and relative importance of these shocks should be similar as well (Mundell, 
1961; Kenen, 1969). Furthermore, if countries are frequently affected by country-
specific (idiosyncratic) shocks, they need to be able to adjust quickly, through fiscal 
policy or other mechanism (such as rapid changes/adjustments in prices, wages and 
interest rates). All of these conditions can be applied to the CBA countries. Since the 
domestic currency is fixed to the anchor currency and the domestic monetary 
authority cannot engage in sterilization, there is a danger that external contractionary 
shocks may cause an economic slowdown and high unemployment, if prices and 
wages are not flexible (Camilleri, 2002).  
 
It is usually argued that in modern economies wages are sticky due to labour market 
rigidities (Gedeon, 2010). If prices and wages are sticky there is a danger of the 
nominal fixed exchange rate becoming overvalued in real terms (Camilleri, 2002). 
However, in subsequent studies of OCA and CBA it is argued that the type of shocks 
that a particular economy is facing is of great importance. Namely, in the case of real 
or external shocks floating exchange rates are likely to provide better insulation 
while fixed exchange rates are likely to perform better in the case of nominal or 
financial shocks (Buiter, 1995; Tavlas, 2009; Wolf et al., 2008). Furthermore, Chang 
and Valesco (2000) showed that in CBA countries banking crises are more likely to 
occur than balance-of-payments crises (the risk of currency devaluation diminishes 
while the risk of bank failure increases). Moreover, it is argued that the effects of 
external shocks might be mitigated (in the short-term) if a country has a strong 
foreign asset position (Santiprabhob, 1997) and high capital mobility (Ingram, 1962; 
as cited in Tavlas, 2009). As the currency is pegged to another country’s currency 
real convergence between those countries is of a great importance as well. 
Unsynchronised business cycles in those countries may destabilise the 
macroeconomic performance, as the anchor currency country’s monetary policy is 
transferred to the pegging country (Seep and Randveer, 2002b). Furthermore, if a 
country’s inflation remains higher than inflation in the anchor country it may lead to 
real misalignment, and the currency will become overvalued, which may weaken its 
export performance. This is an important issue as, under a CBA, money growth is 
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largely determined by the balance of payments, as explained in Section 2.2.3. 
Additionally, overvaluation of a currency may be caused by different productivity 
growth rates between those countries. In this context, Haan et al. (2001) also argued 
that the higher correlation between CBA and anchor currency country’s output 
shocks the more attractive is a currency board (since foreign monetary policy is 
likely to be more in line with the needs of the home country). However, in the 
subsequent studies on the OCA conditions regarding convergence and 
synchronisation between countries it has been argued that these may be more likely 
to occur after rather than before entering a monetary union: after joining business 
cycles are likely to converge (Frankel and Rose, 1997) and shocks become 
symmetric (De Grauwe and Monegelli, 2005). Holub (2003) emphasised that in the 
context of adjusting OCA criteria to CBA besides the convergence of a real factors 
which should exist between the CBA and the anchor currency country the 
importance of gaining monetary credibility through the commitment to strict rules 
has to be accounted for as well. The factors addressed next are those which are 
specific to those CBA countries that are the focus of this research programme, given 
that these are transition countries that introduced a CBA in specific conditions.   
 
A CBA is usually introduced in countries with high political instability and low 
quality of other state institutions in order to avoid the abuse and political pressures 
on the primary issue function. Galic (2012) concludes that CBAs are usually 
introduced in small, open economies facing macroeconomic instability and whose 
monetary policymakers possess a low level of trust. Hardouvelis and Monokrousos 
(2009, p.7) emphasised that a “CBA can facilitate stabilization programs in 
economies lacking credible institutions and when policy discretion is ineffective for 
monetary stabilization.” Until conditions in the country are improved there is still a 
strong argument for retaining a CBA, since high political instability and low trust in 
government institutions can lead to a decrease in trust in the local currency if the 
CBA is abandoned and more discretion allowed.  
 
Furthermore, the determinants of the money supply and the level of development of 
the financial sector have to be considered as well. Namely, as a monetary authority 
cannot induce money growth by using monetary policy instruments, it is argued that 
CBA induces a deflationary bias. However, Treadgold (2006) argued that this bias 
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could be resolved through an increase in the monetary base (which is determined by 
balance-of-payments transitions) or the domestic money multiplier. This implies that 
a CBA country needs to achieve a surplus in its balance-of-payments in order to 
increase its monetary base or support increased lending activities in order to increase 
the money multiplier. However, these conditions are hard to meet especially in 
developing countries. Firstly, most of the countries which introduce CBA are 
transition economies which usually have a persistent current account deficit, though 
in many of these countries this has been financed by net inflows of remittances and 
foreign direct investments (FDI). Secondly, as commercial banks in CBA countries 
are required to be more disciplined since there is no lender of last resort, they usually 
keep excess reserves in order to be always ready to assure depositories’ demands for 
funds, which additionally restrains monetary growth (by lowering the money 
multiplier). As the extra liquidity cannot be provided by the monetary authority one 
more precondition emerges, and that is existence of developed financial markets and 
financial innovations and access to global financial markets, as an alternative source 
of financing. Again, speaking in the context of transition economies it can be said 
that this source of finance is frequently limited in scope (Chang and Velasco, 2000; 
Ponsot, 2006). As there is no lender of last resort banking crises can have serious 
consequences. Therefore to assure additional liquidity, capital restrictions should be 
removed and international banking encouraged (foreign banks attracted). One 
additional condition is fiscal policy soundness and flexibility, as it should support 
local economic activity, especially in a period of crisis, as monetary policy is 
constrained. Therefore, a weak fiscal position in a country with a CBA may inhibit 
its economic development and make economic stagnation and a banking crisis more 
likely to occur (Goodhart, 2004). However, countries which are heading towards 
E(M)U accession (and this is the case for all European transition countries with a 
CBA, which will be examined in our empirical analyses) have strict rules imposed by 
the Maastricht criteria regarding the limits on budget deficits and public debt.  
 
Since a country loses its monetary policy and ability to change the exchange rate by 
introducing a CBA, when deciding to adopt it one should consider the effectiveness 
of the two prior the introduction of CBA. If a country is unable to use effectively its 
monetary policy the loss of monetary independence will not have a significant cost 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). It is argued that discretionary monetary policy is less 
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effective under conditions of high capital mobility and globalised financial markets 
(Schwartz, 1992, as cited in Camilleri, 2004) as developed financial markets are 
more likely to provide liquidity to banks without the need for central bank’s 
(inter)actions (Stockman, 2001). Tavlas (1993) argued that the loss of the exchange 
rate adjustment mechanism is less costly than presented by the traditional theory of 
OCA because changes in the nominal exchange rate may only have temporary effect 
on the country’s competitiveness, as any devaluation of the currency will in the long 
run result in inflation without real effects on output and unemployment, while the 
external deficit will remain. Moreover, Goldberg (1999) argued that for transition 
economies a loss of flexibility in exchange rates is not so costly as these countries 
tend to have a price-inelastic demand and supply of tradable goods and services and 
are not able to effectively perform short-term stabilisation. McKinnon (1963) argued 
that nominal exchange rate changes in a relatively open economy are not likely to 
result in increased competitiveness as this positive effect is likely to be offset by 
changes in costs and subsequently in domestic wages and prices. This may also be 
especially relevant for countries with relatively high imports and which import 
primarily intermediate products and raw materials. Therefore, the country specifics 
and the convergence between CBA and anchor country have to be assessed when 
examining whether potential benefits of CBA prevail over its potential costs.  
 
There are no simple or universal conditions which can be examined in order to 
determine whether a country should adopt and keep a CBA. As Frankel (1999) noted 
for the OCA, these conditions are different for different countries and times and what 
is optimal for one country is changing over time, as fundamental policies and 
exogenous factors of the country are changing.  Therefore, the criteria should be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. Most of these criteria are investigated for BH in 
Chapter 1 and will be assessed in Chapter 7.  
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2.4 The CBA in the context of transition  
 
As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, CBAs which are currently in use 
(modern or ‘new’ CBAs) differ from those introduced in the 19th century as they 
were adopted for different reasons and are characterised by higher flexibility in the 
rules imposed on the monetary authority (the main deviations of modern CBAs from 
orthodox currency board rules are listed in Table 2.3). Moreover, these modern 
CBAs differ amongst themselves regarding their degree of flexibility, institutional 
design and operational framework, as well as in their legal, political and overall 
macroeconomic characteristics. These differences, together with rationale for 
flexibility of the regime in transition countries which currently use CBA, are 
examined in this section.  
 
‘Orthodox’ and ‘modern’ currency board regimes  
 
Studies investigating modern CBAs provide two opposing views regarding the 
desirability of deviations from orthodox CBA rules. According to one stream 
(presented by Hanke and Schuler) modern currency boards should operate as an 
‘orthodox’ CBA (without any deviations), as allowing greater discretion of monetary 
policy while holding exchange rate fixed presents “invitations for abuse” (Hanke, 
2002, p.206). This consequently leads to a higher possibility of balance of payments 
crises (Hanke, 2008) as the most elementary principle of economics is violated (i.e. 
monetary and exchange rate policies conflict with one another). Hanke (2002) further 
argued that deviations from orthodoxy were a source of economic instability which 
resulted in the collapse of Argentina’s CBA.  
 
The other stream (presented by Ho, Wu, Nenovsky and others) argues that modern 
CBAs should deviate from orthodox rules as the conditions under which modern 
CBAs operate differ from conditions under which ‘pure’ CBAs had operated (due to 
changes in the political and economic landscape, country’s independence, increased 
capital mobility and international banking). Ho (2002, p.3) argued that “Given their 
wider responsibilities and the more complex environment, currency boards cannot 
plausibly accomplish their 21st century duties efficiently relying only on 19th century 
mechanics”. Proponents of this stream argue that deviations from orthodox rules in 
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each observed economy should depend on domestic circumstances of individual 
economies (Ho, 2002; Wu, 2005). This stream also argued that too strict rules 
increase the possibility of a liquidity crunch and systematic crises in the banking 
sector (Joksas, 2004) and identified this rigidity as a reason for a collapse of 
Argentina’s CBA (Wu, 2005).    
 
Similarities and differences between the ‘new’ CBAs in European transition 
countries  
 
All CBAs currently in use in the European transition countries (Estonia30, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina) deviate from the ‘orthodox’ CBA. The form 
and extent of their deviation from 'orthodox' rules differ between countries. Regimes 
in those countries differ due to country-specifics, different circumstances before and 
after the CBA introduction and different legal systems and traditions. These 
differences might be regarded through different designs of their CBAs, different 
features of their CBA embedded in a law (Ho, 2002), different institutional designs, 
and different overall macroeconomic frameworks (Nenovsky et al., 2002). Camillieri 
(2004) calculated an index of statutory pre-commitment which includes (and 
assesses) seven different criteria regarding CBA features which are associated with 
institutional, legal and political commitment. The index assesses: clarity of legal 
basis; quality of reserve backing in terms of denomination and liquidity; coverage of 
the monetary rule; vulnerability to alternative claims on reserves; operational 
autonomy; transparency and accountability provisions and regime revocation 
arrangements. According to this index the CBA in BH is characterised as the strictest 
(index value of 0.93) and Lithuania as the least strict (index value of 0.39). In Table 
2.3 the main characteristics of modern CBAs are presented (but our focus will be on 
CBAs in transition countries).  
 
  
                                                                
30 Estonia entered EMU on January 2011. However, it will be included in the anaylsis since it 
operated under a CBA for 18 years until its accession to EMU and therefore might serve as a 
potentially good example for other countries. 
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Table 2.3: The main deviations of modern CBAs from orthodox currency board rules  
 
 Orthodox 
CBA 
Bulgaria Estonia Lithuania BH Argentina 
Hong 
Kong 
Date 
established 
 
July 
1997 
June 
1992* 
April 1994 July 1997 
March 
1991* 
October 
1983 
Reserve 
currency 
Deutsche 
mark – 
euro 
(1999) 
Deutsche 
mark – 
euro 
(1999) 
US dollar 
– euro 
(2002) 
Deutsche 
mark – 
euro 
(1999) 
US dollar US dollar 
Backing rule 
(lower 
bound) 
100% of 
monetary 
base 
100% of 
monetary 
base 
100% of 
monetary 
base 
100% of 
monetary 
base 
100% of 
monetary 
base 
66.6% of 
monetary 
base** 
100% of 
monetary 
base 
Minimum 
reserve 
requirements 
no 12%  15% 
4% but not 
on all 
liabilities  
10% 
(maturity 
up to one 
year) and 
7% 
(maturity 
over one 
year) 
Replaced 
by 
liquidity 
requireme-
nts in 1995 
no  
Lender of 
last resort 
no 
Central 
bank*** 
Central 
bank*** 
Central 
bank*** 
no 
Central 
bank*** 
HKMA*
** 
Deposit 
certificates 
issued by the 
central bank 
no no 
Introduce
d in 1993 
abolished 
2000 
no no no 
Excha- 
nge 
funds 
and notes  
Repurchase 
agreements 
no no no 
yes, for 
fine tuning  
no yes yes 
Government
s deposits in 
Central bank 
no yes no  yes no no yes 
* Argentina abandoned the CBA in 2001 and Estonia abandoned CBA in January 2011 when it entered 
EMU 
** Since 1995 one third may be held in government bonds 
*** Only for system risk and in emergencies; limited by the excess of the  foreign reserves  
Sources: Table based on information provided in Jakubiak (2000) and Kovačević (2004) and national 
central banks’ statistics for the updates   
 
What is common to all 'new' CBAs in these countries is the backing rule (which is 
embedded in law in all countries) which ensures convertibility of domestic currency. 
Another similarity is the use of a reserve requirement tool. Moreover, all countries 
have been changing the rate of required reserves to try to affect the liquidity of the 
banking system. Another deviation which is, to a limited extent, present in all 
observed countries, except in BH, is the lender of last resort. Deviations from the 
orthodox rules in 'new' CBAs may also be observed in the presence of atypical items 
in the CBAs’ central bank’s balance sheet. This deviation is the largest in Lithuania’s 
and Bulgaria’s balance sheets which contain governments’ holdings which influence 
reserve money. This also violates the operation of automatic adjustment mechanism. 
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The econometric investigation conducted by Nenovsky et al. (2001) indicated that an 
automatic adjustment mechanism exists in Estonia (although in a weak form), while 
Bulgaria and Lithuania are characterised by “adjustment through discretion”31. 
Nenovsky et al. (2001) described 'new' CBAs as a “unity of rules and discretion” 
emphasising that central banks and CBAs cannot be found in their pure form today. 
However, given the changed circumstances under which the modern CBAs operate, 
compared to those when orthodox CBAs were used, this might be justified.  
 
Need for flexibility of CBA compared to the need for credibility and discipline in 
transition countries  
 
CBAs introduced in the 20th century differ from the colonial CBAs from the 19th 
century since conditions and circumstances in which they were introduced differ. 
First of all, all countries which introduced a CBA in the 20th century were and still 
are independent countries and they initiated its introduction themselves (though 
following an initiative from multinational organisations in the case of BH) unlike the 
19th century CBAs which were imposed on colonies by their mother country. 
Moreover, the policy alternatives were not the same: alternatives to 'old' CBAs were 
the adoption of the metropolitan currency or use of silver, while the alternative to 
'new' CBAs might be a central bank with discretionary monetary policy (Ho, 2002). 
Second, modern CBAs have to deal with issues which were absent or insignificant in 
the period of 'old' CBAs (Ho, 2002). These refer to the increasing complexity of the 
financial environment, development of interbank activities and non-cash means of 
payment (Ho, 2002), the existence of sophisticated financial markets and liberalised 
capital flows which affect domestic money markets (Hawkins, 2004). Finally, as 
presented in the previous section, ‘modern' CBAs are much more complex and 
diverse among themselves as they are adjusted to country-specific characteristics. All 
of these imply that 'new' CBAs should differ from the 'old' strict-ruled CBAs by 
conducting some monetary discretion. Berensmann (2003) argued that the use of 
monetary policy instruments in the 'new' CBA countries are not aimed to manage 
                                                                
31 Nenovsky et al. (2001) estimated the effect of changes in government deposits on interest rates and 
concluded that fiscal policy can impact interest rates not only directly (through securities issue) but 
also indirectly - through its presence in the currency board’s liabilities. 
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bank liquidity or to pursue active interest rate policy but to cushion economic shocks 
and stabilise fixed exchange rate based monetary policy system. 
 
Furthermore, since all the 'new' CBA countries discussed above are in a process of 
transition towards the market-oriented economy this flexibility is argued to be even 
more important as those counties are characterised by a high degree of overall 
economic instability (especially during the initial phase of transition process) (Ho, 
2002; Berensmann, 2003). Those countries are argued to be often hit by 
macroeconomic shocks: losses in real GDP, volatile capital flows or interest rates 
and banking crises (Berensmann, 2003; Salater, 2004) and to have weaker 
adjustment mechanisms that could compensate for the monetary policy inflexibility. 
Salater (2004) argued that a lender of last resort is an important function which 
should be available for dealing with banking crises especially for transition countries 
which still have unsound and vulnerable banking systems. On the other hand, these 
countries are unstable and CBAs were introduced in order to impose discipline and 
credibility on the monetary authority and any deviations from the strict rules may 
negatively influence this process. However, Berensmann (2003) and Salater (2004) 
argued that deviations from the orthodox rules in transition countries did not 
undermine their credibility and price stability or jeopardize the stability of the 
monetary and exchange rate systems. Wu (2005, p. 355) argued that a middle way 
approach (so called 'modified' CBA) provided “an answer to the general issue of rule 
versus discretion: confined flexibility in credit and exchange rate adjustments 
bounded by the policy discipline tends to achieve macroeconomic stability in a more 
credible way than a pure stereotype of currency board system”. Wu (2005, p. 355) 
further argued that: “The main advantage for a limited extent of exchange rate 
flexibility and monetary liquidity is to avoid the structural rigidity that a pure 
currency board faces in the presence of large current account deficits and pressures 
of capital flight. Its drawbacks are, however, adverse impacts on credibility of the 
currency board and thus increased risk of currency attacks. Indeed, it is often a 
country-specific issue how far a currency board should go toward relaxing its 
discretionary power over exchange rates and domestic credit.“ 
 
The reserve requirements instrument, which is in use in all ‘new’ transition CBA 
countries affects the liquidity stance of banks which is especially important in 
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transition countries where banking supervision is difficult (Abazorius, 1996, as cited 
in Berensmann, 2003). Moreover, they are argued to have a role as a buffer and 
stabiliser of money market interest rates (Berensmann, 2003). Besides, use of this 
instrument does not require the central bank to create money. Finally, Berensmann 
(2003) noted that the relatively high risk of confidence crises is also a good reason to 
introduce reserve requirements in transition economies, although, as noted 
previously, this may not be very effective instrument.  
 
As all European countries with a CBA are heading towards accession to EMU32 an 
important issue for these transition countries is the question of retention/abolition of 
the CBA (and potential introduction of more discretionary monetary policy, such as 
inflation targeting) prior to their accession to EMU.  
 
'New' CBAs in a context of EMU accession  
 
There are several arguments for retaining a CBA prior to EMU accession. First of all, 
in the case of abandonment of a CBA there is a potential threat of a loss of monetary 
authority credibility. Moreover, a CBA is argued to impose macroeconomic stability 
and discipline which are important in the pre-accession period and therefore 
abandonment of CBA may violate the established stability and discipline. It could 
also be “perceived as a failure of the state and would likely undermine popular 
backing for any supporting policies” according to Purfield and Rosenberg (2010, 
p.12), though they provide no explanation for their latter claim. Second, by retaining 
a CBA, the costs of introducing new institutions and policies that would only be used 
during Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERMII33) participation are avoided (Begg et 
al., 2001). Third, retaining a CBA is considered as a way to cope with the risk of 
speculative attacks, since the accession country’s currency is pegged to a currency of 
area to which it is accessing (Katsimi, 2008). Finally, “If there is a risk that 
                                                                
32 Lithuania and Bulgaria became members of EU in 2004 but are still not members of EMU, while 
BH is still not an EU member, although it is progressing towards the accession. Estonia entered EMU 
in January 2011, Lithuania 2015.  
33 “The Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) was set up on 1 January 1999 as a successor to the 
ERM to ensure that exchange rate fluctuations between the euro and other EU currencies did not 
disrupt economic stability within the single market, and to help non euro-area countries prepare 
themselves for participation in the euro area. The convergence criterion for exchange rate stability 
requires participation in ERM II.“   
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/erm2/index_en.htm, last accessed: 4/10/2014). 
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abandoning the CBA will bring back the problems responsible for its establishment 
in the first place, then retaining the arrangement is clearly optimal“ (Katsimi, 2008, 
p. 1061).  
 
On the other hand, Katsimi (2008) pointed out arguments for abandoning a CBA 
prior the introduction of the euro. He argued that the retention of CBA during the 
ERMII period will not allow for testing the appropriateness of the central rate. Any 
“inappropriateness of the exchange rate will prohibit interest rate convergence in an 
environment of free capital mobility, since long term interest rates will contain a risk 
premium for the lack of readiness for EMU” (Begg et al., 2001, as cited in Katsimi, 
2008, p.1047). Katsimi (2008) further emphasised that allowing the exchange rate to 
fluctuate within the bands of ERMII could restrict the inflationary consequences of 
capital inflows in the period before joining the euro-area. Finally, Katsimi (2008) 
argued that abandoning a CBA will signal to markets the sustainability of nominal 
convergence and, hence, improve the prospects of joining the euro-area by reducing 
market uncertainty. These signals are argued to be important since a country’s 
success will crucially depend on markets’ expectations about future economic 
performance. However, the accession of Estonia to EMU implies that the 
convergence criteria could be fulfilled without abandoning a CBA. Nevertheless, its 
desirability should be investigated on a case-by-case basis and by examining the 
potential alternatives.   
 
If a country aims to abandon a CBA prior to the introduction of the euro the question 
of which alternative regime to adopt is raised. Since other European countries which 
are in a process of accession to EMU adopted inflation targeting regime (IT), the 
desirability of CBA should be examined in comparison with this regime. IT involves 
the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation with an 
institutional commitment by the monetary authority to achieve these targets (as noted 
in the IMF classification of monetary and ER regimes). Apostoaie (2010) and 
Kemme and Lyakir (2011) argue that the co-existence of IT with an explicit 
exchange rate objective is problematic, which implies that countries that participate 
in ERMII should opt for the other monetary regime. On the other hand, CBAs are 
argued to be appealing exchange rate regimes even for potential EMU entry 
countries currently without CBAs (Sinn, 1999). One more advantage of a CBA over 
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the IT is credibility of monetary authority which is harder to achieve under the IT 
regime. However, both regimes target price stability, although in exchange rate 
targeting countries it is achieved through exchange rate channel while in IT countries 
it is achieved by usage of monetary policy instruments. Finally, “the exchange rate 
target might inflict output volatility under increased international capital mobility. 
Conversely, IT pre-emptively includes output departures from its potential level in 
the objective function and again delivers an optimal inflation outcome, while 
reducing the sacrifice ratio together with exchange-rate volatility” (Petreski, 2011, 
p.181). 
  
By observing fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria in countries which are 
currently in the EU but not yet EMU members it could be concluded that there is not 
much difference between countries which operate under a CBA and those with IT 
(Table 2.4). However, introduction of a CBA did help those countries to get closer to 
fulfilment of these criteria, through macroeconomic stabilisation and increase of 
confidence in domestic currency and monetary authority (inflation and interest rates 
dropped significantly in Estonia, Bulgaria and Lithuania after their introduction of a 
CBA).  
 
Table 2.4: Fulfilment of Maastricht criteria in EU but not yet EMU countries  
 
Country 
Monetary 
policy 
framework 
Price 
stability 
criterion 
Government 
budgetary 
position 
criterion 
Exchange 
rate 
criterion 
The long-
term interest 
rate 
criterion 
Legislation 
compatibility  
Bulgaria CBA yes yes no yes no 
Czech 
Republic 
Inflation 
targeting 
yes   yes* no yes no 
Lithuania CBA yes yes yes yes yes 
Hungary 
Inflation 
targeting 
yes yes no yes no 
Poland 
Inflation 
targeting 
yes no no yes no 
Romania 
Inflation 
targeting 
no yes no yes no 
Note: *If the Council decides to abrogate its excessive deficit procedure, the Czech Republic will 
fulfil the criterion on public finances.  
Source: European Commission (2014) 
 
These countries also had similar trends in macroeconomic variables and we cannot 
distinguish the CBA countries from other European transition countries on grounds 
other than their operation of a CBA (see Appendix 2.1), though currently we cannot 
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conclude whether and how a specific regime affected these trends. Therefore, in 
order to draw any conclusions about which monetary regime is more appropriate and 
desirable an empirical investigation of the effects of regime on macroeconomic 
performance should be conducted. This requirement will be addressed on Chapters 5 
and 6.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
A CBA is usually introduced as a means to induce monetary discipline and overall 
macroeconomic stability since it imposes strict rules on a monetary authority. 
However, the CBA’s characteristics which aim to increase economic growth through 
inducing international trade and investment, which are expected to result from 
increased monetary credibility and macroeconomic stability, may also have a net 
contractionary effect on the economy due to the inability to stimulate the economy 
through expansionary monetary policy, as well as inability to buffer shocks by using 
monetary policy instrument. In order for CBA’s characteristics to be beneficial 
certain criteria should be met. In this chapter the optimum currency area criteria, 
augmented by some other criteria specific for a CBA in transition economies, were 
assessed. Namely, the specific conditions under which a CBA was introduced, 
together with any improvements in these conditions through time, have to be 
considered. Moreover, the existence and strength of other stabilising mechanisms 
have to be assessed. Hence an overall assessment on the desirability of introducing 
and/or retaining a CBA should be based on specific country circumstances.  
 
In BH the introduction of the CBA was justified by the specific country 
circumstances: as a means of contributing to macroeconomic stability which had 
been disturbed during the war. On the other hand, justification for its retention is 
provided by the weaknesses of other stabilising mechanisms in BH also discussed in 
Chapter 1. Overall, the sustainability and desirability of the CBA in BH depends 
upon the benefits and costs of the CBA and these will be assessed in the next chapter.  
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3.1 Introduction  
 
Based on the strengths and weaknesses of a CBA investigated in the previous 
chapter, the issue of its sustainability and desirability will be introduced in this 
chapter.  This discussion will provide the framework for the empirical investigation 
presented in the later chapters. The analysis presented in this chapter is organised as 
follows. In Section 3.2 the term sustainability of a monetary regime is defined and its 
main features in the context of a CBA as a specific monetary regime determined. In 
Section 3.3 studies which investigate the sustainability of a CBA are critically 
assessed. Section 3.4 investigates some of the features of sustainability of the CBA in 
BH, while Section 3.5 elaborates the importance of confidence in and credibility of 
monetary regime as the main sources of CBA sustainability. Section 3.6 explains 
how the effect of CBA will be captured in the empirical analyses presented in the 
following chapters. Section 3.7 concludes. 
  
3.2 The sustainability and desirability of a monetary regime/policy  
 
The term sustainability is usually related to a concern for the future and the ability to 
adjust to shocks (Hlivnjak, 2011). However, there are many explanations of the term 
and the preferred definition depends on the topic being investigated. In this thesis the 
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term will be defined in the context of monetary policy and then related specifically to 
a CBA in the context of the country of interest. Only a few studies examine the 
sustainability of a monetary regime and most of these investigate only one or two 
features of sustainability. Although it is difficult to integrate all of the features into 
one model, these should at least be identified and separately assessed. According to 
previous analyses, there are three categories of factors that are likely to affect the 
sustainability of a monetary regime: market perceptions/expectations about the 
maintenance of a specific monetary regime and its target(s) (the monetary authority’s 
credibility) (Ferderer, 1998; Mulino, 2002; Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006); 
performance of economic fundamentals (Sepp and Randveer, 2002b; Ho and Ho, 
2009, Belke et al., 2012) and exposure to shocks and ability to react to shocks (Sepp 
and Randveer, 2002a; Minea and Rault, 2011). These categories are interrelated and 
interdependent (see Figure 3.1 below). Thus, the sustainability of a monetary policy 
(and a CBA specifically) may be defined as the capability of the monetary authority 
to maintain their announced policy (which under a CBA is the maintenance of a 
fixed exchange rate) in the medium-to-long run34, while sustaining economic 
stability in the country. The latter is especially important in the case of limited 
monetary discretion, such as under a CBA, since such a regime is not likely to be 
desirable, and consequently sustainable, if macroeconomic performance is 
unfavourable or the economy is exposed to large and/or frequent shocks and there are 
no effective tools/mechanisms in the economy which could help adjustment. There is 
no universally accepted definition of desirability either. One can argue that a 
monetary regime is desirable when: utilization of a specific monetary regime 
generates a better effect on macroeconomic stability and performance compared to 
other monetary regimes, taking into consideration the specific circumstances in the 
country. Desirability of CBA is especially related to the existence of ‘other tools’ 
which could be used as buffers and stimulators in the economy. Since monetary 
policy under a CBA is restricted, flexibility and economic ‘soundness’ are needed, 
namely flexibility of prices and wages together with ‘soundness’ of the financial 
sector and fiscal policy. Beside these, under a CBA, the automatic adjustment 
mechanism between the balance of payments and monetary base (or, more broadly, 
the money supply) should restore balance in the economy after a shock. However, 
                                                                
34 For European transition countries this 'medium-to-long run' period can be argued to be the period 
until EMU accession. 
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the existence of this mechanism in modern CBA countries is, as noted by Desquilibet 
and Nenovsky (2007, p.20), “disputable: theoretically not completely consistent and 
empirically unproved” (see Section 2.2.3). One more important ‘tool’, in the context 
of transition countries, is the support and intermediation of the international 
community, which ‘comes to the rescue’ when all other buffers within the economy 
are inefficient. From the above it could be perceived that the concepts of desirability 
and sustainability intertwine and it is difficult to separate the two (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1 Sustainability and desirability of a CBA  
 
 
 
As noted by Sepp and Randveer (2002a, p.21), a CBA’s sustainability “also depends 
on the ability of the real economy to function reasonably well under such exchange 
rate regime”. This is an important issue since, it is still commonly accepted that 
monetary policy is the macroeconomic policy that should ultimately be responsible 
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for macroeconomic stability and growth, even when that is not its primary goal. If it 
focuses on fulfilling only its primary goal(s) this may undermine economic growth if, 
for example, the nominal exchange rate is overvalued, current account deficits persist 
and business cycles are not synchronised between the domestic and anchor currency 
countries. Moreover, it is usually argued that persistent (and high) unemployment 
may undermine the sustainability of the CBA, since a central bank or government is 
more likely to come under pressure to abandon the CBA in favour of an 
expansionary policy  to stimulate growth and lower the unemployment rate. The 
interconnection between desirability and sustainability of a CBA exists in another 
direction as well: a CBA should provide high credibility for the monetary authority, 
which is usually argued to be the main pre-condition for its sustainability and 
consequently it may increase stability that then increases its desirability. The issue of 
stability, which should be increased by CBA, is especially important for transition 
countries, with political problems (as discussed in Chapter 1). It is a combination of 
all of the above factors that will ultimately determine the CBA’s sustainability. To 
our knowledge, none of the existing studies considers all these factors in assessing a 
CBA’s sustainability and desirability. Accordingly, after assessing previous studies 
that investigate some of the sustainability/desirability features a more comprehensive 
analysis is developed for the case of BH and the approach applied in this thesis is 
then presented.  
 
3.3 A critical assessment of studies investigating the sustainability of a CBA  
 
The common approach to estimating a CBA’s sustainability is by observing 
differences in the interest rates in the CBA and anchor-currency countries. Those 
differences are likely to place devaluation/appreciation pressures on the domestic 
currency and are argued to be direct estimates of the probability of a 
devaluation/appreciation and thus thought to be good proxies of a regime’s 
credibility (Jeanne and Masson, 2000). The size of these pressures is usually 
estimated by using a Markov-switching model (Alvarez and Schrooten, 2003; Boinet 
et al., 2005; Ho and Ho, 2009) which can detect switches in devaluation 
probabilities. Alternatively, the sustainability of a CBA can be assessed through 
examining the “reaction” of the macroeconomic performance of the country to 
external shocks, especially those from the anchor currency country (Sepp and 
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Randveer, 2002a; Minea and Rault, 2008, 2011). Studies that have estimated or 
analysed the sustainability of a CBA are appraised below. However, only a few 
studies conducted empirical research, with most studies assessing a CBA’s 
sustainability in a specific country by observing the performance (flexibility) of other 
policies in that country. For an outline of the main characteristics of these studies see 
Table 3.1. First, the studies that investigated CBA’s sustainability in countries other 
than BH will be presented and assessed (in chronological order). Two studies that 
focused on the sustainability of CBA in BH will be appraised at the end of this 
section as an introduction for Section 3.4 in which the main features of BH’s CBA’s 
sustainability will be briefly addressed. The purpose of the assessment of studies in 
this section is to examine the different definitions and features of CBA’s 
sustainability considered, as well as the different measures applied.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of the studies investigating the CBA’s sustainability (in 
chronological order) 
Study Country 
Period 
and 
frequency 
Dependent variable Controls 
Technique 
Variables analysed 
Sepp and 
Randver 
(2002a) 
Estonia 
1996-2000 
monthly 
and annual 
data 
Shocks: nominal exchange rate (the kron against 
USD) shock, shock of foreign interest rate change, fall 
in money supply, shock in import prices and export 
shock, measured by the GDP of EU15, the Finnish 
GDP, the CPI of EU15, the Russian CPI; economic 
fundamentals: GDP growth, output gap, trade balance, 
inflation and real exchange rate 
Simulations  
Growth of money supply and credit, interest rates of 
forward transactions, dynamics of economic growth 
and fiscal deficit, current account deficit, real wage 
and productivity growth (in trade and public sectors), 
real effective exchange rate, export and import growth 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Alavez-
Plata and 
Schrooten 
(2003) 
Argentina 
1994-2001 
monthly 
data 
Devaluation probability 
measured by an index of 
speculative pressure 
constructed as a weighted 
average of monthly 
exchange rate changes, 
interest differential 
changes and international 
reserve changes 
Capital account, current 
account, financial sector 
and the real sector 
indicators 
Markov-
switching 
model 
Hardouvelis 
and 
Monokrous
os (2009) 
Bulgaria 
 
2003/2004
- 
2008/2009 
monthly 
data 
Coverage of the monetary base and the lev-dominated 
portion of M2 by FX reserves, 1-month interbank rate 
spreads vs. EUR, real effective exchange rate, 
savings-investment imbalances, change in the export-
to-GDP ratio, MFI credits to domestic sector, private 
sector credit, FDI/CA deficit, CA balance, gross 
external debt, government fiscal balance, reserve 
assets 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Ho and Ho 
(2009) 
Argentina 
and Hong 
Kong 
 
1991-2001 
Argentina 
1984-2005 
Hong 
Kong 
quarterly 
data 
The expected rate of 
depreciation measured as 
the interest rate 
differential between the 
domestic economy  and 
the anchor currency 
country 
The economic 
fundamentals: fiscal 
balance, trade, real 
exchange rate, 
unemployment, 
inflation, real growth 
Markov-
switching 
model 
Hayo and 
Neuenkirch 
(2010) 
Argentina 
1998-2006 
daily data 
Daily changes of the 
three-month, six-month, 
and one-year Buenos 
Aires Interbank Offered 
Rate 
Dollar- and peso- 
denominated asset  
returns, macroeconomic 
announcements, the 
Federal Funds Target 
Rate movements and 
communication 
dummies 
GARCH 
Minea and 
Rault 
(2011) 
Bulgaria 
Q3:1999-
Q4:2010 
quarterly 
data 
Interest rate shock in the anchor-currency 
country/zone (LIBOR EUR 3-months interest rate),  
FED interest rate, lev/USD exchange rate, domestic 
“money market rate” with three months maturity, 
growth rate of real activity, consumer prices, growth 
rate of nominal M3 
VAR  
(GITFs) 
Kristić 
(2007) 
BH 
2000-2005 
annual 
data 
Government budget balance, current account balance, 
level and growth of wages and productivity in 
different sectors, coverage of monetary aggregates by 
FX reserves, changes in savings and exports,  Gross 
foreign reserves 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Kahmi and 
Deheija 
(2006) 
BH 
1999-2004 
annual 
data 
Gross and net foreign reserves, real GDP growth rate, 
inflation, government budget, external debt, broad 
money,  current account balance, trade balance 
Descriptive 
analysis 
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As noted in the previous section there are different definitions and aspects of a 
monetary regime’s sustainability. There are also different approaches to assessing the 
regime’s sustainability. The ones that consider many potential features that may 
affect regime’s sustainability are usually those that lack any empirical analysis and 
therefore fail to provide the evidence for their inferences. There are two studies that 
assess sustainability of BH’s CBA and both are descriptive. Kahmi and Deheija 
(2006) analysed trends in the main macroeconomic variables in BH after the 
introduction of the CBA and based on these trends concluded that the introduction 
and maintenance of BH was justified. However, since this was the period of recovery 
after the war these trends cannot be assigned to the implementation of the CBA. 
They further identified a lack of solid legal and regulatory infrastructures and the 
lack of political cohesion as the major potential threats to its sustainability. Kristić 
(2007) identified some other potential threats, such as the persistent current account 
deficit and more rapid growth of wages than productivity, mainly driven by the high 
rise of wages in the public sector.  Despite this conclusion, she argued that fiscal 
policy was prudent. The same conclusion was drawn by Kahmi and Deheija (2006). 
They based this conclusion only on an observation of the trend in the fiscal balance. 
However, the degree of prudence of fiscal policy should be assessed based by its 
ability to efficiently react to shocks and readjust the imbalances in an economy (as 
analysed in Sepp and Randveer, 2002a), not just by the level of a government’s 
budget deficit. Moreover, since the war a very small portion of government 
expenditures has been directed towards capital and infrastructure investments (as 
elaborated in Section 1.2.4), which also places in question the prudency of fiscal 
policy. Moreover, both studies fail to identify some other potential threats to CBA’s 
sustainability, such as high unemployment persistence, potential overvaluation of the 
local currency and lack of funds for development. Kristić (2007) also emphasised the 
importance of ‘a sound’ financial sector, but did not conduct any analysis to 
investigate this determinant. Hardouvelis and Monokrousos (2009) considered all of 
the above in their assessment of sustainability of the Bulgarian CBA. They argued 
that the Bulgarian CBA was sustainable, despite the global financial crisis and 
instabilities in the region, since it “enjoys strong public and constitutional support... 
large pool of foreign exchange reserves  and a strong fiscal position... the banking 
sector is well-capitalised and has limited exposure to single-lender contagion risks , 
while its central bank has the flexibility to undertake ‘strictly limited’ lender-of-last 
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resort (LLR) operations, which can diffuse events that cause domestic financial 
stress” (p. 2). However, the authors did not explain what data or factors led to their 
conclusion of the strong public support for the Bulgarian CBA, which is an important 
drawback of this study since they state that public support is an important feature of a 
CBA’s sustainability, but do not test for this. In addition, the 1-month interest rate 
differential between the Bulgarian and the anchor country’s interest rate was 
observed and compared with the differentials of Baltic countries against their 
respective reserve country’s interest rate. Since it is argued that this differential is an 
estimate of devaluation probability they concluded that the probability of devaluation 
of the Bulgarian currency is lower than for the Baltic countries. However, this might 
not been the case if other variables were taken into account, such as risk and inflation 
differences between the observed countries. As noted above, none of these studies 
conducted any empirical analysis to support their inferences.  
 
The common approach to empirically investigating a CBA’s sustainability is by 
analysing the differences in the interest rates in the CBA and anchor-currency 
countries. Those differences are likely to place devaluation/appreciation pressures on 
the domestic currency and are argued to be direct estimates of the probability of a 
devaluation/appreciation and thus thought to be good proxies of a regime’s 
credibility (Jeanne and Masson, 2000). The size and source of these pressures is 
usually estimated by using a Markov-switching model (Alvarez and Schrooten, 2003; 
Ho and Ho, 2009) which can detect switches in devaluation probabilities. As 
emphasised by the Alvarez and Schrooten (2003, p.9): “In this class of models it is 
assumed that the parameters of the underlying data generating process of the 
observed time series depend on an unobservable state variable.” Usage of the 
Markov-switching model enabled them to detect “jumps” from a “low” to a “high” 
devaluation probability, which depends on the shifts in expectations of private 
investors. Therefore, by using a Markov-switching model they assessed the relative 
importance of fundamentals and expectations. Those expectations in their models are 
not observed but assumed to be the source of switch which is not “caught by” 
observable, macroeconomic variables, which are included in the model. The results 
of Alvarez and Schrooten’s (2003) analysis indicated that, beside the weak and 
deteriorating fundamentals, shifts in agents’ beliefs also played a crucial role in the 
Argentinean crisis. The results of the estimations in Ho and Ho (2009, p.3), which 
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investigated sustainability of the CBAs in both Argentina and Hong Kong, suggested 
that “market expectations play a more important role in maintaining the currency 
board in Argentina than in Hong Kong. Economic fundamentals, including the trade 
surplus, real exchange rate and inflation rate are more important for the sustainability 
of the Hong Kong currency board”.  
 
As the pressure on maintaining a CBA observed through the probability of currency 
devaluation is not directly measurable, Ho and Ho (2009) used the expected rate of 
depreciation as an indicator of devaluation pressure, which they also proxied by the 
interest rate differential between the domestic countries and the anchor currency 
country. Alvarez and Schrooten (2003) used a somewhat broader measure of 
devaluation probability. They assume it to be a function of the pressure in the 
exchange market, and measured it by an index of speculative pressure constructed as 
a weighted average of monthly exchange rate changes, interest differential changes 
and international reserve changes. However, one may argue that the devaluation 
pressure may also come from differences in productivity growth or inflation rates 
between the CBA and the anchor currency country, as well as from a high variation 
in the exchange rate between the CBA country’s currency and currencies of trading 
partners other than that/those to whose currency the CBA’s currency is pegged. As 
relevant macroeconomic variables both studies included a number of economic 
fundamentals, though they differ in most of the variables included (for the list of 
variables see Table 3.1). However, the variables included are not observed relative to 
those in the anchor currency country, which would be more informative given that 
the dependent variable is constructed based on the differential between interest rates 
in the CBA and anchor currency country. Moreover, none of the models account for 
differences (and changes) in the country risk premiums that are also likely to affect 
interest rate differentials. Changes in the money supply that are likely to influence 
the interest rate differentials are also not considered (Frommel et al., 2005). Finally, 
both studies fail to report diagnostic tests and therefore the reliability of their results 
is questionable. 
 
Another empirical approach to assessing the sustainability of a CBA is through 
examining the “reaction” of the macroeconomic performance of the country to 
external shocks, especially those from the anchor currency country (Sepp and 
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Randveer, 2002a; Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2010; Minea and Rault, 2008, 2011). Hayo 
and Neuenkirch (2010) examine the effect of U.S. news on the Argentinean financial 
market and compare the reactions during and after the CBA and before, during and 
after the financial crisis. The authors start from the assumption that U.S. economic 
news (central bank communications and macroeconomic announcements) have a 
great impact not only on the U.S. financial market, but also on other economies’ 
financial markets (here, on Argentina’s specifically), as the United States is the 
world’s largest economy. They assume that this transmission may happen through 
several channels. The first channel is based on real economic integration via 
international trade. The second channel is financial market integration based on high 
capital mobility. This channel carries the risk of contagion arising from shocks in 
other markets. The third channel is driven by monetary policy: Argentina pegged its 
exchange rate against the U.S. dollar (until 2002) and, therefore, had to follow U.S. 
monetary policy very closely. This should also imply a greater sensitivity to U.S. 
news and a co-movement of short-term interest rates. They used the GARCH 
(Generalised AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) specification of daily 
financial returns to capture the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity that 
characterises many financial series. The daily changes of the three-month, six-month, 
and one-year Buenos Aires Interbank Offered Rate for a period 1998-2006 are used 
as dependent variables and controls include  macroeconomic announcements, the 
Federal Funds Target Rate movements and communication dummies. First, the 
authors found that U.S. monetary policy and U.S. macroeconomic announcements 
have a significant impact on Argentina’s financial market returns: money, equity, and 
foreign exchange markets. Second, they also found that Argentina’s financial 
markets were more dependent on U.S. news under the currency board than after its 
abandonment. In particular, neither the U.S. central bank’s actions and 
communications, nor U.S. price indicators exert a significant influence in the post-
crisis subsample. Thus, the degree of financial integration between these countries 
has decreased, which suggests that the currency board lead to a higher degree of 
financial integration in the first place. Third, they found that U.S. dollar-denominated 
assets in Argentina react less to U.S. news than peso-denominated assets, which 
further suggest that dollar-denominated assets are seen as safer than peso-
denominated assets implying that the currency board was not completely credible to 
markets participants. Finally, they obtain a significantly larger economic reaction of 
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Argentina’s financial markets to U.S. news during Argentina’s financial crisis for 
both dollar- and peso-denominated assets. However, as noted in the studies assessed 
above there are many other important factors, beside those included in this study that 
can influence changes in the interest rate. Minea and Rault (2008, 2011) investigate 
whether and how the anchor currency country’s central bank (ECB) and FED interest 
rate shocks (which are considered the main sources of monetary volatility in 
Bulgaria) translate to the Bulgarian real economy. The authors argue that an interest 
rate shock in the anchor-currency country/zone (LIBOR EUR 3-months interest rate) 
will first affect the domestic interest rate (the “money market rate” with three months 
maturity). Changes in the domestic interest rate are further supposed to affect the 
growth rate of real activity (output), followed by changes in consumer prices and 
finally domestic nominal money growth (growth rate of nominal M3). In addition to 
estimating the effect of the ECB interest rate, the effect of the FED interest rate is 
also estimated in the 2011 study, since Bulgaria still has important trade relations 
with countries like Turkey and Russia that are/were heavily linked to the USD 
(United States dollar). They conduct the same estimation with the FED interest rate, 
with the difference of inclusion of the lev (Bulgarian currency) to USD exchange 
rate. Quarterly data for the period 1999 – 2010 is used. “Generalised” impulse 
response functions (GITFs), which are insensitive to the ordering of variables in the 
VAR (Vector autoregression), are utilised. The results suggest that Bulgarian interest 
rates follow the ECB interest rate dynamics, with a short lag (about 1-2 quarters), 
while they follow the FED interest rate dynamics with a longer delay (which is not 
specified in the study). Output growth, prices and money exhibit smaller persistence 
and become non-significant earlier in time following an ECB interest rate shock, 
compared to a FED interest rate shock. The authors argued that: “This result could 
suggest that the CB[A] may have worked as a good convergence device between 
Bulgaria and the EMU, with respect to other foreign partners.” (p.16). However, this 
argument should be treated cautiously given that differences in some key variables, 
such as productivity and inflation between the domestic and anchor countries, are not 
observed. Moreover, the possibility that (foreign) banking sector’s liquidity might be 
altered by the parent banks, which may affect Bulgarian interest rates and money 
supply is not considered. Additionally, a source of monetary shocks may be also 
found in changes in, for example, the inflation rate in the euro-market or ECB 
macroeconomic announcements. These potential channels that may affect interest 
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rates and money supply are not considered in the paper. A similar analysis was 
conducted for Estonia and Lithuania in the European Forecasting Network Report 
(EFN, 2004). This analysis implied that the reaction of GDP and prices to a monetary 
shock is very fast in Estonia, though there is no clear evidence of the presence of a 
well-defined interest rate or exchange rate channel. For Lithuania there are clear 
effects of ECB’s monetary policy on domestic output, but not on prices. Regarding 
the transmission channels, it is indicated that the “direct” interest rate channel seems 
to have been effective in Lithuania during the considered period. 
 
Finally, the most comprehensive approach is applied by Sepp and Randver (2002a). 
They analysed aspects of the sustainability of the Estonian CBA using two methods: 
looking at the outcomes of shock-simulations and then at how the economy had 
actually “coped with shocks” through observing how the Estonian economy reacted 
to the adverse effects caused by the Asian (in 1997) and Russian (in 1998) crises. 
Their simulation analysis suggested that external shocks did not cause a divergence 
of the Estonian economy from its ‘long-run’ path. Both the Asian and Russian crises 
were accompanied by difficulties in obtaining foreign financing. They argued that 
observations of the real (and financial) sectors in Estonia during and after the crises 
are a good test of the sustainability of the CBA (especially from the perspective of 
the viability of the financial sector). According to their analysis, the financial sector 
proved its efficiency during and after the crises, since the capitalisation and liquidity 
of banks increased and the credibility of domestic banks increased. However, they 
did not provide the data or arguments on which they reached the latter conclusion. 
They further observed changes in the money supply, forward market, interest rates 
and credit growth during and after the Russian crisis. Even though the state of these 
variables deteriorated in the short-term, they stabilised shortly after the crisis was 
over. Utilising simulations, they observed the effect of this exogenous shock on the 
price level and real variables. These suggested that the negative impact is temporary 
and GDP growth converges on its ‘long-run’ path (the impact on prices and exports 
was small). The need for ‘soundness’ and flexibility of fiscal policy, flexibility of 
prices and wages and ‘soundness’ of banking system were emphasised as highly 
important conditions for the stability/sustainability of the CBA. The condition for the 
‘soundness’ of fiscal policy was argued to be fulfilled in Estonia, since fiscal policy 
has been used for stabilisation purposes, such as the reduction of current account 
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deficit, through the introduction of tight fiscal policy and setting targets for fiscal 
deficits. By observing trends in productivity and wages they concluded that wages in 
Estonia were quite flexible in the period 1996-1999, especially in the tradable sector. 
Moreover, deviations of the actual real effective exchange rate (REER) from the 
equilibrium level were observed. Although the REER appreciated significantly as a 
consequence of the Russian crisis, it returned to its equilibrium after six months. 
Since the investigated adjustment mechanisms appeared to function well in Estonia 
the authors concluded that its CBA might be sustainable. One aspect missing from 
this ‘comprehensive’ study is the neglect of the importance of public beliefs and 
expectations regarding the credibility of the monetary authority, which can threaten 
the sustainability of the CBA even when the fundamentals are “sound”. Moreover, 
they did not discuss the effect of unemployment on the sustainability of the CBA 
which, if persistent, is argued to be potential reason for decreased credibility of the 
monetary authority (Drazen and Masson, 1994; Mulino, 2002; Castren et al., 2010) 
and may consequently undermine a CBA’s sustainability.   
 
The purpose of the assessment of studies in this section is to examine the different 
definitions and features of CBA’s sustainability considered, as well as the different 
measures applied. These sustainability features identified in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will 
be initially investigated in the context of BH in the next section.  
 
3.4 A short discussion of sustainability/desirability features of the CBA in BH  
 
Since the macroeconomic situation in BH under which a CBA had been introduced 
and maintained was already investigated in the first chapter we will only investigate 
this here in the context of CBA’s desirability and sustainability and refer frequently 
back to the specific section in the first chapter. This section therefore summarises 
trends in BH economy which may undermine or support the maintenance of its CBA.  
 
The level and trends in the key macroeconomic variables which may undermine the 
CBA’s sustainability in BH (real exchange rate, current account balance, external 
debt, inflation and interest rate convergence with anchor currency country, level and 
persistence of unemployment) were explored in Chapter 1. According to these 
fundamentals, it should be emphasised that the persistent deficit of the current 
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account and high and persistent level of unemployment could potentially undermine 
BH’s CBA’s sustainability. A persistent current account deficit puts pressure on the 
domestic currency, potentially signalling an overvalued exchange rate and 
uncompetitive export goods. This, together with decreasing foreign investment and 
aid, as well as the persistent and high unemployment and the inflexibility of BH’s 
labour market, also raises the question of the CBA’s desirability and sustainability, 
since in this regime monetary policy cannot be used to stimulate economic growth. 
The ‘soundness’ of the financial sector can be assessed by its stability, ability to 
stimulate the economy, and to absorb shocks. These are investigated for the BH 
financial sector in the second part of Chapter 1. The financial sector in BH can be 
considered as stable, but it is not stimulating the economy, since it is under-
developed and credit growth is slow. The ability to absorb shocks depends largely on 
‘mother’ banks’ actions, which are driven by their own interests, not those of the 
country in which they have subsidiaries. This might be very dangerous under a CBA, 
especially because foreign-owned banks dominate the domestic banking system as in 
BH. As elaborated in Chapter 1, fiscal policy in BH is heavily constrained, which 
poses a question about its ability to fulfil a role as both a stimulator and buffer in the 
economy. Firstly, since 2008 there has been a continuous government budget deficit, 
since, on one side, public revenues are low due to high percentage of ‘grey’ 
economic activities, while, on the other side, requirements for public expenditures 
are high. Secondly, the high proportion of social benefits and extensive public 
administration expenditures do not provide a foundation for a sustainable fiscal 
policy. Third, international institutions, such as the IMF, impose strict rules on fiscal 
policy, but, international institutions also provide some of the additional funds 
necessary for growth in an economy with low domestic public revenues and savings. 
Finally, the political situation in BH is very complex and people have low trust in 
government and its ability to react to shocks. A further role of the international 
community is as a buffer, which could be observed through its initiative at the 
beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. Namely, when ‘mother’ banks started 
withdrawing funds from their subsidiaries in BH action orchestrated by the IMF (see 
Chapter 1) mitigated this process that would have put downward pressure on the 
financial sector and the whole economy. This would most likely have lead to a 
decrease in trust in the financial sector and people would start withdrawing money 
from banks, and potentially converting their domestic into foreign currency, which 
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would ultimately undermine confidence in the local currency and consequently the 
CBA’s sustainability. Therefore, confidence in the local currency can be considered 
one of the major determinants of the CBA’s sustainability. In the following section 
the importance of confidence in and the credibility of CBA will be emphasised and 
the theoretical rationale and methodologies for estimations in Chapter 4 established. 
Desirability will be assessed by the estimation of the effects of a CBA on the 
economic performance of a country, measured through official statistics and 
subjective assessment of the situation in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 7 will consider 
the results of these empirical analyses and situation in BH assessed in Chapter 1, 
prior giving the final conclusion regarding the sustainability and desirability of BH’s 
CBA. 
 
3.5 The credibility of a CBA as a source of its stability and sustainability  
 
As elaborated in Chapter 2, an increase in confidence in the monetary authority and 
credibility of the monetary authority and policy is the most emphasised advantage of 
a CBA and the main source of its stability and sustainability. This section explains 
the importance of confidence and credibility for a regime’s stability and 
sustainability and the alternative methods of empirically investigating these 
particular features.  
 
First, differences and similarities between ‘confidence’ and ‘credibility’ need to be 
examined and these terms defined in the context of CBA. Le Heron and Carre (2005) 
argued that confidence and credibility (of the monetary authority and policy) are 
different concepts, defining credibility as a belief that the monetary authority will be 
consistent in following the announced policy and confidence as a belief that the 
monetary authority reacts to the market (economic agents’) ‘needs’. Confidence 
defined like this implies that the monetary authority has the discretion and ability to 
adjust to shocks, which cannot be applied to countries with a CBA or other counties 
with a fixed exchange rate and free capital movements if central bank wants to 
maintain the fixed exchange rate. Monetary policy under a CBA is not allowed to 
‘react to market needs’ and it may induce confidence only if it implements its 
announced policy and holds the national currency stable (against the anchor 
currency) and trustworthy. Therefore, in the context of a CBA, the difference 
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between confidence and credibility is only in the period observed. Confidence in the 
monetary authority is a result of perceptions about the current (and past) monetary 
policy, while expectations about the future monetary policy indicate the monetary 
policy’s credibility, and consequently the monetary regime’s sustainability. 
Confidence in the monetary regime may be observed as an indicator of the regime’s 
past credibility and current stability, since current perceptions are likely to be based 
on the previous behaviour of the central bank. It can be argued that credibility is also 
based on perceptions about the current and past monetary policy. Therefore, both 
perceptions and expectations about the stability of local currency will be used as a 
measure of the monetary authority’s credibility and observed as a system in the 
empirical analysis in Section 4.6.3.  
  
The credibility of a monetary authority is usually identified as an important feature, 
since there is a “prevailing opinion that economic policies are more effective if they 
are credible to private economic agents” (Blackburn and Christensen, 1989, p.1). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, high credibility of a monetary authority is expected not only 
to provide lower inflation expectations and consequently a lower inflation rate, but 
also to lessen speculative attacks, contribute to macroeconomic stability and attract 
foreign investments. Mulino (2002) and Ledesma et al. (2004) also argued that low 
credibility may be a destabilising element in the economy and a source of future 
currency crises. Credibility is usually defined as a belief that the monetary 
authority’s announced policy will be implemented. Since a fixed exchange rate is an 
announced policy rule in CBA countries it should result in increased expectations of 
a currency’s stability35 compared to the countries with other policies. As argued in 
Section 2.3 these expectations are likely to be firmer in countries with a CBA than in 
countries with fixed exchange rate regimes since, under a CBA, it is harder to deviate 
from a fixed rate since the rule of a fixed rate is embedded in law and the costs of 
changing legislation are argued to be high. However, assessing the level of 
credibility of the monetary authority under a CBA is not straightforward, since 
sustaining credibility depends on the frequency and type of shocks (Feurenstein and 
Grimm, 2006), the state of the economy (Drazen and Masson, 1994) and the specific 
                                                                
35 This primarily refers to stability against the anchor currency, but since one of the criteria when 
choosing the anchor currency is its stability against other major world’s currencies, it may be argued 
to refer to overall currency stability.  
Chapter 3: The Sustainability and Desirability of a CBA 
 
115 
 
(political and institutional) circumstances in the country (Blackburn and Christensen, 
1989; Desquilbet and Nenovsky, 2007). Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2007, p.1) noted 
that: “the lack of credibility is typical for peripheral countries and cannot be 
overcome completely even by ‘hard’ monetary regimes”, an argument that is 
elaborated in more detail in Section 4.3. Therefore, we may question whether 
‘tougher’ regimes will automatically result in higher credibility of the monetary 
authority and this issue ultimately needs to be answered by empirical analysis.  
 
As noted in Section 3.3 studies which investigated the credibility of monetary 
regimes usually used interest rate differentials relative to the anchor (or some 
credible) monetary policy (Arestis and Mouratidis, 2005; Ho and Ho, 2009), as a 
“good proxy for expected devaluation and hence for the lack of credibility of fixed 
parities” (Drazen and Masson, 1994, p. 744) 36. However, this cannot be conducted 
for BH since it has no money market. One alternative might be to use the difference 
between interest rates on loans in domestic currency and those indexed to a foreign 
currency. However, the difference between these is small in BH (significantly 
smaller than in other countries, e.g. Estonia, Croatia, Latvia) and is not varying much 
over time (see Appendix 3.1). Moreover, only a very small portion of total loans in 
BH are indexed to the euro, according to the official statistics data (see Figure 1.8 in 
Chapter 1). Finally, data on interest rates has only been recorded separately for 
domestic currency loans and those indexed to the euro from 2007 and for a time-
series analysis a longer period is required. Ferderer (1998), Mulino (2002) and 
Feuerstein and Grimm (2006) emphasised that the gain in credibility should be 
represented by the extent to which the announced policies influence expectations 
about future policy. In the next chapter credibility will be measured by the subjective 
residents' attitudes (regarding their currency’s stability) and an empirical analysis of 
the effect of CBA on these attitudes conducted. This approach can be considered 
advantageous compared to previous approaches since it directly reflects perceptions 
and expectations without the need to use any proxies for expected exchange rate 
changes. Bursian and Furth (2012) emphasise the importance of the subjective 
                                                                
36 Some authors created a credibility index for their measure of monetary authority’s credibility. For 
example, Mackiewicz (2009) created a credibility index that consists of central bank’s transparency, 
independence, accountability, a history of honesty (measured as a deviations from the announced 
(inflation) target and past inflation performance), public debt and quality of institutions in a given 
country (proxied by country risk). 
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component when estimating citizens’ perceptions. Moreover, they explain that 
having a ‘tough’ policy is not enough, people have to trust that the policy will be 
implemented and maintained in order for the policy to have the expected effect. 
Therefore, when estimating the credibility of monetary regime one should prefer 
subjective attitudes to observing changes in some variables that are considered to be 
“good proxies”. Specifically, since the announced policy under a CBA is a fixed 
exchange rate (stable currency against the anchor currency) the citizens’ perceptions 
and expectations regarding their currency’s stability should be used as indicators of 
the confidence of monetary regime.  
 
There is only one study (Valev and Carlson, 2007) which has used public 
expectations (measured by national surveys from 2000 to 2004) regarding a 
currency’s stability to empirically assess the sustainability of a CBA. However, this 
study focused only on Bulgaria and did not compare the effect of the CBA and other 
regimes on credibility, but sought to assess the possibility of a collapse of the 
Bulgarian CBA. The question they used to derive their dependent variable was: “In 
your opinion what is the likelihood that the currency board will collapse with a sharp 
devaluation of the local currency in the next 6 months/12 months/5 years?” 
According to the responses, at the time of the 2004 survey, the last survey available 
for their analysis, a large majority of the Bulgarians believed that a collapse of the 
currency board was unlikely. According to responses from all surveys, a non-
negligible minority believed that devaluation was likely and only a quarter of the 
respondents to the survey were willing to rule out completely the possibility of 
devaluation. Answers revealed that concerns over international shocks and pressure 
from international organisations were singled out as major factors. Furthermore, the 
limitations imposed by the currency board on output stabilisation policies, as stated 
by the authors, generated additional doubts about its sustainability. Empirical 
analysis was conducted to estimate the effect of different respondents’ characteristics 
on their perceptions of the probability and the changes of probability of Bulgarian 
CBA’s collapse through time. According to their findings older respondents, more 
educated respondents, and political supporters of the party that introduced the 
currency board had greater confidence in it. However, a few limitations of this study 
should be emphasised. The construction of the question asked requires respondents 
to be familiar with the CBA, its characteristics, as well as the term ‘devaluation’, 
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which might be assumed not always to be the case in the wider population. In the 
empirical analysis the authors fail to control for the expectations about the economic 
situation, as well as political and institutional circumstances in the country, which are 
likely to significantly influence the monetary policy’s credibility. Finally, the authors 
did not conduct any robustness checks to support their findings.  
 
In the empirical analysis presented in the next chapter the effect of a CBA on 
perceptions and expectations about the local currency’s stability is examined, after 
controlling for other relevant factors. Since a CBA is usually argued to establish 
credibility by reducing inflation expectations (see for example Carlson and Valev, 
2001) credibility may also be examined by comparing inflation expectations in 
countries with and countries without CBA from the sample. However, Weber et al. 
(1991, p. 62) argued that in order to achieve credibility “the authorities must 
precommit themselves to a particular policy rule”. Although under a CBA inflation is 
typically maintained at low levels, the “precommitment rule” is more explicit for 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate against the anchor currency than low inflation. 
Weber et al. (1991, p. 72) further argued that credible exchange rate pegging is likely 
to increase the “counter-inflation reputation” of the monetary authority. Hence, lower 
inflation expectations are likely to be the result of a credible exchange rate regime 
and therefore we will first focus on the credibility of the pre-commitment to maintain 
a stable local currency (fixed exchange rates against the anchor currency). Next, the 
approach utilised in our empirical analyses to capture the effect of a CBA will be 
elaborated.    
 
3.6 Capturing the effects of a CBA 
 
In all the empirical analyses conducted in this research programme the effect of a 
CBA, on the monetary authority’s credibility and economic situation in a country, 
will be captured by a dummy variable. As this could be considered a possible 
limitation, additional explanations are needed in order to justify that the variable is 
capturing the effect of the specific monetary framework. Namely, the use of a simple 
indicator variable raises the possibility that the results could be driven by some other 
common characteristics of countries with CBA, other than the CBA itself. However, 
the descriptive statistics on trends in main macroeconomic variables presented in 
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Section 2.4 (Appendix 2.1) do not suggest that the CBA countries in our analyses 
(BH, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania) have common economic characteristics that 
distinguish them as a group. Moreover, the main economic characteristics are 
controlled for in the regression analyses. To investigate the possibility of political 
and institutional characteristics as alternative common set of characteristics defining 
the CBA countries we consider the World Governance Indicator indices. Comparing 
these indicators (see Appendix 1.1) we can again conclude that there is no suggestion 
that there is something similar between CBA countries and distinct from other 
transition countries. Indicators of voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality differ between the CBA countries. 
On the other hand, measures of the rule of law, control of corruption are similar 
between CBA countries (confidence intervals overlap), but are also similar to those 
of the other transition countries and no distinctiveness could be identified for CBA 
countries. Moreover, these countries also differ in their progress in transition. The 
aggregate EBRD index on progress in transition averaged for 1998-2012 for BH was 
2.72; for Bulgaria 3.55; for Estonia 3.94 and Lithuania 3.75. Finally, with respect to 
recent history, ethnic composition and relationship to the European Union there are 
substantial differences between BH and the other European transition countries with 
a CBA: BH had a war, while the other CBA countries have not in the recent past; BH 
is a multi-ethnic country, while this ethnic diversity is not so pronounced in the other 
CBA countries; BH is not an EU member, whereas the other CBA countries are. To 
our knowledge, there is no set of economic, political or historical characteristics that 
define these countries as a distinct group. Therefore, it is a reasonable presumption to 
believe that the CBA dummy variable is capturing the effect of CBA rather than 
some other set of common characteristics.  
 
By including a CBA dummy variable in our empirical analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 
6, we are comparing the effect of a CBA with those of all other monetary-ER regime 
combinations. As argued in Section 2.2.5, the CBA variable compares the effect of 
the regime not only with the other ERRs, as done in previous studies (these studies 
will be assessed in Chapter 5), but with all other monetary-ER regime combinations. 
The advantage of this is that we do not have to choose between the ‘de facto’ and ‘de 
jure’ classifications of ERRs, both of which, as discussed in Section 2.2.5, have some 
limitations. Additionally, the inclusion of only a CBA dummy variable instead of a 
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full set of ERR dummies simplifies the model and saves degrees of freedom 
therefore gaining efficiency given the small sample properties. Finally, the CBA 
variable is also capturing some institutional characteristics which are different from 
the other regimes, such as the inability to finance government, full coverage of 
monetary base and inability of central bank to act as a lender of last resort. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
Sustainability of a CBA may be defined as the capability of the monetary authority to 
maintain its announced policy (monetary credibility) while sustaining economic 
stability in the country. The latter is also related to the desirability of the regime, 
since it is neither sustainable nor desirable when economic stability cannot be 
sustained in the medium-to-long term. A CBA, as a restrictive monetary regime, is 
likely to increase monetary and consequently overall macroeconomic stability in 
country. However, it has a limited ability to stimulate growth and to mitigate the 
effect of shocks on the real economy. The features that may affect CBA’s desirability 
and sustainability have been identified in this chapter through a critical assessment of 
studies that address this issue. These features have also been briefly elaborated for 
BH’s CBA. However, to address these issues appropriately a more detailed analysis 
is required and will be conducted in the following chapters. The credibility of the 
monetary authority, which is usually emphasised as the main source of CBA 
sustainability, will be empirically analysed in Chapter 4. As noted in Section 3.3, 
there are other methods that could be applied to assess CBA’s sustainability. 
However, the absence of a reliable macroeconomic model of the BH economy 
prevents us from conducting simulations in order to observe how external shocks 
would have affected the real economy. In Chapters 5 and 6 the effect of CBA on 
economic performance will be compared to that of other monetary regimes, in order 
to observe whether there is an effect of CBA on the real economy. Since the period 
included in our analysis contains both the global financial and euro-zone crises we 
will be able to assess CBA’s desirability and sustainability during ‘turbulent times’.  
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4.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, the relatively high degree of confidence in and credibility of 
a CBA were identified as sources of its stability and sustainability. In this chapter the 
hypothesised increased confidence in the monetary authority and the credibility of its 
announced policy under a CBA will be empirically investigated. These features, as 
explained in Chapter 3, have been argued to affect the CBA’s stability and 
sustainability, since the absence of confidence and credibility is likely to lead to a 
large-scale conversion of domestic currency into other currencies, which is likely to 
result in a currency crisis.  
 
In Section 4.2 the rationale for using residents’ trust/confidence in the local currency 
(from the Austrian National Bank surveys) as an indicator of confidence in and the 
credibility of monetary policy is explained. The data used in this research has not 
been previously used outside the Austrian National Bank or for this kind of research. 
The questions from these surveys that will be used in estimations are introduced and 
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explained in the context of the stability and sustainability of a CBA. The potential 
determinants of the confidence and credibility of the monetary authority/regime are 
appraised in Section 4.3. After presenting the descriptive statistics of the survey data 
in Section 4.4, the estimation results are presented in Section 4.5. The main 
conclusions from the empirical analysis are appraised in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Indicators of confidence in and credibility of a CBA 
 
As suggested by Ho (2001) (as cited in Desquilbet and Nenovsky, 2007, p.9) “both 
credibility and confidence are subjective categories, related to a promise given”. 
Therefore, as indicators of confidence and credibility respondents' perceptions and 
expectations about the announced policy are used in this research. In order to capture 
these subjective attitudes the answers to questions from the surveys conducted by the 
Austrian National Bank are used as indicators of confidence in and credibility of 
monetary policy. Surveys were conducted in ten European transition countries 
(Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, and Serbia), two of which, namely Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria, operate under a CBA. The rationale for using subjective 
attitudes regarding the local currency’s stability as indicators of confidence and 
credibility of the monetary authority is next elaborated and the precise questions that 
will be used are specified.  
 
Gjedrem (2001) and Krugman (2012) argue that confidence in the monetary 
authority is highly correlated with the nominal anchor37. Krugman argues that a 
country that wants to stabilise its currency “must either peg its currency, or manage it 
strongly”. Schuler (1992) argued that the choice of monetary regime in developing 
markets should be restricted to a currency board, full dollarization or monetary union 
in order to provide currency stability. This is especially relevant for a small open 
economy, which does not have experience in monetary policy implementation or 
strong institutions that would be able to attain economic agents’ confidence in the 
short-to-medium run. With the fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor under a 
CBA, confidence in the monetary authority is likely to be reflected in the 
                                                                
37 Krugman (2012) defines confidence as “the ability to protect exchange rates from destabilizing 
speculation, including currency crises.” (available at: http://web.mit.edu/Krugman/www/triangle.html) 
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respondents’ attitudes/perceptions about the stability of their local currency. The 
precise question from the Austrian National Bank dataset used as an indicator of 
confidence elicits responses to the following statement: “Currently, the [local 
currency] is a very stable and trustworthy currency”.  
 
Blackburn and Christensen (1989, p.2) provided the most general interpretation of 
credibility: “the extent to which beliefs about the current and future course of 
economic policy are consistent with the program originally announced by policy 
makers” (emphasis added). In the context of CBA we may argue that credibility 
refers to the public’s perceptions and expectations with respect to commitment to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate (stable national currency against the anchor 
currency), since that is the announced policy under a CBA. Therefore, in the analysis 
undertaken below we estimate the credibility of the monetary authority under a CBA 
by comparing the public’s expectations about the national currency’s future stability 
in countries with and without a CBA. These expectations about the stability of the 
national currency can be considered an indicator of the monetary authority’s 
credibility, especially in the CBA countries38. This can be argued to apply to the 
other countries in this sample as well, given that all countries effectively peg against 
the euro and since most of the trading partners either already use the euro or are 
heading toward its adoption (and therefore keeping their national currencies stable 
against the euro). The precise question from the Austrian National Bank dataset used 
as an indicator of credibility is based on the following statement: “Over the next five 
years, the [local currency] will be very stable and trustworthy”. A question about 
expectations about the future exchange rate between the euro and the local currency 
is also available in the dataset: “How do you think will the exchange rate of the [local 
currency] against the euro develop over the next five years?” and could also be used 
as a credibility indicator. However, we do not exercise this option for the following 
reasons. The expectations about the local currency’s stability and the stability of the 
exchange rate between the euro and the local currency are expected to have similar 
responses in countries in which the euro is used as a reserve currency. Residents of a 
small open transition economy cannot be expected to have confidence in their 
                                                                
38 In CBA countries confidence in the local currency might be argued to be the main determinant of 
confidence/credibility of monetary authority since the currency’s stability is its primary target and this 
is specified in the central bank laws in all European transition countries that implement a CBA. 
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monetary authority without a nominal anchor. Therefore if the nominal anchor is 
abandoned (which is a fixed exchange rate against the euro in the case of CBA 
countries) it is likely that the confidence in the local currency will be abandoned as 
well (as emphasised by Krugman, 2012). Therefore, responses to the question on 
confidence in the future stability of their local currency would be expected to be 
similar to those for their confidence in future euro exchange rate stability. However, 
based on descriptive statistics (Section 4.4), we observe that the answers between the 
two questions do differ: the correlation coefficient is not very high. We prefer the 
question about the local currency stability to that about maintenance of the fixed euro 
exchange rate due to the following reasons. First, there is a potentially misleading 
framing effect given the way the latter question is constructed. As argued by 
Kahneman (2002, p.456) “different descriptions of the same problem that highlight 
different aspects of the outcomes” may result in different answers to (mainly) the 
same questions. The framing effect in the question about the expectations about the 
local currency’s stability is to direct the attention of the respondent towards the local 
currency, while in the question about the expectations about the exchange rate 
between the local currency and euro the attention is directed to the stability of the 
euro. Second, it might be assumed that people are more confident to talk about their 
confidence in the local currency, with which they operate every day, than about the 
euro exchange rate, with which they may or may not be familiar. This is confirmed 
by the high proportion of ‘do not know’ answers to the euro question (around 20%, 
while around 13% respondents gave this answer to the questions about future local 
currency stability), which indicates that many respondents may not be in a position to 
judge this issue. Descriptive statistics indicate that 59 percent of those who answered 
‘do not know’ to this question were those with a medium level of education and 27 
percent those with a low education (see Table 4.1 and Appendix 4.2). Overall, 63 
percent of respondents are those with medium level of education and 17 percent of 
those with low level of education. Third, trust (confidence) in the local currency 
might be more relevant for residents’ actions (decisions in which currency to spend 
and save) than their expectations about the euro exchange rate. Finally, Belke et al. 
(2012, p.6) emphasise that credibility of a policy is “only given if the public has trust 
in the respective legislation” (emphasis added). Therefore, the former question is 
preferred since it contains information about trust. Bursian and Furth (2012, p2.) 
emphasise that “credibility and trust are closely related” and that “it is difficult to 
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disentangle them” and in the following discussion these terms will be used 
interchangeably. 
 
Table 4.1: Percentage of ‘do not know’ answers and the level of education of those 
respondents 
  
Currently, the 
[LOCAL 
CURRENCY] is 
a very stable 
and trustworthy 
currency 
Over the next five 
years, the [LOCAL 
CURRENCY] will 
be very stable and 
trustworthy  
How do you think will 
the exchange rate of the 
[LOCAL CURRENCY 
(against the euro)] 
develop over the next 
five years? 
Percentage of 'do not know' 
answers  5.1 12.8 19.7 
Level of education of those 
who answered 'do not know':  
High level of education  9.4 16.0 14.3 
Medium level of education  53.3 56.0 59.0 
Low level of education  37.4 28.0 26.8 
 
Since the beginning of the recent global crisis a few studies have analysed levels of 
trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) (Fisher and Hahn, 2008; Gros and Roth, 
2010; Bursian and Furth, 2012; Walti, 2012). Although in these studies trust in the 
ECB is used as a proxy for its credibility, it is emphasised that “people appear to 
evaluate performance of the ECB on the basis of its success in achieving its primary 
goal” (Fisher and Hahn, 2008, p.1). Since a question about trust in the central bank is 
not available in the Austrian National Bank surveys, the perceptions/expectations 
about the achieving primary goal/announced policy (namely, currency stability) is 
used as a confidence/credibility indicator. The question related to trust in a currency 
can be argued to reflect trust in the respective central bank. A question about trust in 
their currency is ‘closer’ to respondents than a question about the monetary authority, 
with whose actions and policies they may or may not be familiar. As noted by 
Bursian and Furth (2012, p. 7) “agents are bounded rationally and do not fully 
understand the mandate of the ECB”. Trust in a currency might be considered more 
relevant since, as noted above, based on this, residents make their decisions about 
using local currency as a medium of exchange and store of value, which then affect 
the stability and sustainability of their national monetary and financial system as a 
whole. Given the use of answers to questions about the confidence in local 
currency’s (current and future) stability as indicators of confidence and credibility of 
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the CBA, potentially relevant determinants are next investigated and the initial model 
specification determined.     
 
4.3 Determinants of the confidence and credibility of a monetary 
authority/regime 
 
Beside a CBA dummy variable, which captures the difference between the responses 
in countries with a CBA and those with other monetary- regime frameworks, it is 
necessary to control for other potentially relevant variables. However, there is no 
substantive theoretical or empirical research on the choice of determinants of 
trust/confidence/credibility, and, as pointed out by Blackburn and Christensen (1989, 
p.1): “one may speculate upon a number of factors that are likely to influence the 
credibility of policy announcements”. In order to assess what additional independent 
variables should be included in the model, studies of a monetary regimes’ credibility 
are appraised.  
 
The degree of credibility of the monetary authority has been addressed in many 
studies starting with Barro and Gordon (1983) in which they developed a model of 
the incentives for a monetary authority to deceive. This model was subsequently 
developed to include other determinants of the monetary authority’s credibility apart 
from time-inconsistency considerations. As argued in the previous chapter (Section 
3.5), the credibility of the monetary authority does not depend only on the 
‘toughness’ of policy maker(s) and a CBA may not necessarily result in greater trust 
in the local currency. Therefore, other factors, such as the state of the economy, 
political and institutional circumstances and the effect of external shocks have to be 
taken into account when estimating the credibility of a monetary/ER regime.  
 
Drazen and Masson (1994) presented a model in which a policymaker maintains a 
fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high, 
implying that credibility depends on the state of the economy. They argued: “if tough 
policies constrain the room to manoeuvre in the future, then following a tough policy 
may actually harm rather than enhance credibility” (p.736). Drazen and Masson 
(1994, p. 735) concluded that “if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a 
tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-
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devaluation pledge in subsequent periods.” Castren et al. (2010, p. 85) also argue that 
high “unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines 
the credibility of the monetary authority”. Following Drazen and Masson, Mulino 
(2002) argued that the credibility of the CBA depends on the state of fundamentals 
such as persistent unemployment, since persistent unemployment is likely to affect 
future expectations and undermine the CBA’s credibility, “eventually inducing a 
self-fulfilling (currency) crisis” (p.381). Here, it can be argued that the way people 
perceive and expect the economic situation to be in their country might be more 
relevant than what the situation really is, since their confidence and further actions 
depend on their perceptions/expectations rather than the actual situation (this 
proposition will be discussed in more detail later in this section). Mulino (2002, 
p.382) further emphasised that external shocks and/or speculative attacks may also 
reduce the CBA’s credibility and result in recession, since the inability to adjust to 
shocks “may entail large output and employment losses, which could in turn 
undermine the confidence in the sustainability of the peg”. Feuerstein and Grimm 
(2006) noted that the credibility of the CBA itself is transient since “it can be 
abolished if the costs of maintaining it—for example, in case of a recession, a debt 
crisis, or problems within the banking sector—exceed its advantages” (p.819). 
Hence, they concluded that “its capability of solving the time-inconsistency problem 
makes the currency board credible, but only as long as this advantage is not 
outweighed by the need for stabilization of shocks occurring with a high volatility” 
(p.829).  
 
Studies that estimated the determinants of the trust in the ECB conducted empirical 
analyses to test for changes in this trust during a period of financial crisis. Besides 
controlling for the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, they also 
emphasised the importance of controlling for macroeconomic conditions and country 
specifics. Bursian and Furth (2012) emphasise the importance of macroeconomic 
conditions, country specifics, as well as the political views of respondents, in the 
trust-building process. Ehrmann et al. (2010) argue that public trust in the ECB 
during the crisis can be explained by the economic situation, trust in the overall 
European project and financial and banking sector (in)stability. In their empirical 
analysis they also control for political orientation and trust in the European 
Commission, implying the importance of controlling for political circumstances. 
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Valev and Carlson (2007) also argued that the political affiliation of respondents 
should be taken into account. Walti (2012, p.594) emphasise the importance of 
controlling for trust in economic institutions, especially in a period of crisis, “when 
uncertainty increases markedly”. Walti also underlines the importance of controlling 
for social loss functions in macroeconomics (proxied by movements in inflation and 
unemployment), as well as other country-specific developments and time specifics. 
Country and time fixed effects are also included in the empirical analysis conducted 
by Gros and Roth (2010) and Bursian and Furth (2012), although the latter include 
time dummies only for the years of crisis. Based on suggestions from these studies 
and on the characteristics of the countries in our sample and the specific questions 
used as indicators of confidence/credibility of CBA, the preferred specifications of 
the models are now addressed. 
 
Using subjective attitudes as confidence/credibility determinants  
 
As explained above, two models are considered and estimated. In the first one (the 
‘confidence’ model), the effect of CBA on confidence and trust in the local currency 
(perceptions about the current stability of the local currency) is analysed. In the 
second (the ‘credibility’ model) the effect of CBA on the expectations about the 
future stability and trust in the local currency is investigated. However, it can be 
argued that views of current trustworthiness are influenced by expectations of 
trustworthiness in the future. Conversely, views of future trustworthiness most likely 
extrapolate, at least to some extent, from current experience and perceptions. From 
this it is reasonable to argue that both are the outcome of similar underlying 
determinants, both observed and unobserved. Current views and views about the 
future are correlated because of their joint determination within a wider system. 
However, they cannot so convincingly be held to determine one another. In this case, 
it is more appropriate to estimate the two models as seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR). Since subjective attitudes are used as dependent variables it is important to 
control for respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics. In this analysis age, 
gender, level of education completed and employment status are used as controls.  
 
Following the above discussion of the determinants of a regime’s credibility, beside 
socio-demographic variables and type of monetary regime, control for the subjective 
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attitudes regarding the economic (and financial) situation and political circumstances 
in a country, as well as other country and time specifics. Both perceptions (used in 
the ‘confidence’ model) and expectations (used in the ‘credibility’ model) about the 
local currency stability are assumed to be determined by some common 
determinants. Some of these determinants can be observed and are available in the 
dataset, such as the respondents’ characteristics, the type of monetary regime and 
political circumstance in the country the respondents are coming from, which are 
included in both models. However, there are some common unobserved 
determinants, such as the political orientation of respondents and the level of their 
knowledge and awareness of the economic situation. However, there are some 
determinants which might be argued to be related to only one model in the system. In 
the ‘confidence’ model these specific determinants are the perceptions about the 
current economic situation in a country and perceptions regarding the euro’s current 
stability. In the ‘credibility’ model expectations regarding the future economic 
situation and the euro’s future stability are used as the specific model determinants. 
These determinants are listed in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Determinants of the confidence and credibility in a monetary 
authority/policy  
 
 
In the preferred specifications, we use subjective attitudes of respondents (the 
reasons for preferring subjective attitudes over macroeconomic data from official 
statistics are discussed at the end of this section) for the independent variables. The 
precise question from the surveys used as an indicator of economic situation/stability 
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(in the ‘credibility’ model) is: “Over the next five years, the economic situation of 
[my country] will improve”. The question about the financial system stability is: 
“Currently, banks and the financial system are stable in [my country]”. We may 
assume that this perception about the financial system is already integrated into their 
answer to the question about the economic situation in their country. Walti (2012) 
also argued that some part of banking sector (in)stability is likely to be captured by 
the economic situation in a country. Only perceptions, not expectations about the 
financial sector stability are available in this dataset and the question is not included 
in all available survey waves and therefore will not be included in the preferred 
specification. However, this variable will be included in the robustness checking. 
The survey question regarding political circumstances in a country from the surveys 
is: “How much trust do you have in Government/Cabinet of ministers”. It is likely to 
be important to control for the political circumstances in this sample, since BH and 
Bulgaria have had a relatively high degree of political uncertainty during the period 
under consideration, as well as in the period prior to the one observed (this is 
elaborated in more detail for BH in Chapter 1). It might be expected that the better 
the perceptions/expectations about the economic situation/stability, the financial 
system’s stability and the higher the level of trust in government are then the more 
the local currency is likely to be perceived as/expected to be stable and trustworthy. 
 
From the review of previous studies we may conclude that besides including the 
economic situation and level of trust as independent variables these should also be 
interacted with the CBA variable in order to estimate/observe the effect of CBA 
conditional on different economic situations and different levels of trust in 
government. Indeed, Blackburn and Christensen (1989, p.4) argued that: “In general, 
credibility of monetary policy will depend not just upon monetary policy alone but 
rather upon the perceived coherence of the overall macroeconomic program, together 
with the intellectual and political consensus on the economic theory being used and 
the objectives and conduct of economic policy.” As elaborated in Chapter 2, a CBA 
is typically introduced in countries where the (perceptions/expectations about) 
economic stability and the level of trust in government are low and is expected to 
increase monetary (and overall macroeconomic) stability in otherwise unstable 
economies. In order to estimate this, we introduce interaction terms between the 
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CBA variable and the economic situation, on the one hand, and the CBA and trust in 
government variables on the other.    
 
Desquilbet and Nenovsky (2007) argued that in CBA countries confidence in the 
local currency is ‘imported’ from “confidence in the power of fiat currency” (p.11), 
meaning that the source of trust in the local currency is trust in the anchor currency 
(in this case the euro). Therefore, we control for the effect of trust in the anchor 
currency by using answers to another question from the survey “(Over the next five 
years) the euro is (will be) a very stable and trustworthy currency”. Since the local 
currencies in both CBA countries were pegged to the euro in the observed period, it 
might be expected that confidence in the local currency is highly determined by the 
degree of trust in the euro. Although closely related, confidence in the stability of the 
local currency and the euro are not likely to be jointly determined, since the stability 
of the euro depends on its exchange rate with other currencies such as the dollar, 
pound etc. but not significantly on the national currencies of BH and Bulgaria. 
Confidence in the local currency is likely to depend on factors such as the economic 
situation and political circumstances in the CBA country that have no effect on the 
level of confidence in the euro. We further include time (wave) fixed effects to 
control for any “unobserved aggregate shocks in the data”, which may be especially 
important given that the period observed is a period of global crisis (Walti, 2012, 
p.595). Since whether a country operates a CBA is represented/captured by a dummy 
variable which is 1 for BH and Bulgaria and 0 otherwise we cannot include country 
dummies, since we would have perfect collinearity. However, as explained in the 
following sub-section, group country dummies are included, namely dummy 
variables for EU membership, Ex-Yugoslav country and high(er) level of 
development, in order to avoid potentially biased estimates. 
 
CBA and country dummies  
 
BH and Bulgaria country dummies and a CBA dummy cannot be included in the 
same regressions, since the first two sum to the second (perfect collinearity). In order 
to observe the effect of a CBA we need a CBA dummy, without country dummies, 
that will compare the joint effect of Bulgaria and BH to all other countries. The CBA 
variable captures what is unique to BH and Bulgaria compared to all the other 
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countries (i.e. what distinguishes them from the other countries). Based on the 
comparison of macroeconomic variables and world development indicators we can 
conclude that the only outstanding similarity between BH and Bulgaria is a CBA and 
there are no other such characteristics common to those two but different from those 
in the other countries (this is investigated and elaborated in Section 3.6).  
 
By not including country dummies we are neglecting time-invariant country specifics 
and so run the risk that their influence may be picked up by other variables in the 
model including the CBA dummy. The model could be estimated with country 
dummies but in that case the comparison group would not be the same. In order to 
partially control for country specifics we include the perceptions/expectations about 
the economic situation in a country and trust in government. Moreover, although we 
cannot include individual county dummies, we can control for country-group effects. 
Accordingly, three group dummies are included: for EU membership; for Ex-
Yugoslav member countries; and for the level of development. Inclusion of the EU 
dummy variable (which is 1 for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania for the whole sample period) is based on the assumption that those who 
entered the EU have more rigid rules regarding their inflation rate, exchange rate 
etc., which may (positively) affect perceptions/expectations about both the local 
currency and the economic situation in a country. The inclusion of the Ex-Yugoslav 
dummy (which is set to 1 for BH, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia) is based on a 
geographical and historical rationale. Namely, these countries have different 
experiences from other countries in the sample. These ex-Yugoslav countries share 
the same experience of loss of monetary unity and specific political disturbances 
after the break-up of Yugoslavia (in the early 1990s), which can still affect the 
credibility of their individual/national monetary authorities (formed after the break-
up). Finally, the level of development is controlled for by identifying the group of 
countries with a GDP per capita higher than $10,000 (Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland). This group of countries also has the highest scores for the 
world development indicators (rule of law, control of corruption, regulatory quality, 
political stability, voice and accountability) (see Appendix 1.3). People in countries 
with a higher level of development might be expected to perceive/expect the 
situation in their countries, and therefore their local currencies, as more stable than 
those in less developed countries. Fisher (2010) argued for the inclusion of 
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geographic region dummies for groups of countries “sufficiently similar to share 
common socio-economic traits, possible caused by imitation effects, exchange of 
population and other types of spill-over across neighbouring countries” (p.16,17) and 
that estimates will not be biased by the omission of country fixed effects if 
regional/country-group effects are controlled for.  
 
Preferring subjective attitudes about economic performance over the official 
macroeconomic variables 
 
Since economic theory is based on the proposition that economic agents respond to 
reality as they experience and perceive it, we prefer a model utilising microeconomic 
(individual) perceptions/expectations about the economic situation in a country to a 
model estimated with official macroeconomic data. The subjective measure of 
economic performance will be used as an independent variable in this chapter and as 
the dependent variable in Section 6.4 where the effect of CBA on macroeconomic 
performance will be estimated. One of the reasons for preferring subjective measures 
of the economic performance over the official macroeconomic data is that the official 
statistics, especially in the less developed countries, are usually argued to be limited 
and unreliable. Official statistics are widely used because they are comparable across 
time and location (although far from perfectly), but mainly because usually there is 
no alternative. However, in this database the same questions about the economic 
situation were posed in ten different countries which enable us to use answers to 
these questions as a measure of the economic performance in these countries. If we 
define the objective of the economy as maximisation of its residents’ well-being then 
the preferred measure will be subjective beliefs of these residents about the 
performance of the economy or specific institutions over aggregate measures of 
actual performance. The individuals’ perceptions, which are based on their 
experiences, are more likely to dominate in determining their well-being than some 
arbitrary measure of aggregate output or movement of aggregate price indices. Thus 
when we have data available on individual’s beliefs, perceptions and expectations 
regarding economic performance we should use it in preference to indicators that 
attempt to measure objectively ‘real’ outcomes.      
In this chapter these subjective measure of macroeconomic performance are used as 
independent variables and respondents’ perceptions and expectations about their 
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currency as the dependent variables. Therefore, it is consistent to use respondents’ 
perceptions/expectations about the macroeconomic performance as controls; since it 
is more likely that people base their perceptions/expectations about a currency on 
their own perceptions/expectations about the economic situation rather than the 
actual economic situation, which may or may not be ‘correctly’ perceived or 
experienced by a respondent. As emphasised by Uslaner (2010, p.112) “trust depends 
on information and experience”. Moreover, using one variable for the economic 
situation enables us to estimate the effect of CBA on confidence/credibility 
conditional on the economic situation. Using a set of macroeconomic variables 
would be likely to be more complex, both for estimation and interpretation. 
Moreover, a collinearity issue is likely to be more pronounced in a model with actual 
macroeconomic variables, since the same value for the same macroeconomic 
variable would have to be attached to all respondents that come from the same 
country and are interviewed in the same year. Accordingly, using the real 
macroeconomic variables would dictate a small sample (10 countries, 3 years), while 
the number of observations from the survey is much larger (10 countries, 
approximately 1,000 respondents per country per survey, 6 survey waves). This is a 
difference in potential sample sizes of three orders of magnitude. Therefore, even 
where relationships are present in the data, the model using official macroeconomic 
variables is not likely to yield precise estimates, while the preferred model where all 
the variables used are derived from survey data can give more precise estimates. 
Finally, as argued by Ho (2001) (as cited in Desquilbet and Nenovsky, 2007, p.9) 
“human behaviour is an immediate source of a possible crisis” and we may assume 
that any such behaviour is reflected in residents’ perceptions/expectations, and 
consequently actions. As noted by Jacobe (2002, p.2): “In economics, like politics, 
perceptions are often reality.” He argued that investors’ confidence will be reflected 
in investment, consumers’ and employees’ confidence and, hence, will result in 
changes in the real economy. Therefore, our preferred models are those in which 
subjective responses are used. Some additional reasons, related to empirical issues, 
for preferring the subjective attitudes about economic performance are explained in 
Section 4.5. 
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4.4 Descriptive analysis of the survey data  
 
As noted in Section 4.3, the surveys from the Austrian National Bank contain 
questions related to the assessments of stability of the local currency and the euro, as 
well as the general economic sentiment. The surveys were conducted in ten 
countries, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, and Serbia39. None of these 
countries is yet an EMU member and all are still using their local currencies. 
However, these countries are current or likely future EU members and are expected 
to adopt the euro at some point in the future. Eight survey waves are available, from 
fall 2007 to spring 201140. Most of these surveys were conducted in April and May 
for the spring waves and October, November or December for the fall wave (months 
in which surveys were conducted are only indicated in the dataset from the 2008 fall 
wave, see Table A.4.1a in Appendix 4.1). For each survey, face-to-face interviews 
were conducted with approximately 1,000 respondents (which are different in each 
survey wave) per country, which makes a total of 80,000 observations. All regions 
were represented in all countries, except in Poland where the population of only the 
ten largest cities was sampled (regions and percentage of respondents per regions in 
countries are listed in Appendix 4.1d)41. In all countries the number of males and 
females interviewed is almost the same (see Table A.4.1b in Appendix 4.1). In all 
countries almost half of respondents are employed, with the rest being unemployed, 
retired or students. The respondents are broadly ‘representative’ of different 
countries’ regions, genders, ages, level of education and employment status (see 
Table A.4.1a and Table A.4.1b in Appendix 4.1).  
 
In the sample selection process the sampling weights42 were not taken into account, 
but weight variables were created on a country-wave basis, by the data provider, by 
                                                                
39 Changes in variables related to the economic sentiment, trust in currency, level of euroization and 
other survey questions between different countries and waves are regularly examined in different 
OeNB publications (descriptive statistics mostly). 
40 Surveys were conducted also in subsequent years. However, the latest survey made available by the 
Austrian National Bank for this research is the 2011 spring survey.   
41 Technical details are taken from the official Austrian National Bank website: 
http://www.oenb.at/en/geldp_volksw/zentral_osteuropa/Eurosurvey/Survey/survey.jsp (last accessed: 
6/08/2012).  
42 Controlling for the sampling weights is needed in order to equalize the percentages of different age 
groups, gender, level of education, region and other relevant characteristics between the sample and 
population.   
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using various socio-demographic variables (Table A.4.1c in Appendix 4.1). Although 
the authorities usually provide information about the sampling weights, there is a 
debate in the literature on how and whether to use weights in econometric analysis. 
Minot (2009, p.36) argued that: “… virtually all random-sample surveys must use 
weights to make estimates that are valid for the whole population.” Purdon and 
Pickering (2001, p.9) suggested that: “… weighted estimates, even with their 
increased standard errors, are almost always preferable to the unweighted estimates. 
There are, obviously, exceptions, but we would recommend that the weights are used 
by default.” By applying weights, the bias is likely to be minimised, but the standard 
error of the estimator is likely to be increased (Purdon and Pickering, 2001). 
However, according to Cameron and Trivedi (2005) (as cited in Gashi, 2007, p.430), 
weighting is unnecessary “if interest lies in regressing (y) on (x), provided the 
conditional model for (y) given (x) is correctly specified and stratification is not on 
the dependent variable”. In our model in this chapter the dependent variable is 
associated with a currency’s stability and that, as well as monetary policy, is a 
national-level variable and should not depend on the region in which the surveys 
were conducted. However, since we are not sure about the model specification, both 
weighted and unweighted results will be presented in the empirical analysis. 
Moreover, as noted in Wooldridge (2002) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) (as cited 
in Gashi, 2007, p.109), applying the sampling weights for descriptive statistics 
enables us to make inference about the population from the sample.   
 
Two countries from the sample, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria, have a CBA, 
which is thus an institutional arrangement affecting all the individuals from those 
two countries. One fifth of the respondents, 16,073 from all survey waves (8,073 
from BH and 8,000 from Bulgaria), are from the countries with a CBA.   
 
In order to generate initial insights about any differences, the responses related to the 
confidence and credibility of the monetary policy of respondents in the CBA 
countries and those in non-CBA countries are compared. Since the preferred 
specification contains a variable (trust in government) which is not available for the 
first three survey waves the number of observations is smaller (compared to the 
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available sample), between 40,000 and 50,000, depending on the specification43. The 
descriptive statistics will therefore be based on this (smaller) sample. According to 
the descriptive statistics which are presented in Table 4.2 (printouts from Stata12 in 
Appendix 4.2a) answers to questions related to the assessment of the current and 
future stability of (and trust in) the local currency indicate higher trustworthiness in 
CBA compared to non-CBA countries. Moreover, almost double the percentage of 
respondents in a CBA compared to those from non-CBA countries expect their local 
currency to be stable against the euro in the next five years. This is as expected given 
the fixed exchange rate of the local currency against the euro under the CBA. 
According to the chi-squared distribution (chi2) test44 these differences are 
statistically significant at all conventional levels of significance and we may 
conclude that it is likely that there is some relationship between the 
perceptions/expectations and the presence of a CBA (Appendix 4.2b).  
 
Table 4.2: Answers to the questions of interest in CBA and non-CBA countries (in 
percentages of total respondents in particular group) (controlled for weights) 
 
 
 
Since these are the answers to the questions which will be used as dependent 
variables and we are interested in the distribution of the responses, then the answers 
to these questions are further analysed  (separately for non-CBA and CBA countries) 
in Figures 4.2 (a, b and c). 
 
                                                                
43 The number of observations varies since different variables used contain different number of ‘no 
answers’ which are excluded from the estimation. However, this number is not large for any of 
independent variables (not larger than 3%) and therefore we assume that the exclusion of these 
answers will not bias the results. 
44 Beside the ‘chi2’ test, ‘gamma’ and ‘taub’ tests (whcih are test for statistical significance of 
differences) are also performed, since these have been suggested as more appropriate for testing 
association between ordinal variables (Torres, 2007). These tests generated the same results as the 
‘chi2’ test. 
Total Non-CBA CBA Total Non-CBA CBA Total Non-CBA CBA
Strongly agree 3.9 3.0 7.9 3.0 2.4 5.7 Lose value 36.6 39.2 25.8
Agree 11.5 10.3 16.5 10.9 9.4 13.0 Will stay the same 34.0 28.9 55.4
Somewhat agree 23.2 22.9 24.1 23.0 23.3 21.9 Gain value 7.7 8.8 3.0
Somewhat disagree 20.9 22.0 16.3 20.5 21.3 17.2
Disagree 18.9 20.3 12.8 17.4 18.1 14.3
Strongly disagree 15.6 15.5 16.2 11.8 10.9 15.5
Do not know 5.1 5.0 5.4 12.7 13.1 11.2 Do not know 19.7 21.1 14.2
No answer 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.6 1.2 No answer 1.9 2.0 1.7
Answers (in percent 
of Total/Non-
CBA/CBA); weights 
included 
Currently, the [LOCAL 
CURRENCY] is a very 
stable and trustworthy 
currency
Over the next five years, 
the [LOCAL CURRENCY] 
will be very stable and 
trustworthy 
How do you think will the 
exchange rate of the 
[LOCAL CURRENCY 
(against the euro)] develop 
over the next five years?
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Figure 4.2a: Perceptions about the local currency’s stability in CBA and non-CBA 
countries 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2b: Expectations about the local currency’s stability in CBA and non-CBA 
countries 
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Figure 4.2c: Expectations about the exchange rate between the euro and local 
currency in CBA and non-CBA countries 
 
 
 
Additionally, the answers about the perceptions and expectations of the stability of 
the local currency are compared with those for the question on the stability of the 
euro. Answers to the latter question are expected to be similar, since all sample 
countries’ currencies are explicitly or implicitly related to the euro. Moreover, the 
answers to the questions about the local currency’s stability and the euro stability are 
expected to be more similar in CBA countries since the local currency is fixed to the 
euro. According to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.3 (also see 
Appendix 4.2a) more people, in both groups of countries, trust in the stability of the 
euro than in the stability of their local currency. However, it does not appear to be 
consistent, especially in the CBA countries, that people expect both the euro to be 
more stable than their local currency and that the exchange rate between the local 
currency and the euro will stay the same. This might be explained by difference in 
the countries’ ‘brands’. Namely, in the context of the South Eastern European (SEE) 
countries, especially those with political and institutional weaknesses trust and 
confidence in anything domestic is by default lower than trust and confidence in 
something foreign. Consequently, even though many people are aware that the 
exchange rate between the local currency and the euro is fixed (and expect it to be 
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fixed in the future) in the CBA countries they still may not have much confidence in 
their local currency.  
 
Table 4.3: Perceptions and expectations about the stability of the local currency vs. 
the stability of the euro (controlled for weights) 
 
 
 
Although questions about the stability of the local currency and the euro are expected 
to be highly correlated, the correlation matrix does not indicate a high correlation 
between any of variables, except for the answers to questions about the current and 
future euro stability (correlation 0.67), which is to be expected (see Appendix 4.3). If 
we observe changes in the answers through waves it can be noticed that there has not 
been any significant change in the answers to question about the stability of the local 
currency over time (Appendix 4.2c). 
 
Regarding economic sentiments, most people (82% in non-CBA and 87% in CBA 
countries) do not agree with the statement that the economic situation in their country 
is good. The percentages are lower (approximately 53% in non-CBA and 62% in 
CBA countries) when the expectations about the future economic situation in the 
country are observed (Figures 4.4a and 4.4b and Appendix 4.4). Regarding the trust 
in government/cabinet of ministers question, approximately 50% of respondents 
answered that they do not trust government and the answers are quite similar 
between CBA and non-CBA countries (Figure 4.4c). However, beside “do not know” 
answers there are also “neither trust nor distrust” answers with high percentage of 
respondents (approximately 20%) answering this in both groups of countries. Since 
the perception about the economic situation in a country and trust in government 
variables will be included as control variables, the distribution of these answers are 
presented in Figures 4.3a – 4.3c.  
 
Total Non-CBA CBA Total Non-CBA CBA Total Non-CBA CBA Total Non-CBA CBA
Strongly agree 4.0 3.3 6.8 12.0 10.4 18.7 3.1 2.6 5.0 10.9 9.2 18.0
Agree 12.4 11.4 16.6 23.4 22.8 26.2 10.8 10.4 12.8 22.7 22.2 25.1
Somewhat agree 24.3 24.4 24.0 29.0 30.5 22.5 23.7 24.0 22.2 27.3 28.6 21.8
Somewhat disagree 20.3 21.5 15.6 14.1 14.8 11.5 20.0 20.8 16.7 12.6 13.0 11.3
Disagree 18.5 19.3 14.8 8.5 8.5 7.0 16.9 17.1 15.8 7.4 7.5 6.6
Strongly disagree 14.4 14.0 16.0 4.7 4.3 6.3 11.0 10.1 14.9 4.0 3.6 5.4
Do not know 5.2 5.1 5.3 7.4 7.4 6.5 13.0 13.4 11.5 13.5 14.3 10.4
No answer 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.2
Answers                  
(in percent of 
Total/Non-
CBA/CBA); weights 
included 
Currently, the [LOCAL 
CURRENCY] is a very 
stable and trustworthy 
currency
The euro is a very stable 
and trustworthy currency
Over the next five years, 
the [LOCAL CURRENCY] 
will be very stable and 
trustworthy 
Over the next five years, 
the euro will be very stable 
and trustworthy 
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Figure 4.3a: Perceptions about the economic situation in CBA and non-CBA 
countries 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3b: Expectations about the economic situation in CBA and non-CBA 
countries 
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Figure 4.3c: Trust in government in CBA and non-CBA countries 
 
 
 
There are a number of “do not know” answers to all questions in the surveys. Since 
these answers for the dependent variable cannot be rated/ordered and it is difficult to 
include them in the empirical analysis (this will be explained in Section 4.5.4) and in 
the main estimations these answers are excluded. It might be argued that by 
excluding these answers additional information is lost, though there are no more than 
13 percent of these answers and the number of remaining observations is high. 
However, in the robustness check we will create a separate category for “do not 
know” answers and estimate a simplified model by multinomial probit in order to test 
for the potential bias.    
 
The above descriptive statistics indicate that the perceptions and expectations about 
the local currency’s stability are somewhat higher in CBA than in non-CBA 
countries and that the current and future economic situation are perceived/expected 
to be worse in CBA than non-CBA countries. This initial analysis provides useful 
insights into the data and identifies some initial trends and relations. However, to be 
able to give more precise inference a more formal empirical analysis needs to be 
conducted. Therefore, the effect of CBA on confidence/credibility (measured by the 
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specified questions above) will be estimated, taking into account all the controls 
specified in Section 4.3. 
 
4.5 Econometric analysis 
 
The survey data available for this research includes surveys from fall wave 2007 to 
spring wave 2011. Since the respondents are different in different waves, we cannot 
use panel estimation. Therefore, in order to get as many observations as possible we 
utilise a pooled cross-section. This strategy is preferred over cross-section analysis as 
it produces higher variability in the data, since it has an ability to capture variation in 
both time and space dimensions simultaneously (Podesta, 2002). On the other hand, 
in pooled cross-sections there is a potential problem of errors being correlated across 
time (serial correlation) and countries (for additional advantages and disadvantages 
of using a pooled cross-section see Podesta, 2002). In our analysis we address these 
issues by the inclusion of time (t) and country-group (λcd) dummy variables, since 
country-group dummies should remove any country-group specific, time invariant 
characteristics from the error term and wave dummies should remove all time-
specific country(-group) invariant characteristics. Additionally, we report the 
equivalent of cluster-robust standard errors, which are inflated to take account of loss 
of information associated with error correlation45 (this is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.5.2). 
 
Since we assume that the effect of CBA is also conditional on the level of trust in 
government (see Section 4.3) we use the smaller dataset, which includes the 
observations from spring 2009 to spring 2011 (in this dataset we lost 40 percent of all 
possible observations, since the question about the trust in government was not 
included in the first three survey waves). However, this variable is excluded and a 
model without it is estimated with the large dataset in a sensitivity analysis.   
 
  
                                                                
45 As noted in UCLA notes: “Stata's survey routine calls the same routine used to create clustered 
robust standard errors.” http://statistics.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/library/cpsu.htm  
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4.5.1 The endogeneity issue  
 
Since it can be argued that the perceptions/expectations about the local currency’s 
stability and the economic situation in a country might be jointly determined then 
potential endogeneity, caused by simultaneity between those two variables, might be 
assumed. However, it can be argued that the expected effect of the local currency’s 
stability on the economic situation is weaker than the expected effect of the 
economic situation on a local currency’s stability, since the effect of currency 
stability on the economic situation is inconclusive (both on theoretical and empirical 
grounds, as elaborated in Chapter 5). In spite of the large number of studies 
investigating the effect of a currency’s stability on real economy variables, such as 
trade, investment and output, there is no clear evidence of any systematic effect (for 
more details see Rose, 2011). Finally, it may be argued that simultaneity is not likely 
to be an issue between the perceptions/expectations of currency stability and the 
CBA, since there is no rationale for assuming that current perceptions/expectations 
about currency stability affects the likelihood of a CBA being in operation/having a 
CBA (in both BH and Bulgaria the decision concerning the introduction of a CBA 
was taken and implemented long before our sample period).  
 
4.5.2 Survey design characteristics 
 
In several recent studies the importance of controlling for survey design 
characteristics when using survey data in estimations has been emphasised (Chromy 
and Abeyasekera, 2005; Kreuter and Valliant, 2007; Pitblado, 2009). These studies 
argue the need to control for four features usually involved in sample surveys, which 
may have “potentially significant consequences for estimations” (Kreuter and 
Valliant, 2007, p.2). These features are: weights; stratification (stratum/strata); 
clustering (primary sampling units (PSUs)); and finite sample population (FSP). 
These can be controlled for by defining these features in the ‘svyset’ (available in 
Stata12) and specifying a ‘svy’ option before the estimation command. These details 
should be provided together with the dataset by the data provider, since these should 
be determined before the data is collected. However, due to differences in the 
sampling frames and approaches to sampling between the countries46 it is not 
                                                                
46 This became evident from the descriptions of sampling sent by the data provider.   
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possible to control for survey design (by using the ‘svy’ option). Moreover, the 
survey database only contains full data on weights. It does not contain data for the 
‘strata’ variable and contains a primary sampling unit (PSU) variable that is 
incomplete and therefore cannot be used to control for the clustering effect, i.e. 
common unobservable features between individuals in the same PSU, which are not 
shared (at least, not to the same extent) with individuals in other PSUs – which 
would correspondingly adjusts standard errors. However, standard errors that control 
for clustering should be obtained, if clustering is present (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2010). Alternatively, as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2010, p.175), “a 
conservative approach is to use non-survey methods and obtain standard errors that 
cluster on a variable that subsumes the PSUs, for example, a geographic regions such 
as a state”. Therefore, we conduct inference using robust SEs clustered on country, 
as a locational variable, since in this analysis we are interested in the questions about 
the local currency stability and the answers are not expected to depend on regions or 
other location smaller than a country, since the same currency is used in a whole 
country and monetary policy is conducted at the state level. Pepper (2002), as 
explained in Cameron (2011), argued that the highest level at which correlation 
between respondents can be assumed should be chosen as the cluster. However, the 
question about the perceptions/expectations concerning the economic situation 
(which is used as the independent variable) might depend on the region of the 
respondent. Namely, those coming from less developed regions of the country are 
more likely to perceive/expect the economic situation as/to be worse than those who 
live in the capital city region where production and industry are more developed and 
the level of employment is usually higher. Therefore, we also estimated the 
specifications using a robust SEs clustered on region. Moreover, Nicholas and 
Schaffer (2007) argued that the cluster-robust standard error estimator converges to 
the true standard error as the number of clusters, not the number of observations, 
approaches infinity and that “at higher levels the number of clusters will be smaller, 
so the asymptotic results for the estimator are less likely to hold”. Therefore, we will 
use both country and region as locational variable and present both results.  Since 
quota sampling47, in which the sample is chosen to be representative of the 
                                                                
47 As noted in Saunders et al. (2009, p.235): “Quota sampling is entirely non-random and is normally 
used for interview surveys. It is based on the idea that your sample will represent the population, as 
the variability in your sample for various quota variables is the same as that in the population”.  
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population, is applied only in Bulgaria, the weights are taken into account, since it 
enables us to apply estimates not only to a sample but also to the full population 
(Kreuter and Valliant, 2007, p.2). The main characteristics on which this variable is 
formed for each country and wave is noted in Appendix 4.1 (these details were 
provided by the data provider). However, since there is a debate in the literature on 
how and whether to use weights in econometric analysis, as noted in Section 4.4, 
both weighted and unweighted results are reported. As noted in Kreuter and Valliant 
(2007), we may expect an increase in standard errors after weighting. 
 
Since the probit estimator will be used for all specifications, in order to discuss the 
results marginal effects have to be calculated. In Stata 11 (and later versions)  a new 
command for calculating marginal effects, ‘margins’, has been introduced and this 
will next be discussed in more detail.   
 
4.5.3 Marginal effects computed using the ‘margins’ command 
 
The difference between the marginal effects at the means and the average marginal 
effects 
 
The marginal effect of CBA is computed by using the ‘margins’ command, 
introduced in Stata11. Using this command, marginal effects can be estimated at the 
means of other variables (marginal effect at the means, MEMs). Alternatively, with 
other variables kept as observed, the predicted probabilities for each individual are 
calculated: first as if subject to a specific state and, second, as if not subject to a 
specific state, with the mean difference being the average marginal effect (AME). 
The former could be produced by both old ‘mfx’48 and new ‘margins’49 command, 
while the latter is only possible within the ‘margins’ command. However, since the 
MEMs are usually argued to be inappropriate for some variables (for example, there 
                                                                
48 The “mfx’ command “numerically calculates the marginal effects or the elasticities after 
estimation“. However, “mfx has been superseded by margins. mfx does not support factor variables 
and will often fail if you do not run your estimation command under version control, with the version 
set to less than 11.“  (Stata11, help file) 
 
49 “Margins are statistics calculated from predictions of a previously fit model at fixed values of some 
covariates and averaging or otherwise integrating over the remaining covariates. The margins 
command estimates margins of responses for specified values of covariates and presents the results as 
a table.“ (Stata 12, help file) 
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is nobody who is 52.5% female) the AME will be used. Using the AME we are 
estimating the marginal effect of a CBA by creating two hypothetical populations: 
one in which everybody in the sample are assumed to come from a country with a 
CBA (CBA=1) and another in which nobody in the sample is assumed to come from 
a country with a CBA (CBA=0), having the exact same values for the other 
independent variables in the model. As elaborated by Williams (2012), the AME 
could be explained as follows. 
 
- Go to the first case and treat the person as though his/her country had a CBA (i.e. 
the CBA dummy variable is set to one and multiplied by its estimated effect), 
regardless of the actual regime used in a country from which the person comes. The 
predicted probability that this person (if his/her country had a CBA) would perceive 
the local currency as stable and trustworthy is computed; 
- Calculate the predicted probability that this person would perceive the local 
currency as stable and trustworthy treating this person as though (s)he was coming 
from the country without a CBA (i.e. the CBA dummy variable is set to zero); 
- The difference in the two probabilities is the marginal effect for that case; 
- The process is repeated for every case/person in the sample; 
- The average of all the marginal effects is computed and this is called the average 
marginal effect (AME).  
 
Marginal effects at the means, on the other hand, are showing us the probability of 
perceiving the local currency as stable and trustworthy if we had two otherwise 
average (values of all other variables set at average) individuals, one from country 
with a CBA and another from non-CBA country. Besides the critique that MEMs use 
impossible values for some variables, as noted above, it is also criticised for using a 
set of values that (probably) no real person actually has (Williams, 2012). As noted 
in the Stata base reference manual 2012 (p.1036), the prediction at the average of the 
covariates, given by the margins specified at the mean, is the expected probability of 
a person with average characteristics. On the other hand, the average of the 
predictions, given by the average margins (or the ‘as observed’ option of marginal 
effect), is the average of the probability among actual persons in the data, in two 
counterfactuals. Choice between MEMs and AME is not a matter of right or wrong. 
With MEMs we are dealing with imaginary people (a person with average 
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characteristics is unlikely to exist in the real world) in actual states and with AME we 
are dealing with actual people in imaginary (counterfactual) states. 
 
Marginal effects of the interaction terms in a non-linear model  
 
In recent studies it has been emphasised that the marginal effects calculated with the 
standard ‘mfx’ command, after using a non-linear estimator in which the interaction 
terms are included, are likely to be incorrect. This refers not only to their magnitude 
but also to the sign and significance of the coefficients on variables that are part of 
the interaction terms as well. The recently introduced command ‘margins’ does not 
even report the marginal effects of the interaction terms in non-linear models, since, 
as stated in Williams (2012, p.329): “The value of the interaction term cannot change 
independently of the values of the component terms, so you cannot estimate a 
separate effect for the interaction”. Since we are not interested in the marginal effects 
of the interaction terms, but rather on the effect of CBA conditional on the 
perceptions/expectations about the economic situation and the level of trust in 
government, we estimate the effect of CBA at different perceptions/expectations of 
economic performance and levels of trust in government. The ‘margins’ command 
takes into account that a CBA is also part of the interaction terms when these are 
included in the regression. Therefore, we prefer models with the interaction terms 
and rely on the average marginal effect of the CBA variable. However, usage of the 
average marginal effect is also argued to “obscure differences in effects across cases” 
(Williams, 2012, p. 326). Therefore, we are using a marginal effect at representative 
values (MER), as Williams (2012, p.330) suggests: “Presenting MERs can make 
results easier to interpret and provide a better feel for how the effects of variables 
differ across cases.”, since it allows us to observe the marginal effect of one variable 
at different levels of the other variable(s). By providing a visual display of results, 
the ‘marginsplot’ command (introduced in Stata12) makes it easier to observe the 
effect of one variable conditional on the change of the other variable(s). However, 
different values/categories are only chosen for the variables of greatest interest 
(perceptions/expectations about the economic situation and trust in government), not 
for all variables, since this would be time and space consuming and since these are 
not of primary interest for this study.  
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Ai and Norton (2003) suggested the usage of the ‘inteff’ command50, which enables 
the estimation of marginal effects of the interaction term for each observation. As 
noted in Ai and Norton (2003, p.129) “the interaction effect requires computing the 
cross derivative or cross difference” since “the magnitude of the interaction effect 
depends on all the covariates in the model”. Consequently, it can have different signs 
for different observations “making simple summary measures of the interaction 
effect difficult”. Therefore, Ai and Norton suggested estimation of the marginal 
effects of interaction term for each observation separately by using the ‘inteff’ 
command after estimating the non-linear model with an interaction term. However, 
this approach is not applied here, since no more than one interaction term can be 
estimated by ‘inteff’, while there are more interaction terms in our specification. 
Moreover, Greene (2010) suggests usage of graphical devices that can be more 
informative than the test statistics suggested by Ai and Norton (2003). In private 
correspondence, Williams also suggests that the ‘margins’ approach (now integrated 
in Stata) is much easier and more sensible. Finally, it is not possible and makes no 
sense to represent/summarise the marginal effect of interaction term with one 
number, since “they are just too variable” (Buis, 2011), which also complicates 
comparisons between different models. 
 
4.5.4 Estimation of the ‘confidence’ and ‘credibility’ models as seemingly 
unrelated regressions  
 
As argued in Section 4.3, the two models can be observed as a part of a wider 
system. These two models have some common observed factors (CBA, trust in 
government, and socio-demographic variables) and we may assume that there are 
some common unobserved determinants as well, such as some other respondents’ 
characteristics which are not controlled for (e.g. income, political orientation). We 
therefore estimate the two models as a system by using a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR). SUR allows inclusion of the equation-specific variables as well, 
which are in our models perceptions/expectations about the local currency’s stability, 
the euro and economic situation. By using a SUR the unobserved factors are allowed 
                                                                
50   'inteff' is a command for „computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit 
models“ (Stata12, help file). 
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to be correlated. This correlation is indicated in the SUR results as the ‘rho’ (ρ)51 (see 
Equations 4.1). The motivation behind using a SUR is to gain efficiency in 
estimation by combining information from different equations (which is one of the 
reasons for using SUR emphasised in Moon and Perron, 2006).  
 
Answers to the questions “Currently, the [local currency] is a very stable and 
trustworthy currency” and “Over the next five years, the [local currency] will be very 
stable and trustworthy currency” are used as the dependent variables (CSagreei, 
ExpCSagreei, respectively). There are eight answers offered, as noted in Table 4.1. 
Since the interpretation of the results when the dependent variable includes many 
scales is complicated (see Long and Freese, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002), especially 
when interaction terms are included in the regression (Williams, 2012), the answers 
are aggregated into two groups: “agree” (which combines the answers “strongly 
agree”, “agree”, “somewhat agree”), and “disagree” (which combines the answers 
“somewhat disagree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree”), the latter being the base 
category. In the analysis there is the problem of treating “do not know” and no 
answers, since those cannot be rated or aggregated with other answers. One common 
practice is to drop these observations. Wang (1997, p.220) argued that “there is a 
potentially serious cost in terms of lost information” and that “sample selection bias 
may be introduced if DK do not know respondents are systematically different 
from the rest of the respondents”. Wooldridge (2002, p.557) argued that dropping the 
observations with no answers may result in biased estimators. However, in the 
preferred estimation we will exclude these answers since their inclusion would 
require usage of a multinomial probit, and ‘margins’ command which has to be used 
in order to interpret the results of models with interaction terms (as noted in Section 
4.5.3) is more difficult to use with multiple-outcome commands (see Williams, 
2012). Moreover, we prefer the seemingly unrelated regression estimator which 
cannot be used with multiple-outcome command. In order to test for the potential 
bias we will create a separate category for “do now know” answers and estimate 
multinomial probit for the separate equations (4.1a and 4.1b), but without the 
interaction term. Additionally, separate probit models without the interaction terms 
will also be estimated and the results compared with those from the multinomial 
                                                                
51 'Rho’ is the showing the (significance and the sign of) correlation between unobservable factors in 
the equations.  
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probits. In all specifications the dummy variable which is 1 for countries with a CBA 
and 0 otherwise (CBA) and the variable for current and future trust in the euro 
(ECSagreei and ExpECSagreei), for which the answers are aggregated in “agree” and 
“disagree” groups (the same way as for the dependent variable), are included. We 
control for the macroeconomic performance of country by including the answers to 
questions regarding the current and future economic situation in a country (ESi, 
ExpESi). Seven answers are possible, rated from “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree”, plus “do not know” answers, (“strongly agree” is used as the base 
category). Moreover, we assume that the effect of CBA is also conditional on 
different perceptions and expectations about the economic situation. Accordingly, 
interaction terms between those two variables (in the first model between perceptions 
and CBA and in the second between expectations and CBA) are included in the 
models to be estimated. As elaborated in Section 4.3, we consider trust in 
government to be a potentially important determinant of the perceptions about the 
local currency’s stability, especially in European transition countries where political 
issues are more likely to influence peoples’ perceptions and expectations. Moreover, 
trust in economic institutions has been argued to be “particularly important” at times 
of crisis (Walti, 2012, p.594). Hence, we include the ‘trust in government’ variable in 
the analysis (Gtrusti). Moreover, we assume that the effect of CBA is also 
conditional on the level of trust in government and, therefore, the interaction term 
between those two variables are included in the models estimated. The trust in 
government variable has five categories of answers (from 1 to 5, respectively: “I trust 
completely”, “I somewhat trust”, “I neither trust nor distrust”, “I somewhat distrust” 
and “I do not trust at all”, plus “do know answers” (the first category is used as a 
base). In all estimations we control for the respondents’ socio-demographic 
characteristics, namely age (h_age1i, h_age2i), gender (h_female), level of education 
(h_edu_highi, α12edu_mediumi) and employment status (h_retiredi, h_studenti, 
h_unemployedi), as well as for the time (γt) and country-group dummy (λcd) 
variables. These variables are not reported in the tables with results due to space 
limitations, but are reported in Appendices. There are four categories of age: 1-18; 
19-34; 35-54 (h_age1); and 55+ (h_age2)). We argue that respondents younger than 
19 are unlikely to have much knowledge about their currency and these respondents 
are excluded from the analysis. The base category for age is thus the group of 
respondents from age 19 to 34; for gender the base category is ‘male’; for education 
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there are three categories (‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ education) and the ‘low’ 
education category is used as the base category; for employment status there are four 
categories (‘retired’, ‘student’, ‘unemployed’ and ‘employee’) and ‘employee’ is 
used as the base. The SUR specification is given below (Equations 4.1a, 4.1b and 
4.1c). 
 
CSagreei = α052 + α1CBAc + α3ECSagreei + α4ESi + α5CBAc·ESi + α6Gtrusti + 
α7CBAc·Gtrusti + α8h_age1i + α9h_age2i + α10h _femalei + α11h_edu_highi + 
α12h_edu_mediumi + α13h_retiredi + α14h_studenti + α15h_unemployedi + γt + λcd + ε1i
                                                                                                                  (4.1a) 
 
ExpCSagreei = 0 + 1CBAc + 2ExpECSagreei + 3ExpESi + α4CBAc·ExpESi + 
α5Gtrusti + α6CBAc·Gtrusti + 7h_age1i + β8h_age2i + β9h _femalei + β10h_edu_highi 
+ β11h_edu_mediumi + β12h_retiredi + β13h_studenti + β14h_unemployedi+ γt + λcd + 
ε2i            .                                                                                                             (4.1b)                                                                   
 
ρ= Cov(ε1i, ε2i)                                               (4.1c)
                                    
The estimator used is biprobit, which fits maximum-likelihood two-equation probit 
models. We use robust SEs clustered on country and region and present both sets of 
results. Additionally, weighted and unweighted results are also presented. Since the 
results from the biprobit estimation are not indicative when interaction terms are 
included in the model (see Section 4.5.3) the marginal effects are calculated and 
reported. Marginal effects are given for the probability of both perceptions and 
expectations being equal to 1, which is a high confidence/trust category in both cases 
(Table 4.3, Appendix 4.5 and Appendix 4.7). Marginal effects take into account the 
correlation between the models and are consequently slightly different for all 
variables, compared to the results of the separately estimated models, since we are 
observing the effects on the combined probability of having a high current and future 
confidence in the local currency’s stability. The SUR results indicate that the 
unobserved factors are significantly and positively correlated and moving both 
perceptions and expectations about the local currency’s stability in the same direction 
                                                                
52 In all equations coefficients (α, β, γ etc.) are the estimates.  
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(this is indicated by the positive ‘rho’ coefficient and the small standard error on 
‘rho’, see Appendix 4.5 and 4.7). This means that if unobservable factors are 
increasing the probability of the currency being perceived as currently stable, they 
are also increasing the probability of the local currency being expected to be stable in 
the future. The highly significant correlation between the unobserved factors 
supports the usage of SUR and, therefore, this is the preferred estimator. Although 
the interpretation of these combined marginal effects is complicated, some general 
findings, can be provided:  
-The effect of the CBA on the combined probability of high current and future 
confidence in the local currency is significant and positive. The average marginal 
effect for CBA is 0.142, meaning that, on average, if the individuals are coming from 
is a CBA country then they are 14.2 percentage points more likely to perceive/expect 
local currency to be stable than are individuals coming from a countries with some 
other regime. As noted in Section 4.5.3 these implications are based on the 
comparison of two hypothetical populations calculated on the whole sample (all 
countries from the sample are considered in the counterfactuals). It should be noted 
that the period observed is a period of crisis (2009-2011), which is implying that the 
credibility of CBA in the ‘bad times’ is not undermined (as suggested by some 
authors, for example Drazen and Masson, 1994; Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006; 
Castren et al., 2010; see Section 4.3). In order to assess the impact of a CBA 
separately for CBA and non-CBA subsamples the marginal effects are calculated 
separately for these subsamples. According to these results, the effect of CBA is 
positive and significant in both subsamples (Appendix 4.5f). The effect is somewhat 
higher in CBA countries indicating that the countries that actually had a CBA 
benefited from it more than the countries with other regimes would have benefited if 
they had had a CBA. 
- The weaker the perceptions/expectations about the economic situation in a country 
the lower the probability of high current and future confidence in the local currency. 
Those that somewhat disagree, disagree and strongly disagree that the economic 
situation is good are respectively 9.6, 12.9 and 16.7 percentage points less likely to 
perceive/expect the local currency as/to be stable than those who strongly agree that 
the economic situation in a country is good. Similarly, those that somewhat disagree, 
disagree and strongly disagree that the economic situation in a country will improve 
are respectively 11.5, 16.2 and 19.1 percentage points less likely to perceive/expect 
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the local currency as/to be stable than those who strongly agree that the economic 
situation in a country will improve.  
- High current and future confidence in the euro (compared to having low 
confidence) positively affects the probability of high current and future confidence in 
the local currency. Those that trust in the current and future stability of the euro are, 
respectively, 6.9 and 5.8 percentage points more likely to perceive and expect their 
local currency to be stable than those who do not perceive/expect the euro to be 
stable. This is expected, since all countries from the sample are current or likely 
future EU members and their currencies are directly or indirectly connected to the 
euro. 
- Regarding the effect of the trust in government variable, the results imply that, as 
expected, the lower is trust the larger is the negative effect it has on the favourable 
perceptions and expectations about the local currency’s stability. Namely, those who 
somewhat distrust and totally distrust government are 11.5 and 13.8 percent less 
likely to perceive/expect current and future stability of the local currency than those 
who highly trust their government.  
These results are highly significant and consistent over the different specifications 
estimated53.  
 
In order to investigate conditionality between CBA, trust in government and CBA 
and the economic situation the marginal effects of CBA conditional on level of trust 
and economic state are estimated by calculating the marginal effects at representative 
values (MER) (Appendices 4.5 c, 4.5d and 4.5e). Nagler (1991) and Brambor et al. 
(2006) argued that “Any finding of interaction from a model without a product 
term... is an ‘artefact of the methodology’” and “is substantively meaningless” (as 
cited in Berry et al., 2010, p.249). However, the effect of the interaction terms cannot 
be seen separately from the estimates of the variables included in the interaction 
terms in the marginal effect results (as explained in Section 4.5.3). This 
conditionality will be presented by using ‘marginsplot’ in Figures 4.4a, 4.4b and 
4.4c. The marginal effects, calculated after the estimation of the system by using the 
‘biprobit’ estimator, are presented in Table 4.4.   
                                                                
53 The significance of the difference between the effect of different groups/levels of trust in 
government and perceptions/expectations about the economic situation in a country is also tested by 
using the ‘contrast’ command and differences between all the groups, except between the first and the 
second one is significant (see Appendix 4.1g). 
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Table 4.4: SUR results - Estimation of the ‘credibility’ model (as specified in 
Equation 4.1 (number of observations: 37,908) 
 
Questions used for the dependent variable: 
"Currently, the local currency is very stable and 
trustworthy?" and "Over the next five years, the 
[LOCAL CURRENCY] will be very stable and 
trustworthy"  
Dependent variable: probability of both questions being 
equal to 1 (answers: "Strongly agree", "Agree" and 
"Somewhat agree”) as opposed to 0 (answers: "Strongly 
disagree", "Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree") 
Marginal effects;          
clustered on country 
Marginal effects;          
clustered on region 
unweighted weighted unweighted weighted 
CBA 0.137* 0.142* 0.137*** 0.142*** 
1=CBA is implemented (0.0792) (0.0768) (0.0454) (0.0440) 
Base category: CBA not implemented         
Gtrust2 -0.0184 -0.0131 -0.0184 -0.0131 
Trust in Government: "I somewhat trust" (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0168) 
Gtrust3 -0.0807*** -0.0759*** -0.0807*** -0.0759*** 
Trust in Government: "I neither trust nor distrust" (0.0261) (0.0248) (0.0187) (0.0185) 
Gtrust4 -0.119*** -0.115*** -0.119*** -0.115*** 
Trust in Government: "I somewhat distrust" (0.0315) (0.0307) (0.0205) (0.0206) 
Gtrust5 -0.142*** -0.138*** -0.142*** -0.138*** 
Trust in Government: "I do not trust at all" (0.0289) (0.0278) (0.0179) (0.0175) 
Gtrustdnk -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.152*** 
Trust in Government: "Do not know" (0.0356) (0.0381) (0.0278) (0.0271) 
Base category:Trust in Government:"I trust completely"         
ECSagree 0.0689*** 0.0695*** 0.0689*** 0.0695*** 
Euro currently stable; 1="Strongly agree", "Agree" and 
"Somewhat agree" 
(0.0135) (0.0146) (0.00750) (0.00793) 
Base category: "Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and 
"Somewhat disagree"         
Current economic situation in a country is very good:          
ES2 -0.0101 -0.00983 -0.0101 -0.00983 
"Agree" (0.00712) (0.00636) (0.00817) (0.00789) 
ES3 -0.0410*** -0.0421*** -0.0410*** -0.0421*** 
"Somewhat agree" (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.00798) (0.00782) 
ES4 -0.0953*** -0.0966*** -0.0953*** -0.0966*** 
"Somewhat disagree" (0.0123) (0.0114) (0.00835) (0.00826) 
ES5 -0.126*** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.129*** 
"Disagree" (0.0161) (0.0151) (0.00910) (0.00882) 
ES6 -0.164*** -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.167*** 
"Strongly disagree" (0.0168) (0.0154) (0.00978) (0.00941) 
Esdnk -0.115*** -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.118*** 
"Do not know" (0.0176) (0.0192) (0.0182) (0.0191) 
Base category: "Strongly Agree"         
ExpECSagree 0.0596*** 0.0581*** 0.0596*** 0.0581*** 
Future euro stability; 1="Strongly agree", "Agree" and 
"Somewhat agree" (0.00979) (0.00958) (0.00604) (0.00592) 
Base category: "Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and 
"Somewhat disagree"         
Future economic situation in a country is very good:          
ExpES2 -0.0170*** -0.0151*** -0.0170*** -0.0151*** 
"Agree" (0.00517) (0.00525) (0.00509) (0.00505) 
ExpES3 -0.0424*** -0.0398*** -0.0424*** -0.0398*** 
"Somewhat agree" (0.00692) (0.00698) (0.00621) (0.00637) 
ExpES4 -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.115*** 
"Somewhat disagree" (0.00670) (0.00664) (0.00656) (0.00657) 
ExpES5 -0.166*** -0.162*** -0.166*** -0.162*** 
"Disagree" (0.00848) (0.00816) (0.00660) (0.00653) 
ExpES6 -0.193*** -0.191*** -0.193*** -0.191*** 
 "Strongly disagree" (0.00887) (0.00812) (0.00718) (0.00734) 
ExpEsdnk -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** 
"Do not know" (0.00595) (0.00587) (0.0114) (0.0118) 
Base category: "Strongly Agree"         
 Robust standard errors (clustered on country and region) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Note: The results presented in this table are only an extract from the full results reported in Appendices  
 Note: The marginal effects calculated after the biprobit SUR estimation are reported 
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As noted in Section 4.5.3, the effect of the interaction term cannot be seen from the 
‘margins’ results. Therefore, the marginal effect of CBA at different levels of 
variables used in interaction terms will be separately assessed and presented in 
figures produced by the ‘marginsplot’ in Stata12. Figures 4.4a - 4.4c indicate the 
effect of CBA conditional on the level of trust in government and 
perceptions/expectations about the economic situation.  
 
 
Figure 4.4a: The average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of high current 
confidence and expectations about local currency stability conditional on the level of 
trust in government  
 
 
 
 
  
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 P
r(
C
s
a
g
re
e
=
1
,E
x
p
c
s
a
g
re
e
=
1
)
I trust completely I somewhat trust I neither trust nor distrust I somewhat distrust I do not trust at all
Trust in Government/cabinet of ministers
Average Marginal Effects of 1.CBA with 95% CIs
Chapter 4: An Assessment of the Credibility of CBAs in BH and Bulgaria  
 
156 
 
Figure 4.4b: The average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of high current 
confidence and expectations about local currency stability conditional on perceptions 
about current economic situation 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4c: The average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of high current 
confidence and expectations about local currency stability conditional on 
expectations about future economic improvement  
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tested (Table 4.5). Mitchell (2012, p.204) notes that “overlap (or lack of overlap) of 
confidence intervals between groups cannot be used to draw conclusions about the 
significance of the difference between groups” the ‘contrast’ command (which is 
calculating the difference between the marginal effects of one variable at different 
levels of the other variable) is used to test for the significance of the difference in the 
effect of CBA at different levels of the other variable (economic situation and trust in 
government). 
 
Table 4.5: The effect of having a CBA compared to not having a CBA on 
perceptions/expectations about the local currency stability at different levels of trust 
in government, perceptions and expectations about the economic situation  
 
Trust in government: Contrast 
‘Somewhat trust’ compared to ‘trust completely’   0.094*** 
‘Neither trust nor distrust’ compared to ‘trust completely’  0.108*** 
‘Somewhat distrust’ compared to ‘trust completely’  0.079* 
‘Do not trust at all’ compared to ‘trust completely’  0.12*** 
  Perceptions about the current economic situation good: Contrast 
‘Agree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’  0.014 
‘Somewhat agree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’  0.018 
‘Somewhat disagree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’  0.14 
‘Disagree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’  0.084*** 
‘Strongly disagree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’  0.099*** 
  Future economic situation will improve:  Contrast  
‘Agree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’ -0.045*** 
‘Somewhat agree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’ -0.027* 
‘Somewhat disagree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’  0.001 
‘Disagree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’  0.013 
‘Strongly disagree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’ -0.001 
 
The test for the significance of the differences in the size of effect of CBA between 
different levels of trust in government indicates that differences between every group 
and the base category are significant. The effect is increasing as we move from high 
trust to high distrust (with an exception of ‘somewhat agree’ category, although the 
effect for this difference is significant only at 10 percent level) (Appendix 4.5g). The 
results suggest that the effect of a CBA on perceptions/expectations about the local 
currency is 12 percentage points higher for those who do not trust at all compared to 
those who trust government completely. The test for the significance of the 
differences in the size of the effect of CBA between different perceptions about the 
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economic situation indicates the significance between the effect at all ‘bad’ 
(categories of) perceptions about the economic situation in a country compared with 
‘the best’ (category of) perceptions (Appendix 4.5g) . According to comparison of 
the marginal effects (which are calculated by ‘contrast’ command) of a CBA for the 
‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ compared to ‘strongly agree’ answers to the 
question about the economic situation in a country indicate that the effect is 8.4 (for 
‘disagree’) and 9.9 (for ‘strongly disagree’) percentage points higher (compared to 
‘strongly agree’). Finally, the effect of a CBA is calculated at different levels of 
expectations about the economic situation. Only the differences between the ‘agree’ 
and ‘somewhat agree’ category (at the 10% level of significance for the latter) 
compared to strongly agree category are significant and negative. However, the 
differences of the effect of a CBA between ‘disagree’ and ‘agree’ categories are not 
significant and therefore we can conclude that the effect of a CBA does not differ 
between those with pessimistic (compared to those with optimistic) expectations 
about the future economic situation, when estimated as seemingly unrelated 
regression (together with perceptions).  
 
According to the Wald and likelihood-ratio tests the variables included in the model 
are jointly significant at all conventional confidence levels (Appendix 4.6). 
According to the correlation matrix there is no indication of a high correlation 
between the variables used (Appendix 4.3).  
 
The results from the preferred model specification indicate that none of the socio-
demographic variables proved significant. Only the high education variable is 
significant and positive when the unweighted, clustered on country, results are 
observed. Due to space limitations these results are not presented here but are 
available in the Appendices. All time dummy variables are significant (except the 
one for the wave fall 2009, when country is used as cluster) and indicate that the 
perceptions/expectations about the local currency became more stable after spring 
2009 (which is the first year in the preferred dataset and the omitted category). This 
is consistent with gradual increase in stability after the beginning of the global 
financial crisis. Moreover, in the larger dataset (which is used as a robustness check) 
where spring 2007 is used as the base period (Appendix 4.11) the only significant 
time dummy, after controlling for survey design, is for spring 2009, which is 
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negative. This also suggests that the two sets of results are consistent in indicating 
that early 2009 was a particularly unstable period. 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
 
Since in some studies it is emphasised that the financial situation in a country may 
also affect the perceptions about the local currency’s stability, a variable for 
perceptions about banks’ and financial stability is included in the preferred model, 
for the robustness check. The results for the variables included both in this and in the 
preferred specification are very similar. The estimates on the financial stability 
variable indicate that, as expected, the worse the perceptions about the financial 
stability in a country the more pessimistic are perceptions and expectations about the 
current and future stability of the currency (result column 1 in Table 4.6a and 4.6b, 
Appendix 4.8). The CBA effect is again positive and highly significant. However, 
these results are not preferred, since: there is an issue of endogeneity (simultaneity) 
between the perceptions about the local currency’s stability and the local financial 
stability and there is no strong/clear theory suggesting the inclusion of a financial 
stability control. Next, perceptions and one-year expectations regarding the financial 
situation of a household are controlled for (results column 2 in Table 4.6a and 4.4b, 
Appendix 4.9). The results again suggest a significant and positive effect of a CBA. 
Other results are also very similar to the preferred results in Table 4.4. Additionally, 
the results suggest that the lower the perceptions/expectations about the financial 
situation of a household the higher the negative effect on perceptions/expectations 
about the local currency stability will be.  
 
Since we had to exclude all observations from the first three survey waves, as one of 
the questions of interest, namely, trust in government, was not included in these 
waves, we now estimate the model without this variable for the large dataset 
(respondents from all survey waves are included in the estimation) (column 3 in 
Table 4.6a, Appendix 4.10). The results again suggest positive and significant effects 
of the CBA and the other results do not change a lot.  
 
Next, we estimate the model without using interaction terms. Here, even biprobit 
estimates are somewhat indicative (and they also suggest a positive effect of a CBA, 
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although the level of significance somewhat differ54), although we again present 
marginal effects for the comparison (column 4 in Table 4.6a and Appendix 4.11). 
The results are very similar to those from the preferred specification. However, the 
inference from the effect of CBA conditional on other variable differs. Namely, there 
is no indication of a different effect of the CBA at different levels of trust in 
government, perceptions and expectations of economic situation in a country when 
interaction terms between these variables with the CBA dummy are not included. 
However, we cannot rely on these findings since, as argued above, interaction terms 
should be included if we want to observe this conditionality.  
 
 
                                                                
54 From the SUR results the significance of the effects of a CBA on perceptions is higher but on 
expectations it is lower. However, the marginal effects show the combined effect (and which is 
comparable to previous results) is somewhat higher. The latter are shown in the table; the former are 
only mentioned as a check of the consistency of the results. 
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Table 4.6a: SUR results (the first part) - robustness checks for the ‘credibility’ model (the results for the first two columns continue in 
Table 4.6b) 
 
Questions used for the dependent variable: "Currently, the local 
currency is very stable and trustworthy?" and "Over the next five 
years, the [LOCAL CURRENCY] will be very stable and 
trustworthy"                         .   
Dependent variable: probability of both questions being equal to 1 
(answers: "Strongly agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree”) as opposed to 
0 (answers: "Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree") 
Controlling for 
perceptions about the 
financial stability in a 
country 
Controlling for 
perceptions about the 
financial situation in a 
country and financial 
situation of a 
household 
Using large dataset 
(trust in government 
variable excluded); no. 
of observations: 59,351 
No interaction terms 
used 
CBA 0.139** 0.134** 0.116** 0.149** 
1=CBA is implemented (0.0663) (0.0625) (0.0589) (0.0788) 
Base category: CBA not implemented         
Gtrust2 -0.00198 -0.000670   -0.0166 
Trust in Government: "I somewhat trust" (0.0114) (0.0107)   (0.0218) 
Gtrust3 -0.0512*** -0.0460***   -0.0802** 
Trust in Government: "I neither trust nor distrust" (0.0174) (0.0161)   (0.0312) 
Gtrust4 -0.0852*** -0.0776***   -0.1193*** 
Trust in Government: "I somewhat distrust" (0.0220) (0.0205)   (0.0347) 
Gtrust5 -0.0986*** -0.0882***   -0.1427*** 
Trust in Government: "I do not trust at all" (0.0198) (0.0191)   (0.0338) 
Gtrustdnk -0.110*** -0.100***   -0.1478*** 
Trust in Government: "Do not know" (0.0302) (0.0298)   (0.0359) 
Base category: Trust in Government: "I trust completely"         
ECSagree 0.0538*** 0.0518*** 0.0709*** 0.0699*** 
Euro currently stable; 1="Strongly agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree" (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0159) (0.0142) 
Base category: "Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree"         
Current economic situation in a country is very good:          
ES2 -0.0121 -0.0146* -0.00120 -0.0073 
"Agree" (0.00785) (0.00862) (0.00306) (0.0076) 
ES3 -0.0437*** -0.0463*** -0.0354*** -0.0387*** 
"Somewhat agree" (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.00567) (0.0109) 
ES4 -0.0919*** -0.0918*** -0.0977*** -0.0927*** 
"Somewhat disagree" (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.00513) (0.0124) 
ES5 -0.124*** -0.119*** -0.146*** -0.1243*** 
"Disagree" (0.0152) (0.0146) (0.0109) (0.0178) 
ES6 -0.156*** -0.147*** -0.191*** -0.1594*** 
 "Strongly disagree" (0.0158) (0.0149) (0.0112) (0.0197) 
Esdnk -0.108*** -0.102*** -0.110*** -0.1142*** 
"Do not know" (0.0202) (0.0194) (0.0180) (0.0186) 
Base category: "Strongly Agree"         
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Table 4.6a: SUR results (the first part - continuing) - robustness checks for the ‘credibility’ model (the results for the first two columns 
continue in Table 4.6b) 
 
Questions used for the dependent variable: "Currently, the local 
currency is very stable and trustworthy?" and "Over the next five 
years, the [LOCAL CURRENCY] will be very stable and 
trustworthy"                         .   
Dependent variable: probability of both questions being equal to 1 
(answers: "Strongly agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree”) as opposed to 
0 (answers: "Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree") 
Controlling for 
perceptions about the 
financial stability in a 
country 
Controlling for 
perceptions about the 
financial situation in a 
country and financial 
situation of a 
household 
Using large dataset 
(trust in government 
variable excluded); no. 
of observations: 59,351 
No interaction terms 
used 
     ExpECSagree 0.0501*** 0.0477*** 0.0620*** 0.0604*** 
Future euro stability; 1="Strongly agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree" (0.00830) (0.00821) (0.0118) (0.0103) 
Base category:"Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree"         
Future economic situation in a country is very good:          
ExpES2 -0.0146*** -0.0155*** -0.0108*** -0.0120** 
"Agree" (0.00557) (0.00570) (0.00300) (0.006) 
ExpES3 -0.0356*** -0.0356*** -0.0407*** -0.0394*** 
"Somewhat agree" (0.00729) (0.00739) (0.00462) (0.00814) 
ExpES4 -0.110*** -0.106*** -0.124*** -0.1169*** 
"Somewhat disagree" (0.00590) (0.00581) (0.00478) (0.0096) 
ExpES5 -0.154*** -0.144*** -0.184*** -0.1664*** 
"Disagree" (0.00673) (0.00723) (0.00862) (0.0136) 
ExpES6 -0.181*** -0.167*** -0.222*** -0.1889*** 
 "Strongly disagree" (0.00602) (0.00696) (0.00769) (0.0143) 
ExpEsdnk -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.127*** -0.1087*** 
"Do not know" (0.00710) (0.00671) (0.00743) (0.0064) 
Base category: "Strongly Agree"         
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Table 4.6b: SUR results (the second part) - robustness checks for the ‘credibility’ 
model (the results of the first two columns from Table 4.6a continuing) 
Questions used for the dependent variable: 
"Currently, the local currency is very stable and 
trustworthy?" and "Over the next five years, the 
[LOCAL CURRENCY] will be very stable and 
trustworthy"  
Dependent variable: probability of both questions being 
equal to 1 (answers: "Strongly agree", "Agree" and 
"Somewhat agree”) as opposed to 0 (answers: "Strongly 
disagree", "Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree") 
Controlling for 
perceptions about 
the financial 
stability in a 
country 
Controlling for 
perceptions about the 
financial situation in 
a country and 
financial situation of 
a household 
Currently, banks and the financial system in a country 
are stable:      
FS2 -0.0600*** -0.0544*** 
"Agree" (0.0144) (0.0130) 
FS3 -0.138*** -0.126*** 
"Somewhat agree" (0.0144) (0.0141) 
FS4 -0.250*** -0.233*** 
"Somewhat disagree" (0.0235) (0.0238) 
FS5 -0.268*** -0.248*** 
"Disagree" (0.0193) (0.0189) 
FS6 -0.270*** -0.248*** 
 "Strongly disagree" (0.0314) (0.0303) 
FSdnk -0.234*** -0.214*** 
 "Do not know" (0.0241) (0.0233) 
Base category: "Strongly Agree"     
Currently, the financial situation of my household is 
good     
FSH2   0.00783 
"Agree"   (0.00662) 
FSH3   -0.00750 
"Somewhat agree"   (0.00516) 
FSH4   -0.0349*** 
"Somewhat disagree"   (0.00547) 
FSH5   -0.0425*** 
"Disagree"   (0.00992) 
FSH6   -0.0556*** 
 "Strongly disagree"   (0.0102) 
FSHdnk   -0.0495*** 
 "Do not know"   (0.0153) 
Base category: "Strongly Agree"     
Over the last 12 months, the financial situation of my 
household has got better     
ExpFSH2   -0.00186 
"Agree"   (0.00698) 
ExpFSH3   -0.00590 
"Somewhat agree"   (0.00882) 
ExpFSH4   -0.0333*** 
"Somewhat disagree"   (0.0101) 
ExpFSH5   -0.0497*** 
"Disagree"   (0.00848) 
ExpFSH6   -0.0584*** 
 "Strongly disagree"   (0.00957) 
FSdnk   -0.0320*** 
 "Do not know"   (0.00898) 
Base category: "Strongly Agree"     
 Robust standard errors (clustered on country and region) in parentheses;***p<0.01,** p<0.05,* p<0.1 
 Note: The results presented in this table are only an extract from the full results reported in Appendices  
 Note: The marginal effects calculated after the biprobit SUR estimation are reported   
 Note: Results presented are weighted results with country used as cluster 
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Additionally, single equation models are also estimated using a probit estimator. 
Even though unobserved factors are positively correlated, as suggested by SUR 
estimation, the single-equation estimations are consistent with those from the SUR, 
which also suggest that the single-equation results are not being driven 
systematically by the unobserved factors (Appendix 4.12 and 4.13). The estimated 
effects of the observed variables in both models separately are very similar to those 
when models are estimated as a system. In particular, the results imply that a CBA is 
likely to increase perceptions and expectations about the local currency’s stability by 
19.5 and 10 percentage points, respectively, while the combined effect from the SUR 
estimation was 14.2 percentage points. The other results have similar implications 
and the ‘marginsplots’ again indicate an increasing positive effect of the CBA with 
lower trust in government and worse perceptions. The only difference is that the 
effect of a CBA conditional on different levels of expectations about the economic 
situation in a country is significant for the ‘strongly disagree’ compared to ‘strongly 
agree’ category, indicating that the effect of a CBA is higher at the most pessimistic 
level of expectations about the economic situation (compared to the most optimistic 
level) (Appendix 4.13). Finally, in order to test for potential bias caused by exclusion 
of “do not know” answers (see Section 4.5.4) the separate models are estimated 
without the interaction terms by using probit (where ‘do not know’ answers are 
excluded) and multinomial probit estimator (where a separate category of the 
dependent variable is created for ‘do not know’ answers) (see Appendix 4.14). The 
results of this robustness check imply that the preferred results are unlikely to be 
biased since the effect of the variable of interest in “do not know” category is 
insignificant, while it is still significant and positive when the ‘agree’ (‘trust in the 
local currency’) category is compared to the ‘disagree’ (‘distrust’) category. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
Since enhanced confidence/credibility of the monetary authority is usually 
emphasised as the main feature of a CBA’s sustainability, in this chapter it is 
empirically investigated. Since confidence and credibility are defined as the public’s 
beliefs about the announced policy, and under a CBA the announced policy is 
maintenance of a stable local currency (against the anchor currency), perceptions and 
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expectations about local currency stability and trustworthiness from the Austrian 
National Bank survey dataset are used as indicators of confidence in and credibility 
of the CBA. The data used in this research has not been previously used outside the 
Austrian National Bank or for this kind of research. Using survey data from ten 
European transition countries, two of which have a CBA, enabled us to estimate the 
effect of a CBA on perceptions/expectations about the local currency stability and 
trustworthiness. One of the major contributions to knowledge of this chapter is in 
providing an empirical comparison between the confidence in/credibility of the CBA 
and the confidence in/credibility of other monetary regimes that, to our knowledge, 
has not previously been undertaken.  
 
Since the dependent variable is based on respondents’ perceptions and expectations, 
we controlled for the economic situation and political circumstances in the countries 
under investigation by also using respondents’ perceptions/expectations. Comparable 
studies that investigated the credibility of the ECB included actual macroeconomic 
data, but we prefer controls based on respondents’ subjective attitudes, since 
economic theory is based on the proposition that economic agents respond to reality 
as they perceive and experience it. This is an additional novelty of this research, 
since other studies that investigated the credibility of a particular monetary regime 
relied upon different proxies for these perceptions/expectations.  
 
A further contribution is that, not only is the monetary authority’s credibility under a 
CBA investigated but also the circumstances under which the CBA is more 
important for the credibility of monetary policy. Namely, the model is specified to 
control for the effect of CBA conditional on the economic situation and trust in 
government (by including the interaction terms between CBA and 
perceptions/expectations regarding the economic situation and CBA and trust in 
government). 
 
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the effect of a CBA on 
perceptions/expectations about the local currency stability and trustworthiness is 
positive and significant. Since the marginal effects are comparing the counterfactual 
states, the positive effect implies that if all countries from the sample had had a CBA 
then perceptions/expectations about the local currency’s stability would have been 14 
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percentage points higher compared to perceptions/expectations if those countries did 
not have a CBA. Estimation of the effect in CBA and non-CBA subsamples suggests 
that this effect is higher for CBA than non-CBA countries, suggesting that countries 
that had a CBA benefited from it more than other countries would have benefited 
from it if they had had a CBA. These are important findings, which may partially 
justify the maintenance of CBAs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria as a 
stabilisation tool.  
 
The marginal effects of the interaction terms suggest that the positive effect of a 
CBA on perceptions and expectations about the local currency stability and 
trustworthiness is greater the worse the perceptions about the economic situation in a 
country and the lower the trust in government. Even though we observed only the 
period during the financial and euro crises (2009-2011), the effect of the CBA was 
significant and positive, when the unemployment rate was increasing (compared to 
the pre-crisis period). This suggests that the maintenance of CBAs in BH and 
Bulgaria has been justified in the period of crisis and even when the anchor currency 
(the euro) was less stable. These results contradict the suggestions of some authors 
that the credibility is likely to be undermined in the ‘bad times’ (Drazen and Masson, 
1994; Mulino, 2002; Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006). 
 
Several robustness checks were conducted and the findings were very similar across 
all estimations. Therefore, we may conclude that these findings are robust. Hence, 
one may conclude that CBAs in European transition economies have the advantage 
of increasing the monetary authority’s credibility and increasing monetary stability in 
otherwise unstable economies and in periods of maximum stress. Increased 
credibility of the monetary authority should lower inflation expectations and hence 
inflation. However, since inflation rates are also influenced by other factors causation 
is ambiguous. Therefore, in order to investigate whether a CBA also contributed to 
better inflation performance, the next chapter addresses this question directly.   
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5.1 Introduction  
 
The results of the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 4 suggest that a CBA is 
increasing the credibility of the monetary authority. This is expected to decrease 
inflationary expectations and consequently to lower inflation. However, this effect is 
not straightforward and should be empirically assessed. Studies that have 
investigated the effect of CBA on inflation performance also estimated the effect on 
other macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth and volatility. The effect on the 
latter will be empirically analysed in Chapter 6, while this chapter will focus on the 
empirical investigation of the effect of a CBA on inflation performance. Section 5.2 
will assess studies that investigated the effect of a CBA on macroeconomic variables. 
Section 5.3 analyses the specifics and main trends in the transition countries that will 
be included in the empirical analyses in this chapter and Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of the 
next chapter. Section 5.4 will investigate the effect of CBA on inflation performance. 
Subsequently, the CBA variable will be divided into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, according 
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to its strictness, in order to estimate whether the effect on inflation differs with the 
strictness of the CBA. Conclusions of the empirical analyses presented in this chapter 
will be drawn in Section 5.5.  
 
5.2 Theoretical rationale and critical analysis of the empirical evidence  
  
The prediction of orthodox economic theory, outlined in  Section 2.3, is that 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime will have a better inflation performance 
than countries with a flexible exchange rate regime, since pegs are likely to lower 
inflationary expectations (“confidence effect”) and the rate of money growth 
(“discipline effect”). This is confirmed by empirical research in many studies (e.g. 
Levy- Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001; De Grauwe and Schnable, 2004a; Domac et 
al., 2004), although the size of the effect usually differs depending on the level of 
development of the countries observed and exchange rate regime (hereafter ERR) 
classification used. As a type of pegged ERR (usually classified as a “hard” peg) 
CBAs are expected to reduce inflation by more than other pegged ERRs, due to the 
greater increase in credibility of the monetary authority (Wolf et al., 2008). Namely, 
in a world of free capital movements, other fixed exchange rate regimes can alter the 
exchange rate parity, while the institutional arrangements of CBA do not allow a 
central bank to alter the exchange rate or money supply. Moreover, the abolition of a 
CBA is more difficult than abolition of other pegged ERRs and the time-
inconsistency problem is reduced in the CBA countries. Consequently, the inflation 
rate is expected to be lower and more stable in the CBA countries than in countries 
with other pegged ERRs. However, the opposite result may emerge as a consequence 
of the so called “catch-up” process in transition countries. As argued by De Grauwe 
and Schnabl (2004b), high productivity growth in transition countries (due to the low 
starting point) with a tight peg to the euro is likely to result in an increase in inflation 
rates in those countries, while in the countries with a flexible exchange rates high 
productivity rates are likely to alter the exchange rate. This phenomenon is known as 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect, which is found to be present in many transition 
countries (e.g. Halpern and Wyplosz 2001, Mihaljek and Klau, 2008).  
 
There are manyof studies estimating the effects of different ERRs on macroeconomic 
performance (usually inflation and output growth and volatility) some of which 
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include the CBA together with dollarization (and in some cases a conventional 
pegged arrangement) as a type of a “hard” peg (De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2004a; 
Bleaney and Francisco, 2007a; Ghosh et al., 2011). However, there are only a few 
studies which focus exclusively on the CBA and its effect on macroeconomic 
performance. Those studies which focus on a CBA estimate its effect by comparing 
different countries with different ERRs (‘comparison’ approach) or by observing one 
country during the periods before and during the CBA (‘experimental’ approach). 
The ‘comparison’ approach allows comparison of macroeconomic performance 
between countries with a CBA and countries with other fixed ERR and flexible ERR, 
after controlling for other factors. The potential limitation of this approach might 
emerge when the sample is large and relatively few observations are related to 
countries with a CBA, which is the case for most of the studies which estimate the 
effect of CBA on macroeconomic performance. On the other hand, the 
‘experimental’ approach allows comparison of macroeconomic performance within 
the country prior to and after the introduction of CBA55, which might be beneficial 
since there are fewer factors to control for. Moreover, this approach might be more 
reliable for policy-makers, since it is focused only on the country of interest. 
However, this approach requires data for a long time period. Moreover, Kwan and 
Lui (1999, p.407) argued that “sufficiently rich data variation is necessary for 
statistical purposes”, since “if the economic conditions of the two periods had 
remained perfectly stable, the data would hardly contain enough information for 
inferring the macroeconomic performance of the two systems”. Since our focus is on 
transition countries for which there is not enough data for the estimation of latter 
approach, the former method will be used and studies which use this approach will 
be discussed in more detail.   
 
Among the few studies which estimate the effect of CBA on macroeconomic 
performance the most cited ones are Ghosh et al. (1998) and Kwan and Lui (1999). 
Those two papers have different approaches in estimating the effect of CBA on 
macroeconomic performance; while the former uses the “comparison approach”, the 
latter uses the “experimental approach”. The “comparison” approach is also used by 
                                                                
55 Strictly speaking, this is before and after comparison only, even thouth Kwan and Lui (1999) call it 
the 'experimental approach'. The identification strategy of a natural experiment requires comparison 
between treatment and control groups before and after some change. 
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Anasstasova (1999), Ghosh et al. (2000) and Wolf et al. (2008) while the 
‘experimental’ approach is used by Sepp and Randveer (2002b). Sepp and 
Randveer’s (2002b) and Kwan and Lui’s (1999) studies will next be briefly 
presented and those studies which use the “comparison” approach will be analysed in 
more detail (a summary of the studies is given in Table 5.1). Even though in this 
chapter only the effect of CBA on inflation performance will be empirically 
analysed, this section assesses studies in which its effect on other macroeconomic 
variables was investigated as well.   
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Table 5.1: Summary of the empirical research of the currency board effect on inflation and growth 
 
Study 
Data and 
sample 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
The effect of 
CBA on 
dependent 
variable 
compared to 
other regimes† 
Controls Technique Endogeneity 
Robustness 
checking 
Ghosh et al. 
(1998) 
1970-1996, 
all IMF 
members 
Inflation [π/(1+π] 
†† 
     - ** 
money supply; openness; GDP growth,  Central 
bank governor turnover 
OLS 
Addressed 
through the  
simultaneous 
equation model 
No 
Kwan and 
Lui (1999) 
1973-1995, 
Hong 
Kong 
Inflation  
- 
 
 
structural 
vector 
autoregressi-
ve model 
Not addressed 
 
Output growth 
volatility 
-   
Anastassova 
(1999) 
1984-1997, 
22 
countries 
Inflation (CPI)        - *** money growth, openness 
Panel data 
analysis 
Not addressed 
No 
Nominal  interest 
rates 
       - *** money growth No 
Real interest rates   - * money growth No 
Growth per capita       + *** money growth, openness and inflation No 
Growth  + * 
The initial level of per capita income, relative to US, 
investment/GDP, human capital, terms of trade 
volatility, population growth, drought and war 
No 
Ghosh et al. 
(2000) 
1975-1996, 
all IMF 
members 
inflation [π/(1+π)]                 -*** 
the growth rate of money and output, openness, and 
annual dummies 
Panel data 
analysis 
Addressed  
through the  
simultaneous 
equation model 
No 
Per capita GDP 
growth 
+* compared to 
flexible ERR; 
+ **compared 
to other ERRs 
the investment/GDP ratio, a convergence term, trade 
openness, population growth, a dummy for droughts 
and annual dummies 
+ lagged values of GDP and money supply 
Yes - not 
robust 
Output volatility 
 
+ 
Convergence term, openness, drought, population 
growth, investment ratio volatility, a dummy for 
droughts 
No 
Export 
performance 
+ 
the investment/GDP ratio, a convergence term, trade 
openness, population growth, a dummy for droughts  
No 
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Table 5.1 (continuing): Summary of the empirical research of the currency board effect on inflation and growth 
 
Note: ***, **, * donates that variables are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
          † Different studies have different comparison group (s) 
         †† Ghost et al. call this measure of inflation “scaled inflation” and they note that this measure is introduced to check for the influence of hyperinflation outliers 
  
      
Study 
Data and 
sample 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
The effect of CBA 
on dependent 
variable compared 
to other regimes† 
Controls Technique Endogeneity 
Robustness 
checking 
Wolf et al. 
(2008) 
1972-2002, 
99 countries 
Inflation -*** 
Money supply growth, GDP growth, 
openness, CB turnover, terms of trade, fiscal 
balance 
Panel data 
analysis 
Addressed 
Yes - results 
robust  
Per capita real 
GDP growth 
 
- for lower income 
countries 
(insignificant for 
upper income 
countries) 
Investment ratio, openness, terms of trade, 
years of schooling, tax ratio, fiscal balance, 
convergence ratio, population growth, log 
(pop) 
Yes - results 
not robust  
Output 
volatility  
 
+*** for upper 
income countries, -
*** for ––––––lower 
income countries 
Investment volatility, openness, terms of 
trade volatility, schooling, government 
balance, population size 
No 
Export growth 
-* for lower income 
countries, + 
insignificant for 
upper income 
countries) 
Real exchange rate growth, lagged terms of 
trade, output growth 
Yes - results 
robust  
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Sepp and Randveer (2002b) conducted counterfactual simulations for estimating the 
effects of alternative monetary regimes on Estonia’s macroeconomic performance. 
As alternative regimes they consider combined exchange rate and monetary regimes: 
1) pegged exchange rate arrangement with inflation or output gap targeting; 2) 
floating exchange rate arrangement with inflation or output gap targeting and 3) 
floating exchange rate regime excluding any monetary policy target. Through 
simulations these authors examined how successful were different regimes in 
achieving their objectives and how volatile the key indicators were (output gap, 
inflation, interest rate and nominal exchange rate) under various combinations of 
monetary and exchange rate regimes. A comparison of the effect of shocks on the 
variability of the key macroeconomic indicators under different regimes suggested 
that the CBA outperforms all other regimes under every type of shock (at least as it 
functioned during the period under consideration).  Additionally, the authors argue 
“an exit from the CBA could, at least in the short-term, increase uncertainty in the 
market and also reduce policy transparency and discipline” (p.415). Therefore, the 
authors conclude that the CBA was still the best policy option. Kwan and Lui (1999) 
compared macroeconomic performance in Hong Kong before and during the 
operation of CBA. By using a structural vector autoregressive model they estimated 
that the volatility of inflation and output growth in Hong Kong was lower during the 
currency board period than under the free float regime. Based on simulations, they 
further concluded that demand shocks led to greater output volatility under CBA, 
while output was less sensitive to supply shocks under CBA compared to a free-
floating regime. However, Kwan and Lui (1999) warned that increased output 
stability was likely to be the result of Hong Kong’s increased fiscal discipline, 
though they failed to include a measure of fiscal discipline in their model.  
 
In the empirical studies using the “comparison” approach the effect of a CBA on 
inflation, growth and other macroeconomic variables is captured by inclusion of a 
dummy variable in an appropriate equation. Anastassova (1999) used panel data 
analysis of 22 countries for the period 1984-1997 and estimated the effect of CBA on 
inflation, GDP growth per capita and nominal and real interest rates. Anastassova 
(1999) divided the sample into three groups: the first consists of CBA countries, the 
second of countries with a similar-to-CBA regime and the third of countries with 
pegged ERR or crawling band. Beside addressing the possible difference in the effect 
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of a CBA and other pegged ERRs on macroeconomic indicators Anastassova also 
addressed the effect of “strong” and “weak” CBAs on macroeconomic indicators 
since the institutional arrangements of CBAs adopted in the 1990s differ significantly 
among themselves (this issue is addressed in Section 2.4). According to the results, 
the CBA countries have lower inflation, nominal and real interest rates and higher 
growth than do other pegged ERRs countries (and countries with regimes similar to 
CBA). When the CBA dummy is split between “strong” and “weak” CBAs the 
results indicate that “adopting strict institutional arrangements will have much 
stronger impact on the main economic variables” (p.19). However, there are some 
limitations in the analysis presented in this paper. First, it is not clear what the 
comparison group for the “strong” and “weak” CBA dummies is (all other countries 
from the sample, countries with regimes similar to CBA or other pegged ERRs). It is 
also likely that GDP growth is not just determined by exchange rate/monetary 
regime, openness of economy and money growth, but by other determinants as well 
which should be controlled for. For example, Ghosh et al. (1998) also included: 
human capital accumulation, the initial level of per capita income, terms of trade 
variability, population growth and indicators for cataclysmic events such as wars and 
droughts. Additionally, GDP in the base year in currency board countries is likely to 
be low relative to potential output (as the period observed is a period just after a 
CBA introduction which was in all these countries a period of recovery) which may 
be one explanation for the higher ‘growth’ in this group of countries. Furthermore, 
capital controls should also be considered, since countries with a similar ERR may 
have different impact on growth if they have different capital controls. Moreover, a 
control for some other variables in the inflation regression is suggested in the 
literature. Ghosh et al. (1998) included the degree of central bank independence, as 
well GDP growth and controls for global inflation shocks. A further important 
limitation is that the potential endogeneity of regime choice is not controlled for, 
since according to Ghosh et al. (1998, p.3) “countries with a greater proclivity 
towards low inflation may be more likely to adopt a currency board”. Moreover, the 
observed period after the adoption of CBA is quite short (being only a year for some 
countries, such as Bulgaria). Additionally, as noted in our literature review in 
Chapter 3, when estimating interest rates differentials differences in country  risks 
should be accounted for.  
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Although, as noted above, Ghosh et al. (1998) addressed some of the drawbacks of 
Anastassova’s (1999) study there are a few limitations emphasised by the authors. 
Firstly, they argued that “it is difficult to determine whether the observed differences 
in performance between existing currency board arrangements and other pegged 
exchange rate regimes result from the regime itself or from some peculiarity specific 
to the countries, since many of the currency board countries in the sample are small, 
island economies, subject to specific shocks, and with particular economic structures 
which makes their experience perhaps less relevant to other countries” (p. 18). 
However, these country’ specifics could have been controlled by including the 
country’s fixed effects or, at least, dummy variables for country-group effects (such 
as small island economies and EU member countries). Secondly, since CBAs are 
usually argued to adjust slowly to shocks the authors argue that “currency board 
arrangements may appear better for economic growth than they really are” if the 
sample, as here, does not include periods of economic disruptions (Ghosh et al., 
1998, p. 18). Indeed, their sample contains a relatively small number of CBA 
countries and only a short period after the introduction of most CBAs. Hence, a more 
satisfactory sample would include a period such as the recent financial crisis and a 
longer period under a CBA. Finally, these authors do not report model diagnostics. 
However, a similar group of authors made some improvements and additions in their 
later published paper Ghosh et al. (2000). Here, in the growth function the authors 
controlled for the potential endogeneity of GDP and the money supply by using their 
lagged values as instruments.. However, the results of both studies are similar and 
imply a negative effect of a CBA on inflation and a positive effect on growth, 
compared to other ERR. Since an introduction of a CBA is usually associated with a 
potential real appreciation, Ghosh et al. (2000) additionally estimated the effect of a 
CBA on export growth performance, but did not find a significant effect. Again, the 
short period observed after the CBA introduction puts constraints on a “fuller 
assessment, especially of the [unspecified] downsize risks” (p. 294). Diagnostics are 
not reported in any of assessed papers. Both Ghosh et al. (1998) and Ghosh et al. 
(2000) estimated all regressions for the full sample, and for upper and upper middle 
income and lower and lower middle income groups and compared the 
macroeconomic performance of CBA to other ERRs. The estimated effects of CBA 
on macroeconomic performance are similar across all groups. However, it is peculiar 
that some CBA countries in the sample are identified as belonging to the upper 
Chapter 5: Estimation of the Effect of CBAs on Inflation Performance 
176 
 
income group of countries. The authors do not specify which countries are included 
in this group and how many countries with a CBA are in this group. 
 
Wolf et al. (2008) conducted a similar, but more comprehensive, analysis to that 
undertaken by Ghosh et al. (2000). Their inflation equation is augmented by a 
‘central bank’s governor turnover’ variable, which is their proxy for the central 
bank’s independence, terms of trade shocks and fiscal balance. GDP growth, money 
growth rate and fiscal balance are instrumented by their lagged values to control for 
their potential endogeneity. The results again indicate that, on average, the CBA 
countries had lower inflation than countries with other pegged or flexible ERRs. 
Besides dividing the sample into upper and lower income countries, they also divided 
their sample into countries without current account restrictions, countries without 
capital account restrictions, low inflation observations, countries with a low turnover 
rate of central bank governor and very open economies. The same effect of CBA on 
inflation is observed across all subsamples, even among countries with low inflation, 
indicating that “the superior performance of currency boards is not a case of simple 
reverse causality” (p. 85). The results are robust after excluding the first few years 
following the adoption (to control for the potential “contamination”), inclusion of 
fixed effects and accounting for the possible endogeneity of the regime choice 
(addressed the same way as in the above studies). Additionally, Wolf et al. (2008) 
tested the success (defined as the ability to maintain inflation below its pre-
stabilisation period after three years) and durability (defined as the ability to maintain 
inflation below its initial post-stabilisation period after three years) of positive effects 
of CBA on inflation performance compared to other ERRs. They found that the 
levels of “success” and “durability” were considerably higher for CBA countries than 
countries with other ERRs. They also estimated that CBAs have been more 
successful in lowering inflation in countries that started with high inflation. 
Additional to the growth regression model estimated by Ghosh et al. (2000), Wolf et 
al. included the budget balance/GDP ratio and terms of trade shocks “to allow for 
shorter-term shocks” (p. 102), the average number of years of schooling of the 
population, population size as a scale variable and a proxy for the size of 
government, the tax/GDP ratio. However, the coefficients on the ERR variables are 
significant only for lower income countries. Their robustness checking consists of 
dropping the first three years following the adoption of a new ERRs to control for 
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“legacy effect across regimes” (p.103), including the level of a country’s income in 
the year prior to the adoption of a new ERR to control for the “rebound effect of 
countries having adopted boards during a period of macroeconomic turbulence” 
(p.150), including country fixed effects and controlling for simultaneity bias. 
However, the first two inclusions passed the robustness checking, while the results 
after including fixed effects and controlling for simultaneity bias are economically 
small and statistically insignificant. Wolf et al. also estimated the effect of ERRs on 
output volatility (measured as a centred, three-year standard deviation of the log of 
real GDP relative to its Hodrick-Prescott trend). It is expected that the relation 
between CBA and output volatility will be positive since under a CBA the central 
bank cannot mitigate the effect of shocks. Consistent with this classic Mundell-
Fleming prediction, the authors found that “among upper-income countries — where 
nominal wages are more likely to be sticky — countries with currency boards indeed 
experienced more volatile output. Conversely, in lower-income countries, where 
labor markets tend to be more informal, nominal wages are less downwardly rigid, 
and policy itself may be a significant source of shocks, currency boards are not 
associated with greater volatility” (p.115). However, robustness checks were not 
conducted for this regression and diagnostic tests are not reported for any empirical 
analysis. Finally, since there is a common concern that the real exchange rate will 
appreciate in CBA countries56 and consequently export performance be undermined, 
these authors also estimated the effect of a CBA (compared to other ERRs) on export 
performance. For upper-income countries, the regime does not seem to be robustly 
related to export performance, while lower-income countries with currency boards or 
other pegged regimes experienced weaker export growth performance57 (p.115).  
 
All the above studies divided countries into three groups according to their exchange 
rate regime, with one group being the group of countries with a CBA. They 
estimated the effect of a CBA by including dummy variables for two groups of 
                                                                
56 The authors emphasise two reason for this concern: “First, currency boards have often been adopted 
in the midst of high or hyperinflations, periods in which the real exchange rate is typically grossly 
undervalued, providing considerable room for a post-stabilization appreciation. Second, the growth 
and productivity recovery may itself raise the equilibrium real exchange rate, again providing some 
room for an appreciation without serious adverse effects on competitiveness” (p. 133). 
57 These results apply both before and after controlling for the possibility of the “bounce-back” effect 
which represents the possibility that exports might be undermined in CBA countries in times of 
economic crisis, by augmenting the regression with the export-to-GDP ratio relative to its predicted 
value based on a standard cross-country openness regression. 
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exchange rate regimes while omitting the third one. However, none of these 
explained what type of classification they used for allocating the countries (exchange 
rate regimes) into specific group. Moreover, none of the above studies control for 
differences in monetary policy regimes (e.g. inflation targeting) which may affect 
macroeconomic performance, additional to the ERR. Moreover, they treat a CBA 
only as an ERR. Although it is defined as an ERR in the IMF classification it is 
usually stated that a CBA is a monetary regime as well, and therefore it might be 
useful to compare it with other monetary regimes beside treating it only as ERR (this 
issue is discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.1). The approach utilised in the 
research programme reported in this thesis is superior as inclusion of an only CBA 
variable (instead of a full set of different ER regimes variables) simplifies the model, 
saves degrees of freedom and avoids the need to choose between ERR 
classifications, all of which have some limitations (as discussed in Section 2.2.5). 
Finally, none of the above studies control for potential inflation hysteresis by using a 
dynamic estimator(s) and none of the studies report diagnostic tests, which 
undermined the reliability of their results. Moreover, these studies examine both 
developed and developing countries together and it has been argued that developing 
countries (especially those going through a transition process) have specific features 
and should therefore be examined separately from developed countries. This point is 
elaborated in more details in the next section where the main characteristics of 
transition countries, which will be focus of our empirical analyses, are analysed. 
 
5.3 Characteristics of selected transition countries 
 
5.3.1 Choice of sample and sample specifics  
 
To estimate the effect of a CBA on macroeconomic performance (in this Chapter and 
Section 6.2 of the next chapter) panel data from a sample comprising 25 transition 
countries from the Central, South-Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union for the 
period 1998-2009 is used. The main reason for not including the period prior 1998 is 
a data constraint. However, the first years of transition (at the beginning of 1990s) 
were very volatile in terms of trends in the major macroeconomic variables and, if 
included, might have biased the estimates. Since Serbia and Montenegro separated in 
2006 there is a lack of data for Montenegro and therefore it is excluded from the 
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sample. Moreover, due to a lack of data Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also 
excluded from the sample. Since data on the EBRD indicator for Czech Republic for 
the years 2008 and 2009 is missing58 and data on the general government balance for 
Serbia in 1998 and 1999 and on openness for Hungary and Lithuania for 2009 are 
missing, the panel is unbalanced. Data for all countries and all years for certain 
variables are not always available from the same source. For most of the countries 
the data used are those from international databases, such as the IMF’s and the World 
Bank’s databases, but for some countries national statistics had to be consulted. Data 
sources for the variables used in each regression will be discussed and analysed 
within the appropriate sub-sections.  
 
Some authors emphasise that transition (and developing) countries should be treated 
separately from developed countries since they have specific features (such as lack of 
policy makers’ credibility, limited access to international markets, high default risk, 
weak and underdeveloped institutions) and are going through the process of 
transition towards a market-oriented economy, which is likely to affect 
macroeconomic variables significantly (Domac et al., 2004; Barlow, 2010; Frankel, 
2010). Moreover, most of the counties in this sample changed their monetary and/or 
ERRs as a part of the transition process (Domac et al., 2004). Typically a CBA was 
introduced as a means of establishing stability, which was disturbed at the beginning 
of the transition process in all countries. Therefore, it is important to estimate the 
difference that those different regimes had on macroeconomic performance. 
Moreover, when estimating this effect it is important to control for the effect of 
progress in transition, since that process is characterised by liberalisation, 
privatisation and tighter monetary and fiscal policies, which are likely to influence 
macroeconomic performance. Barlow (2010) controls for this by using the EBRD 
transition indices for liberalisation, privatisation and credit reform. Since our focus is 
not on the effect of the progress of transition on macroeconomic performance and in 
order to save degrees of freedom, the aggregate transition indicator which reflects the 
general progress made in transition is used. It is calculated as an average of eight 
transition indicators related to liberalisation, privatisation and credit reform reported 
in the EBRD transition reports. These indicators are available for the whole sample 
except for the Czech Republic for 2008 and 2009. Furthermore, macroeconomic 
                                                                
58 EBRD Transition Reports do not include the Czech Republic after 2008.  
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performance is likely to be affected by the EU accession process of some countries in 
this sample, first informally (through stabilisation programmes before EU accession) 
and then formally (through an endeavour to fulfil the Maastricht criteria after EU 
accession, before EMU accession). According to their EU orientation the countries 
from the sample might be divided into two groups: Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), which are not EU oriented, and EU oriented countries: Central-Eastern 
Europe and Baltic countries (CEB) and South-Eastern European countries (SEE). 
Nine countries from the second group are already EU members, four of them EMU 
members (Slovenia, from 2007, Slovakia, from 2009, Estonia from 2011 and Latvia 
from 2014), while other countries from this group are heading towards accession. 
Furthermore, BH (from 1997), Bulgaria (from 1997), Estonia (from 1992 until EMU 
accession), and Lithuania (switched from the dollar peg to the euro in 2002) pegged 
their currencies to the euro through a CBA, while Latvia (since 2005 until EMU 
accession) and Macedonia (since 1997) fixed their currencies against the euro. This 
convergence towards the EU/EMU may lower the effect of monetary-ERRs on 
macroeconomic performance, since countries in the process of accession endeavour 
to converge towards the economic trends in EU countries. Since, after the EU 
accession, countries are highly influenced by EU trends, this convergence process 
should be controlled for.  
 
5.3.2 Major trends in selected transition countries 
 
Economic reform in transition countries has been achieved through stabilisation, 
liberalisation and privatisation processes (Barlow, 2010). Although the transition 
process in all countries started at the beginning of the 1990s, it did not progress at the 
same pace in all countries. Moreover, different countries had different pre-transition 
conditions and therefore their progress in transition would have been expected to 
differ. Therefore, countries are typically divided into three groups, as noted in the 
previous section, following the grouping suggested in the EBRD transition reports. 
The first group consists of CEB countries, which includes the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The second 
group is SEE countries, which includes: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia. The third group is the group of CIS 
countries which includes: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
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Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine59. According to the overall 
EBRD index (which accounts for the progress in liberalisation, privatisation and 
credit reform) the greatest progress was accomplished by the first group of countries, 
which might be argued to be result of EU accession since all countries from this 
group entered the EU in 2004. Countries from the SEE group are argued to have 
made quite good progress, but are still below the levels of CEB countries, while the 
CIS countries progressed at the slowest pace (see Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1: Regional patterns of progress in transition (according to the EBRD 
aggregate index) for CEB, SEE and CIS countries 
 
 
Source: Based upon the various issues of EBRD transition reports 
 
Beside the liberalisation, privatisation and credit reforms captured by the EBRD 
index, the reform process also included institutional changes, most notably central 
bank independence; experiments with intermediate targets such as exchange rate 
anchors and monetary targeting; and more recently inflation targeting (Barlow, 
2010). By observing Cukierman’s index for central bank independence (CCBI), 
similar trends to those of the EBRD index between country groups can be observed 
(see Figure 5.2). However, data for CIS countries is not reliable since it includes the 
index for only two countries (Moldova and Ukraine) as data is not available for the 
rest of the countries in this group60.   
 
                                                                
59 Only countries which are included in our sample are noted here. 
60 The Cukierman's central bank independence index (CCBI) is updated for all countries in the sample 
except for eight CIS countries by Bogoev et al. (2012). We did not update the index for missing 
obervations since it is not our main focus of research and none of the countries for which the index is 
not calculated/updated implemented a CBA.   
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Figure 5.2: Average Cukierman’s central bank independence index (updated) for 
CEB, SEE and CIS countries 
 
 
Source: Based upon the updated Cukierman’s index calculated by Bogoev et al. (2012) 
 
During the first years of the transition process most of the transition countries 
experienced negative macroeconomic trends, namely, low growth rates and high 
inflation rates. Through their stabilisation programmes most of the countries 
succeeded in successfully reversing these negative macroeconomic trends by the 
middle 1990s. As observed in Figure 5.3, at the beginning of the observed period all 
groups of countries had positive growth rates which were increasing until the end of 
2007 when they started falling sharply, even being negative in late 2008 and in 2009, 
due to financial crisis which “hit” all countries in the sample. The highest growth 
rates can be observed in the CIS countries, possibly due to their initial growth being 
low relative to the CEB and SEE countries (Figure 5.4).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
C
B
I i
n
d
e
x 
Year
CEB
SEE
CIS
Chapter 5: Estimation of the Effect of CBAs on Inflation Performance 
183 
 
Figure 5.3: Real GDP growth (in percentage changes) in CEB, SEE and CIS counties 
 
Source: Based upon the World Bank Indicator database  
 
Figure 5.4: Real GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) in CEB, SEE and CIS 
countries prior to the sample period (1990-1998) 
 
 
Source: Based upon the World Bank Indicator database  
 
Most of the countries also experienced high inflation rates at the beginning of the 
transition process. Most of the transition countries managed to lower their inflation 
rates by the middle 1990s.This period is not included in the sample. However, it may 
be observed that there were some high inflation rates in the late 1990s in the CIS 
countries, which are likely to be the result of the Russian financial crisis in 1998. The 
high average inflation rate for CIS countries in the 1999 was mainly driven by the 
extremely high inflation rates in Belarus (293%) and Russia (85%). The inflation 
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shock in 2001 in SEE countries was mainly driven by the high inflation rate in Serbia 
(95%) which is likely to be the result of the Kosovo war in 1998-1999. However, the 
inflation rates stabilised after 2003 in most of the transition countries. Inflation rates 
increased in late 2007 as a result of the financial crisis, but returned to their pre-crisis 
levels at the beginning of 2009. For a comparison of inflation rates between CEB, 
SEE and CIS countries see Figure 5.5.    
 
Figure 5.5: Inflation rates (measured as percentage changes in consumer price index) 
in CEB, SEE and CIS countries  
 
 
Source: Based upon the World Bank Indicator database  
 
As noted above, some of the transition countries adopted stricter monetary and ERR 
regimes during the first years of transition, such as a CBA, as a part of their 
stabilisation programmes (Inoue, 2005). Some authors (Domac et al., 2004; Botrić 
and Cota, 2006) argued that these regimes played an important role in stabilising 
macroeconomic performance.  
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5.4 Estimation of the effect of CBA on inflation 
 
5.4.1 Inflation determinants  
 
At the beginning of the transition process all countries from the sample experienced 
periods of high inflation. However, the inflation rates decreased significantly over 
time in all countries in the sample (Figure 5.5). As noted earlier, some of the 
countries switched from one regime to another during the first years of transition as a 
part of their stabilisation process. The aim of this chapter is to estimate whether the 
countries which adopted a CBA in the early stage of transition had better inflation 
performances than countries with other monetary-ER regimes. In this section the 
potential determinants of the inflation performance in transition countries will be 
identified and assessed.  
 
The actual and anticipated behaviour of the monetary authorities plays a crucial role 
in modern theories of inflation Under more discretionary policy there is a higher 
possibility of time-inconsistency which affects inflationary expectations and 
therefore inflation is expected to be higher. Under rule-based monetary policy, and a 
CBA is one of the most rigid rule-based policies, the time-inconsistency problem is 
reduced significantly. Wolf et al (2008) noted that the inflation rate is determined by 
the rate of money growth (Δm) and any monetary shock: 
 
π = Δm + νπe + ε                 (5.1) 
 
where ε has mean zero, has variance 𝜎𝜀
2, and ν is the elasticity of the growth of 
velocity with respect to expected inflation, reflecting forward-looking elements in 
household money demand and 𝜋𝑒   is the private sector’s expectations of the inflation 
rate. 
Under a CBA (and other fixed exchange rate regimes) domestic monetary policy 
cannot affect either inflation or the level of output and the central bank has no ability 
to expand the money supply.  Starting from the formal models which are based on 
the assumption of rational expectations, inflationary expectations would be 
eliminated under such a regime and inflation (π) equal the anchor-currency country’s 
inflation rate (π*) (Wolf et al., 2008, p.35) 
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π = π*                                                                                                                      (5.2)   
 
Under a floating exchange rate regime inflation is expected to be higher since the 
central bank can pursue an activist monetary policy and create surprise inflation and 
therefore inflationary expectations are higher. Therefore, the inflation rate will be: 
 
π = 
−𝐴𝜃𝜂+ 𝐴𝜃𝑦+ 𝐴𝜃2(1−𝜈)𝜋𝑒−𝜈𝜋𝑒 
1+ 𝐴𝜃
                                                                                        (5.3) 
 
where, y is the log of output, θ is a positive constant, A is the marginal benefit from 
the surprise inflation from any source and η is a random productivity shock. As noted 
in Wolf et al. (2008, p.35): “Actual inflation is increasing in the central bank’s 
incentive to create surprise inflation, A?̅? > 0 (?̅? is desired level of output), and in the 
private sector’s expectation of inflation, 𝜋𝑒 . Under rational expectations, the latter is 
given by the mathematical expectation of actual inflation.  
 
𝜋𝑒  = Aθ?̅? > 0                                                                                                           (5.4) 
 
In particular this implies that the central bank cannot systematically surprise the 
private sector” (p.36). However, in Wolf et al. (2008) the banking system is ignored 
and therefore another source of money supply growth is ignored. If we observe 
broader money supply inflation can still be induced under any regime through the 
credit multiplication process and a high pressure of demand induced by a rise in 
output growth, which is not followed by a rise in productivity. Therefore, we will 
start with the baseline model in which inflation (INF) is determined by the broad 
money supply growth (MSG) and GDP growth (GDPG). 
 
lnINF = MSG + GDPG                                                                                        (5.5)
  
In determining the inflation regression we start from this baseline model to which 
variables of interest and control variables, which are likely to influence inflation in 
transition countries, are added. For the inflation variable the logarithm of the 
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percentage changes in consumer price index61 (logs are used in order to reduce the 
effect of outliers) are used (this approach was also applied by Staehr, 2003 and 
Barlow, 2006). As suggested by monetary theory, a higher growth in money supply is 
likely to increase inflation, holding other factors constant. The positive effect of 
money supply growth on inflation is found in many studies (Wolf et al., 2008; Ghosh 
et al., 2011). In developing countries money supply growth and inflation might be 
considered endogenous, since higher nominal price of goods and services increases 
money demand which may put pressure on the authorities to increase money supply 
(Sargent and Wallace, 1981). This is not likely to be the case in many transition 
countries, which established more independent central banks during the first years of 
the stabilisation process (Figure 5.2). Moreover, since we are using the broadest 
monetary aggregate, the increase in money demand is likely to result in increases in 
broad money supply, even when the central bank is not increasing the monetary base 
(so called endogenous money supply), through the credit multiplication process. 
Since there is usually a time gap until the old situation adjusts to the new one and 
since consumer prices are argued to be sticky, the effect of money supply growth on 
inflation is likely to be lagged. The usually emphasised reasons are: inventories, 
forward and future contracts, the time needed for firms to notice higher costs and the 
time needed for firms to change their prices. Moreover, in order not to lose 
customers, firms may not change prices until they are sure that increase in costs is 
not temporary. This lag is usually argued to be 1-2 years,62 although it is likely to be 
different in different countries depending on the level of development of country, 
monetary regime, type of dominant transmission mechanism, (changes in) money 
velocity and the degree of product market competition. The inclusion of lagged 
money supply growth is likely to resolve the potential endogeneity between money 
supply growth and inflation. Moreover, since we are using the growth of the broadest 
monetary aggregate as the measure of money supply growth (which is determined 
not only by monetary authority actions, but by the financial sector as well) there is no 
need for including longer lags of money supply growth in order to avoid 
endogeneity. 
                                                                
61 Since 8 observations have negative inflation values in order to calculate logs these are dropped out 
from the sample.  
62 Chen (2009) emphasised Friedman’s findings that approximately 6 - 9 months is needed for 
changes in monetary supply to change nominal national income and output, and a further 6 - 9 months 
for changes in nominal national income and output to affect prices. So the time lag is about one or one 
and a half years from the changes of monetary supply to the changes of price. 
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On the other hand, real GDP growth is expected to be negatively correlated with 
inflation, ceteris paribus, since faster output growth should raise money demand and 
consequently decrease inflation for a given expansion of money supply (Wolf et al., 
2008). However, in some studies it is argued that this relationship holds only in 
countries with pegged ERR, since in countries with flexible ERRs output growth is 
likely to affect the exchange rate rather than inflation (Abbott and De Vita, 2011). 
The difference between the effect of a CBA, which is the variable of interest, and 
other regimes on inflation is estimated by using a dummy variable for the CBA. The 
expected effect of CBA on inflation is appraised in Section 5.2 in comparison to 
other exchange rate regimes. As explained in Section 2.2.5, we may assume that a 
CBA variable is capturing a “broader” effect (not just the effect of the ERR). 
Therefore, we expect that CBA countries had lower inflation than countries with 
other monetary-ER regimes. By including only a CBA variable we may argue that 
the endogeneity problem between the choice of ERR and inflation, which is usually 
emphasised in the studies, is likely to be avoided. Namely, simultaneity between a 
CBA and inflation may occur since it is argued that “countries with a greater 
proclivity towards low inflation may be more likely to adopt a currency board” 
(Ghosh et al., 1998, p.3, emphasis added). Therefore, periods of high inflation might 
explain the origins of a CBA, but not its maintenance. Since the sample period does 
not include a period before CBA introduction in any of our observed countries, we 
may argue that simultaneity is not likely to be an issue, since the maintenance (and 
the abandonment) of a CBA is an institutional and political matter rather than 
determined by a countries’ inflation aversion. To determine the model specification 
and additional variables which should be included, recent studies that examine the 
effect of ERRs on inflation and studies which examine the sources of inflation in 
transition countries are next consulted.  
 
Beside the growth of money supply and output growth, the control variables usually 
included in inflation models are: fiscal balance, openness and terms of trade. A 
higher fiscal deficit is usually argued to increase inflation in developing countries, 
since in these countries a fiscal deficit is usually financed by an increase in the 
money supply growth (seigniorage) (Lozano, 2008). However, after early transition a 
monetisation of fiscal deficit was less likely to occur, since countries increased 
central bank independence and had more developed financial markets (Catao and 
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Torrones, 2001; Henry et al., 2004). However, a fiscal deficit may influence inflation 
through other channels. Specifically, if government increases its net expenditures 
significantly aggregate demand is likely to increase therefore putting upward 
pressure on prices (since it is not likely that the aggregate supply will increase to the 
same extent, as least not in the short-run) (Samimi, 2000). If we expect that the effect 
of a fiscal deficit on inflation will not be through monetisation of the deficit then the 
potential endogeneity, which is usually argued to exist between fiscal deficit and 
inflation, is not an issue. Empirical evidence is inconclusive; some studies indicated 
a positive relationship between fiscal deficit and inflation in developing countries 
(Catao and Terrones, 2001; Lozano, 2008), while others did not find any significant 
relationship (De Haan and Dick, 1990; Mukhtar and Zakaria, 2010). Since we use the 
fiscal balance (in percentages of GDP) (FB) as a measure, if there is a significant 
effect, we expect it to be negative, since a fiscal surplus in the context explained 
above is likely to reduce inflation. A measure of the openness (OPEN) of an 
economy is usually included in the inflation regression “to control for the potential 
disciplinary effect elicited by international arbitrage” (Levy-Yeyati and Stuzengger, 
2001, p.8). Studies which include this variable as a control (Levy-Yeyati and 
Stuzengger, 2001; Wolf et al., 2008; Ghosh et al., 2011) suggest that the expected 
effect of openness on inflation is negative. These studies refer to Romer (1993) in 
their explanation of an expected negative effect. Romer (1993) explained this 
relationship through the commitment mechanism (and time-inconsistency problem) 
as a main channel through which openness influences inflation. He argued that 
higher openness leads to lower inflation since the inflation costs of the “surprise” 
monetary expansion are higher (and output gains lower) when a country is more 
open, assuming a floating ERR. As Romer (1993, p. 1) further explained: “because 
unanticipated monetary expansion causes real exchange rate depreciation, and 
because the harms of real depreciation are greater in more open economies, the 
benefits of surprise expansion are a decreasing function of the degree of openness.” 
Romer (1993) also emphasised that the effect of openness on inflation is likely to be 
lower when central bank independence is high. Daniels et al. (2005) demonstrated 
that once one controls for the degree of central bank independence, a positive 
relationship between openness and inflation emerges. However, studies which deal 
with issue of openness and inflation causation in more detail note that this link is 
highly dependent on particular country circumstances and channels through which 
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the openness affects inflation. According to the new growth theory, the channel 
through which openness may influence inflation is not through affecting the 
incentive for money expansion but through its “positive influence on output, mainly 
through increased efficiency, better allocation of resources, improved capacity 
utilization, and increased foreign investment” (Jin, 2000). The effect of openness on 
inflation is not likely to occur through a commitment mechanism channel, since most 
of the countries from the sample already established a high level of independence of 
their monetary institutions by the beginning of the observed period. However, if 
inflation is affected by openness in these countries is it likely to be through the 
channel emphasised by Jin (2000).  
 
Fisher (1993) argued that the changes in terms of trade (TOT) are a major source of 
supply shocks for most developing countries. The commonly used measure for the 
terms of trade is a ratio of the export unit value index to the import unit value index. 
Accordingly, it is argued that when a country’s terms of trade are improving 
(increasing) a country can afford more imports for the exported value, due to 
increase in earnings from the exports, which may be the result of an increase of 
export prices and/or increase of export quantity, and/or decrease of import prices 
relative to export prices. These improvements are likely to increase import quantity 
(of relatively cheaper import goods), which is considered as a supply-shock, and 
consequently lead to a decrease in inflation, in the short-run. However, the TOT 
might have a quite different implications for inflation under a wide range of 
circumstances, depending on the type of the exchange rate regime, prices within the 
TOT measure that are changing and whether the changes are seen to be temporary or 
long-lasting (Archer, 1993). Archer (1993) and Gruen and Dwyer (1996) argued that  
changes in TOT are expected to affect inflation in the short run, since over the long --
run inflation is determined by the stance of domestic monetary policy. Archer (1993) 
argued that the relative price changes will not affect inflation if the effect is of a one-
off nature since inflation is an ongoing process, involving a generalized movement of 
all prices in the same direction and changes in prices and production are costly. 
Therefore, the changes in international trade prices will not spill over on to the 
domestic prices and production if the change is expected to be temporary. However, 
the TOT changes may affect inflation if the effect is permanent and when these 
changes are not expected to be reversed in the short period. Gruen and Dwyer (1996) 
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and Desormeaux et al. (2009) argued that the main channel through which changes in 
TOT affect inflation is the exchange rate response and that the effect of TOT will 
depend on the exchange rate regime which is in use in a particular country. They 
argued that under a fixed ERR, the changes in TOT will have higher influence on 
inflation than under a flexible ERR since the changes in TOT might be offset by 
changes in the real exchange rate under a flexible ERR. Under fixed ERRs the rise in 
TOT will increase the real purchasing power of domestic production which is likely 
to have a positive effect on income, investment, consumption and production and 
consequently inflation (Archer, 1993; Gruen and Dwyer, 1996; Cunningham, 2010). 
This is the indirect effect of an increase in TOT on inflation. However, Desormeaux 
et al. (2009) argued that this link is getting weaker over time due to increased 
diversification of the export base, enhanced macroeconomic framework, as well as a 
floating exchange rate regime that usually bears the burden of the adjustment to 
changes in external conditions. However, if a country is predominantly a price taker 
rather than a price setter, which is the case for most countries in our sample in both 
export and import markets, it may be argued that changes in the TOT result virtually 
entirely from international developments (Archer, 1993). Moreover, as most 
countries from the sample are small, open economies (with a few exceptions) their 
price levels are strongly influenced by import prices. Sepp and Randveer (2002b, 
p.377) argued that in small, open economies import prices are “predominantly 
relevant in domestic price formation”. Therefore, improvements in TOT are usually 
the result of a decrease in the prices of imported goods, which is consequently 
expected to lower domestic inflation.  
 
Empirical studies which examine the inflation determinants in transition countries 
emphasise the importance of accounting for the effects of economic liberalisation, 
central bank independence and other institutional characteristics (Cukierman et al., 
2002; Inoue, 2005; Barlow, 2010). In transition economies, there are many structural 
and institutional changes, which are expected to influence the inflation generating 
process. To account for these changes transition indicators are included in the model. 
Although they have some limitations (see Chapter 1) the EBRD indices, as the most 
widely used transition indices, are used. The aggregate EBRD index (EBRDI) 
indicates the overall progress in transition, assigning scores from 1 (which indicates 
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little or no progress) to 4 (for the highest progress)63. Better progress in transition 
should result in lower inflation due to trade liberalisation (through increase in 
competition), privatisation (through increase in enterprises efficiency) and credit 
reforms (through the increase in monetary policy efficacy via raising the 
effectiveness of credit allocation) which are included in the aggregate EBRD index 
(Barlow, 2010). 
 
An increase in a central bank’s independence (CBI) is also argued to be a 
characteristic of the transition process and to influence inflation (Frankel, 2010). 
Therefore it is also important to perceive if and how the changes in the institutional 
and legal framework of monetary authority affect inflation. As elaborated in Section 
2.2.5, in the case of a CBA the choice of monetary and ERR are jointly determined, 
since beside the commitment to keep the domestic currency fixed to the anchor 
currency, a CBA sets rules which restrain the discretion of the monetary authority. 
Therefore a CBA variable is capturing all the features associated with that particular 
regime, not just the type of the exchange rate (such as the inability to finance 
government, full coverage of monetary base and inability of the central bank to act as 
a lender of last resort). Some of these features are also assessed within a central bank 
independence (CBI) index, which is usually argued to influence inflation in transition 
countries (Maliszewski, 2000; Cukierman et al., 2002). Cukierman’s CBI index 
(CCBI), which is usually used in similar studies, is constructed for every country by 
assigning points on certain features/questions which are assumed to affect central 
bank independence (such as “Who appoints the Governor?“, “Limits on the level of 
CB credit to government“ and “Provisions for dismissal of the CB governor“) and by 
assigning certain weights to these features. Since this assessment is based on 
provisions in central bank laws (and CBA laws in countries with a CBA) it may be 
argued that the CBA variable is capturing the features assessed in the CCBI. 
However, although monetary policy is rule-bound under a CBA that does not 
necessarily mean that all CBA countries have a high CCBI index. For example, 
Lithuania had 0.78 CCBI from 1998 until 2000, which is lower than the CCBI index 
for some countries with more flexible ER-monetary regimes (e.g. Poland).  
                                                                
63 „In 1995 an additional category of 4* was added for equating policies and performance standards 
with those of an advanced industrial economy, and in 1997 pluses and minuses were introduced to 
allow for finer distinctions among the different categories (with 4* redefined as 4+)“ (EBRD, 2010, 
p.2). 
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We may argue that the level of central bank independence is related to the 
“strictness” of a CBA. Namely, by observing the CCBI indices in the CBA countries 
it can be noted that it is the highest in the country which had the strictest CBA 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina), while the country with the lowest level of CCBI index 
(Lithuania) had a more flexible CBA (the one which deviates most from the orthodox 
rules)64 (for more details on deviations from orthodox rules see Chapter 2). The 
“strictness” of a CBA can be observed through the pre-commitment index calculated 
by Camilleri65 (2002 and 2004) which controls for deviations of modern CBAs from 
the theoretical benchmark (for more details about the composition of this index see 
Section 2.4). This index partially overlaps with the Cukierman’s CBI index. It is also 
the highest for the country with the most rigid CBA (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and 
the lowest in the country which has the most flexible CBA (which is again 
Lithuania).  
 
Since an increase in central bank’s independence is associated with a decrease in the 
time-inconsistency problem it is expected to lower inflationary expectations and 
therefore to decrease inflation. This relationship is found in many studies (Grilli et 
al., 1991; Cukierman et al., 1992; Panagiotidis and Triampella, 2006, as cited in 
Bogoev et al., 2012). What is also of particular interest is how to measure the level of 
CBI. In this respect there are a few indices calculated which mainly assess the level 
of autonomy of central banks in determining monetary policy. The most widely used 
indices in the empirical studies are those designed by Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1991) and Cukierman et al. (2002) which consider a broad variety of legal 
provisions  assumed to contribute to CBI (as cited in Bogoev et al., 2012). The 
weighted Cukierman’s indices used in this Chapter are updated from the original 
Cukierman indices, which are considered to be the most comprehensive (Bogoev et 
al., 2012). The issue recognised by most of the recent studies is that the relationship 
between inflation and CBI is likely to be endogenous, since countries with a higher 
CBI are expected to have lower inflation but, on the other hand, the low inflation 
countries are likely to adopt more independent central banks, causing an inverse 
                                                                
64 Central bank independence indices calculated as impliedby Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. 
(1992) suggest that central bank independence in CBA countries is not necessarily (very) high: BH 
(0.979), Bulgaria (0.859), Estonia (1998–2001: 0.78; 2002–2004: 0.88; 2005-2009: 0.907) and 
Lithuania (1998-2000:0.78; 2001-2009:0.912). 
65 Camilleri pre-commitment index differs between CBA countries and suggests that CBAs differ 
institutionally: 0.93 for BH; 0.62 for Bulgaria; 0.86 for Estonia; 0.39 for Lithuania. 
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relationship between inflation and CBI. Most studies avoided this potential 
endogeneity by including a lagged CBI variable (Maliszewsky, 2000; Cukierman et 
al., 2002; Eijffinger and Stadhouders, 2003, as cited in Bogoev et al., 2012). 
Inclusion of a lagged CBI measure is also justified on theoretical grounds, since there 
is a time lag between the dates when the central bank law has been imposed and 
when it is actually implemented in practice. Therefore, we also include this variable 
lagged one period. However, this variable is assumed to be capturing the level of the 
central bank’s credibility and therefore may lower the influence of a CBA on 
inflation, which is also thought to be capturing this effect. The same applies to the 
dummy variable for fixed exchange rate. By including the ‘defactoFIX’ variable, 
which refers to an actual (de facto) fixed exchange rate, we will observe whether the 
effect of a CBA on inflation is the result of fixed exchange rates in those countries or 
whether a CBA reduces inflation over and above the effect of the fixed exchange 
rate. Therefore, we used Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) exchange rate 
classification (IRR) which is based on actual variations in the exchange rate. This 
variable includes the CBA countries, except Lithuania for the period 2002-2009, 
since the IRR classification classifies the Lithuanian ERR as limited-flexible in this 
period. Inflation in the EU member countries is likely to be influenced by the 
inflation in the Euro-zone due to the convergence process. In order to capture this 
effect (for the Euro-oriented countries in the sample) a dummy variable for EU 
membership (EU) is included in the model.  
 
One more potential determinant of short-run increases in inflation in transition 
countries might be the introduction of value-added tax (VAT), which occurred in 
most of the countries in the sample during the early stages of transition66. Bird (2005) 
argued that the introduction of VAT is one of the most important fiscal issues in 
transition and developing countries. Bye et al. (2003, p.13) noted that “the general 
VAT reform increases the share of indirect taxation in the consumer prices, and the 
aggregate price index of material consumption rises”. A general result of all analyses 
conducted by Viren (2009) is that more than one half of a tax increase shifts to 
                                                                
66 VAT was introduced in Russia and ex-Soviet Union countries in 1992, after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. In most of the Central Europen countries it was introduced in the early 90's (Czech 
Republic 1993, Slovak Republik 1993, Poland, 1993) and in South Easter European countries in the 
late 90's, early 2000 (Croatia in 1998, Slovenia in 1999, Macedonia in 2000, Montenegro in 2003, 
Serbia in 2005 and BH in 2006).  
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consumer prices. However, it is sometimes argued that VAT is not inflationary. Tait 
(1991) conducted the empirical analysis about the effect of VAT on inflation for 
forty countries and did not find evidence of causality for thirty three countries. Sarili 
(2000) did not find a significant relationship between introduction of a VAT and 
inflation in Turkey. None of the studies reviewed in Section 5.2 control for this 
effect. However, since it is believed that the introduction of VAT affected inflation in 
transition countries a dummy variable which indicates the year of VAT introduction 
is included in the model. Finally, year dummies are included to control for shocks 
that are common for all countries such as an increase in oil price or a financial crisis. 
This control is usually included in previous studies and all the studies reviewed in 
Section 5.2 include this control. Annual data for all variables is used. All the above 
specified variables with their measures, labels, and expected signs are presented in 
Table 5.2 below.  
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Table 5.2: Inflation regression variables – label, description, expected sign and data source 
 
Variable name Label Description  
Expected 
sign 
Data 
source 
Notes 
Inflation  lnINF 
Natural log of inflation (which is measured as 
annual percentage change in consumer price 
index   
 
Dependent 
variable 
WDI 
For BH national statistics is used; 
inflation in BH is measured by using 
the retail price index until 2007 
 
Since 8 observations have negative 
inflation values in order to calculate 
logs these are dropped out from the 
sample. 
Countries with 
currency board 
arrangement 
CBA Dummy variable for countries with a CBA -   
Real GDP  growth GDPG 
Based on the market prices expressed in 
constant local currency (annual % change)  
- WDI  
Broad money supply 
growth 
(L1)MSG 
The first lag of the broad money supply 
growth which is the sum of currency outside 
banks; demand deposits other than those of the 
central government; the time, savings, and 
foreign currency deposits of resident sectors 
other than the central government; bank and 
traveller’s checks; and other securities such as 
certificates of deposit and commercial paper 
(annual % change) 
+ WDI 
Data on broad money for Slovenia 
taken from various EBRD transition 
reports  
Fiscal balance/GDP  FB Fiscal balance in % of  GDP 
- 
 
EBRD  
Data for Moldova taken from various 
EBRD transition reports and EconStat 
Openness OPEN 
The sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product (% of GDP)  
- WDI  
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Table 5.2 (continuing): Inflation regression variables – label, description, expected sign and data source 
  
Variable name Label Description  
Expected 
sign 
Data source Notes 
Terms of trade TOT 
Ratio of the export unit value index to the 
import unit value index (base year 2000) 
? 
UNCTAD 
STAT 
Data not available for years 1998 and 
1999 and data for Serbia is joint with 
data for Montenegro, therefore data 
for 2008 and 2009 missing for this 
county 
EBRD progress in 
transition indicator 
EBRDI 
Average of eight EBRD transition indicators 
(for liberalisation, privatisation and credit 
reform) (index) 
- EBRD 
Available for all countries in the 
sample except for the Czech Republic 
in years 2008 and 2009, as it is 
considered to have completed its 
transition in 2007  
Central bank’s 
independence  
(L1)CCBI 
The first lag of updated Cukierman’s index of 
central bank independence (index)  
- 
Bogoev et 
al., 2012 
Data not available for 8 CIS countries 
(96 missing observations) 
Fixed exchange rate  defactoFIX 
Dummy variable for countries with fixed 
exchange rate (de facto fixed exchange rate 
regime) 
- 
Ilzetski, 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff 
(2010) 
 
EU membership  EU Dummy variable for EU member countries  -   
Introduction of value 
added tax 
VAT 
Dummy variable for the year of VAT 
introduction 
+ 
Background 
paper for 
International 
Tax 
Dialogue 
Conference 
on the VAT, 
2005 
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5.4.2 Descriptive statistics and model specification  
 
In the previous section variables to be included in the inflation model were specified 
and their expected effect on inflation elaborated. In this section the main trends in 
these determinants in countries with a CBA will be compared with their trends in 
countries with other regimes. 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison of average trends in inflation and inflation determinants 
between countries with a CBA and countries with other regimes 
 
Variable 
CBA Other regimes 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation  
Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
INF 5.03 3.90 0.28 18.67 12.64 24.65 0.05 293.68 
GDPG 5.36 4.79 -15.03 15.60 5.11 5.55 -18.01 34.50 
MSG 19.68 14.41 -0.40 90.00 28.04 30.85 -14.13 276.00 
FB -0.47 2.77 -9.20 3.40 -2.69 3.99 -13.10 25.50 
OPEN 123.67 23.22 87.28 172.80 99.29 31.38 45.13 203.20 
TOT 110.53 16.78 97.95 148.35 105.76 21.39 73.51 238.18 
EBRDI 3.29 0.55 2.10 4.00 3.07 0.54 1.40 4.00 
CCBI 0.89 0.07 0.78 0.98 0.75 0.17 0.34 0.95 
 
According to Table 5.3 countries with a CBA recorded, on average, lower inflation, 
higher GDP growth rates, lower money supply and lower fiscal deficits than 
countries with other regimes. Furthermore, CBA countries were more open and had 
more improved (increased exports-to-imports unit value index) terms of trade 
compared to the countries with other regimes. CBA countries also recorded higher 
EBRD and CCBI indices than countries with other regimes.  
 
However, these are only unconditional averages of variables. Therefore, before 
making any inference about the difference in macroeconomic performance in 
countries with CBA compared to those with other regimes a more formal empirical 
analysis should be conducted. Therefore, the effect of CBA (compared to other 
regimes) on inflation performance will be estimated by using the appropriate static 
and dynamic estimator, taking into account all the above specified controls. The 
natural logarithm of the consumer price index will be used as a measure of inflation 
in order to decrease the influence of outliers and to induce a linear relationship 
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among the variables. Since there are only eight observations with negative change in 
inflation these observations are dropped in order to use logarithms. The first lag of 
money supply growth and Cukierman’s CBI index will be included as discussed in 
Section 5.4.2. Other variables are included in their current values. The correlation 
matrix suggests that there are no signs of high correlation between the explanatory 
variables (Appendix 5.1). As suggested by other studies, time or period dummy 
variables (period fixed effects - t) will be included in order to control for price 
shocks. A test for the significance of the time dummy variables also suggests that 
time dummies should be included in the regression (Appendix 5.2). Accordingly, the 
model we want to estimate is:  
 
LnINFi,t = α0 + α1CBAi,t (+ α2defactoFIXi,t + α3CCBIi,t-1) + α4GDPGi,t + α5MSGi,t-1 + 
α6FBi,t + α7OPENi,t + α8TOTi,t + α9EBRDIi,t + α10EUi,t + α11VATi,t + t + εi,t                                                           (5.6) 
 
‘DefactoFIX’ and ‘CCBI’ variables are put in the brackets since in each case (static 
and dynamic estimations) the model is developed from variables outside the brackets 
and built up by subsequently including the controls for fixed exchange rate regime 
and the level of central bank independence.  
 
5.4.3 Static panel model estimations 
 
Estimation results of Equation 5.6 by pooled OLS suggest that the CBA variable is 
highly significant with the expected (negative) sign implying that countries with a 
CBA have, on average, lower inflation rates than countries with other regimes. GDP 
growth, money supply and CBI index are also significant with the expected signs 
(OLS results are presented in Table 5.4). Diagnostic tests indicate that the 
assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity cannot be rejected at all 
conventional levels of significance (Appendix 5.2). However, since we cannot expect 
to capture all countries’ specifics by the exogenous variables we should control for 
the country effects which is not done within pooled OLS. Botrić and Cota (2006) 
emphasised that the inflation generating processes in transition economies differs, 
and that country specifics should be taken into account when analysing inflation in 
those countries. Therefore, since it ignores the countries’ specifics, one may argue 
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that the OLS would result in biased estimates. In order to account for the countries’ 
effects (t) a fixed effects (FE) model is next utilised (Equation 5.7).  
 
FE model (Stage 1 in FEVD) 
 
LnINFi,t = α0 + [α1CBAi,t]67 + (α2defactoFIXi,t + α3CCBIi,t-1) + α4GDPGi,t +α5MSGi,t-1 
+ α6FBi,t + α7OPENi,t + α8TOTi,t + α9EBRDIi,t + α10EUi,t + α11VATi,t + t + ui + εi,t            
                           (5.7)                                                  
 
The F-test, after estimation of Equation 5.7, suggests that the hypothesis that the unit 
fixed effects (ui) are equal to zero is rejected at all conventional levels of significance 
(p-value 0.000) (Appendix 5.3). This implies that the FE should be preferred over the 
OLS estimator. However, using the FE model disables the estimation of the time-
invariant variables since it uses only within-group (time) variation. Therefore, if we 
are interested in the effects of the time-invariant variables, the FE model will not tell 
us anything about their effect on the dependent variable (since it disregards 
additional information contained in the between-group (countries) variation, in effect 
absorbing all sources of between-group variation into the group fixed effects). This is 
an important issue for our model, since the variable of interest (CBA) is not changing 
during the observed period (as discussed in Section 5.4.1). Additionally, Plumper and 
Troeger (2007) argued that the FE estimator is also unreliable when estimating the 
effect of slowly changing variables (variables with relatively small within-group 
variation) which is usually a characteristic of institutional variables. This could be 
argued for the transition indicator variable (EBRDI) and the central bank 
independence index (CCBI). However, when interested in the time-invariant and/or 
slowly changing variables one may use the random effects (RE) model or Hausman-
Taylor estimator, though both estimators are argued to give biased and inefficient 
estimates of the true betas in relatively small samples (Plumper and Troeger, 2004). 
Moreover, the RE requires the strict exogeneity of regressors and orthogonality 
between regressors and unit effects, which is a rarely-fulfilled condition. As Plumper 
and Troeger (2004, p.6) argued: “the real world data rarely satisfied the conditions 
under which RE estimators are consistent”. As a solution, Plumper and Troeger 
                                                                
67 The CBA variable is put in the square brackets since it drops from the estimation in the first stage 
since it is time-invariant variable (as explained in the text below).   
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(2004, 2007) proposed the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator, 
which allows estimation of time-invariant variables and variables with low within-
group variance in the presence of unit effects. Other advantages of FEVD, pointed 
out by its creators, are that it maintains the small sample properties of fixed effects 
estimation and it is more reliable in estimating the coefficients of time-varying and 
time-invariant variables even when these are correlated with the unit effects. It is 
argued that the FEVD is more efficient than FE, since it uses more information (both 
within and between variation) but is also argued to be more biased (Plumper and 
Troeger, 2007). Therefore, the decision about which estimator should be used is 
based on a trade-off between efficiency and unbiasedness and depends on the sample 
size and the researcher’s interest68. Plumper and Troeger (2011) further argue that 
FEVD estimation has characteristics that combine the FE with the pooled-OLS 
model69. Specifically, it is induced by including the estimated unit effects from the 
FE model in a pooled OLS regression. The FEVD estimator is described as a three-
stage procedure: the first stage estimates the model with the FE estimator (Equation 
5.2); the second stage regresses the time-invariant and slowly moving variables on 
the predicted unit effects 𝑢?̂?from the first stage (Equation 5.8); the third stage 
estimates the time-varying, time-invariant and slowly changing variables by OLS and 
including the estimated residuals from the second stage hi (Equation 5.9).  
 
Stage 2 in FEVD 
 
𝑢?̂? = β0 + β1CBAi,t + β2EBRDIi,t (+ β2CCBIi,t-1)+ hi                  (5.8) 
 
where: 
 
𝑢?̂? - the estimated unit effects (from 5.2); and 
hi - the error term, i.e. the unobservable, hence unexplained part of the unit effects  
                                                                
68 As noted in Plumper and Troeger (2007, p. 130): “If researchers always went for the estimator with 
the best asymptotic properties (as typically recommended in econometrics textbooks) they would 
always choose the best estimator for inﬁnitely large samples. Unfortunately, this estimator could 
perform poorly in estimating the ﬁnite sample at hand.” Therefore, for the small sample available the 
consistency issue is already pronounced regardless of the estimator chosen.  
69 “... FEVD analyzes variables that are best analyzed by FE by a de facto FE model and variables that 
are best analyzed by pooled OLS by a de facto pooled OLS model. As we concluded in our 2007 
Political Analysis article, FEVD does better than FE in estimating time-invariant (and rarely changing 
and exogenous time varying) variables and better than pooled OLS and random effects in estimating 
endogenous time-varying variables“ (Plumper and Troeger, 2011, p. 149). 
Chapter 5: Estimation of the Effect of CBAs on Inflation Performance 
 
202 
 
 
Stage 3 in FEVD 
 
LnINFi,t = δ0 + δ1CBAi,t (+ α2defactoFIXi,t  + α3CCBI i,t-1)  + α4GDPGi,t + α5MSGi,t-1 + 
α6FBi,t + α7OPENi,t + α8TOTi,t + δ2EBRDIi,t + α9EUi,t + α10VATi,t + α10hi +  t + εi,t
                               (5.9) 
 
Plumper and Troeger (2004, 2007) argued that only the third stage overcomes the 
potential multicollinearity between time-variant and time-invariant variables, and it 
is also needed to adjust the degree of freedom to obtain the correct standard errors 
(SEs). However, the FEVD estimator was criticised as producing inconsistent 
estimates (Greene, 2011a) and small/incorrect standard errors (Greene, 2011a and 
Breusch et al., 2011). The SEs were eventually changed in the subsequent FEVD 
version (xtfevd4.0 which replaced xtfevd2.0) by Plumper and Troeger to account for 
the additional variance (a more detailed discussion about the SEs is provided below). 
Therefore, the separate estimation of three stages (stage by stage) will not yield the 
correct standard errors, since they are not corrected for the extra variance. In his 
“Reply to Rejoinder” Greene (2011b) argues that “although it produces the right 
coefficient estimates, it produces the wrong SEs for the estimator of β [the 
coefficients on time-varying variables] and an ambiguous result for the SEs for the 
estimator of γ [the coefficients on time-invariant variables]” (p. 171). He argues that 
the step 3 estimator is incorrect and suggests relying entirely on step 2 plus a side 
calculation for γ and that “a fair amount of mechanical detail, including the crucial 
statement about how to compute SEs is simply omitted from PT [Plumper and 
Troeger]” (Greene, 2011b, p.172). However, Greene, with two other authors, 
published an empirical paper (Greene et al., 2010) in which they utilise the FEVD 
method. In their paper they argue that FEVD “becomes a useful tool only when 
slowly changing variables are included in the second stage” (p.5) and they emphasise 
the importance of the between to within ratio as a criterion for the inclusion of time-
varying variables in the second stage (as suggested by Plumper and Troeger, 2007). 
Although the ratio cannot be exactly determined, since it depends on the correlation 
between the variable and the unit heterogeneity, which is unobservable, Plumper and 
Troeger (2007) suggested the ratio of 2.8 as sufficient to justify the inclusion of the 
variable in the second stage. However, it is not clear whether Greene et al. (2010) 
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utilise exactly the same procedure suggested by Plumper and Troeger (2011) or they 
made some changes, but they note that the accuracy of the SEs cannot be confirmed. 
However, by using the FEVD himself Greene tacitly approved its usage when both 
time-invariant and slowly changing variables are included in the second stage.  
 
The model is estimated by using the ‘xtfevd4.0’ command70. We included CBA as a 
time-invariant variable (since countries with a CBA had this regime during the whole 
observed period) and EBRDI as a slowly changing variable (since its ratio of 
between-to-within variance is 2.7). We also treated the CCBI variable as slowly 
changing, since it changes infrequently during the observed period, even though - 
since it is not varying much between countries either - it also has a low between 
variance (and consequently low between to within ratio)71 (Appendix 5.4). Since the 
‘xtfevd’ does not allow us to do post-estimation tests we run the three stages step-by-
step as suggested in Plumper and Troeger (2007), which allows us to do post-
estimations (since OLS estimation is used in the last stage). The tests suggest that the 
standard assumptions on homoscedasticity, normality and linearity cannot be rejected 
at all conventional levels of significance72 (Appendix 5.5a). However, although the 
coefficients from the third stage are the same as the ones provided by the ‘xtfevd’ 
estimator the two have different degrees of freedom and in the third stage (when 
estimating stage by stage) the SEs are not adjusted for the variance from the previous 
stage (which is done in ‘xtfevd’, as discussed above)73. Therefore we will interpret 
the results from ‘xtfevd’ estimation. 
 
As noted above, we implement a sequential approach to estimation of our variables 
of interest. Since we argue that a CBA is a monetary framework which captures the 
                                                                
70 ‘xtfevd4.0’ is a command introduced by Plumper and Troeger (2007) for estimation of fixed effect 
vector decomposition in Stata. 
71 DefactoFIX, VAT and EU variables also do not vary much between countries or within a country. 
We tried estimations in which these variables are treated as slowly changing (added into the second 
stage) but they were insignificant in the second stage and the results in the third stage, as well as these 
from 'xtfevd' were very similar to these where these variables are not treated as slowly-moving. Since 
the variables are insignificant in the second stage the preferred results are those where these variables 
are not treated as slowly changing. 
72 Although Cameron and Trivedi‟s decomposition of IM-test (‘imtest’) suggests that the hypothesis 
of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected, the Breusch–Pagan (1979) and Cook–Weisberg (1983) test for 
heteroskedasticity (‘hettest’) suggests a rejection of this hypothesis at all conventional levels of 
significance.  
73 By comparing the results one may note that most of the variables lose their significance when 
‘xtfevd’ is applied, compared to their significance in the third stage when estimating stage by stage. 
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effect of fixed ERR, central bank independence and discretion of the monetary 
authority, the first specification includes only the CBA variable (Appendix 5.5b). In 
the second specification we control for the fixed exchange rate (defactoFIX) in order 
to see whether a CBA still has significant effect on inflation or its effect is a result of 
a fixed ER (Appendix 5.5c). Finally, in the third specification we also include the 
(lagged) central bank independence variable (L1CCBI) in order to observe whether 
the CBA effect on inflation is a result of the high central bank independence or 
whether it has an additional effect on inflation over the effect of central bank 
independence (Appendix 5.5d). 
 
Table 5.4: Results from the OLS and FEVD - Equations 5.1-5.4 
Note: ***, **, * donates that variables are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
 
As summarised in Table 5.4, when a CBA variable is included in the model (but 
dejureFIX and CCBI are not) it is significant at the 5% level in both the OLS and 
FEVD estimations and has the expected negative sign, holding other factors constant. 
After introducing the dummy variable for fixed ER the negative effect of a CBA on 
inflation is still significant, though only at the 10% level, while the variable for the 
fixed ER is insignificant. After including the CCBI variable the CBA variable loses 
its significance, while CCBI has a significant negative effect on inflation. These 
results suggest that a CBA has an additional effect on inflation reduction when a 
fixed exchange rate is accounted for. However, once the degree of central bank 
independence is controlled for then neither fixed exchange rates nor a CBA are 
significant influences; instead, central bank independence is “doing the work” of 
Estimation 
technique 
OLS 
FEVD 
Variables CBA 
CBA + 
defactoFIX 
CBA + defactoFIX + 
L1CCBI 
CBA -0.631** -0.704** -0.601* -0.614 
DefactoFIX  0.084  -0.156  0.047 
L1CCBI -1.578**   -1.992** 
GDPG -0.062** -0.019 -0.019 -0.055 
L1MSG  0.024***  0.008**  0.008**  0.012** 
FB  0.076** -0.009 -0.009  0.035 
OPEN  0.004  0.012**   0.012**  0.007 
TOT  0.008  0.004  0.004  0.023 
EBRDI  0.173 -0.630** -0.662** -0.149 
VAT  0.999  0.935*  0.933*  0.895 
EU  0.011 -0.163 -0.166 -0.284 
Period dummies 
included  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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inflation reduction. The inclusion of the CCBI variable also has the effect that the 
coefficients on openness, EBRDI and VAT variables become insignificant. Money 
supply is significant and positive through all specifications suggesting that an 
increase in the previous period’s money supply is likely to increase current inflation.  
 
However, the interpretation of the results from the FEVD is not straightforward, 
since there are still some unresolved issues about this estimator. Firstly, the 
appropriateness of the structure (adjustment) of the standard errors is not agreed 
upon. All the authors engaged in the discussion about the FEVD approach propose 
similar but somewhat different structures of the standard errors (for the comparison 
of the variance formula used by Plumper and Troeger, Greene and Breusch et al., see 
Plumper and Troeger, 2011, p. 160). However, in their paper in which they apply the 
FEVD Greene et al. (2010, p.14, emphasis added) argue that: “It is not clear yet 
whether and how any adjustment should be made to the standard errors in the 
rarely-changing variable case and this will doubtless be a subject of debate in the 
future” and that “gains in precision have arisen from more plausible parameter 
estimates, not from greatly reduced standard errors”. Plumper and Troeger’s 
improved estimator (xtfevd4.0) is adjusting the standard errors in the third stage by 
taking into account the extra variation from the previous stage which could be seen 
from its structure (Equation 5.6). In order to see the additionally added part of the 
SEs, the Plumper and Troeger variance formula provided in 201174 (Equation 5.6) is 
compared with the sampling variance of the linear regression estimator (Equation 
5.5): 
 
As noted in Baum (2006, p.134) the sampling variance of the linear regression 
estimator (independent and identically distributed i.i.d. errors assumed) is a scaling 
of the variance of the data against the data itself75: 
 
varx = (X’X)-1(X’uX) (X’X)-1, where u is 2INxT and 2 is a constant variance, 
X is a data matrix and X’ is a transposed data matrix                                (5.10) 
                                                                
74 It cannot be compared with the variance formula used in the previous version of FEVD (xtfevd2.0) 
since it is not provided in the PT’s 2007 paper, but they argue in their 2011 paper that “the OLS is 
overconfident“ and that “this was the main reason for why xtfevd2.0beta was overconfident, with 
computed SEs being much smaller than the sampling distribution” (p.160). 
75 The original formula from Baum (2006) is amended with a time dimension (T) to be better 
comparable with FEVD variance, which is derived for the panel data 
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while the xtfevd4.0 variance formula is as follows: 
 
XFEVD4.0(,) = (H’W)-1H’H(W’H)-1, where  = 2INT + 2ηINlTl’T                            (5.11) 
 
where IN is an NxN identity matrix, lT is a Tx1 vector of ones, σ2η stands for the 
variance of the residuals (eta) of the second stage regression of the FEVD procedure, 
the unexplained part of the unit specific effects. 
 
From the Equations 5.5 and 5.6 we can see that these formulas have similar but 
different structures. First, the FEVD accounts for two different types of variables, 
namely time varying (Y) and time-invariant and slowly changing variables (Z). 
Second, the H matrix is in the demeaned form of Y: H = ?̈?, Z and the W matrix is 
W = [Y; Z]. Finally, the middle matrix, Ω, is different; while the default SEs assume 
constant variance, the FEVD SEs allow for extra variance from the second stage and, 
therefore, additional information compared to u. In addition, 2INT suggests that 
5.6 does not yield SEs that are robust to heteroscedasticity (because the variance of 
the idiosyncratic error term is not allowed to vary with observation i; cluster-robust 
SEs also take into account variation by group j, as noted below.) However, when 
Plumper and Troeger’s SEs (Equation 5.6) are compared to the SEs which account 
for heteroscedasticity (Equation 5.7), and for arbitrary correlations within clusters 
(Equation 5.8), it should be noted that Plumper and Troeger’s SEs do not account for 
potential heteroscedasticy and/or serial correlation in the residuals, since they do not 
include the group effect (i or j subscript) to indicate that the variance is no longer 
constant.  
 
The robust estimator of the variance component estimation (VCE), as noted in Baum 
(2006, p.136) is: 
 
var [?̂?|𝑥] = 
𝑁
𝑁−𝑘
 (X’X)-1 ( ∑ ?̂?𝑖
2𝑁𝑥𝑇
𝑖=1 xi’xi ) (X’X)
-1                                                   (5.12)  
 
where N is the number of observations, k is the number of coefficients estimated, T 
number of years, ui is the ith regression residual and xi is the ith row of the regressor 
matrix: a 1 x k vector of sample values.  
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The cluster-robust VCE estimator, as defined in Baum (2006, p.139), is: 
 
var [?̂?|𝑥] = 
𝑁−1
𝑁−𝑘
 
𝑀
𝑀−1
 (X’X)-1 (∑ ?̃?𝑗
′𝑀𝑥𝑇
𝑗=1 ?̃?𝑗) (X’X)
-1                                               (5.13) 
 
where M is the number of clusters, ?̃?𝑗 =  ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑁𝑗76
𝑖=1 , Nj is the number of observations 
in the jth cluster, ?̂?𝑖 is the ith residual from the jth cluster, xi is the 1xk vector of 
regressors (sample values) from the ith observation in the jth cluster, where the 
subscript j indicates that the arbitrary patterns of within group correlation 
(autocorrelation of various different kinds) is taken into account. 
 
Plumper and Troeger in their 2007 paper (where they introduced ‘xtfevd2’) noted 
that FEVD estimation can account for potential heteroscedasticy and/or serial 
correlation by running a robust Sandwich estimator or a model with panel-corrected 
SEs and that in the presence of serial correlation the Prais-Winston regression should 
be used instead of OLS in the first and the third stage. However, in relation to their 
revised estimator (‘xtfevd4.0’) they are silent about model diagnostics and 
corresponding strategies to address diagnostic failures. Indeed, the options for 
accounting for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation described in the help file are 
not working within the ‘xtfevd4.0’ programme and Plumper notes on his website that 
the help file is not adjusted for the new version of FEVD. Additionally, Plumper and 
Troeger (2011, p.5) emphasise that the FEVD is consistent only when i,t is an i.i.d. 
error term, which also suggests that potential diagnostic failures are not accounted 
for within the FEVD. However, they point out the trade-off between the consistency 
and efficiency of estimation and that “researchers necessarily face a choice between 
using as much information as possible and using an unbiased estimator” (Plumper 
and Troeger 2007, as cited in Plumper and Troeger, 2011, p.150). 
  
Consequently, we may not fully rely on the results from the FEVD as the debate 
about the SEs is on-going and there is no agreed verdict that they are correct. Further, 
                                                                
76 In Baum (2006, p. 139) N in the summation is written with a subscript k and afterwards Nj is 
explained (which is not used anywhere). Therefore, we assume that it should be Nj in the summation 
as well, since a summation is being done across all the observations within each group (which is what 
cluster SEs are doing). 
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Plumper and Troeger (2011) note that i.i.d. is a precondition for FEVD consistency. 
Additionally, we should not rely on the FEVD results since the time span is shorter 
than 20, which Plumper and Troeger (2011, p.160) argue to be “problematic”. 
Furthermore, Plumper and Troeger (2011, p.7) note that “FEVD is inconsistent if and 
only if the time-invariant-variables are correlated with the unit effects”, which cannot 
be tested. Moreover, it is not clear which variables should be treated as slowly 
moving variables (and therefore included in the second stage) since the relationship 
between the rarely changing variable and the unobserved unit effects is 
unobservable. Finally, the FEVD approach does not allow for diagnostic tests or for 
standard responses to diagnostic failure. Therefore, as suggested in most recent 
studies, dynamics will be included in our next modelling approach, since it is likely 
that there is “inflation inertia” in the countries in the sample. Moreover, the serial 
correlation test, conducted after the 3-stage procedure, suggest that serial correlation 
may be an issue (the p-value is on the border line of rejection/non-rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no error serial correlation (Appendix 5.5e). This will also allow us 
to check the consistency of the results, which, due to the limitations discussed above, 
may not be fully reliable.  
 
5.4.4 Dynamic panel model estimations 
 
As it is likely that the inflation rate from the previous year affects the current 
inflation rate, a dynamic panel will be estimated. Although none of the studies that 
estimate the effect of CBA on inflation (reviewed in Section 5.2) addressed this 
issue, recent studies of inflation emphasise the importance of inclusion of dynamics 
(Levy-Yeyati and Stuzengger, 2001; Bleaney and Fransisco, 2005; Barlow, 2010). 
Levy-Yeyati and Stuzengger (2001, p. 8) argued that the lagged dependent variable 
should be included “to capture the effect of past policies on currency expectations, as 
well as to control for the possibility of backward-looking indexation”. This inflation 
persistence is captured by inclusion of one lag of inflation (Equation 5.14). 
 
LnINFi,t = α0 + α1lnINFi,t-1 + α2CBAi,t + (α3dejureFIXi,t + α4CCBIi,t) + α5GDPGi,t + 
α6MSGi,t + α7FBi,t + α8OPENi,t + α9TOTi,t + α10EBRDIi,t + α11EUi,t + α12VATi,t + t + 
εi,t                                                           (5.14)                                                                                         
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Where εi,t = ui + vi,t (ui is a group-specific effect and vi,t is a white noise) 
 
Lagged values of money supply growth and central bank independence indicator 
could again be used in a dynamic model instead of the current values. In static 
estimation lagged values were included to avoid the potential problem of 
endogeneity. However, we would expect the contemporaneous and lagged values to 
be highly collinear, so inclusion of the lagged values in the dynamic estimations, in 
which we can control for the potential endogeneity without the inclusion of lagged 
values, might be of very limited value. In the dynamic estimation these variables are 
included in their current values and treated as endogenous and their lags are used as 
instruments. In order to estimate the dynamic model the General Method of Moments 
(GMM) is used. All GMM techniques for estimating dynamic panel models are 
argued to be suitable for panels with wide cross section (N) and short time series (T), 
which is the case with our sample (25 countries and 12 years of data). Dynamic panel 
estimators require as few as three periods of data to be usable, although “four or 
more will be preferable” (Greene, 2007, E11-83, as cited in Pugh, 2009). Other 
advantages of the GMM are that distributional assumptions, such as normality, are 
not required and that it enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity of the 
same countries over time (Verbeek, 2000, as cited in Pugh, 2009). The Arellano-
Bond approach (the so called ‘difference’ GMM), which uses lagged values of the 
levels as instruments for the equations in first differences, is not conducted since it 
drops out the variable of interest, which is time-invariant. Therefore, we use only the 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (so called ‘system’ GMM) that builds a system of 
two equations: a difference equation which is instrumented by levels; and a levels 
equation instrumented by first differences. Additionally, ‘system’ GMM is more 
comprehensive than “difference” GMM, since lagged levels (used in ‘difference’ 
GMM) are argued to be rather poor instruments for first differenced variables, 
especially for variables that are close to a random walk, which is frequently the case 
with macroeconomic variables (Baum, 2006, p.234). Although the ‘system’ GMM 
dynamic model developed by Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond can be estimated by 
using the Stata command 'xtdpdsys', we estimated it by the command 'xtabond2'77, 
which was subsequently developed by Roodman (2006). Roodman’s ‘xtabond2’ is 
preferred over ‘xtdpdsys’ as it offers a much more flexible approach than does 
                                                                
77 ‘xtdpdsys’ and ‘xtabond2’ are commands for estimation of ‘system’ GMM in Stata. 
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official Stata’s ‘xtabond’, which does not allow the same flexibility with respect to 
the specification of instrument sets. Since the variable of interest drops out when the 
two-step estimator is used we applied the one-step ‘system’ GMM estimator78. 
Again, the same three specifications are estimated: the first which includes the CBA 
variable (Appendix 5.6a); the second with CBA and defactoFIX (Appendix 5.6b) and 
the third with CBA, defactoFIX and CCBI variables (Appendix 5.6c).  
 
For the reasons discussed in Section 5.4.2, the money supply growth and central 
bank independence variables are treated as endogenous. However, since a switch in 
the exchange rate regime is sometimes argued to be the result of high inflation rates 
this variable should be treated as endogenous as well. The Sargan test is at the border 
line of significance when the defactoFIX variable is treated as endogenous 
(Appendix 5.11). However, since we already have too many instruments we will treat 
this (defactoFIX) variable as exogenous, although we later allow for it to be 
endogeneous as a robustness check. Due to our small sample, we used the minimum 
number of lags. However, even with a minimum number of lags we still have more 
instruments than groups, due to the small sample available, from only 25 countries 
(the number of instruments for each specification are 56, 57, 74, respectively, while 
the number of groups is 25 and 17, as noted in Table 5.5). Consequently, the Hansen 
version of the Sargan test is too weak, which is indicated by the p-value = 1.00, 
meaning that it is unable to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity (strictly, 
the validity of the over-identifying instruments). Although the number of instruments 
could be decreased by using the “collapse” option within the ‘xtabond2’, this option 
is not used since it also reduces the additional information and, in consequence, all 
variables in the sample are imprecisely estimated79. However, the Sargan test is 
                                                                
78 „In one-step GMM, xtabond2’s robust option is equivalent to cluster (id) in most other estimation 
commands, where id is the panel identifier variable, requesting standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within individuals; in two-step estimation, 
where the errors are already robust, robust triggers the Windmeijer correction.“ (Roodman, 2009, 
p.123). The system GMM (estimated by xtabond2) makes the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample 
correction to the reported standard errors in two-step estimation, without which those standard errors 
tend to be severely downward biased (Roodman, 2009). 
79 Another option for decreasing the number of instruments is Roodman's 'pca' (principal component 
analysis), which is available in the latest version of xtabond2, which creates combinations from the 
available instruments (“principal components”) and instruments using these. This approach both 
reduces the number of instruments and, arguably, creates an optimum instrument set and is therefore 
conducted here as well. However, even with the 'pca' option the number of instruments is still larger 
than number of groups. These results are briefly discussed after the results without the ‘pca’ option. 
When the ‘pca’ option  for lowering the number of instruments is included in system GMM 
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available and suggests that there is no problem with instrument validity in the final, t 
specification80. However, it should be noted that the Sargan test is not 
heteroskedasticity robust, which is why the Hansen  test – which is 
heteroskedasticity-robust - is usually preferred (except, possibly, when the number of 
instruments is “too many” in relation to the number of groups). Moreover, tests for 
the first (m1) and second order autocorrelation (m2) suggest no problem with 
autocorrelation in the difference residuals, which is consistent with instrument 
validity. The m2+m1 procedure requires rejection of the null of m1, meaning that 
there is first-order autocorrelation, and “acceptance” of m2 null, meaning that there 
is no second-order autocorrelation; conditions which are satisfied in all 
specifications. Additionally, in order to observe whether the effect of CBA differs at 
different levels of m6.oney supply growth the interaction term between CBA and 
MSG is added to the preferred specification (Equation 5.15). This amendment of the 
model improves Sargan test. Namely, the p value of Sargan test is 0.29 which 
suggests the validity of the instruments used. This enables us to have some 
confidence in the results. However, the results did not change significantly implying 
the stability of the model (Appendix 5.6f). 
 
LnINFi,t = α0 + α1lnINFi,t-1 + α2CBAi,t + α3dejureFIXi,t + α4CCBIi,t + α5GCBA·MSG + 
α6GDPGi,t + α7MSGi,t + α8FBi,t + α9OPENi,t + α10TOTi,t + α11EBRDIi,t + α12EUi,t + 
α13VATi,t + t + εi,t                                 (5.15)                                                                                         
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(‘xtabond2’) estimation, the p-value for the Hansen test is somewhat lower than 1 (0.88 - 0.98, 
depending on the specification), while the Sargan is 0.02 when CBA and defactoFIX variables are 
included in the estimation. When central bank independence index is controlled for (which is, as noted 
above, not available for all countries in the sample and therefore when estimating this specification the 
number of observations is lower) the p-value for the Sargan test is 0.3, but for the Hansen test it is 
again 1. In all estimations using the ‘pca’ option the estimated effect of the variable of interest, the 
CBA, is still negative but is not statistically significant at conventional levels  (see Appendix 5.6e). 
However, because in each case the number of instruments continues to exceed the number of groups 
(countries), so that the Hansen continues to be one or near to one, there is no obvious advantage to 
applying the ‘pca’ approach to instrumentation.   
80 Even though the Hansen test is too weak we can rely on the Sargan which is not weakened by a 
problem of too many instruments. 
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Table 5.5a: Results from the one-step ‘system’ GMM - Estimation of Equation 5.10 
and 5.11 
Estimation 
technique 
One-step ‘system’ GMM 
Variables 
Equation 5.10 
with a CBA 
Equation 5.10 
with CBA + 
defactoFIX 
Equation 5.10 with  
CBA + defactoFIX 
+ CCBI 
CBA + 
defactofix + 
CCBI + 
CBA·MSG  
L1.lninf  0.464***  0.466***  0.413***  0.416*** 
CBA -0.306* -0.303* -0.274** -0.352*** 
DefactoFIX  -0.014  0.126  0.089 
CCBI   -0.937 -0.427 
GDPG -0.006 -0.006 -0.013 -0.013 
MSG  0.009**  0.008**  0.023***  0.017*** 
FB  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.017 
OPEN  0.003**  0.003**  0.004*  0.003 
TOT  0.004**  0.004**  0.004  0.003 
EBRDI -0.223 -0.240  0.292  0.219 
VAT  0.621***  0.619***  0.534***  0.543*** 
EU  0.169  0.185 -0.065 -0.006 
  Note: ***, **, * donates that variables are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively  
            In the last column (model 5.11) marginal effects are reported since interaction terms are 
included 
 
Table 5.5b: Diagnostic tests for the estimations with one step ‘system’ GMM  
 
 
Variables 
Equation 5.10 
with a CBA 
Equation 5.10 
with CBA + 
defactoFIX 
Equation 5.10 with 
CBA + defactoFIX 
+ CCBI 
CBA + 
defactofix + 
CCBI + 
CBA·MSG 
Number of 
observations 
229 229 153 
153 
Number of groups 25 25 17 17 
Number of instruments 56 57 74  
Hansen/Sargan (Prob > 
chi2) 
1/0 1/0 1/0.095 
1/0.292 
m1+m2 (Pr > z) 0.002/0.356 0.002/0.355 0.003/0.397 0.003/0.492 
 
Results from the one-step ‘system’ GMM (summarised in Table 5.5) suggest that, in 
all specifications, the lagged dependent variable is highly significant and positive 
indicating that inflation is persistent in these countries. Moreover, the size of the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from the dynamic estimation lies 
between the values of the coefficients from, respectively, OLS and fixed effect 
estimation (Appendix 5.6d). In spite of our concerns over instrument validity,  given 
the small sample size, this diagnostic check is consistent with the validity of our 
model (Roodman, 2009). 
 
The results also suggest that the CBA has a significant and negative effect on 
inflation, even after controlling for the fixed ER and central bank independence. The 
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effect is somewhat larger and significant at all level of significance when interaction 
term is included. The coefficient on the CBA variable suggests that countries with a 
CBA have, on average, a 23.9781 percentage points lower inflation rate than countries 
without a CBA, holding other factors constant. Moreover, the fixed ER and CCBI 
variables are not found to have an important influence on inflation (since they are 
insignificant). However, if we treat the defactoFIX variable as endogenous, the CBA 
variable is still negative but it loses significance (Appendix 5.11a).  The money 
supply variable is again significant and positive in all specifications. The marginal 
effect of a CBA at different level of MSG indicate that the effect of CBA is 
significant when money supply growth s positive and it is more negative the higher 
the money supply growth (Figure 5.6). This suggests that the CBA tends to repress 
the effect of money supply growth on inflation, which is an additional argument for 
maintenance of a CBA.  
 
Figure 5.6 The average marginal effect of CBA on inflation conditional on money 
supply growth 
 
 
The dummy variable for the introduction of VAT is also highly significant and 
positive in all specifications indicating that it has a positive short-run effect on 
inflation (in the year of introduction). The differences between the inferences from 
                                                                
81 “If β is the coefficient on a dummy variable, say x1, when log(y) is the dependent variable, the exact 
percentage difference in the predicted y when x1=1 versus when x1=0 is 100·[exp(β1)-1]” 
(Wooldridge, 2006, p. 238) 
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the static and dynamic estimators will be explained in Section 5.4.7. Before this, the 
differences between CBAs with more strict versus those with less strict rules will be 
empirically assessed.  
 
5.4.5 Examining differences between CBAs 
 
As argued in Chapter 2, currency boards in transition countries are not the same, 
some of them are stricter while others are more flexible and therefore should be 
expected to have different effects on inflation. In order to distinguish the effect of 
CBAs which are stricter from the more flexible ones, the CBA variable is divided 
into strongCBA and weakCBA. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s and Estonian CBAs are 
classified as ‘strong’, since they are argued to be more strict (and to have a higher 
pre-commitment index), while Bulgarian and Lithuanian CBAs are classified as 
‘weak’ since they deviate significantly from the orthodox rules (and have a lower 
pre-commitment index) (this issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). The 
same specifications (but with CBA divided for ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ CBAs) are 
estimated by using FEVD (Appendix 5.8) and one-step ‘system’ GMM (Appendix 
5.9). Diagnostic tests do not significantly differ from those results reported above. 
 
Table 5.6a: Strong and weak CBA specifications estimated by FEVD and ‘system’ 
GMM 
 
Estimation 
technique 
FEVD One-step ‘system’ GMM 
Variables 
Strong 
and weak 
CBA 
Strong 
and weak 
CBA+def
actoFIX  
Strong and 
weak CBA 
+ 
defactoFI
X 
+ L1CCBI  
Strong 
and weak 
CBA 
Strong 
and weak 
CBA+def
actoFIX 
Strong and 
weak CBA 
+defactoFIX
+CCBI 
Strong and 
weak 
CBA+defact
oFIX+ 
CCBI+CBA
·MSG 
L1. lninf     0.464***  0.469***  0.413***  0.451*** 
StrongCBA -1.123*** -0.955** -1.088 -0.536*** -0.548*** -0.597*** -0.642*** 
WeakCBA -0.329 -0.233 -0.180 -0.174 -0.187 -0.147 -0.171 
DefactoFIX  -0.211  0.047   0.011  0.123  0.127 
(L1)CCBI   -1.744**   -0.849 -0.495 
GDPG -0.021 -0.021 -0.055 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.007 
(L1)MSG  0.010***  0.009***  0.012**  0.008**  0.008**  0.020***  0.015*** 
FB -0.010 -0.010  0.035  0.001  0.003  0.005  0.014 
OPEN  0.013**  0.013**  0.007  0.004***  0.004***  0.005*  0.004* 
TOT  0.005  0.004  0.023  0.005**  0.005**  0.010*  0.009 
EBRDI -0.634** -0.667** -0.250 -0.268* -0.281**  0.124 -0.004 
VAT  0.954*  0.953*  0.895  0.675***  0.663***  0.575***  0.761*** 
EU -0.162 -0.167 -0.284  0.170  0.188 -0.058  0.038 
Note: ***, **, * donates that variables are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
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Table 5.6b: Diagnostic tests for the estimations with one step ‘system’ GMM  
 
Strong and 
weak CBA 
Strong and weak 
CBA + 
defactoFIX 
Strong and weak 
CBA + 
defactoFIX + 
CCBI 
Strong and weak 
CBA + 
defactoFIX + 
CCBI + 
CBA·MSG 
Number of observations 229 229 153 153 
Number of groups 25 25 17 17 
Number of instruments 57 58 75 108 
Hansen/Sargan 
(Prob>chi2) 1/0.001 1/0 1/0.068 
1/0.247 
m1+m2 (Prob > chi2) 0.002/0.372 0.002/0.373 0.003/0.419 0.002/0.579 
 
 
The results summarized in Table 5.6 suggest that ‘strong’ CBAs have a negative and 
significant effect on inflation (except in FEVD when the central bank independence 
variable is included, upon which the strongCBA variable loses significance), while 
the effect of ‘weak’ CBAs is insignificant through all specifications. Moreover, after 
dividing the CBA variable between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, the effect of ‘strong’ CBA 
on inflation is higher compared to the effect of the combined CBA variable. The 
coefficient on the strongCBA variable suggests that countries with a ‘strong’ CBA 
have, on average, 44.96 percentage points lower inflation rate than do countries 
without a CBA. When estimated by ‘system’ GMM, the strongCBA variable is 
highly significant and negative in all specifications, even when the dejureFIX 
variable is treated as endogenous (however, when this variable is treated as 
endogenous the Sargan test is at the border line of significance; p=0.04; diagnostic 
tests are reported in Table 5.6b) (Appendix 5.11b). The Hansen test is again weak 
(indicated by p-value of 1) in all specifications82. Sargan test is again improved when 
interaction between CBA and MSG is included. However, the rest of the results do 
not change significantly (Appendix 5.9f). According to the marginal effects of a 
CBA at representative values of MSG, the effect of a strong CBA is significant and 
more negative the higher the money supply growth, while the effect of a weak CBA 
is significant (and negative) only at negative or very low growth rates of money 
supply (Figure 5.7 shows only the effect of strong CBA conditional on money supply 
growth, since the effect of weak CBA is insignificant). These additional results 
suggest that a weak CBA does not have a repressing effect on inflation when money 
                                                                
82 As above, the ‘pca’ option is again used to lower the number of instruments. As in the specification 
prior to dividing the CBA variable into strong and weak, the p-value for Hansen test is somewhat 
lower than 1 before including CCBI variable and 1 after the inclusion of CCBI. The strongCBA 
variable is significant and negative in all specification (the significance is lower after including CCBI, 
13 percent), while the weakCBA variable is insignificant in all specifications. DefactoFIX and CCBI 
are still insignificant (see Appendix 5.9d).   
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supply growth is positive and that stricter rules are needed to repress the effect of 
money supply growth on inflation.   
 
Figure 5.7 The average marginal effect of strong CBA on inflation conditional on 
money supply growth 
 
 
5.4.6 Comparison between preferred static and preferred dynamic estimations  
 
Given that the dependent variable is included as a lagged regressor in the dynamic 
model, the coefficients estimated by the dynamic estimator indicate the short-run or 
impact effects. Specifically, the lagged dependent variable is mostly netting out the 
historical effect of all independent variables and, consequently, the coefficient 
estimates on the independent variables are capturing any current (impact) effect on 
the dependent variables. On the other hand, the static model gives the long-run 
(overall) effects of the independent variable. Therefore, in order to compare the 
coefficients from the static estimator with the coefficients from the dynamic 
estimator we have to calculate the long-run coefficients from the dynamic estimator. 
This is done by dividing the (short-run) coefficient on the variable of interest from 
the dynamic estimator by 1-coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (Equation 
5.16) (for a derivation see Pugh et al., 2008). The long-run coefficients on CBA and 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 F
it
te
d
 V
a
lu
e
s
-15 -.39 11.7 23.84 49.7 78.06 89.99
msg
Average Marginal Effects of 1.strongcba with 95% CIs
Chapter 5: Estimation of the Effect of CBAs on Inflation Performance 
 
217 
 
strongCBA and weakCBA are estimated by the ‘nlcom’ command in Stata, which 
also gives us SEs and confidence intervals (Appendix 5.7 and Appendix 5.10).  
 
Long-run coefficient = 
Regressor’s (short−run) coefficient 
1 − Coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
                        (5.16) 
 
Table 5.7: Comparison of the long run coefficients on CBA, strong CBA and weak 
CBA from the preferred static and dynamic model  
 
 CBA Strong CBA Weak CBA 
Static coefficient            -0.614     -1.088     -0.180 
Dynamic 
 
SR coefficient           -0.274**     -0.597***     -0.147 
LR coefficient           -0.466**     -1.017***     -0.249 
Note: these are the coefficients from the specifications in which it is controlled for defactoFIX and 
CBI 
 
This adjustment of the short-run coefficients on variable(s) of interest obtained from 
the dynamic panel model for the long-term closely replicates the coefficients from 
the static panel equation (Table 5.7). In the next section all the results will be 
compared and discussed and final conclusions regarding the CBA’s effect on 
inflation performance in transition countries drawn. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
The results from the previous chapter suggest that a CBA is likely to increase the 
credibility of the monetary authority. Therefore, it is also expected to decrease 
inflationary expectations and consequently inflation rates. However, this effect is not 
straightforward and should therefore be established through empirical analysis. 
Therefore, in this chapter the effect of CBA on inflation is analysed for a sample of 
25 transition countries over 12 years (1998-2009), four of which operated a CBA 
during this period. The estimation of the simplest specification, which includes a 
CBA variable (before controlling for the fixed exchange rate and central bank 
independence), suggests that a CBA reduces inflation more than all the other 
monetary and exchange rate regime combinations used in countries in the sample. 
This result is consistent within both static and dynamic estimations. In order to test 
whether its negative effect on inflation is a result of a fixed exchange rate, central 
bank independence or the increased credibility of the monetary authority, we control 
first for the fixed exchange rate and then, in addition, for central bank independence. 
Chapter 5: Estimation of the Effect of CBAs on Inflation Performance 
 
218 
 
Although its significance decreases once a fixed exchange rate is included, the CBA 
variable is still negative and significant at the 10% level in both the static and 
dynamic estimates. However, when controlling for the degree of central bank 
independence, the sign of the CBA variable does not change, although its 
significance is different within static and dynamic estimations. The static estimator 
suggests that after controlling for the degree of central bank independence (CBI), this 
variable has a significant and negative effect on inflation, while the overall effect of a 
CBA becomes insignificant. Since in the static estimations the coefficients are 
indicating the long-run (historical) effects of independent variables on inflation, this 
implies that if a country’s central bank has a high degree of independence across 
recent history it does not need a CBA, since a high level of CBI contributes most 
with respect to inflation reduction. On the other hand, the results of dynamic 
estimation suggest that the short-run effect of CBA is still significant and negative 
after inclusion of the CBI variable, while the latter’s (CBI) short-run effect on 
inflation is insignificant. These results suggest that when the overall 
(contemporaneous) effect on inflation is estimated, a CBA is not adding anything 
more than a higher degree of central bank independence with respect to inflation. On 
the other hand, the dynamic estimator suggests that the CBA continues to be 
important with respect to inflation even after the history of the CBA and CBI is 
accounted for, while the short-run effect of CBI on inflation is estimated to be 
insignificant. Dynamic estimation results suggest that a CBA has, on average, a 
23.97 percentage points lower inflation rate than countries without a CBA, holding 
other factors constant.  
 
One more important finding is that the degree of strictness of the CBA appears to be 
important with respect to the reduction in inflation, since the division of the CBA 
variable into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms suggests that they do not have the same 
effect on inflation. According to the results from both static and dynamic 
estimations, the ‘weak’ CBAs (Bulgarian and Lithuanian), the ones which deviate 
more from the orthodox rules, do not have a significant effect on inflation, while the 
‘strong’ CBAs (BH’s and Estonian), the ones which are the most strict, have a 
significant and negative effect through all specifications (except in FEVD after the 
CBI variable is introduced). The results suggest that a ‘strong’ CBA affects inflation 
performance significantly and has more than double the effect of the overall CBA 
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effect (which incorporates both ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ CBAs). However, it is important 
to note that we are operating with a very small sample and, therefore, it was not 
possible to implement some of the diagnostic tests. Moreover, the results from the 
static estimator should be considered only as indicative, although the evidence for 
serial correlation is on the border line, since the high and systematic significance of 
the lagged dependent variable suggests that the static model is misspecified. 
Moreover, discussion about the consistency of the FEVD estimator is still on-going. 
However, dynamic estimation suggests that a CBA should be treated as a monetary 
framework and that it has a current effect on inflation reduction over and above the 
fixed exchange rate and high degree of central bank independence, which is 
presumably the result of the additional credibility of the monetary authority, which 
operates under a ‘strong’ CBA. The highly significant and large effect of a CBA on 
inflation could be used to justify the introduction and maintenance of CBA in the 
European transition countries with respect to inflation performance in these 
countries. This also implies that there may be a continuing need for a CBA in the 
countries that operate under this regime, especially in those with a ‘strong’ CBA, 
though its overall sustainability and desirability depends also on its affects on the 
other key determinants of overall economic performance. Hence in the following 
chapter, we turn to consider these before drawing our final conclusions. 
 
In Table 5.7 we summarise the effects of CBA arrangements on inflation both overall 
and in its strong and weak variants: these are consistently negative; consistently 
statistically significant (or insignificant in the case of the weak variant); and of 
similar magnitude. These results are obtained from entirely different modelling 
strategies, each one of which has different strengths and weaknesses in relation to 
model specification and the available data. In turn, the consistency of our estimates 
strengthens the case for their validity. 
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6.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter the effect of a currency board arrangement (CBA) on 
inflation performance was investigated, in this chapter its effect on growth, growth 
volatility, as well as subjective perceptions regarding a country’s economic 
performance are analysed. The analyses presented in this chapter are organised as 
follows. Section 6.2 briefly assesses relevant studies for identifying growth 
determinants in transition countries. Furthermore, the model specification for 
estimating the effect of a CBA on growth in transition countries is determined and 
estimated. It is conventionally argued that monetary and exchange rate (ER) regimes 
have no effect on long-run growth, moreover the investigation of the determinants of 
growth in transition countries represents a “short-run exercise” due to lack of long 
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time-span data. Therefore, in Section 6.3 the effect of CBA on growth volatility is 
estimated. The analyses of the effect of CBA on growth and growth volatility are 
conducted by using a panel data of 25 transition countries for the period 1998-2009. 
In Section 6.4, a new strategy for estimating the effect of CBA on macroeconomic 
performance is developed and applied. This strategy relies on the usage of the 
subjective assessments of the economy as a proxy for the overall country’s 
macroeconomic performance. The latter analysis covers ten Central and South 
Eastern European countries and the dataset is based on the Austrian National Bank 
surveys from 2007 (2009 in the robustness check) to 2011. Section 6.5 concludes.  
 
6.2 Estimation of the effect of CBA on growth 
 
6.2.1 Growth theories and the effect of monetary/ER regimes on growth 
 
Since economic growth is usually argued to be a key indicator of economic welfare 
its determinants have been repeatedly investigated through history. The beginning of 
this attempt goes back to the era of classical theory (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817; 
Malthus, 1798, as cited in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), which provided the basic 
determinants that appear in modern theories of economic growth, such as the effect 
of the growth rate of population, technological progress in the forms of labour 
specialisation and discoveries of new goods and methods of production (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004). More recently, a further contribution was provided by 
neoclassical growth theory through its emphasis on a production function approach 
and a general equilibrium framework. The main contributions were provided by 
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) who argued that growth rates tend to decline as the 
economy evolves towards its steady-state. This implies that countries with a lower 
starting level of real per capita GDP may grow faster than countries with high 
starting levels (a phenomenon now known as conditional convergence). Another 
prediction of the Solow-Swan model is that in the absence of continuing 
improvements in technological progress (which is assumed to be exogenous in the 
model), per capita growth must eventually cease (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
The neoclassical growth model predicts that in the long run countries reach their 
steady state. A new ‘boom’ in growth theory began with the work of Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988) who argued that growth may go on indefinitely because returns to 
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investment do not necessarily diminish as economies develop (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004). Romer incorporated research and development and imperfect 
competition into the growth framework and argued that technological advance results 
from purposive research and development activity. Since technological progress is 
considered to be endogenous in the model this theory is known as the endogenous 
growth theory. Contrary to neoclassical theory, endogenous growth theory argues 
that if there is no tendency for the economy to run out of ideas the per capita growth 
rate may remain positive in the long run. Moreover, this theory argues that countries 
may benefit not only from their own ideas, but also by imitating the advances of 
other counties (diffusion of technology). Beside the neoclassical and endogenous 
growth theories there are number of alternative approaches which will not be 
reviewed here, since our focus is on the growth determinants used in empirical work 
rather than on the theoretical background (for a review of the alternative approaches 
see Gore, 2007).  
 
Regarding the empirical investigation of growth determinants, studies usually use the 
real growth rate (Fisher and Sahay, 2004; De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2008; Josafidis et 
al., 2011) or the real per capita growth rate (Ghosh et al., 2000; Wolf et al., 2008) as 
the dependent variable and two groups of explanatory variables: initial levels of 
some variables (GDP, schooling); and population growth rate together with control 
variables to reflect policy actions, institutional settings or other country 
characteristics (Petreski, 2011). However, there is still no consensus over the most 
appropriate growth specification83 and different studies tend to include different 
determinants depending on their particular interest. Some studies observe the effect 
of monetary and ER regimes on growth, which will also be assessed in this chapter. 
However, it is conventionally argued that monetary and ER regimes/policies have no 
effect on long-run growth, since in the long run output is likely to return to its trend 
level due to adjustment mechanisms. Namely, the monetary authority may stimulate 
output growth through increases in money demand (or currency devaluation) in the 
short run, but in the long run workers will adapt their expectations and increase their 
wage demands (and producers their prices). Consequently, the actions of monetary 
                                                                
83 Durlauf and Quah (1999) suggested over 90 variables as potential determinants of growth (as cited 
in Petreski, 2011). Staehr (2003) argued that in the “new growth” literature it is relatively easy to find 
theoretical arguments for including almost any variable. 
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authority will affect only prices/wages but not long-term output and growth. 
Although most economists accept that monetary actions have no long-run effects on 
the economy, it is also widely accepted that monetary actions or lack of monetary 
actions can have a significant effect on output growth in the short and medium term 
(Walsh, 2010). However, the strength of this effect remains unclear since there are 
two opposing channels that may affect growth. Stricter regimes are likely to provide 
greater stability and therefore may increase growth through a positive effect on trade 
and investment (De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2004b). On the other hand, there is a 
possibility of a negative effect of more strict regimes on trade (and consequently 
growth) if traders are either extremely or not at all risk averse, although there is only 
a limited amount of empirical evidence that support this possibility (Ćorić and Pugh, 
2010). Moreover, it is usually argued that more discretionary monetary regimes may 
provide quick adjustments to shocks, while these adjustments under stricter regimes 
are likely to be channelled through prices and wages into the real economy 
(Friedman, 1953; Fisher, 2001). Since shocks are likely to affect short-run variations 
in output the effect of different regimes on macroeconomic performance through the 
latter channel might be better observed through their effect on output or growth 
volatility rather than on growth rates. Moreover, since growth should be measured 
over decades rather than years, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, and our 
sample covers only 12 years, macroeconomic performance will be measured by both 
GDP growth and growth volatility.  
 
Given that we are interested in the effect of a specific monetary framework on 
macroeconomic performance in transition countries, we will focus on studies that 
investigate the effect of different monetary/ER regimes on macroeconomic 
performance and those that investigate the main growth determinants in transition 
countries. Due to the small sample size, we use a minimally specified growth model, 
which will allow us to estimate the effect of the variable of interest.  
 
6.2.2 Growth determinants in transition economies  
 
Studies that focus on growth determinants in transition countries typically argue that 
these countries and market-oriented economies at a similar level of GDP per capita 
are not structurally identical and therefore should not have the same model 
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specifications (see Table 6.1). Fisher et al. (1996a) identified two sets of growth 
forces in transition countries: those arising from the transition and transformation 
process; and the basic neo-classical determinants of growth. Most of the studies 
which focused on the countries in transition found that initial conditions, 
macroeconomic (in)stability and structural reform are the main growth determinants 
during the first years of transition (De Melo et al., 1996; Fisher et al., 1996b). 
However, even those studies together with a few that estimated the growth 
determinants in the second period of transition pointed out that the importance of the 
determinants that reflect the transition process diminishes as a country progresses 
through transition and that greater weight over time should be put on the standard 
determinants of growth (Fisher et al., 1996a; Dragutinović and Ivančev, 2010). This 
especially relates to the effect of initial conditions, which has been estimated to 
vanish over time (Staehr, 2003; Fisher and Sahay, 2004, Dragutinović and Ivančev, 
2010; Josifidis et al., 2011). However, the effects of macroeconomic stability factors 
and structural reform are still found to be significant (Fisher and Sahay, 2004; 
Dragutinović and Ivančev, 2010; Josafidis et al., 2011). Recent studies mostly focus 
on growth determinants in those transition countries that became EU members in 
2004 and identify economic integration through trade and financial integration as an 
important growth driver (Bower and Turrini, 2009; Friedrich et al., 2010; Kose and 
Prasad, 2010). Most of the recent studies (Staehr, 2003; Barlow, 2006; Falcetti et al., 
2006; Josafidis et al., 2011) include the lagged dependent variable as one of the 
explanatory variables, since current growth rates are likely to be influenced by the 
previous year’s growth rate. Moreover, when the model is correctly specified, the 
estimation of a dynamic panel model allows easier controlling for potential 
endogeneity, which is an important issue in growth estimations. Variables that will 
be included in our growth model are divided into four categories: variables that affect 
macroeconomic stability; variables that represent progress in transition and initial 
conditions; traditional growth determinants; and variables that control for the effect 
of the financial crisis.  
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Table 6.1: Summary of the empirical research of the growth determinants in transition countries  
 
Highlighted studies are those that assess the effect of ERR on growth 
Study Sample 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Controls 
The effect of fixed ERR on 
the dependent variable 
compared to other regimes 
Technique 
Fisher et al. 
(1996a) 
25 transition 
countries,  
1992-1994 
GDP growth 
Fixed ERR, government balance, cumulative value of the 
liberalisation index, measures of exports, log of initial 
(1991) per capita income  
Positive  
Fixed effects 
model 
Fisher et al. 
(1996b) 
20 transition 
countries,  
1992-1994 
GDP growth 
 
 
Logarithm of the annual inflation rate, ratio of fiscal 
surplus and GDP, official external assistance as a 
percentage of GDP, an index which measures the degree 
of enterprise- and banking- sector reforms and 
privatisation    
Not addressed   2 step GLS  
Growth rate 
of aggregate 
income 
Initial level of real per capita income, growth rate of 
population, secondary school enrolment rate, the share of 
investment in GDP 
Staehr (2003) 
25 transition 
countries, 
1989 - 2001 
Growth rate 
Lagged growth rate, trend variable, conflict dummy, 
consumer price index (log(100+I)), initial conditions, 
reform variables (included in differences and in lags)  
Not addressed   
WLS and 
GMM 
Domac et al. 
(2001) 
22 transition 
countries, 
10 years 
(different period 
for each country) 
Growth rate  
Budget balance, change in liberalization index, lagged 
liberalization index, inflation, years under communism, 
share of industry, urbanization, share of CMEA trade, 
dummy variables for different ERRs (fixed ER, 
intermediate and floating ERR) and dummy variables for 
Central Europe and Baltic Countries  
Inconclusive  
Switching 
regression 
technique  
Fisher and Sahay 
(2004) 
25 transition 
economies, 1991-
2001 
GDP growth 
Dummy variable for the fixed ERR/inflation (lagged), 
initial condition index, initial conditions index*year, 
change in fiscal balance, reform index and state reform 
index  
Negative and significant if 
inflation is not included, 
insignificant when inflation is 
included, positive and 
significant when initial 
conditions and institutional 
developments are not 
controlled for. 
2 SLS panel 
regression 
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Table 6.1 (continuing): Summary of the empirical research of the growth determinants in transition countries  
 
Highlighted studies are those that assess the effect of ERR on growth 
Study Sample 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Controls 
The effect of fixed ERR on 
the dependent variable 
compared to other regimes 
Technique 
Barlow (2006) 
Transition 
countries 
 
Growth rate  
Lagged growth rate, percentage rate of inflation (in logs), 
index of trade policy, index of privatization, index of 
internal market reforms (indices included in differences 
and lagged and interaction terms between indices), 
dummy variable for war 
Not addressed   
Arellano-
Bond (1991) 
technique 
Falcetti et al. 
(2006) 
25 transition 
countries,  
1989-2003 
Growth rate, 
GDP per 
capita 
growth rate 
(Lagged growth rate), Initial conditions index, average 
EBRD indicator (lagged), general government balance to 
GDP,  civil liberties index, dummy variable for recovery, 
annual net exports of oil, external growth 
Not addressed   
OLS, 2SLS, 
Arellano-
Bond (1991) 
technique 
De Grauwe and 
Schnabl (2008) 
10 CEE 
countries,  
1994-2002 
Growth rate  
Indicators of ER stability, ratio of investment to GDP, the 
growth rate of dollar exports, the budget deficit to GDP, 
short-term capital inflows to GDP, real growth of the EU 
15, dummies for 1998 crisis and inflation targeting 
Insignificant (when de jure 
ER stability is used) 
Negative and significant 
(when de facto ER stability 
used) 
Panel GLS 
estimation 
Dragutinović and 
Ivančev (2010) 
27 transition 
counties,  
1999-2009 
Growth rate  
Fiscal balance, consumer price index, government 
expenditure, investment, investment lagged, education, 
average EBRD indicator, dummy for EU candidates, 
dummy for SAA, dummy for EU member countries, 
initial GDP  
Not addressed   
FE, ECGLS, 
G2SLS,  
Josifidis et al. 
(2011) 
Ten Emerging 
Economies and 
five West Balkan 
1997-2009 
Growth rate 
Lagged value of GDP; fiscal balance to GDP, logarithm 
of consumer price index, government expenditure to 
GDP; aggregate EBRD indicators (lagged), FDI inflow 
per capita (lagged), share of total volume of trade in GDP, 
initial level of GDPpc (in 1989); interaction terms of all 
explanatory variable and Emerging Europe dummy   
Not addressed 
System 
GMM 
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Macroeconomic stability variables  
 
Fisher et al. (1996b) argued that macroeconomic stability might be captured by the 
budget balance and an exchange rate regime dummy. Fisher and Sahay (2004) 
argued that a variable for the inflation rate might be used instead of an exchange rate 
regime variable, since they assume that the fixed exchange rate regimes are expected 
to increase growth in the long run because they bring inflation down much faster 
than other ERRs. This effect might also be partially captured through the inclusion of 
regimes that were introduced to stabilise the macroeconomic situation in a country. 
In the countries with a CBA, monetary stabilisation was hypothesised to have been 
established through the introduction of CBA, since it is likely to increase the 
monetary authority credibility and to lower inflation (as suggested by the analysis 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5). The CBA is therefore observed as a monetary 
framework that is expected to maintain monetary stability. However, its effect on 
macroeconomic stability and growth is more ambiguous.  
 
As explained in Section 5.2 and discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, a CBA may 
influence the economy through several channels. In particular, it may enhance 
growth through an increase in monetary stability, since a fixed exchange rate regime 
decreases exchange rate risk and uncertainty and should consequently increase 
investment and international trade, which should increase GDP growth. Additionally, 
this effect/channel might be enhanced through the additional features of CBA, such 
as the high degree of central bank independence and limited discretion of the 
monetary authority, which also decrease uncertainty and inflation (as suggested by 
the empirical analysis in Chapter 5). On the other hand, a CBA may negatively 
influence growth in a period of crises and shocks, since the monetary authority 
cannot give loans to government or banks and it cannot act as a lender of last resort. 
Since adjustments to shocks cannot be channelled through changes in the exchange 
rate or through the central bank’s support to the financial sector shocks are 
transmitted into the real economy. This negative effect might prevail due to 
constraints posed on fiscal policy in transition countries (this is elaborated for BH in 
Chapter 1). Since the monetary authority under a CBA cannot finance government 
deficits, the usage of fiscal policy instruments in period of crises is restrained as well. 
This is likely to repress output, employment and consequently growth. However, the 
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effect of all of these channels is not straightforward and it is hard to distinguish 
between them.  
 
The results of the studies that estimated the effect of a CBA on growth performance, 
which were appraised in Section 5.2, are also inconclusive: some found a positive 
(Anastassova, 1999; Ghosh et al., 2000), while others found no effect of a CBA on 
growth (Wolf et al., 2008). As elaborated in the previous section, the effect of 
exchange rate regime on growth is not straightforward and the empirical results of 
studies that estimate the effect of exchange rate regime on growth are also 
inconclusive. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) and Bleaney and Francisco 
(2007b) found a negative effect of pegged ERR (and CBA) on growth for developing 
countries, while Huang and Malhota (2005) found that developing countries with a 
fixed ERR outperform those with other ERRs with respect to growth. Studies that 
focus only on transition countries also give mixed results. Domac et al. (2001) found 
that none of the ERRs are superior with respect to growth in transition countries. 
Fisher et al. (1996b) found that transition countries with fixed ERR had better growth 
performance than countries with other ERRs. De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004a, 2008) 
found that among Central and Eastern European countries the ones with a pegged 
ERR had, on average, higher growth rates than countries with other ERRs. Studies 
also differ in their methodologies and other growth determinants included (see Table 
6.1). Additionally, some studies which focused on the estimation of different ERRs 
on growth argued that there is an endogeneity (caused by simultaneity) between 
growth and ERR and addressed this issue by using simultaneous equations 
(Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003) or by treating it as endogenous in a dynamic panel 
estimation (Petreski, 2011). Studies that focused on estimating the effect of CBA on 
growth and studies that focused on growth determinants in transition counties did not 
address this issue. However, there is no reason to assume that there is a problem with 
endogeneity between CBA and growth since there is no reason to assume that 
countries with higher or lower growth tend to introduce or maintain a CBA. 
 
Fisher et al. (1996b) argued that lower inflation is one of the preconditions for 
macroeconomic stabilisation, which is likely to enhance growth. Fisher et al. (1996b) 
argued that countries that succeeded in reducing inflation also began to grow, 
typically with a lag. On the other hand, prioritising low inflation may depress 
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economic activity that lowers growth in the short run. Verme (2004) argued that a 
low inflation rate up to a certain threshold level might stimulate domestic output. 
However, Verme (2004, p.856) further argued that “in economies with fixed 
exchange rates, increases in the foreign (and domestic) rate of inflation always have 
adverse consequences for real activity.” However, a measure of inflation is usually 
not included when a variable for the exchange rate regime is in the model. Fisher and 
Sahay (2004) argued that inflation and the exchange rate regime variable are strongly 
correlated, and that they are not separately significant if both entered into the 
regression. To avoid extreme inflation rate observations a logarithmic transformation 
is usually used (Staehr, 200384; Barlow, 2006).  
 
Another variable that is considered to capture the macroeconomic stabilisation effect 
is fiscal balance, which is included in some studies (see Table 6.1), though this 
variable is likely to be highly correlated with the inflation rate variable. However, 
studies that included both fiscal balance and inflation generated mixed results85. 
Studies that included only fiscal balance as a measure of macroeconomic stability 
found a positive effect of fiscal surplus on growth (Fisher et al., 1996b; Falcetti et al., 
2006). Most of the studies emphasise that this variable is likely to be endogenous 
(Berg et al., 1999; Falcetti et al., 2002) and some include it with a lag in order to 
avoid this potential problem (Falcetti et al., 2006). In order to control for the above 
effects and to address all emphasised issues, inflation and the fiscal balance (a fiscal 
deficit takes on a negative value) are included with a one-year lag. Additionally, for a 
robustness check the fixed exchange rate dummy, inflation rate and fiscal balance 
variable will be incrementally added in order to check whether the inclusion of one is 
affecting the inclusion of another, which is suggested by some studies. Beside the 
fiscal balance variable, some studies also control for the size of government by 
including the ratio of government expenditures to GDP (Dragutinović and Ivančev, 
2010, Josifidis et al., 2011). However, the direction of this effect is not 
straightforward, since it depends on the relative size and type of government 
consumption and investment and distortions associated with its financing (Fisher et 
                                                                
84 LI = log(100+I) 
85 The difficulties in separating the effects of inflation and fiscal deficit on growth could be explained 
in several ways: regression models did not include possible simultaneous determination of inflation 
and growth (Havrylyshin, 2001), or it is due to endogeneity of the fiscal balance variable (Berg et al., 
1999; Falcetti et al. 2002) (as cited in Dragutinović and Ivančev, 2010). 
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al., 1998). Namely, a 'big' government reduces private-sector risk-taking and hence 
lowers growth, whilst on the other hand it may be associated with relatively high 
investment in infrastructure that supports growth.   
 
Progress in transition and initial conditions 
 
Most of the studies that estimated the growth determinants in transition countries 
emphasised the importance of controlling for the progress in transition/reform. This 
is one of the controls which have been recognized as the most important in transition 
countries, especially during the first period of transition (Fisher et al., 1996b; De 
Melo et al., 1997). However, its effect is estimated to be significant during the 
second period of transition as well (Fisher and Sahay, 2004; Dragutinović and 
Ivančev, 2010). It is expected that the higher the progress in transition is the higher 
the growth rates are. However, Dragutinović and Ivančev (2010) found a negative 
effect of reform on growth during the second period of transition. They explain this 
by arguing that: “transition countries that were late with the reforms could be faced 
with further time taking reforms and slower growth in the second decade, despite the 
fact that they undertake them properly” (p.26). Most of the studies used the average 
of various reform indices to capture this effect. Some studies tried to estimate the 
effect of individual (specific) indices instead of the aggregate one in order to 
distinguish between different types of progress. However, Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) 
argued that an aggregate index performs best, whereas parameters to individual 
reform elements are estimated very imprecisely. Moreover, it is argued that 
individual indices tend to be highly correlated (countries usually proceed with 
liberalisation, privatisation and structural reform simultaneously) which is likely to 
result in imprecise estimates (Staehr, 2003). As a measure of reform the EBRD 
indices are usually used (Fisher and Sahay, 2004; Barlow, 2006; Josafidis et al., 
2011) and Staehr (2003, p.12) argued that these indices are “established in the 
literature, allow a long sample and are all collected by the same source”. Fisher and 
Sahay (2004) argued that the aggregate EBRD index is a measure of the extent of 
reform and a measure of institutional change. Moreover, Havrylyshyn and van 
Rooden (2000) (as cited in Staehr, 2003) found that nearly all of a large number of 
institutional indicators are strongly correlated with the EBRD indices. However, 
since it also might be expected that higher growth tends to accelerate progress in 
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transition the endogeneity issue is again raised. Some studies include this variable 
with a one period lag (Staehr, 2003; Barlow, 200686; Falcetti et al., 2006; Josafidis et 
al., 2011) since it may be argued to have a delayed impact on growth and since it 
reduces the problem of endogeneity. Following the above discussion, we include the 
aggregate EBRD indicator as a proxy for progress in transition, with a one-year lag.  
 
Initial conditions which represent macroeconomic distortion at the beginning of 
transition (in terms of the initial, pre-transition level of GDP per capita) are expected 
to be negatively correlated with economic growth, indicating that poor countries 
typically grow faster than less poor ones. However, as noted above, this relationship 
appears to be significant only in the initial phase of transition and to fade over time 
(Fisher and Sahay, 2004; Dragutinović and Ivančev, 2010). Additionally, Staehr 
(2003) argued that the inclusion of fixed-effect dummy variables “soak-up” the effect 
of initial conditions since they are country specific. However, since the initial 
conditions capture the effect of conditional convergence and are regularly included in 
almost all growth models, we will control for this effect by including the GDP per 
capita at the first year of transition. Although most of the studies use GDP per capita 
in 1989 (as the pre-transition year) to control for initial conditions in transition 
countries it might be argued that this year should be determined on a country-by-
country basis since a beginning of transition process is country specific. Fisher and 
Sahay (2004) determined different years of beginning of transition (transition years) 
for different groups of transition countries, assigning 1990 as a starting point of 
transition for Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland and Slovenia; 1991 for Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovak Republic; and 1992 for the Baltic 
and CIS countries. For countries that are included, both in Fisher and Sahay’s and in 
our own analysis, we will use the transition years established in this study. Only BH 
and Serbia from our sample are not included in Fisher and Sahay’s (2004) sample. 
Although Dragutinović and Ivančev (2010) use 1990 as a transition year for both 
Serbia and BH, it may be argued that the real process of transition in these countries 
started later, due to the specific circumstances in these countries during the early 
1990s. The real process of transition in Serbia is usually argued to begin in 2000, 
                                                                
86 Staehr (2003) and Barlow (2006) included reform variables in both levels (in the first differences) 
and in lags. Instead of creating one aggregate index Staehr (2003) used individual EBRD indices 
while Barlow (2006) included three groups of reform indices (for liberalisation, privatisation and 
internal market reforms).   
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since during the 1990s it was still a state-dominated and deeply criminalised country 
and processes of liberalisation, privatisation and financial reforms did not start before 
2000 (Zivkovic, 2004). As discussed in Chapter 1, the transition process in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina started later due to the war. Therefore, as a transition year for BH 
1998 is used, since implementation of most of the new (market-oriented) laws started 
in that year.    
 
Traditional growth determinants  
 
Beside ‘transition-specific’ determinants, recent studies on growth in transition 
countries also control for some traditional determinants from the ’standard’ 
economic growth theories, such as population growth, investments in fixed and 
human capital and the level of economic integration. The ‘traditional’ growth 
variables that will be included in our model specification are discussed next. As 
noted in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) a higher rate of population growth is 
expected to lower the steady-state level of capital and output per worker and thereby 
to reduce the per capita growth rate for a given initial level of per capita output. The 
effect of the investment in fixed and human capital is usually measured by including 
two variables in the model: investment (as a percentage of GDP) and educational 
attainment. It is expected that higher investment and higher educational attainment 
will increase growth. As suggested by Dragutinović and Ivančev (2010), the 
investment variable will be included with one lag to avoid potential endogeneity 
between investment and growth. Dragutinović and Ivančev (2010) also find that 
openness of the economy appears to be important growth determinant in the second 
phase of transition. According to neoclassical theory, more open economies tend to 
grow faster due to increased competition from international markets, while according 
to the endogenous theory this relationship is argued to be channelled through 
increased economies of scale and faster technological diffusion between countries 
(Mirestean and Tsangarides, 2009). Moreover, Calvo et al. (2004) (as cited in Kose 
and Prasad, 2010) found that greater trade openness makes countries less vulnerable 
to financial crises, including sudden stops and currency crashes and a positive effect 
of openness on growth has been found in several studies (Dragutinović and Ivančev, 
2010; Friedrich et al., 2010). However, in the context of the latest global financial 
crisis the direction of this effect is less certain. The commonly used measure for the 
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openness variable is the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. 
Additionally, some studies include a terms of trade variable to control for external 
shocks (Anastassova, 1999; Wolf et al., 2008; Mirestean and Tsangarides, 2009). 
The expected sign on this variable is positive since an increase/improvement in the 
terms of trade means that a country can buy more imports for any given level of 
exports, and this is expected to positively affect growth. Finally, recent studies 
emphasise the importance of the effect of economic integration. Dragutinović and 
Ivančev (2010) estimate the effect of different stages towards EU accession on 
growth and find that only the phase of full EU membership has an impact on growth 
dynamics and it appears to be negative. Dragutinović and Ivančev (2010, p.7) explain 
this negative effect “by the fact that there are common patterns for countries at a 
similar level of development. Namely, once the transition country improves its 
general welfare, which happens along with its accession to the EU, it follows a 
similar growth path to other EU countries in terms of lower growth rates.”  
 
Growth during the crisis 
 
A few recent studies emphasise the importance of the recent financial crisis on 
growth. Josafidis et al. (2011) argue that this crisis hit transition countries relatively 
hard, since they were highly reliant on the international financial markets. 
Tsangarides (2010, p.6) specifies the growth function for the period of crisis by 
including “proxies of the ‘trade’ and ‘financial’ channels in the transmission of 
shocks in the global economy”. He estimates that in the recent financial crisis 
countries with pegged regimes performed better than countries with floating 
exchange rate regimes, but worse during the recovery period 2010-2011. Josafidis et 
al. (2011) try to capture the effect of crisis by estimating the sample first before the 
crisis and then by including a crisis period and comparing the results. In order to 
control for the effects of crisis, time dummy variables will be included in our 
analysis. Table 6.2 summarises variables which will be included in the growth 
model, providing their description, expected sign and data source.  
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Table 6.2: Growth regression variables – label, description, expected sign and data 
source 
Variable name Label Description 
Expected 
sign 
Data 
source 
Notes 
Real GDP per 
capita growth  
GDPPCG 
Growth rate of GDP 
per capita based on 
constant local 
currency  
(annual % change)  
Depend-
ent 
variable 
WDI  
Currency board 
arrangement 
CBA 
Dummy variable       
(1 for CBA countries) 
?   
Fixed exchange 
rate (regime) 
defactoFIX 
Dummy variable for 
countries with de 
facto fixed exchange 
rate regime 
+ 
Ilzetski, 
Reinhart, 
Rogoff 
(2010) 
 
Inflation  lnINF 
Natural log of 
inflation, measured as 
percentage change of 
consumer price index  
 
- WDI 
For BH national 
statistics is used; infla- 
tion in BH is measured 
by using the retail price 
index until 2007 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP  
FB 
The ratio of fiscal 
balance to real GDP 
(%)  
(a fiscal surplus takes 
on a positive sign) 
? 
 
EBRD 
Data for Moldova taken 
from various EBRD 
transition reports and 
EconStat 
Government 
expenditure  
GOV 
Government 
expenditures in 
percentage of GDP 
? EBRD  
EBRD progress 
in transition 
indicator 
EBRDI 
Average of eight 
EBRD transition 
indicators (for the 
liberalisation, 
privatisation and 
credit reform) (index) 
? EBRD 
Available for all 
countries in the sample 
except for Czech 
Republic in years 2008 
and 2009 
Initial 
conditions 
IC 
GDP per capita in 
transition year 
- 
Fisher and 
Sahay 
(2004) 
For BH and Serbia own 
assessment 
Population 
growth 
POPG 
Growth rate of total 
population 87 
- WDI  
Investment INV 
Total investment (% 
of GDP)  
+ 
IMF, 
WEO 
Data for Macedonia not 
available 
Education  EDUC 
School enrolment, 
tertiary (% gross) 
+ WDI  
Openness OPEN 
(exports + imports) / 
GDP (%) 
+ WDI  
Terms of trade TOT 
Ratio of the export 
unit value index to the 
import unit value 
index (base year 
2000) 
+ 
UNCTAD 
STAT 
Data not available for 
years 1998 and 1999 
and data for Serbia is 
joint with data for 
Montenegro, therefore 
data for 2008 and 2009 
missing for this county 
EU 
membership  
EU 
Dummy variable 
for EU member 
countries 
?   
                                                                
87 Since there might be a problem with including population growth on the right hand side when the 
growth of GDP per capita is on the left, the preferred estimations without this variable was estimated 
and the results were quite similar. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) also included population 
growth and used GDP per capita growth as the dependent variable. 
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6.2.3 Descriptive statistics and model specification 
 
After specifying growth determinants in the previous section the average trends in 
GDP per capita growth and growth determinants between countries with a CBA and 
countries with other regimes will be summarised (Table 6.3) and the initial model 
specified (Equation 6.1).  
 
Table 6.3: Comparison of average trends in GDP growth and growth determinants 
between countries with a CBA (four countries) and countries with other regimes 
(twenty one countries) 
 
Variable 
CBA OTHER REGIMES 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
GDPPCG 5.08 5.48 -14.55 11.79 5.07 5.48 -17.62 33.03 
INF 4.69 4.02 -1.13 18.67 12.29 24.46 -8.53 293.68 
FB   -0.60 2.75 -9.18 3.37 -2.73 3.96 -13.14 25.46 
POPG 1.00 0.25 0.13 2.19 1.11 0.86 0.05 10.73 
EDUC 55.53 13.22 33.5 79.53 43.89 18.67 13.25 87.62 
INV 26.17 6.18 10.64 39.64 25.04 6.89 4.39 57.99 
EBRDI 3.31 0.56 2.13 4.00 3.07 0.54 1.42 4.00 
OPEN 122.91   23.12 87.28 172.80 99.06 31.15 45.13 203.20 
TOT 110.97 17.39 97.95 148.66 105.64 21.26 73.51 238.18 
GOV 39.27 6.17 33.17 62.85 35.83 9.72 3.10 60.39 
 
Countries included in the analysis are the same transition countries as those in 
Chapter 5 and the period is 1998-2009. Again, four countries, BH, Bulgaria, Estonia 
and Lithuania, out of 25 in the sample had a CBA during this period. According to 
Table 6.3 countries with a CBA recorded, on average, a startlingly similar GDP per 
capita growth rate (GDPPCG) and had only slightly higher levels of education 
(EDUC), investment (INV), progress in transition (EBRDI) and government 
expenditures (GOV) than countries with other regimes. CBA countries were, on 
average, also more open and had better terms of trade than countries with other 
regimes. In contrast, as expected, inflation and fiscal deficit, variables are markedly 
lower in CBA countries than in those with other regimes. However, these are only 
unconditional averages of variables. Therefore, before making any inference about 
the effect of CBA on macroeconomic performance a more formal empirical analysis 
should be conducted. Accordingly, the effect of CBA (compared to other regimes) on 
GDP growth (Equation 6.1) will be estimated taking into account all the above 
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specified controls. Moreover, time-specifics (such as a shock of oil or food prices) 
are controlled for by including time dummy variables (t); εi,t is a standard error term. 
 
GDPPCGi,t = α0 + α1CBAi,t + α2defactoFIXi,t + α3lnINFi,t-1 + α4FBi,t-1 + α5ICi + 
α6POPGi,t + α7EDUCi,t + α8INVi,t-1 + α9EBRDIi,t-1 + α10OPENi,t + α11TOTi,t + 
α12GOVi,t + α13EUi,t + t + εi,t                                                                                (6.1) 
 
6.2.4 Methodology and results 
 
Since possible endogeneity issues have been emphasised in the growth literature 
some of the appraised studies used instrumental variable methods, such as 2SLS, 
3SLS and G2SLS (Fisher and Sahay, 2004; Falcetti et al., 2006; Dragutinović and 
Ivančev, 2010), while others used a dynamic model estimator (Staehr, 2003; Barlow, 
2006; Falcetti et al., 2006; Josifidis et al., 2011). Here, this issue is addressed by 
initially using lagged values of potentially endogenous independent variables and 
later by using their lags as instruments in a dynamic model estimator.  
 
Static panel model estimation 
 
The estimation of Equation 6.1 by pooled OLS suggests that the CBA variable is 
insignificant. According to the correlation matrix, these variables are not highly 
correlated (Appendix 6.1). Only variables for the progress in reform and government 
consumption are estimated to be significant at the 5 percent level, with inflation and 
fiscal balance being significant at the 10 percent level (Appendix 6.2). However, this 
is not the preferred estimator since it does not account for countries’ fixed effects and 
these results will not be discussed further. After plotting the residuals it may be 
observed that there are some outliers that may affect the results. To control for the 
outliers country-time dummies are included: for Azerbaijan in 2006 and 2007 and for 
Latvia and Armenia in 2009. Azerbaijan experienced exceptionally high levels of 
GDP growth in 2006 and 2007 due to very large trade surpluses (which were the 
result of an expanding oil industry and an increase in the world price of oil) (Garbe-
Emden et al., 2011). One the other hand, Latvia and Armenia experienced a severe 
decline in their growth rate in 2009. Sharp declines in the construction sector and 
workers' remittances in Armenia, particularly from Russia, are argued to be the main 
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reasons for the latter downturn. Inclusion of country-time dummies (for the above 
mentioned countries in particular years: Azerbaijan 2006 and 2007 (variables aze2006 
and aze2007), Latvia and Armenia in 2009 (variables lat2009 and arm2009)) improves the 
statistical properties of the model with respect to normality and linearity since, after 
controlling for these outliers, diagnostic tests suggest that hypotheses of linearity, 
homoscedasticity and normality cannot be rejected (Appendix 6.3). The F-test 
suggests that these variables are jointly significant and results of the estimation in 
which these country-time dummy variables are included suggest their individual 
significance as well. Estimations suggest that the fixed effect model is preferred over 
the OLS. However, our variable of interest drops out from the fixed effect estimation 
as it is time invariant (Appendix 6.4). Since we are interested in the effect of CBA 
and, as discussed in Section 5.4 random effects are argued to result in biased and 
inefficient estimates in small samples, the FEVD will again be used as a preferred 
static estimator (for further explanations on FEVD estimator see Section 5.4.3). 
 
Diagnostic tests after the three stage-by-stage estimation suggest the hypotheses of 
linearity, homoscedasticity and normality cannot be rejected. As in the inflation 
regression (Section 5.4.3), the CBA variable and EBRDI are treated as time 
invariant/slowly changing. Since the population growth variable slowly changes both 
between and within countries it is also included in the second stage. Moreover, the 
variables for openness, education and government consumption are included in the 
second stage since their between-to-within ratio is close to 2 (Appendix 6.5a).     
   
FE model (Stage 1 FEVD) 
 
GDPPCGi,t = α0 (+ α1CBAi,t) + α2defactoFIXi,t + α3lnINFi,t-1 + α4FBi,t-1 + α5ICi + 
α6POPGi,t + α7EDUCi,t + α8INVi,t-1 + α9EBRDIi,t-1 + α10OPENi,t + α11TOTi,t + 
α12GOVi,t + α13EUi,t + α14aze2006 + α15aze2007 + α16lit2009 + α17arm2009 + t + ui + εi,t                                        
                                                                                                (6.2) 
Stage 2 in FEVD 
 
ui = β0 + β1CBAi,t + β2EBRDIi,t-1 + β3POPGi,t+ β4OPENi,t + β5GOVi,t + β2EDUCi,t + hi 
.                                                       
.                                                                                                                                .                                                                                                                                 
.                                                                                                                                (6.3) 
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Stage 3 in FEVD 
 
GDPPCGi,t = δ0 + δ1CBAi,t + α2defactoFIXi,t + α3lnINFi,t-1 + α4FBi,t-1 + α5ICi + 
α6POPGi,t + α7EDUCi,t + α8INVi,t-1 + α9EBRDIi,t-1 + α10OPENi,t + α11TOTi,t + 
α12GOVi,t + α13EUi,t + α14aze2006 + α15aze2007 + α16lit2009 + α17arm2009 + α16hi +  t + 
εi,t                                                                                                                                               (6.4) 
 
The FEVD results suggest that a CBA has no effect on growth, when estimated by 3 
stages procedure and using the ‘xtfevd’ command (Appendices 6.5b and 6.5c). The 
results are not altered when fixed ER, inflation and fiscal balance are excluded 
(separately or together) from the specification (Appendix 6.5d); reasons for 
conducting these additional estimations are noted in Section 6.2.2. All other 
variables, except government expenditure, which as expected has a negative effect on 
growth, are insignificant. The results do not differ when the CBA variable is divided 
into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ (Appendix 6.6). Since some studies suggest that previous 
growth rates are likely to influence current growth rates, a dynamic panel estimator 
will be next used. Moreover, the hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected at all 
conventional levels of confidence (the last test within diagnostic tests in Appendices 
6.5b and 6.6a), which also suggests that static models are misspecified and that 
dynamics should be included in the model.  
 
Dynamic panel model estimations 
 
As suggested in the recent literature and estimated in some studies (Staehr, 2003; 
Barlow, 2006; Falcetti et al., 2006; Josifidis et al., 2011) GDP growth is likely to be 
persistent and therefore the lagged dependent variable will be included and a 
dynamic model estimated.  
 
GDPPCGi,t = α0 + α1GDPPCGi,t-1 + α2CBAi,t + α3defactoFIXi,t + α4lnINFi,t + α6FBi,t + 
α8ICi + α9POPGi,t + α10EDUCi,t + α11INVi,t + α13EBRDIi,t + α15OPENi,t + α16TOTi,t + 
α17GOVi,t + α18EUi,t + α19aze2006 + α20aze2007 + α21lit2009 + α22arm2009 + t + εi,t        
                                                               (6.5) 
where εi,t = ui + vi,t (ui is a group-specific effect and vi,t is white noise) 
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According to the results of the dynamic estimation (one-step ‘system’ GMM) the 
CBA variable is again insignificant, before and after controlling for the fixed 
exchange rate regime, inflation and fiscal balance (Appendices 6.7a and 6.7c). 
According to the results government expenditures are again significant and negative, 
investment is significant and positive and the lagged dependent variable88 is 
significant and positive. Other variables are insignificant (Appendix 6.7). The results 
are very similar when the CBA variable is divided into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ CBA 
(Appendix 6.7d). However, the Hansen test is too weak and the Sargan test suggests 
that the hypothesis of instrument validity is rejected and therefore we cannot make 
any inference from these results. Therefore, we do not present the results in the main 
text, but these are available in the appendices.  
 
Standard growth models focus on the very long run. Accordingly, given the limited 
time series depth of our data (12 years), the estimation of a GDP growth function is 
more indicative of the determinants of short-run variations in growth rather than the 
GDP trend. Therefore, the effect of CBA on macroeconomic performance in 
transition countries will next be estimated by focusing on growth volatility.  
 
6.3 Estimation of the effect of CBA on growth volatility  
 
6.3.1 Growth volatility as a proxy for macroeconomic performance in transition 
countries 
 
Since standard growth models focus on the long run and we are operating with a 
short sample period, macroeconomic performance in transition countries could be 
represented better by output or growth volatility89 rather than output growth. 
Moreover, since we are estimating the effect of a specific monetary framework on 
macroeconomic performance the estimation of its effect on growth is not fully 
convincing on theoretical or empirical grounds. As argued in Section 6.2.1, it is 
usually argued that the monetary/ER regimes/policies have no effect on growth since 
in the long run output is likely to return to its trend level due to adjustment 
                                                                
88 The size of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from the dynamic estimation is between 
the values of the coefficients from the OLS and fixed effect estimates (Appendix 6.7b). 
89 Previous studies used both output and growth volatility as measure of volatility. Even though we 
use growth volatility, for the reasons discussed below, we refer to and assess both output and growth 
volatility studies in order to determine our model specification. 
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mechanisms. Therefore, the focus will next be placed on estimating the effect of 
CBA on growth volatility.  
 
Kose and Prasad (2010, p. 45) emphasise that “even if volatility is considered 
intrinsically a second-order issue, its relationship with growth indicates that volatility 
could indirectly have first-order welfare implications”. Toit (2009) and Leonidas 
(2010) emphasise that output volatility is usually higher in less developed countries 
(compared to the developed ones) and that it matters in terms of economic welfare. 
As noted in Athanasoulis and Van Wincoop (2000) (as cited in Leonidas, 2010), the 
effects of volatility on welfare can be significant, even reaching 5-10 percent of 
consumption. Leonidas (2010) emphasises that understanding the causes of volatility 
in growth rates is important since volatility is likely to create economic uncertainty 
that may negatively impact on future growth rates (as first documented in Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995). This negative correlation between growth rates and their volatilities 
may also be observed in our sample by comparing Figures 5.3 and 6.1. According to 
Figure 5.3 after a relatively steady growth from 1999 to 2006 (2007 for SEE 
countries), there has been a significant decline in growth rates in all observed 
transition countries. Accordingly, growth volatility declined until 2001-2003 (2004-
2006 in SEE countries) and increased significantly after 2004-2006 in all transition 
countries (Figure 6.1). 
 
Figure 6.1: Volatility of real GDP growth in CEB, SEE and CIS counties  
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None of the studies that focused on transition economies investigated directly output 
or growth volatility determinants nor used measures of volatility as a dependent 
variable. Moreover, there is only a limited literature that focuses on the effect of 
different monetary and ER regimes on output or growth volatility. A few studies that 
estimated the effect of CBA on macroeconomic performance estimated its effect on 
both output growth and volatility. In determining the output volatility specification, 
these studies used a very similar specification to that in growth studies, with the only 
differences that volatility instead of growth of some variables (volatility of 
investment, volatility of terms of trade) was used (Ghosh et al., 2000; Wolf et al., 
2008, see Table 5.1). Some studies which estimated the effect of different ERRs on 
output or growth volatility even used the volatilities of the same explanatory 
variables as in the growth regression (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001; 
Bastourre and Carrera, 2004, as cited in Petreski, 2011). However, none of these 
studies offered a rationale for this, nor did these studies focus on transition countries. 
In order to determine the appropriate model specification we will reflect on studies 
which focus on determining growth determinants in transition countries (Section 
6.2.2). Additionally, output growth and output and growth volatility studies will be 
consulted, especially those that focus on estimating the effect of different monetary 
/ER regimes on volatility, in order to identify further likely growth volatility 
determinants.  
 
6.3.2 Output and growth volatility measures and determinants  
 
Studies that focus on the determinants of output and growth volatility differ in their 
choice of explanatory variables. Leonidas (2010, p.3) notes that: “The current state of 
the literature on the determinants of volatility parallels the first phase of the growth 
literature, as it is comprised of a number of studies using very different and specific 
subsets of variables with often diametrically opposite conclusions”. There is also no 
consensus on which measure should be used for volatility. Some studies used the 
standard deviation of the annual GDP growth rate (Ramey and Ramey, 1995; 
Bleaney and Fielding, 200290; Bejan, 2006; Kose and Prasad, 2010) or the standard 
deviation of GDP level (Gavin and Hausman, 1996), while other studies used a three-
year or five-year moving standard deviation of GDP per capita level and/or growth 
                                                                
90 Bleaney and Fielding (2002) used this measure in logs 
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(Ghosh et al., 2000; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001). Wolf et al. (2008) used 
the centred three-year standard deviation of the log of real GDP relative to its 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend and the three-year standard deviation of the real GDP 
growth rate. In our estimations, the variability of GDP growth will be used, since the 
variability of GDP levels would show us the changes in output, which represents 
growth. Haddad et al. (2010, p.7) emphasise three reasons for using volatility of 
growth rather than volatility of output: “First, even a stable growth path at a constant 
annual rate of growth will generate a positive volatility measure, even though this is 
both a desirable and perfectly forecastable outcome. Second, policymakers are 
generally more concerned with maintaining a stable growth rate, as opposed to stable 
output levels, since it is the former on which policy decisions are predominantly 
based. Third, we follow the standard approach in the literature on the effects of 
volatility and these papers (Easterley and Kraay, 2000 and Ramey and Ramey, 1995) 
have generally focused on growth rather than output volatility”. 
 
Another issue when formulating the dependent variable is the number of years over 
which the standard deviation should be calculated. A commonly used measure is the 
standard deviation over the whole period or three-year period of GDP growth or 
GDP level. However, Ćorić (2008) argued that these measures are arbitrary and that 
the time periods over which the standard deviation is to be calculated should be 
determined according to the detected break points (years) in volatility. Another issue 
is whether rolling standard errors should be used or standard deviations should be 
calculated for the separate periods without overlapping. When applied to annual-
level data, a few problems with using the rolling standard errors are usually 
emphasised (Bastourre and Carrera, 2004; Petreski, 2011): it adds persistence to the 
series, i.e. induces high autocorrelation; moving average time series typically 
generate spurious cycles (the Yule-Slutsky theorem); and the way in which each 
standard deviation should be assigned to a particular year is not clear. Therefore, we 
will use standard deviations calculated for non-overlapping periods, even though 
there is a significant information loss and with 12 year periods only 4 time periods 
are available (when 3-year standard deviations, based on non-overlapping averages 
of GDP growth, are used). The procedure suggested by Ćorić (2008) for determining 
the periods over which standard deviations should be calculated cannot be applied in 
our case for several reasons: with only 12 years period data we cannot identify long-
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run structural changes (therefore we cannot form periods according to these breaks); 
since we are dealing with short-run data, the only way to analyse growth variance is 
by a simple measure over short periods; because of the need for as many degrees of 
freedom as possible, the minimum period possible for calculating GDP growth 
volatility will be used (3-year period). 
 
Although different studies used different determinants of output and growth 
volatility, the consensus is that a regression should contain variables that represent 
shocks and shock buffers. As noted in the previous section, studies that focus on 
transition recognised the importance of macroeconomic stabilisation and reform 
variables as determinants of macroeconomic performance. There is no agreement on 
whether variables should be included in levels or volatilities. In further analysis we 
identify those that are determined to be the most commonly used and which will be 
used in our empirical analysis. After considering these potential macroeconomic 
performance determinants, the growth volatility model, which focuses on the effect 
of monetary/ER regimes in transition countries, will be determined.  
 
The monetary/ER regime might be considered a potential measure of a shock buffer 
as well as a potential tool for macroeconomic stabilisation. If CBA is considered as a 
potential monetary stabilisation tool its effect on growth volatility is not 
straightforward. On the one hand, a CBA is likely to decrease inflation (as suggested 
in Section 5.4) which is likely to induce monetary stability and consequently growth 
stability. On the other hand, a CBA may increase growth volatility in a period of 
crises and shocks, since the monetary authority cannot give loans to government or 
banks and it cannot act as a lender of last resort. Since adjustments to shocks cannot 
be channelled through changes in the exchange rate or through central bank support 
to the financial sector, the shocks will be transmitted into the real economy, 
especially when prices and wages are sticky. This negative effect might prevail in 
transition economies due to constraints posed on fiscal policy. Since the monetary 
authority under CBA cannot finance government deficits the usage of fiscal policy 
instruments in period of crises may be restrained as well. This is likely to increase 
growth volatility, since both monetary and fiscal buffers are limited.  
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Studies that estimated the effect of CBA on macroeconomic performance, which are 
appraised in Section 5.2, treated the CBA as an ERR. Their results for the CBA 
effect on output volatility are inconclusive: Ghosh et al. (2000) found no significant 
effect, while Wolf et al. (2008) found different effects depending on the level of a 
country’s development. Their results suggested that amongst higher-income 
countries, countries with CBAs experience higher output volatility while amongst 
lower-income countries CBAs are associated with lower volatility, relative to 
countries with either a floating ER regime or soft pegs. They justified these findings 
by arguing that there were differences in price and wage stickiness between countries 
with different levels of development. Namely, they argued that in less developed 
countries “wages and prices are less likely to be sticky and macroeconomic policies 
may themselves be a source of volatility. In such circumstances, the discipline of a 
currency board arrangement may help provide greater economic stability”. (p.112). It 
may also be argued that this effect may occur in transition counties due to their 
extensive informal sectors, which may buffer shocks even when wages and prices in 
the formal sector are sticky. However, studies which estimated the affect of CBA on 
output volatility did not provide any robustness checks or explanation for using 
almost the same specification for examining the determinants of growth and output 
volatility (see Table 5.1). In addition, these studies failed to control for inflation, with 
Ghosh et al. (2000) failing to control for fiscal balance as well. Finally, none of these 
studies reported the results of diagnostic tests. However, we cannot control for the 
fixed ERR since we are averaging data over a three-year period and the effect of 
ERR is measured by a dummy variable which is changing in some countries during 
these sub-periods. This problem does not occur with the CBA variable, since no 
country introduced or ended a CBA in the observed period. 
 
Identification of the effect of fixed exchange rate regime on growth volatility is also 
not straightforward. While some studies found a positive effect of fixed exchange 
rate regimes on output/growth volatility (Bastourre and Carrera, 2004; Bleaney and 
Fielding, 2002; Edwards and Levy-Yeyati, 2005), others did not find any significant 
effect (Haddad et al., 2010). Petreski (2011) emphasises that the effect of ERR on 
output volatility depends on the type of shock experienced, arguing that in the case of 
predominantly nominal domestic shocks more rigid regimes are expected to prevent 
their transmission to the real economy, while more flexible regimes are believed to 
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behave as buffers when real (mostly exogenous) shocks hit an economy. Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) argued that this effect depends on the level of 
development of an economy. Their results suggested a positive effect in developing 
countries and insignificant effect in advanced economies. However, there are only a 
limited number of studies that estimated the effect of different ERRs on output or 
growth volatility and these differ in controls and techniques used (for summary of 
these studies see Table 6.4). Furthermore, inflation is also argued to be an 
appropriate measure of monetary stability and a function of stabilisation policy 
(Staehr, 2003) and it is expected that countries with lower inflation rates have lower 
volatility. A fiscal balance variable is also considered one of the potential 
stabilisation measures and fiscal surpluses may be expected to give more scope for 
fiscal activism in the event of an adverse shock and therefore to decrease output and 
growth variability. This effect is also suggested for the lower income countries in the 
empirical analysis conducted by Wolf et al. (2008). These three variables are also 
used as monetary stabilisation variables in some of the studies which estimated 
macroeconomic performance (“growth”) in transition countries (for the summary of 
empirical evidence of the studies which focused on macroeconomic performance 
determinants in transition countries see Table 6.1). The way specific monetary-ER 
regimes affect output and growth volatility might be argued to depend on the level of 
development of the financial system (Easterly et al., 2000; Petreski, 2011). Namely, if 
the financial system is well-developed it may cushion the shock effects on the real 
economy even when a rigid regime is used. Therefore, a measure of the level of 
financial development should be included. Ćorić (2008) used the private credits to 
GDP ratio and the M2 to GDP ratio as measures of financial development, while 
Petreski (2011) used the total bank assets as a proportion of GDP as a measure of 
financial development. Easterly et al. (2000) suggested a whole set of variables as 
measures of financial system development: change in private credit/gross domestic 
investment, standard deviation of M3/GDP, stock market value traded/GDP, credit to 
private sector/GDP, long-term private debt issues/GDP, private bond market/GDP 
and public bond market/GDP. Bejan (2006) used the black market premium, interest 
rate, liquid liabilities and credit to private sector as measures of financial 
development. Due to data limitations and small sample properties we will use two 
variables as measures of financial development: domestic credit provided by banking 
sector (as a % of GDP) and the volatility of money supply growth, measured as a 
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standard deviation of the three-year broadest monetary aggregate annual growth. In 
the light of the recent Global Financial Crisis and, in particular, its effect on 
transition countries, the sign of this variable is debatable. The contemporaneous 
effect of domestic credit may be stabilising; but the lagged effect can be very 
destabilising. The money supply growth variable is also argued to represent a 
measure of nominal policy shocks (as noted below). Bejan (2006) and Ramey and 
Ramey (1995) (as cited in Bejan, 2006) also controled for total investment arguing 
that a negative effect might be expected since “a country with a higher level of 
investment should display less volatility in its output” (p.8). Conversely, the effect 
could also be positive, meaning higher volatility, since investment is typically the 
least stable component of GDP (much less stable than consumption, for example). 
Wage flexibility is also usually emphasised as a determinant of output and growth 
volatility. It is usually argued that more flexible wages are likely to decrease output 
and growth volatility. On the other hand, Easterly et al. (2000) emphasised that the 
adverse aggregate demand effects of wage adjustment may offset the positive effects 
arising from wage flexibility. However, Easterly et al. (2000) found no effect of real 
wage flexibility on volatility. Due to data limitations we cannot control for this 
potential effect in our sample. Moreover, on theoretical grounds, we do not consider 
that controlling for real wage flexibility in a volatility model is of first-order 
importance (and most of the studies appraised below did not use this control). 
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Table 6.4: Summary of the empirical research on the effect of different ERRs on output growth and volatility  
 
Study Sample 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Controls 
The effect of fixed ERR on 
dependent variable 
compared to other regimes 
Endogeneity Technique 
Easterly et 
al. (2000) 
60-74 
countries 
(depending on 
the spec.), 
aggregating 
over periods 
1960-1978 
and 1979-
1997  
Volatility of GDPpc 
growth (measured 
by SD of GDPpc 
growth rate) 
Developing country dummy, openness 
(X+M/GDP), SD change log real wage index, SD 
M1 growth, private capital flows/GDP, SD private 
capital flows/GDP, credit to private sector/GDP 
(and squared), (initial GDPpc, openness*initial 
GDPpc)  
Not addressed   Credit to private 
sector and SD of 
private capital 
flows treated 
endogenous in 
EC2SLS 
OLS, EC2SLS 
Levy-
Yeyati and 
Sturzenegg
er (2001) 
154 countries 
over the 
period 1974-
1999 
Growth of real per 
capita GDP 
Investment-to-GDP ratio, the rate of change of the 
terms of trade, growth of government consumption 
(lagged), population growth, political instability, 
initial per capita GDP, secondary enrolment, 
openness, regional dummies: Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America and transition economies and year 
dummies; (additionally added: lagged inflation, 
dummy for currency crisis and bank runs) 
Negative (fixed ER regimes 
are associated with a lower 
per capita output growth 
rate (results are driven by 
non-industrial economies; 
for industrial economies the 
ERR is unrelated to growth 
performance) 
Additionally 
addressed for 
ERR (standard 
multinomial logit 
model of the 
choice of 
exchange 
rate regime) 
OLS, 2SIV  
Volatility of real per 
capita growth 
(measured as the 
standard deviation 
of the growth rate 
over a centred 
rolling five-year 
period) 
Volatilities of the investment ratio, change in 
government consumption, and of the terms of 
trade, measures of openness, initial wealth, and 
political instability, regional and year dummies. 
Inconclusive (fixed 
exchange rate regimes are 
associated to higher output 
volatility only in the case of 
non-industrial countries, 
with no significant impact 
on volatility within the 
group of developed 
economies) 
Not addressed  OLS 
Bleaney 
and 
Fielding 
(2002) 
80 developing 
countries, 
1980-1989 
Volatility of real 
output growth 
(measured as 
standard deviation 
of real output 
growth in logs) 
Pegged exchange rate dummy, single-currency peg 
dummy, standard deviation of terms of trade, 
agriculture share (mean log share of agriculture 
value added in GDP), country size (mean log of 
GDP), region dummies 
Positive (fixed ERR induce 
higher output volatility) 
Report no 
presence of 
endogeneity 
between ERR and 
volatility 
Cross-country 
regression 
analysis (OLS? 
-  not specified) 
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Table 6.4 (continuing): Summary of the empirical research on the effect of different ERRs on output growth and volatility  
 
Study Sample 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Controls 
The effect of fixed 
ERR on dependent 
variable compared 
to other regimes 
        Endogeneity Technique 
Bastourre 
and 
Carrera 
(2004) 
45 countries, 
153 countries 
(depending on 
the model 
specification) 
1974-2000 
Output volatility 
(measured as standard 
deviation of the log-
differences in the 
seasonal-adjusted 
industrial production 
index and as SD of 
GDP growth in sub-
periods) 
PPP per capita GDP, the same variable squared, 
GDP growth, trade openness, inflation volatility 
(SD of inflation rate), terms-of-trade volatility, 
investment volatility, an institutional index, 
exchange-rate dummies 
Positive (more rigid 
ERR greater output 
volatility) 
Treated in the GMM 
but not noted which 
variables are treated 
endogenous 
Fixed and 
random effects 
panel data 
estimators; 
dynamic GMM 
Edwards 
and Levy-
Yeyati 
(2005) 
183 countries,  
1974-2000 
Real growth Investment to GDP, GC, political instability, 
initial per capita GDP, population, openness, 
secondary enrolment, regional dummies and 
exchange-rate dummies 
Negative  Not addressed  FGLS 
Change of real per 
capita GDP 
Level of adjustment of the growth rate towards its 
long-run equilibrium [difference between the 
term stemming from the growth equation and the 
lagged actual growth]; terms of trade; civil unrest 
Positive  Not addressed 
Bejan 
(2006) 
111 countries 
1950-2000 
Output volatility 
(measured as standard 
deviation of the 
growth rate of real 
GDP per capita in 
constant prices) 
Openness, GDPpc, population, human capital, 
FDI inflow, investment, government expenditure, 
export index, terms of trade volatility, inflation 
volatility, black market premium, interest rate 
liquid liabilities, credit to private sector and 
foreign debt  
Not addressed   Not addressed  Not specified  
Ćorić 
(2008) 
97 countries, 
1961-2005 (due 
to averaging 
maximum three 
time periods 
available, 
depending on 
country group) 
The standard 
deviation of the real 
GDP growth  for each 
country-period (which 
are determined 
according to 
identified break points 
in volatility), non-
overlapping averages; 
SD of GDP growth 
rates around the HP 
trend in GDP growth 
International net worth diversification measure: 
FDI; Monetary shocks: inflation rate volatility, 
money growth volatility; fiscal shocks: volatility 
of share of government consumption in GDP; 
supply side economic shocks: volatility in terms 
of trade; trade and financial system development: 
(country-period average value of) openness, the 
ratio of M2 to GDP, ratio of credits to the private 
sector to GDP; GDP per capita growth; 
government share in GDP; civil liberties index; 
additionally: financial openness: share of gross 
capital flows in GDP; measure of fiscal volatility  
Not addressed  Endogeneity of 
variable of interest 
addressed by using 
IV estimation of FE 
(instrumented by the 
average share of 
urban population, the 
average life 
expectancy and by 
the beginning of 
country-period values 
of GDPpc)  
Fixed effect 
estimator 
(preferred), 
pooled OLS, and 
random effects 
estimator; IV 
estimation of the 
one-way FE 
(xtivreg2); 
GMM as 
robustness check 
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Table 6.4 (continuing): Summary of the empirical research on the effect of different ERRs on output growth and volatility  
Study Sample 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Controls 
The effect of fixed 
ERR on dependent 
variable compared 
to other regimes 
Endogeneity Technique 
Haddad et 
al. (2010) 
77 developing 
and developed 
countries, 1976-
2005 
Output growth 
volatility (measured 
as the SD of GDPpc 
growth across each 5-
year period) 
Lagged volatility of growth, trade openness, 
measures of product and market diversification, 
interaction term between openness and 
diversification (specific interest of the study), 
financial openness, capital flow volatility, foreign 
growth volatility, term of trade volatility, ER 
volatility, inflation volatility, banking crisis, (5-
year period averages (SDs in the case of volatility 
measures)) 
Insignificant effect 
of ER volatility on 
growth volatility 
(inflation significant 
and positive 
amongst low 
income countries; 
insignificant among 
high income 
countries) 
Endogeneity of 
openness less of an 
issue in volatility 
regressions but not 
totally removed  
System GMM 
Petreski, 
2011 
169 countries, 
1976-2006 
Per capita GDP 
growth 
Initial GDP; average years of schooling; 1/(life 
expectancy at age 1); government 
consumption/GDP; trade openness; inflation rate; 
investment/GDP; fertility rate; democracy index; 
population growth; rule of law index; exchange-
rate regime; regional/country specific/time 
dummies 
No significant effect 
of ERR on growth 
(regardless of level 
of countries’ 
development, ERR 
classification used 
and duration of 
specific ERR) 
Addressed for ERR 
in GMM 
Dynamic 
system-GMM 
panel method 
Output volatility Terms-of-trade volatility; money-supply 
volatility; government consumption volatility; 
civil unrest; GDP per capita growth; financial 
development; trade and financial openness; 
inflation; exchange-rate regime; exchange-rate 
regime*TOT volatility; regional/country 
specific/time dummies 
Some, though not 
overwhelming, 
effect of exchange 
rate regime on 
output volatility91 
 
Volatility of money 
growth, government 
consumption 
volatility, measure of 
financial 
development and 
inflation treated  
endogenous92 
Hausman-
Taylor, 2SLS, 
GMM and 
dynamic system-
GMM 
Note: Highlighted studies are those that assess the effect of ERR on output or growth volatility  
                                                                
91 i. Long fixed (a fixed exchange rate longer than five years), limited-flexible and flexible regimes, as compared to a float, reduce output volatility in general; ii. A 
long fixed rate, compared to a float, is associated with higher output volatility under an aggregate-supply shock, but limited-flexible and flexible regimes have 
marginally lower output fluctuations than long pegs; iii. Overall, a TOT shock larger than 7 p.p. under a fixed, and larger than 8-9 p.p. under limited-flexible and 
flexible exchange-rate regimes, will give a higher output volatility compared to a float; and iv. Exchange-rate regimes are not important for channelling nominal 
shocks to real activity. 
92 The potentially endogenous variables (financial development, monetary and fiscal volatility, and inflation) are instrumented by: their first and second lags, terms 
of trade, inflation and growth and their first lags; and population.  
 
Chapter 6: Estimation of the Effect of CBAs on Macroeconomic Performance 
 
250 
 
Other measures that have been considered as potential shock buffers, or as Haddad et 
al. (2010, p.8) call them ‘measures of the actual exposure of a country to 
international markets’, are trade and financial openness. Trade openness, commonly 
measured as the ratio of sum of exports and imports to GDP, is emphasised as a 
potentially important determinant of output and growth volatility, since it affects an 
economy’s vulnerability to shocks. However, its effect is not straightforward: 
Easterly et al. (2000) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) suggested that more 
open countries are exposed to higher volatility, while, on the other hand, more open 
economies may more easily offset internal shocks. Bejan (2006) found that higher 
openness increased volatility in developing countries, while it helped smooth growth 
in developed countries. Most of the studies that estimated growth determinants in 
transition countries emphasised the importance of controlling for the progress in 
transition/reform (as noted in Section 6.2). This variable may also represent a buffer 
from shocks, although it is not commonly included in output and growth volatility 
regressions. Some studies used the above mentioned variables in levels, while other 
included them as volatilities.  
 
Regarding the variables which capture the effect of external shocks, the volatility of 
the terms of trade has been distinguished as one of the main causes of growth 
volatility in emerging markets (Medoza, 1997, as cited in Coricelli and Masten, 
2004). In addition, some studies included money supply growth and government 
expenditure variables (Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001) in levels or volatilities 
as measures of nominal policy shocks (Petreski, 2011). Therefore, these variables 
will be included in our regression as well. The determinants used in our specification 
are defined in Table 6.5 below.  
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Table 6.5: Growth volatility regression variables – label, description, expected sign 
and data source  
 
Variable 
name 
Label Description 
Expected 
sign 
Data 
source 
Notes 
Growth 
volatility 
lnGDPG
VOL 
The dependent 
variable: standard 
deviation of three 
year GDP growth 
rate  (in logs) 
 WDI  
Countries 
with 
currency 
board 
arrangement 
CBA 
Dummy variable (1 
for countries with a 
CBA) 
?   
Inflation  lnINF 
Natural log of 
inflation (which is 
measured as annual 
percentage change in 
consumer price 
index)  
+ WDI 
For BH national 
statistics is used; 
inflation in BH is 
measured by using the 
retail price index until 
2007 
Fiscal 
balance/GDP   
FB 
The ratio of fiscal 
balance to real GDP 
(%) (a fiscal surplus 
takes a positive sign) 
- EBRD 
Data for Moldova taken 
from various EBRD 
transition reports and 
EconStat 
Domestic 
credit 
CRED 
Domestic credit 
provided by banking 
sector (as % of GDP) 
?   
 Investment INV 
Total investment (as 
% of GDP) 
? WDI  
Trade 
openness 
OPEN 
exports + imports as 
% of GDP) 
? WDI  
EBRD 
progress in 
transition 
indicator 
EBRDI 
Average of eight 
EBRD transition 
indicators (for the 
liberalisation, 
privatisation and 
credit reform) 
(index) 
- EBRD 
Available for all 
countries in the sample 
except for Czech 
Republic in years 2008 
and 2009 
  
Terms of 
trade 
volatility 
TOTvol 
Standard deviation 
of the ratio of the 
export unit value 
index to the import 
unit value index 
(base year 2000) 
+ 
UNCT
AD 
STAT 
Data not available for 
years 1998 and 1999 and 
data for Serbia is joint 
with data for 
Montenegro, therefore 
data for 2008 and 2009 
missing for these 
countries 
Volatility of 
the broad 
money 
supply 
growth 
MSGvol 
Broad money supply 
growth93 (annual % 
change) 
?  
Data on broad money for 
Slovenia taken from 
various EBRD transition 
reports 
Government 
expenditure  
GOV 
Government 
expenditure (as % of 
GDP) 
? EBRD  
                                                                
93 Broad money is calculated as the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those 
of the central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other 
than the central government; bank and traveller’s checks; and other securities such as certificates of 
deposit and commercial paper 
Chapter 6: Estimation of the Effect of CBAs on Macroeconomic Performance 
 
252 
 
6.3.3 Model specification and descriptive statistics  
 
After specifying the determinants of volatility in Section 6.3.2 the average trend in 
GDP growth volatility and its hypothesised determinants will be summarised and the 
model will be specified.  
 
Figure 6.2: Volatility of real GDP growth in countries with CBA and countries with 
other regimes 
 
Volatility is calculated as rolling standard deviations over three-year GDP growth rates 
 
From Figure 6.2 it can be observed that there are generally no major difference in 
growth volatility between CBA countries and those with other regimes and that the 
trends in the two groups are similar. However, the figure suggests that CBA 
countries had lower volatility during the period 2001-2006, but higher after 2007, 
which is the period of financial crisis. This might suggest that due to their limited 
ability to use monetary policy instruments, the countries with CBA had more trouble 
facing financial shocks. However, to make any inference about this we have to 
control for other potential determinants of growth volatility. For the reasons 
discussed above we are averaging over 3-year period and therefore levels are 
calculated as the 3-year mean, while volatilities are calculated as 3-year standard 
deviations (SDs). Consequently, we are operating with 4 year time periods for 
estimation. 
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Table 6.6: Comparison of average trends in GDP growth volatility and growth 
volatility determinants between countries with a CBA and countries with other 
regimes 
 
Variable 
CBA Other regimes 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation  
Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
GDPGvol 3.61 3.82 0.19 12.81 3.32 3.26 0.08 14.64 
INF 4.69 2.70 0.17 10.52 12.29 21.33 -2.50 178.39 
FB -0.60 2.10 -4.49 2.85 -2.71 3.40 -11.01 12.43 
CRED 44.02 22.70 14.89 98.80 35.22 19.43 7.42 91.09 
OPEN 122.99 21.50 94.84 162.41 99.30 30.34 50.36 182.00 
INV 26.17 4.96 17.58 35.18 25.04 6.04 8.68 43.13 
EBRDI 3.31 0.57 2.14 4.00 3.07 0.54 1.42 4.00 
TOTvol 1.89 1.62 0.58 6.32 4.84 7.88 0.11 32.04 
MSGvol 10.39 10.70 2.02 46.50 15.05 16.16 0.83 79.38 
GOV 39.27 5.90 33.42 58.14 35.80 9.36 17.58 56.45 
 
According to Table 6.6 countries with a CBA recorded, on average, lower inflation, 
lower fiscal deficits, worse terms of trade and lower volatility of the money supply 
growth than countries with other regimes. Moreover, CBA countries were, on 
average, more open, with a higher ratio of domestic credits to GDP, slightly higher 
government expenditure and investment compared to the countries with other 
regimes. CBA countries also recorded a higher EBRD index than countries with 
other regimes.  
 
However, these are only unconditional averages of variables. Therefore, before 
making any inference about the difference in growth volatilities in countries with a 
CBA compared to those with other regimes a more formal empirical analysis should 
be conducted. On the basis of the previous discussions the model is specified in 
Equation 6.16, as suggested by other studies a time (3-year period) dummy variables 
(t) will be included in order to control for common shocks.    
 
lnGDPGvoli,t = α0 + α1CBAi,t + α2lnINFi,t + α3FBi,t + α4CREDi,t + α5OPENi,t + 
α6INVi,t + α7EBRDIi,t + α8TOTvoli,t + α9MSGvoli,t + α10GOVi,t + t + εi,          (6.6) 
 
The dependent variable is calculated as standard deviation of GDP growth in logs in 
order to decrease the potential influence of outliers (this measure is also used by 
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Bleaney and Fielding, 2002). Regarding the issue of whether to include variables in 
levels or volatilities the EBRDI variable will be included in levels since it is slowly 
changing (as evident from Table 6.6, its volatility is close to zero). As discussed 
above there is no rationale for including investment and government expenditures in 
volatilities and therefore these variables will also be included in levels. The TOT 
variable is used in volatilities in almost all studies appraised above and therefore it 
will be measured as SD of 3-year TOT. The variable that measures openness is in all 
above studies included in levels. Regarding inflation, it could be included in both 
levels and volatilities. However, we include this variable only in levels, which is 
argued to represent a monetary stabilisation measure. Since the money supply growth 
variable (in levels) is highly correlated with inflation and credit (in levels)94 it will be 
included in volatilities, while the credit variable will also be included in levels (for 
correlations between the variables see Appendix 6.8). Therefore, the credit variable 
is designed to capture the effect of changing levels of financial development, while 
the money supply growth variable captures the effect of nominal shocks.    
 
6.3.4 Estimation strategies and results  
 
Previous studies that estimated growth volatility by averaging over the whole sample 
period have used an OLS estimator. Studies that averaged over a few years or used 
the rolling standard deviations used different static and dynamic panel estimators. 
However, there is no agreement in these studies either about the estimation strategy 
that should be applied in the output and growth volatility estimations or about any 
potential endogeneity problem in this framework. Consequently, studies differ 
significantly in their approaches and techniques. Studies which addressed the issue of 
endogeneity used estimators such as 2SLS (Easterly et al., 2000; Petreski, 2011), the 
IV estimator of the fixed effect model (Ćorić, 2008) and/or the dynamic GMM 
estimator (Bastourre and Carrera, 2004; Haddad et al., 2010; Petreski, 2011), 
estimation strategies used in the appraised studies are noted in Table 6.4. Most of 
these studies focused on the potential simultaneity between the specific variable of 
interest and output/growth volatility. However, the endogeneity of our variable of 
                                                                
94 This high correlation between money supply growth, inflation and credit when all are expressed in 
levels might have been expected since money supply growth is measured as the broadest monetary 
aggregate and its increase is expected to increase credit and potentially inflation.  
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interest is not an issue, since it is not likely that countries will decide to maintain or 
abandon CBA (since all countries introduced CBA before the sample period) as a 
result of volatilities in growth rates.  
 
Estimation of Equation 6.16 by pooled OLS suggests that none of the explanatory 
variables has a significant effect on growth volatility (Appendix 6.9a). Diagnostic 
tests after the pooled OLS do not suggest problems with heterogeneity or normality. 
However, since it does not account for countries’ fixed effects this is not the 
preferred estimator. Although the F-test after the FE estimation suggests that the 
OLS estimator is preferred over the FE (Appendix 6.9b), in order to control for 
countries’ specifics, the countries’ fixed effects will be included.  However, if we 
want to control for countries’ fixed effects and not lose the variable of interest, which 
is time invariant, we cannot use the FE estimator. Therefore, the FEVD estimator 
will again be used (the reasons for using the FEVD estimator are explained in detail 
in Section 5.4.3).  
 
Since the between to within ratio for the variables for progress in transition (EBRDI) 
and for government expenditure (GOV)95 is higher than 2 (Appendix 6.10), 
suggesting that these are slowly changing variables (variation between countries is 
higher than within countries) and they are significant in the second FEVD stage, then 
these will also be treated as slowly changing variables (beside CBA, which is time 
invariant). Diagnostic tests after the 3-stages FEVD estimation suggest that the 
assumptions of normality, homoscedasticity and linearity cannot be rejected at all 
conventional levels of significance (Appendix 6.11a). The joint test suggests that the 
model as a whole has explanatory power, since the hypothesis of insignificant 
coefficients is rejected at all conventional levels of confidence. According to the 
results in the third stage the CBA variable has a significant and negative effect on 
growth volatility. However, since in the stage-by-stage FEVD estimation the SEs are 
not adjusted for the variance from the previous stage the results after the ‘xtfevd’ 
(which provide these adjustments) should be observed. These results suggest that 
none of the variables has a significant effect on growth volatility (Appendix 6.11b). 
The CBA variable also has a negative sign but is significant only at the 30% level of 
                                                                
95 The openness variable also has a high between to within ratio, but it is highly insignificant in the 
second stage and therefore is not treated as a slowly changing variable.  
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significance. Moreover, dividing the CBA variable into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ makes 
no difference in the results and diagnostic tests (Appendix 6.12). The test for serial 
correlation suggests that the assumption of no serial correlation cannot be rejected at 
all conventional levels of significance (Appendix 6.9). Moreover, the number of 
observations is too small for conducting a dynamic estimation.  
 
These inconclusive results of growth and growth volatility models might be expected 
due to short data span for transition countries, massive structural changes and poor 
quality and inconsistent data. Moreover, by creating the volatility variables we are 
operating with a very small number of observations, which additionally questions the 
reliability of the results of growth volatility estimation. To overcome these problems 
we will apply a different strategy for measuring macroeconomic performance in a 
country. This is using the subjective assessment of a country’s economic 
performance as the dependent variable. 
 
6.4 The effect of a CBA on the subjective assessment of a country’s economic 
performance 
 
The results of the analysis of the effect of CBA on growth and growth volatility 
suggest that there is no firm evidence that a CBA has an effect on growth and growth 
volatility. In Section 5.2 we concluded that the results of previous studies on the 
effect of CBA (and ERR in general) on growth and output/growth volatility were 
also inconclusive, with the coefficients of interest usually being insignificant. In this 
section an alternative approach to analysing the effect of a CBA on a country’s 
performance, based on citizen’s subjective assessments of the economic situation in 
their country, is pioneered. These subjective assessments are captured by using the 
answers to the Austrian National Bank survey questions: “Currently, the economic 
situation of [MY COUNTRY] is very good” and "Over the next five years, the 
economic situation of [MY COUNTRY] will improve". By using the answers to these 
questions as the dependent variables (since answers to both questions are used for the 
dependent variable, the SUR is again used as a preferred estimator) we are in 
principle combining our previously estimated models (inflation, growth, growth 
volatility) and utilising a composite measure of a country’s economic well-being. As 
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noted in Chapter 4, the approach of using subjective assessments can be argued to be 
superior to using indicators that attempt to measure objectively ‘real’ outcomes.  
 
6.4.1 Theoretical background and model specifications  
 
Although there is no comparable study, to our knowledge, utilising perceptions about 
the economic performance of a country to estimate the effect of monetary/exchange 
rate regime on macroeconomic performance, there are a few in related areas that may 
provide useful insights. First, there are studies that investigate the welfare effects of a 
monetary regime/policy. These studies investigate the domestic and foreign welfare 
effects of changes in domestic monetary policy, the so called “beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy” (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Berger, 2003; Tervala and Engler, 2010). The 
authors argued that the welfare effects depend on the degree of interdependence of 
the economies (cross-country substitutability), competitiveness of markets and 
preferences of consumers and considered consumption of both domestic and foreign 
goods in their models. Some studies estimate the effect of monetary policy variability 
(rules vs. discretion) on welfare, represented by variability of output and inflation 
(Woodford, 2003; Mahmood and Shahab, 2012). In these studies it is emphasised 
that different monetary policies/rules and types of monetary regimes are likely to 
influence economic welfare differently. Mahmood and Shahab (2012, p.158) find 
that in an emerging economy “central banks will have to sacrifice the discretionary 
status if the maximization of welfare is the objective”, since discretion, according to 
their findings, “serves only to control the variation in interest rate whereas the 
volatility in macroeconomic variables was higher”. On the other hand, some studies 
found no effect of monetary/exchange rate fluctuations on welfare (Gali and 
Monacelli, 2005).  
 
Second, there are political science studies that have used perceptions about the 
economic situation in a country as the dependent variable96. They observed the 
relationship between perceptions about the economic situation in a country and the 
                                                                
96 In these studies, beside estimating the effect of electoral preferences of respondents on perceptions 
about the economic situation in a country, the authors also estimated the adverse effect where the 
effect of perceptions about the economic situation in a country is used as the independent variable and 
their effect on the electoral preferences of respondents was estimated. 
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electoral preferences of respondents in what is called ‘sociotropic’97 models of 
voting, which are based on the perceptions about the economic situation in a country 
(Evans and Andersen, 2001; Hansford and Gomez, 2011). Although these studies 
have a very different focus from ours, they are examined in order to assist our own 
model specification. Hansford and Gomez98 (2011, p.9) noted that subjective 
evaluations of the economy are likely to be influenced by both objective national 
economic conditions and respondents’ (personal) characteristics, namely age, gender, 
race, education, personal income and employment status. They also noted the 
importance of controlling for the party for which the respondent voted. Hence, they 
interacted all of these variables with a ‘democratic incumbent’ term, which depends 
upon the party of the incumbent president. They noted that “objective national 
economic conditions” are captured by the “election fixed effects, and an 
idiosyncratic ‘error term’” (p.12). Because of the endogeneity issue (due to 
hypothesised reciprocal effects of political preferences and economic perceptions) 
they used changes in country income and country unemployment99 as instruments for 
their ‘sociotropic’ evaluation. They argued that: “It makes theoretical sense, though, 
for voters to use local, tangible, and easily accessible economic information to make 
inferences about the state of the national economy (Books and Prysby 1991, p. 146, 
as cited in Hansford and Gomez, 2011, p.14). As argued by Hansford and Gomez 
(2011, p.14) this is “consistent with what psychologists refer to as the ‘availability 
heuristic’, which is the tendency for people to use readily available information to 
make inferences about distant phenomena”. Hansford and Gomez (2011) found a 
positive effect of an increase in a country’s income and a negative effect of an 
increase in unemployment on views of the state of the national economy. As with 
Hansford and Gomez, Evans and Andersen (2001) also noted the importance of 
controlling for demographic variables (age, gender, education, region, income, and 
                                                                
97 In these studies the distinction between personal economic perceptions and perceptions of the state 
of the national economy is emphasised. The first is noted as egocentric (‘pocket-book’) and the second 
‘sociotropic’ model. Since we are using the perceptions about the economic state we will focus on the 
estimations and discussions of the latter. 
98 Hansford and Gomez (2011) primarily focus on estimating the effect of subjective assessment of the 
economy on voting choices but they also conduct the reverse effects: they estimated probit model in 
which sociotropic evaluations is the dependent variable. Therefore, we will reflect on this study in 
determining control variables.  
99 The change in country’s income is measured as the change in the inflation-adjusted median income 
in the survey respondent’s country of residence since the last presidential election. The change in 
unemployment is measured as the change in the unemployment rate in the respondent’s home county 
since the last presidential election. 
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social class of the respondents). However, they do not control for any objective 
economic variables. Evans and Andersen also noted that the public’s perceptions 
about economic performance100 were strongly influenced by aspects of respondents’ 
political orientations and beliefs about their country’s political system. They used a 
large number of political indicators, which were available from the surveys they used 
in their analysis. Although in our database there are no questions that could be used 
as indicators of respondents’ political orientation, beliefs in a country’s political 
system might be captured by a trust in government variable, which we include in our 
analysis. However, once again almost half of the observations are lost when this 
variable is included, since the variable was not included in the first three survey 
waves.    
 
Based on the above studies and our specific interest, the specification of the model is 
now explored. As the dependent variables are categorical, for easier interpretation of 
the results they are each transformed into a binary: an “agree” category, which 
combines the answers “strongly agree”, “agree”, “somewhat agree”; and a “disagree” 
category, which combines the answers “somewhat disagree”, “disagree”, “strongly 
disagree”. Since we are interested in the effect of a CBA on respondents’ assessment 
of the current and future economic situation in a country, we include a dummy 
variable for the presence or otherwise of CBA. As noted above, the trust in 
government variable from the survey is also introduced and again interacted with the 
CBA dummy. Since perceptions and expectations about the economic situation in a 
country are used as the aggregate measure of economic well-being in a country, we 
control for the main macroeconomic variables, namely inflation rate, real GDP 
growth and unemployment rate. As countries in the sample are at different levels of 
development, which is also likely to affect respondents’ perceptions/expectations 
about economic performance, we include GDP per capita. The same variables are 
used in both (perceptions and expectations) specifications, which form the SUR 
(equations 6.7). We expect lower inflation, lower unemployment and higher GDP 
growth to positively affect (perceptions/expectations about) a country’s economic 
well-being. Since respondents’ perceptions/expectations about the economic 
                                                                
100 By ‘objective’ we mean as embodied in official statistics. Whether or not these are more objective 
than peoples’ perceptions we leave to future discussion and investigation, which is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
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situation in a country are assumed to be influenced both by the current state of 
macroeconomic variables that they experience, and by the published data on 
macroeconomic performance, which they can perceive but with a lag101, we will 
include macroeconomic variables in their current values and with a one-year lag. A 
higher level of trust in government is expected to affect positively 
perceptions/expectations regarding the current economic situation in a country, other 
things being equal. Respondents’ satisfaction with their life is also likely to influence 
their perceptions/expectations about their country’s economic performance. 
However, this variable is not available from the survey. In order to observe whether 
there is a lot of variation in life satisfaction during the period observed, data from the 
Eurobarometer surveys was considered. In the countries from our sample included in 
the Eurobarometer survey, life satisfaction was quite steady. An aggregate value of 
life satisfaction from Eurobarometer survey could be entered into the equation as a 
proportion of respondents that answered they are satisfied. However, due to data 
limitations (data for only one country with a CBA is available) we do not control for 
this effect. 
 
Since we are interested in the effect of CBA (compared to non-CBA) conditional on 
different levels/values of trust in government and macroeconomic variables, we 
interact trust in government and all macroeconomic variables with the CBA variable. 
We also control for socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (as suggested 
by Evans and Andersen, 2001; Hansford and Gomez, 2011) since they may affect the 
weights attached to the different macroeconomic outcomes. Beside age, gender, level 
of education completed, employment status, which were used in Chapter 4 (for 
categories and the base category for each of these variables see Section 4.5.4), we 
also control for income status, since its inclusion in models with 
perceptions/expectations about national economic situation is emphasised as 
important in the above studies. We assume that respondents in a relatively high 
income group in their country are more likely to perceive/expect the current/future 
economic situation in their country more favourably than those in a lower income 
group, ceteris paribus. Respondents’ income is grouped in four categories: low, 
                                                                
101 Since the most recent data is usually not available to respondents (due to lags in data publishing) 
and since it “takes some time until a country’s population becomes fully aware of changes in its 
economy’s state” (Fisher and Hahn, 2008, p. 6), the actual macroeconomic variables will also be 
lagged. 
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medium, high and no answers (and the first one is used as the base category). ‘No 
answers’ are kept as a separate category since there are 15% of observations with no 
answers, so by excluding them we would lose a lot of observations. By creating a 
separate category for ‘no answers’ the omitted category is clearly defined. Finally, 
we control for country-group and time specifics.  
 
Due to the problem of perfect multicollinearity (explained in Section 4.3) country 
dummies are again not included. However, here, we are controlling for country’s 
specifics by including the main macroeconomic variables, which is consistent with 
suppressing the other effects of individual countries. Moreover, we control for EU 
membership (EUi) and we expect people in EU member countries to perceive/expect 
the situation in their country to be better than people in countries which are still in 
the process of accession to EU. We also control for the Ex-Yugoslavia membership 
(ExYui), assuming that people from those countries are more pessimistic due to 
higher political uncertainties and tensions. In our specification wave fixed effects are 
included to capture the characteristics specific to each wave. As noted above, the 
SUR is used as a preferred estimator and it consists of two equations: one for 
perceptions and the other for expectations about the economic situation in a country. 
We used the SUR again since we assume perceptions and expectations about the 
economic situation to be jointly determined. Moreover, these variables are assumed 
to have all the same observable variables, which are appraised above. Beside these, 
there are some unobservable variables common to both perceptions and expectations 
variable, such as respondents’ satisfaction with life and extent of their knowledge 
about the economic situation in their country. The specification is listed below in 
Equation 6.7a, b and c.  
 
ESagreei = α0 + α1CBAc + α2Gtrusti + α3gdppcc + α4gdpgc + α5lgdpgc + α6infc + 
α7linfc + α8unc + α9lunc + α10CBA·Gtrusti + α11CBA·gdppcc + α12CBA·gdpgc + 
α13CBA·lgdpgc + α14CBA·infc + α15CBA·linfc + α16CBA·unc + α17CBA·lunc + 
α18h_age1i + α19h_age2i + α20h_age3i + α21h_femalei + α22h_edu_mediumi + 
α23h_edu_highi + α24h_retiredi + α25h_studenti + α26h_unemployedi + 
α27h_inc_mediumi + α28h_inc_highi + α29h_inc_no_answeri + EUi + ExYui + t + εi    
                                                                                                 (6.7a) 
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ExpESagreei = 0 + 1CBAc + 2Gtrusti + 3gdppcc + 4gdpgc + 5lgdpgc + 6infc + 
7linfc + 8unc + 9lunc + 10CBA·Gtrusti + 11CBA·gdppcc + 12CBA·gdpgc + 
13CBA·lgdpgc + 14CBA·infc + 15CBA·linfc + 16CBA·unc + 17CBA·lunc + 
18h_age1i + 19h_age2i + 20h_age3i + 21h_femalei + 22h_edu_mediumi + 
23h_edu_highi + 24h_retiredi + 25h_studenti + 26h_unemployedi + 
27h_inc_mediumi + 28h_inc_highi + 29h_inc_no_answeri + EUi + ExYui + t + εi                     
                                                                                                                  (6.7b) 
 
ρ= Cov(ε1i, ε2i)                                                                     (6.7c) 
 
Subscript ‘i’ indicates that the value of a particular variables differs between the 
respondents, while subscript ‘c’ indicates that the value changes only between 
countries (it is the same for each respondent coming from the same country).  
 
According to the descriptive statistics in Chapter 4 and Figures 4.4a and 4.4b around 
80% (50%) in non-CBA and 90% (60%) in CBA countries do not agree with the 
statement that the economic situation in their country is (expected to be) good. These 
differences are statistically significant at all conventional levels of significance and 
can be regarded as considerable given that the sample is large. However, to get more 
information and more precise estimates we proceed with the estimation of Equations 
6.7.  
 
6.4.2 Estimation issues and results 
 
Methodology and empirical issues are similar to those elaborated and applied in 
Chapter 4 and therefore we refer to Section 4.5 for more details on empirical issues. 
Since we are using quarterly data on actual macroeconomic variables in this 
analysis102, which is different from the strategy applied in Chapter 4, we will 
elaborate on the usage of this data. GDP per capita is included only in 
contemporaneous values, since it does not change significantly quarter by quarter 
and we include this variable to control for the differences in the level of development 
between the countries. As noted above, other macroeconomic variables are included 
                                                                
102 Quarterly data could not have been used in Chapter 5 and the first part of this chapter due to a lack 
of data for other macroeconomic variables included in these models in these analyses. 
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in both contemporaneous and lagged values. Surveys conducted in April/May are 
matched with macroeconomic data from the first quarter of the same year and with 
lagged values from the last quarter of the previous year (i.e. values of 
macroeconomic variables from both quarters are matched with the same 
answer/observation of the dependent variable); and surveys conducted in 
October/November are matched with macroeconomic data from the third and the 
second quarter of the same year. By doing this we covered the whole period between 
the surveys, as suggested by Walti (2012), although he used biannual average of the 
monthly values of explanatory variables between the biannual fieldworks. Since all 
macroeconomic data is for periods prior to the relevant fieldwork we avoid potential 
endogeneity (caused by simultaneity103) between the dependent variable and 
contemporaneous macroeconomic variables. There is no rationale for assuming that 
there is a simultaneity problem between CBA and the dependent variable, since 
current perceptions and future expectations about national economic performance are 
not likely to affect the likelihood of a CBA being in operation/having a CBA. As 
expected, there is high collinearity between the contemporaneous and lagged values 
of the same variable (Appendix 6.13). However, multicollinearity can be dealt with 
by increasing the sample size (Maddala, 2001). Therefore, we do not think this 
should be a problem here, since we are operating with a large sample. Additionally, 
as stated in Maddala (2001, p.270): “When we have more than two explanatory 
variables, the simple correlations among them become all the more meaningless”. 
Hence, despite the high collinearity, we prefer keeping both contemporaneous and 
lagged values, since we get more information than in the case when we average the 
data over the period. As noted in Section 6.4.1, current values are indicating how 
macroeconomic performance is being experienced (and this experience reflected on 
perceptions) by respondents, while the lagged values are indicating how the 
published data on macroeconomic performance is being perceived by respondents. 
For a robustness check we used semi-annual macroeconomic data: the average 
between the two quarters preceding the survey fieldwork.  
 
                                                                
103 The potential endogeneity problem that may arise from the reverse effect of the contemporaneous 
actual macroeconomic performance on contemporaneous perceptions about the economic situation in 
a country is overcome by including macroeconomic data prior the fieldwork, even for 
contemporaneous values.  
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GDP per capita data is collected from the World Development Indicator database. 
Quarterly data on GDP growth and the inflation rate was delivered on request from 
the EBRD. Data on the unemployment rate delivered by the EBRD or by national 
statistical agencies differ by the type of measure reported (some report labour force 
survey, LFS, based unemployment, while others report registered unemployment). 
However, it is important to be consistent since the two might differ substantially, as 
they usually use different sources of data, different reporting units, observation 
periods, data gathering methods and cycles and, sometimes, definitions of 
employment and unemployment (see Labour Force Survey, BH, e.g. 2008, p.16). 
Therefore, the data from the International Labour Organisation, which reports only 
labour force survey based data, is used. However, these data were not available for 
all countries at the quarterly level. Namely, in Serbia the survey is conducted twice a 
year (in April and October), while in BH it is conducted only once a year (April). In 
order to ‘create’ quarterly rates for these two countries, data on the registered 
unemployment rate is used, which is available at quarterly level. We calculated 
quarter-to-quarter percentage changes in the registered unemployment rate within 
each year and transferred these changes to LFS rates. Since the LFS is conduced 
usually in April we observe it as a first quarter unemployment rate and then apply the 
percentage change in the registered unemployment rate to calculate the second 
quarter (created) LFS unemployment rate. For BH the percentage change in 
registered unemployment from the second to third and from the third to fourth 
quarter is applied, while in Serbia the second LFS survey was used for the third 
quarter unemployment rate and the rate for the fourth quarter is again applied from 
the percentage change in the registered unemployment from the third to the fourth 
quarter. However, we have to add a note of caution given that seasonal and 
occasional jobs are also not likely to be registered. For Albania, the registered 
unemployment rate is used since the LFS has only been conducted every four years. 
The results of the estimations for the model specification specified in the previous 
section are presented in Table 6.7 (and in Appendices 6.14 and 6.15).   
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Table 6.7: SUR results - Estimation of the perceptions/expectations about the 
economic situation in a country (as specified in Equations 6.7, number of 
observations: 40,832) 
 
Questions used for the dependent variables: 
"Currently, the economic situation of [MY 
COUNTRY] is very good" (ESagree) and 
"Over the next five years, the economic 
situation of [MY COUNTRY] will improve" 
(ExpESagree) (1="Strongly agree", "Agree" 
and "Somewhat agree", 0="Strongly disagree", 
"Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree")  
Marginal effects;          
clustered on country 
Marginal effects;          
clustered on region 
unweighted weighted unweighted weighted 
CBA -0.0841*** -0.0819*** -0.0841*** -0.0819*** 
1=CBA is implemented (0.0127) (0.0121) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Base category: CBA not implemented         
Gtrust2 -0.0530 -0.0500 -0.0530*** -0.0500*** 
Trust in Government: "I somewhat trust" (0.0346) (0.0336) (0.0182) (0.0184) 
Gtrust3 -0.128*** -0.123*** -0.128*** -0.123*** 
Trust in Government: "I neither trust nor 
distrust" (0.0366) (0.0348) (0.0195) (0.0193) 
Gtrust4 -0.182*** -0.176*** -0.182*** -0.176*** 
Trust in Government: "I somewhat distrust" (0.0421) (0.0405) (0.0209) (0.0206) 
Gtrust5 -0.216*** -0.211*** -0.216*** -0.211*** 
Trust in Government: "I do not trust at all" (0.0416) (0.0401) (0.0203) (0.0200) 
Base category: Trust in Government: "I trust 
completely"         
Gdppc -7.70e-06** -7.75e-06** -7.70e-06* -7.75e-06* 
GDP per capita (3.02e-06) (3.03e-06) (4.12e-06) (4.33e-06) 
Gdpg 0.0119*** 0.0115*** 0.0119*** 0.0115*** 
GDP growth (0.00327) (0.00319) (0.00235) (0.00242) 
Lgdpg 0.00590 0.00602 0.00590*** 0.00602*** 
Lagged GDP growth (0.00371) (0.00381) (0.00220) (0.00223) 
Inf 0.00674 0.00591 0.00674  0.00591 
Inflation rate (0.00523) (0.00616) (0.00561) (0.00580) 
Linf -0.0180*** -0.0171*** -0.0180*** -0.0171*** 
Lagged inflation rate (0.00532) (0.00605) (0.00526) (0.00549) 
Un -0.0107** -0.00932* -0.0107*** -0.00932** 
Rate of unemployment  (0.00470) (0.00489) (0.00408) (0.00436) 
Lun 0.00766 0.00672 0.00766**  0.00672 
Lagged rate of unemployment  (0.00483) (0.00513) (0.00383) (0.00418) 
Robust standard errors (clustered on country and region) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The results presented in this table are only an extract from the full results reported in Appendices  
Note: The marginal effects calculated after the biprobit SUR estimation are reported   
 
Due to reasons explained in Chapter 4, both country and region are used to cluster 
and both weighted and unweighted results are presented. Again, SUR is the preferred 
estimator and the specifications are first estimated by using a ‘biprobit’ estimator, 
since perceptions and expectations about the economic situation in a country can be 
assumed to be part of a wider system and jointly determined. This correlation is also 
indicated by the positive ‘rho’ coefficient and by the small standard error for ‘rho’. 
All presented results are the average marginal effects since, as elaborated in Section 
4.5.3, when the interaction terms are included it is sensible to only interpret the 
marginal effects. The effect of CBA on perceptions/expectations about the economic 
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situation in a country is highly significant and negative. The average marginal effect 
for CBA is -0.08, meaning that on average individuals coming from a CBA country 
are 8 percentage points less likely to perceive/expect economic situation in their 
country as good than are individuals coming from a country with some other regime. 
This can be explained by the fact that under a CBA a central bank cannot stimulate 
growth or mitigate shocks and, consequently, it can negatively affect the economic 
performance of a country, which is here proxied by the perceptions and expectations 
about the economic situation. However, since the average marginal effect is creating 
two hypothetical populations (as explained in Chapter 4) this result is not suggesting 
that this effect is significant and negative in countries which actually have a CBA, 
but what its effect would have been if everybody had had a CBA. Therefore, we also 
estimated the effect separately for CBA and non-CBA countries. According to the 
results there is a suggestion that a CBA would have had a significant and negative 
effect in both CBA and non-CBA counties (Appendix 6.14c). Even though the 
results suggest that hypothetically having a CBA would have a somewhat larger 
negative effect in the non-CBA (-0.086) than in the CBA subsample (-0.065), we 
should not make inference regarding the non-CBA countries without further analysis, 
which is beyond the purpose of this thesis. However, this result further implies that 
even though we could not find a robust effect of CBA on actual macroeconomic 
performance, proxied by growth and growth volatility, a CBA does seem to have an 
effect on residents’ assessment of the state of their economy. The results also imply 
that, as expected, the lower is trust in government the larger is the negative effect it 
has on the perceptions and expectations about the economic situation in a country. 
The average marginal effects suggest that those that somewhat distrust and those that 
do not trust government are, respectively, 17.6 and 21.1 percentage points less likely 
to perceive the economic situation in their country to be good than those that trust 
completely. The effect of GDP per capita is negative indicating that the lower the 
level of development in a country the more likely that the residents will perceive and 
expect the economic situation in their country as good. This is not as expected, but 
this effect is very small; namely one unit (dollar) increase in GDP per capita is 
associated with 0.00077 percentage points decrease in the probability of a respondent 
assessing the economic situation in their country as good. The results on both 
contemporaneous and lagged GDP growth (the latter being significant only when 
region is used as the cluster) indicate that a one percentage increase in growth rate is 
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likely to increase the possibility of a respondent being satisfied and optimistic 
regarding the economic situation in a country, 1.15 and 0.6 percentage points, 
respectively. The average marginal effect suggest that a one percentage increase in 
the lagged inflation rate and unemployment rate is likely to decrease the probably of 
the economic situation being assessed as good by 1.7 and 0.9 percentage points, 
respectively. The negative effect of lagged inflation suggest that, after being 
experienced (and acknowledged) by residents,  inflation has a negative effect on 
respondents’ assessment of the current and future economic situation. As expected, 
unemployment also has a negative effect, suggesting that higher unemployment rates 
are likely to worsen the perceptions and expectations about the economic situation in 
a country. In order to observe the effect of CBA conditional on the level of trust in 
government the ‘marginsplot’ is presented (Figure 6.3; Appendix 6.14d). This 
indicates that the negative effect of the CBA on the probability of perceiving and 
expecting a good/better economic situation in a country (compared to bad/worse) is 
smaller the lower the level of trust in government. The results suggest that at high 
levels of trust in government (trust completely) those in countries with a CBA are 18 
percentage points less likely to perceive the economic situation in a country as good 
than those in non-CBA countries. Results further suggest that when there is a high 
level of distrust in government (do not trust at all) the negative effect of a CBA is 
much smaller, with the probability of assessing the economic situation as good only 
3 percentage points lower than for non-CBA. These differences in the effect of CBA 
at different levels of trust in government are statistically significant. These results 
suggest that in a high trust environment a CBA is observed as an economic 
hindrance, due to limitations imposed on the central bank to stimulate country’s 
economic performance. However, in a low trust environment it may be thought to be 
a necessity for stabilisation and therefore its negative effect on the assessments of the 
economic situation in a country is significantly smaller.  
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Figure 6.3: The average marginal effect of CBA on the probability of high current 
confidence and expectations about the economic situation in a country conditional on 
the level of trust in government  
 
 
 
According to the results (Appendix 6.14e), the effect of CBA is not differing 
conditional on different levels of GDP per capita, inflation and lagged 
unemployment rate. Regarding the effect of CBA conditional on GDP growth there 
is some indication of an increasing negative effect of CBA at higher levels of GDP 
growth (both contemporaneous and lagged). Results further suggest that the negative 
effect of CBA is increasing as contemporaneous unemployment rates are increasing. 
The effect of both EU and Ex-Yugoslavia membership dummy are positive and 
significant, indicating that respondents in the countries who are/were members of 
these unions are more likely (7.8 and 6.5 percentage points, respectively) to 
positively perceive current and future economic situations in their countries than are 
those in the countries not belonging to these unions.   
 
The inclusion of the trust in government variable might raise some difficulties, since 
it is not clear whether there is a potential problem of simultaneity or joint 
determination with the dependent variable and this issue is not addressed by theory. 
Therefore, we estimate the model without the trust in government variable as a 
robustness check. Other robustness checks are conducted by augmenting the 
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preferred specifications by the variables related to financial situation and financial 
stability; by excluding the interaction terms and, finally, by using semi-annual 
instead of quarterly macroeconomic data. The results of these estimations are 
presented in Tables 6.8a and 6.8b, below (and in Appendix 6.16). The presented 
results are those where country is used as the cluster and weights applied.  
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Table 6.8a:  SUR results (the first part) - robustness checks (the results for the first three columns continue in Table 6.8b) 
 
Question used for the dependent variable:  "Currently, the 
economic situation of [MY COUNTRY] is very good" and 
"Over the next five years, the economic situation of [MY 
COUNTRY] will improve" ESagree, ExpESagree 
(1="Strongly agree", "Agree" and "Somewhat agree", 
0="Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and "Somewhat disagree")  
Controlling for 
perceptions about 
the financial 
stability in a country 
Controlling for 
perceptions about 
the financial 
situation in a 
country and 
financial situation 
of a household 
Semi-annual 
macroeconomic 
variables instead of 
quarterly used 
Using large dataset 
(trust in government 
variable excluded); 
no. of observations: 
69,540 
No interaction 
terms used 
CBA -0.0808*** -0.0733*** -0.0826*** -0.0967*** -0.0581*** 
1=CBA is implemented (0.0124) (0.00895) (0.0113) (0.0287) (0.0111) 
Base category: CBA not implemented           
Gtrust2 -0.0448 -0.0370 -0.0534   -0.0497*** 
Trust in Government: "I somewhat trust" (0.0291) (0.0251) (0.0344)   (0.0184) 
Gtrust3 -0.108*** -0.0878*** -0.127***   -0.124*** 
Trust in Government: "I neither trust nor distrust" (0.0306) (0.0264) (0.0360)   (0.0190) 
Gtrust4 -0.158*** -0.130*** -0.178***   -0.176*** 
Trust in Government: "I somewhat distrust" (0.0358) (0.0302) (0.0425)   (0.0205) 
Gtrust5 -0.189*** -0.155*** -0.215***   -0.210*** 
Trust in Government: "I do not trust at all" (0.0358) (0.0304) (0.0410)   (0.0201) 
Base category: Trust in Government: "I trust completely"           
Gdppc -9.00e-06*** -5.57e-06** -7.97e-06** 1.33e-06 -4.11e-06** 
GDP per capita (3.07e-06) (2.79e-06) (3.99e-06) (3.29e-06) (1.70e-06) 
Gdpg 0.0118*** 0.00819***   0.0118*** 0.0120*** 
GDP growth (0.00304) (0.00224)   (0.00208) (0.00218) 
Lgdpg 0.00536 0.00508*   0.0120*** 0.00647*** 
Lagged GDP growth (0.00376) (0.00298)   (0.00354) (0.00155) 
Inf 0.00745 0.00433   0.00932 -0.00124 
Inflation rate (0.00615) (0.00567)   (0.00820) (0.00487) 
Linf -0.0176*** -0.0117**   -0.0185*** -0.0108** 
Lagged inflation rate (0.00605) (0.00520)   (0.00652) (0.00488) 
Un -0.00790* -0.00193   -0.00743** -0.00613 
Rate of unemployment  (0.00443) (0.00434)   (0.00304) (0.00433) 
Lun 0.00496 0.000318   0.00789** 0.00378 
Lagged rate of unemployment  (0.00467) (0.00460)   (0.00360) (0.00411) 
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Table 6.8b: SUR results (the second part) - robustness checks (continuing results 
from the first three columns from Table 6.8a) 
 
Questions used for the dependent variable: 
"Currently, the local currency is very stable 
and trustworthy?" and "Over the next five 
years, the [LOCAL CURRENCY] will be very 
stable and trustworthy"  
Dependent variable: probability of both questions 
being equal to 1 (answers: "Strongly agree", 
"Agree" and "Somewhat agree”) as opposed to 0 
(answers: "Strongly disagree", "Disagree" and 
"Somewhat disagree") 
Controlling for 
perceptions 
about the 
financial 
stability in a 
country 
Controlling for 
perceptions about 
the financial 
situation in a 
country and 
financial situation 
of a household 
Semi-annual 
data for 
macroeconomic 
variables used 
instead of 
quarterly used  
Currently, banks and the financial system in a 
country are stable:        
FS2 -0.0139 -0.00941   
"Agree" (0.00951) (0.00823)   
FS3 -0.0544*** -0.0361***   
"Somewhat agree" (0.0112) (0.00825)   
FS4 -0.0887*** -0.0602***   
"Somewhat disagree" (0.0141) (0.0104)   
FS5 -0.103*** -0.0701***   
"Disagree" (0.0122) (0.00924)   
FS6 -0.123*** -0.0847***   
 "Strongly disagree" (0.0129) (0.00871)   
FSdnk -0.105*** -0.0700***   
 "Do not know" (0.0131) (0.00920)   
Base category: "Strongly Agree"       
Currently, the financial situation of my household 
is good       
FSH2   -0.00866   
"Agree"   (0.00974)   
FSH3   -0.0425***   
"Somewhat agree"   (0.0130)   
FSH4   -0.0909***   
"Somewhat disagree"   (0.0165)   
FSH5   -0.112***   
"Disagree"   (0.0146)   
FSH6   -0.139***   
 "Strongly disagree"   (0.0155)   
Base category: "Strongly Agree"       
Over the last 12 months, the financial situation of 
my household has got better       
ExpFSH2   0.00123   
"Agree"   (0.00148)   
ExpFSH3   -0.00392***   
"Somewhat agree"   (0.00145)   
ExpFSH4   -0.0261***   
"Somewhat disagree"   (0.00213)   
ExpFSH5   -0.0400***   
"Disagree"   (0.00364)   
ExpFSH6   -0.0538***   
 "Strongly disagree"   (0.00403)   
Base category: "Strongly Agree"       
gdppc     -7.97e-06** 
GDP per capita     (3.99e-06) 
sagdpg     0.0171*** 
Semi-annual GDP growth      (0.00496) 
sainf     -0.0131*** 
Semi-annual inflation rate     (0.00318) 
saun     -0.00261 
Semi-annual rate of unemployment      (0.00166) 
Robust standard errors (clustered on country and region) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The results presented in this table are only an extract from the full results reported in Appendices  
Note: The marginal effects calculated after the biprobit estimation are reported, in all estimations weights are 
controlled for and country is used as a cluster 
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First, the preferred specification is augmented for perceptions about the financial 
stability in a country (result column 1 in Tables 6.8a and 6.8b) and then subsequently 
for perceptions/expectations about the financial situation of a household (result 
column 2 in Tables 6.8a and 6.8b). These inclusions do not alter the results from the 
preferred specification. The estimates on the added variables imply that the worse the 
perceptions about the financial stability in a country and the worse the perceptions 
and expectations about the financial situation of a household are, the worse the 
perceptions and expectations about the economic situation in a country will be (the 
first and the second result column in Table 6.8b). However, these are not the 
preferred results since there is a potential endogeneity, caused by simultaneity 
between variables that refer to financial stability in a country and financial situation 
in a country, on one side and the dependent variables, on the other. Next, we 
estimated the model with semi-annual instead of quarterly macroeconomic data. The 
results are very similar to those with quarterly data and the effect of CBA is again 
highly significant and negative (the third result column in Tables 6.8a 6.8b). Next, 
the model is estimated without trust in government variable (the fourth result column 
in Table 6.8a), which enabled us to use larger dataset (since the trust in government 
variable was not included in the first three survey waves). The results again imply 
that the CBA has negative and significant effect on combined perceptions and 
expectations about the economic situation in a country. The difference in the rest of 
the results is that the GDP per capita variable becomes insignificant, the lagged GDP 
growth becomes significant and positive and the lagged unemployment rate also 
becomes significant and positive. The model is also estimated without the interaction 
terms. Here, the results from the ‘biprobit’ are also indicative and they again imply a 
negative and insignificant effect of the CBA on both perceptions and expectations 
about the economic situation in a country; for comparison the marginal effects are 
again presented (the last column in Table 6.8a). Finally, the single equations which 
form the SUR are also estimated. The implications are very similar to those when the 
equations are estimated as a system and again suggest a negative and significant 
effect of the CBA on perceptions and expectations about the economic situation in a 
country (Appendices 6.17 and 6.18). The results of the single equations imply that 
people in countries with a CBA are 9.5 and 18.8 percentage point less likely to 
perceive and expect the economic situation in their country to be good (to improve), 
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respectively. Since there is around 8% of ‘do not know’ answers to the question 
about the future economic situation in a country and 2% to the question about the 
current economic situation, the same strategy as in Chapter 4 is applied. Multinomial 
probits without interaction terms are estimated and the results are compared with 
those of the probit estimations without interaction term. The results imply that the 
effect of the CBA in the 'agree' ('trust') category compared to 'disagree' ('distrust') 
category are similar to those from the probit estimation without the interaction term 
and the implications are the same as those from the preferred estimation. However, 
the effect of CBA in the 'do not know' category compared to the ‘distrust’ category is 
also highly significant and still negative (Appendix 6.19). These results suggest that 
there might be some bias but it can be argued that this is likely to be minimal given 
that the sample used in estimation is representative of almost 90 per cent of the 
sample population. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In assessing the effect of a CBA on macroeconomic performance the effect on 
inflation, growth and growth volatility is estimated. The results of the previous 
chapter suggest that the presence of a CBA is likely to lower inflation. In this chapter 
we have not been able to uncover a robust relationship between CBA and either 
growth or growth volatility using an applied modelling strategy. There is a data 
availability constraint since the data for macroeconomic variables for transition 
countries is available only for 10-20 years, while growth models require a much 
longer time span. Therefore, we decided to apply a different strategy in the second 
part of the chapter, where we used subjective perceptions and expectations about the 
economic situation in a country. This provided a much larger sample size, since the 
model is based on answers from the surveys conducted in the selected European 
countries. As argued in Chapter 4, this approach can be considered as superior to that 
of relying on official macro data-based when considering the desirability of a CBA 
and, in addition, the large samples yield more precise results. From a welfare 
perspective it is peoples’ subjective perceptions and expectations that matter, rather 
than abstract, and limited, measures like GDP.  
 
Chapter 6: Estimation of the Effect of CBAs on Macroeconomic Performance 
 
274 
 
The results of our analysis suggest that, other things being equal, a CBA is likely to 
deteriorate perceptions/expectations about the economic situation in a country. This 
could be explained presuming that growth is sacrificed when the stability of the local 
currency and prices is assured/gained (the latter is implied by the results from 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). This could be explained by the constraints on domestic 
stabilisation policy imposed by a CBA, since in this regime a central bank cannot 
stimulate growth or buffer shocks. This further implies that even though we could 
not find a robust effect of CBA on macroeconomic performance, proxied by growth 
and growth volatility, the presence of a CBA seems to have a significant effect on 
residents’ assessment of the state of their economy. The usage of survey data enabled 
us also to estimate the effect of CBA conditional on different levels of trust in 
government, which is argued to be an important determinant of perceptions and 
expectations about the economic situation, especially in the transition countries. A 
low level of trust in government is also argued to be an important reason for 
introducing and maintaining a CBA (see Chapters 1 and 2). The findings suggest that 
this interaction is significant and that the lower the trust in government the smaller 
the negative effect of CBA on perceptions/expectations about the economic situation 
in a county. This implies that in the high trust environment a CBA is more frequently 
observed as a hindrance than in the low trust environment where it is also more likely 
to be thought of as a necessity for stabilisation. This is an important finding that 
should be reflected upon in the following chapter where we draw conclusions about 
the desirability of maintaining a CBA in BH.  
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7.1 Introduction  
 
Since the end of the war Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) has implemented a currency 
board arrangement (CBA) as its monetary framework. It was introduced as a 
transitional regime that was aimed at facilitating the process of recovery and early 
transition. However, 17 years later it is still in operation and its sustainability and 
desirability, especially in turbulent periods and with the low ability of BH’s economy 
to counter shocks, should now be questioned. Studies investigating the CBA in BH 
are relatively scarce and the few that addressed this issue lack any empirical 
investigation. This research was aimed at closing this gap. The purpose of this thesis 
was to investigate whether the CBA in BH is sustainable and desirable in the short-
to-medium run. Due to the lack of a long span of data for BH in all the empirical 
analyses conducted in this thesis, BH’s CBA was assessed jointly with CBAs in 
other European transition countries. The sustainability of a CBA was assessed 
through an investigation into the confidence and credibility of the monetary authority 
under the CBAs in BH and Bulgaria. The desirability of CBA was assessed through 
estimation of the effect of all CBAs in European transition countries (BH, Bulgaria, 
Estonia and Lithuania) on macroeconomic performance, proxied by inflation, growth 
and growth volatility. Since the effect of this monetary/exchange rate regime on 
growth is ambiguous, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, and since growth 
models require long data span, which is not available for the transition countries, the 
desirability of a CBA was also estimated by assessing its effect on citizens’ 
subjective perceptions and expectations regarding the economic situation in their 
country. Even though the empirical analyses were not focused solely on BH, the 
conclusions presented in this chapter are specifically related to BH and the specific 
circumstances of its economy.  
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This chapter is organised as follows. The main findings and contributions of the 
analyses conducted in the thesis are elaborated in Section 7.2. In Section 7.3 
conclusions regarding the medium-run desirability and sustainability of the CBA in 
BH are drawn from these empirical analyses, taking the specific circumstances and 
future goals of BH into account. In Section 7.4 the limitations of the research 
programme are specified and suggestions for further research developed.   
 
7.2 Main findings and contributions to knowledge  
 
Most of the studies that estimated the effects of CBA on macroeconomic 
performance treated a CBA as an exchange rate regime. In this research it was 
treated as a monetary framework, which integrates both monetary and exchange rate 
rules. Therefore, in all the empirical analyses conducted in this thesis a CBA was 
compared to all other monetary frameworks, not only to other exchange rate regimes, 
implemented in other countries in the samples. Even though it would be useful to 
specify and control for all combinations of monetary-exchange rate regimes that are 
in use in these other countries, it would further complicate the analyses and it is 
beyond the scope and interest of this thesis. However, controlling only for other 
exchange rate regimes and treating a CBA just as a type of fixed exchange rate 
regime, as conducted in previous cross-country studies that investigated the effect of 
CBA on macroeconomic performance, is likely to neglect some important features of 
the regime. By treating a CBA as a monetary framework, we allow for other 
important characteristics of this regime, beside the fixed exchange rate. Those other 
characteristics include the monetary rule/target of the monetary authority and the 
restrictions imposed on the monetary authority regarding the usage of monetary 
policy instruments. Under a CBA, central banks have to keep 100 percentage 
coverage of the monetary base and they cannot use most monetary policy 
instruments. Moreover, all of these rules are embedded in law in CBA countries, 
which should make a regime ‘tougher’ than other regimes that also seek to maintain 
the local currency fixed to some other stable currency. However, modern CBAs 
which are used in the European transition countries deviate to different extents from 
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these orthodox rules. The CBA implemented in BH is usually identified as the 
strictest type104, allowing only the usage of reserve requirements instrument.   
 
The trends in macroeconomic and financial variables in BH, analysed in Chapter 1, 
suggest that there are misalignments in policies and inflexibilities in fiscal policy, as 
well as in prices and wages in economy that may potentially undermine the CBA’s 
sustainability and desirability. However, in order to draw any implications regarding 
that regime’s sustainability and desirability a detailed empirical analysis has to be 
conducted. As appraised in Chapter 3, sustainability has been defined and addressed 
differently in different studies, but the main issue related to it is the existence and 
maintenance of the monetary authority’s credibility. Therefore, in order for the 
monetary framework to be sustainable, the residents should believe that the monetary 
authority’s main objective would be maintained in the medium-to-long run. Since the 
main objective of a CBA is the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate, in Chapter 4, 
credibility was investigated through estimation of the effect of a CBA on perceptions 
and expectations of respondents about the local currency’s stability. This is a novel 
approach to estimating a CBA’s credibility. Another novelty was in using subjective 
attitudes about the economic situation in a country as a control in this model. 
Previous studies that investigated the credibility of a monetary authority controlled 
for a country’s economic situation by including actual macroeconomic data (as 
reported by the official statistics), although they used subjective attitudes (about the 
trust in the central bank) as the dependent variable. However, we argue that 
respondents react and respond according to their perceptions, rather than the formal 
data with which they may not be familiar. Moreover, using only survey data allows 
for a higher order of magnitude (more observations), since with macroeconomic 
variables the same value has to be attached to each respondent coming from the same 
country in the same survey wave. Previous studies used the Eurobarometer survey 
and the question about trust in the European Central bank as an indicator of its 
credibility. In this thesis, surveys from the Austrian National Bank and questions 
about the local currency’s current and future stability were used. These data were 
                                                                
104 The Camilleri pre-commitment index, which controls for deviations of modern CBAs from the 
theoretical benchmark, for BH is 0.93 and the Cukierman index for central bank independence for BH 
is 0.98 (for more details see Chapter 2).  
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made available exclusively for this research and, to our knowledge, have not been 
previously used for this kind of research.  
 
Considering the main characteristics of CBA, which were elaborated in Chapter 2, 
we may expect that the credibility of the monetary authority that implements a CBA 
will be increased. However, a higher credibility in countries with a CBA, compared 
to countries with other monetary frameworks, is not automatic, since credibility 
could be undermined by political and other circumstances in the economy. Therefore, 
it is important to control for these circumstances in the empirical analysis. In our 
analysis inclusion of answers to the questions about the economic situation and trust 
in government provides that control. Findings from our empirical analysis imply that 
a CBA has a positive and significant effect on respondents’ subjective attitudes 
towards their currency’s stability, which suggests that having a CBA increases the 
credibility of the central bank. A further contribution of this analysis is that it 
investigates the circumstances under which a CBA is most effective. This was 
conducted by introduction of interaction terms between CBA and respondents’ trust 
in government and CBA and their perceptions/expectations about the economic 
situation in their country. The results imply that the effect of CBA on favourable 
perceptions/expectations about the local currency’s stability is higher the lower the 
level of trust in government and the lower the perceptions about the current 
economic stability in a country. From this analysis, we can also conclude that the 
CBA is likely to be an important mechanism for positively affecting residents’ 
perceptions/expectations about their local currency’s stability and trustworthiness, 
even in the period of crises, since the period investigated was the period of the 
Global financial crisis (GFC) and the euro crisis (2009-2011 was the observed period 
for the main results and 2007-2011 for robustness check). These results contradict 
the suggestions of some authors that credibility in countries with rigid monetary-
exchange rate regimes is likely to be undermined in periods of economic stress 
(Drazen and Masson, 1994; Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006; Castren et al., 2010). This 
is an important finding for BH, since its low quality institutions and political 
uncertainties would have likely resulted in a low trust in the local currency if it were 
not subject to the strict rules imposed by its CBA.  
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As a result of this increased credibility, as well as the fixed exchange rate with 
respect to a stable anchor currency, we may also expect a CBA to lower inflationary 
expectations and consequently the inflation rates. However, this effect is ambiguous, 
especially in transition countries in which higher productivity growth in the tradable 
sector (due to the low base level of productivity) might result in higher inflation (the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect). Therefore, the effect of CBA on inflation performance 
was investigated in Chapter 5 using a sample of transition countries. In order to 
estimate the effect of a CBA on inflation performance a static estimator was first 
applied. Since the countries in the sample that had a CBA did so through the whole 
period observed (1998-2009), we applied a relatively new estimator, called the fixed 
effect vector decomposition (FEVD), introduced by Plumper and Troeger (2007), 
which allows estimation of time-invariant variables. The results imply that the CBA 
countries have had, on average, better inflation performance than transition countries 
with other monetary frameworks. To our knowledge, this relatively novel approach 
has not been previously applied for this kind of research. However, since the debate 
about the consistency of the FEVD estimator is still on-going and since the static 
model did not include the influence of past inflation rates on the current rates, a 
dynamic estimator was next applied. The results from the dynamic estimation also 
imply that CBA reduces inflation more than the monetary frameworks implemented 
in other transition countries. In order to test whether this effect of a CBA was 
induced by the fixed exchange rate, high level of the central bank independence, 
which are assumed under this framework, or some other feature of the regime, the 
former two were controlled for in the model. As expected, the effect of the CBA 
variable is somewhat smaller after the inclusion of these controls, but is still 
significant. This implies that a CBA has a positive effect on inflation performance 
over and above fixed exchange rate and high level of central bank independence. 
This is presumably the result of the increased credibility of the monetary authority, 
which is also suggested by the estimations based on the survey data (which were 
estimated in Chapter 4). The additional contribution of this research is that the 
‘strong’ CBAs, those with the stricter rules, which deviate less from the orthodox 
CBA (the ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Estonia), are highly significant in all 
specifications, while the less strict ones (those in Bulgaria and Lithuania) do not have 
a significant effect on inflation performance. Since BH is the country with the 
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strictest CBA, these results imply that it had benefited from its implementation with 
respect to inflation.  
 
Beside its effect on inflation performance, the effect on growth and growth volatility 
were also estimated (in the first part of Chapter 6). The results of these estimations 
were not robust105. However, growth models require a long span of data, which is not 
available for transition countries. Moreover, the expected effect of the monetary 
regime on growth is ambiguous on both theoretical and empirical grounds (even with 
a longer span of the data). Therefore, in the second part of Chapter 6, we applied a 
novel approach for estimating the effect on economic performance by using surveys 
from the Austrian National Bank. Answers to the questions about the economic 
situation in a country were used as an indicator of the economic situation in a 
country. Behavioural economics studies emphasise the importance of subjective 
attitudes in affecting consumer and producer behaviour and hence the overall 
economic situation in a country. The results of our own study imply that a CBA is 
likely to decrease the probability of perceiving the current and future economic 
situation in a country as good. One explanation for these findings may be the 
strictness of the monetary authority under a CBA, since the economic situation 
cannot be improved through discretionary monetary policy. This further implies that 
a CBA, while increasing monetary credibility and potentially macroeconomic 
stability, cannot improve the economic situation in a country, and may consequently 
lower its potential growth. The important additional finding is that this negative 
effect becomes smaller the lower the trust in government. This again implies that a 
CBA is more effective in a low trust environment, where it can be argued to be 
observed as a necessity for stabilisation, than in a high trust one, where is it more 
likely to be viewed as a net impediment to economic policymaking. 
 
The main contribution to knowledge of the research presented in this thesis is the 
detailed empirical investigation of the credibility of CBA, which has not been 
undertaken previously. In conducting this investigation, a novel approach and a novel 
database were used. Namely, the answers to questions regarding currency stability 
                                                                
105 There is some evidence of the negative effect of CBA on growth volatility (meaning that it tends to 
decrease growth volatility), when estimated by three-stage FEVD procedure. However, the effect is 
insignificant when estimated with the ‘xtfevd’ command, which accounts for the additional variance 
in standard errors. 
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were used as a measure of the monetary authority’s credibility and respondents’ 
subjective assessments of the economic situation and government were used as 
controls. For this data, surveys from the Austrian National Bank, which were made 
available exclusively for this research, were used. Another novelty is in the treatment 
of a CBA as an exchange rate-monetary framework, not just an exchange rate 
regime, which was the practice in previous studies and in the IMF classification. The 
next contribution is derived from this specific approach, since in the estimation of the 
effect of a CBA on macroeconomic performance the CBA was compared to other 
exchange rate-monetary frameworks (not just other exchange rate (ER) regimes as in 
other studies). Moreover, when estimating its effect on macroeconomic variables, 
some additional features of the regime are controlled for, namely fixed exchange rate 
and high level of central bank independence, in order to observe whether the CBA is 
effective over and above these features. Another contribution is in the usage of 
respondents’ perceptions and expectations about the economic situation in a country 
as an indicator of a country’s macroeconomic performance. This enabled us to 
estimate the effect of CBA on country’s economic well-being, since the results on 
economic performance, proxied by GDP growth and volatility were, due to short data 
span, inconclusive. Finally, a further important novelty is in connecting the effect of 
CBA with the level of trust in government. The inclusion of this interaction term was 
significant and enabled us to estimate whether the CBA is more effective in a low 
trust or high trust environment. 
 
Taken together the results from this research programme imply that a CBA is likely 
to have positive effect on increasing monetary authority’s credibility and improving 
the inflation performance in a country. However, as expected, the CBA’s effect on 
the perceptions about the current and future local economic situation in a country is 
negative. These results might be explained by a trade-off between increased stability 
and growth, with the latter capable of being boosted by greater discretion. However, 
in order to draw firm conclusions about the sustainability and desirability of 
maintaining that regime the specific circumstances in the country of interest, as well 
as its future goals, should be considered. This will be undertaken in the next section.  
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7.3 Policy implications  
 
In this section, the current and future sustainability and desirability of the CBA in 
BH is assessed in the light of the empirical findings presented in this thesis and the 
prevailing circumstances in the country. As noted in Chapter 3, the concepts of 
sustainability and desirability of a policy regime are very complex and interrelated, 
and in the empirical analyses presented above only some of their features were 
estimated. Those that were not directly investigated in these analyses were appraised 
and discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 and will be incorporated into the following 
analysis before drawing final conclusions regarding the maintenance/abandonment of 
the CBA in BH.  
 
As implied by the estimations in Chapters 4 and 5 a CBA is likely to be an efficient 
regime for increasing monetary credibility and price stability, features which should 
increase macroeconomic stability and consequently positively affect growth. 
However, its overall effect on growth is ambiguous since monetary policy is 
restricted under a CBA and the monetary authority cannot use monetary policy 
instruments to mitigate shocks or stimulate economic growth. Since currently there is 
not a long enough series of data to estimate its effect on growth the findings of the 
analysis of the effect of CBA on growth and growth volatility conducted in Chapter 6 
were inconclusive. For this reason we focused on estimating the effect of CBA on 
preferences and expectations about the economic situation in a country and these 
imply that the effect of the CBA is negative (Chapter 6). However, the results also 
suggest the lower the trust in government then the larger the positive effect of a CBA 
on perceptions and expectations about the local currency and the smaller the negative 
effect of CBA on perceptions and expectations about the economic situation. These 
results have very important implications given the recent and current political 
situation in BH. Namely, as noted in Chapter 1, the political situation in BH can be 
characterised as fragmented and deadlocked, with a very low quality of state and 
entities’ institutions and regulations. These results suggest that under the current 
circumstances in the country the maintenance of CBA is justified. Therefore, 
suggestions about the future monetary regime in BH should focus on any benefits 
from introducing more flexibility into the CBA rather than the abandonment of it. As 
explained in Chapter 2, these flexibilities are already present in CBAs in other 
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European countries (Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia, before entering EMU) which 
implement(ed) this regime and which could be advantageous in periods of crisis. As 
appraised in Chapter 1, during the GFC the BH’s central bank could not mitigate the 
shocks or stop withdrawals of money from BH subsidiaries, both those by residents 
and the foreign parent banks. At the beginning of the crisis, when leverage 
requirements in European banks were increased, mother banks started withdrawing 
money from their BH subsidiaries and if the Vienna initiative, initiated by the IMF, 
was not signed and implemented this would have had severe consequences for both 
the financial and real sectors. This is one of the reasons for advocating a more 
flexible CBA in BH. These flexibilities should go in the direction of developing 
buffer mechanisms for the periods of crisis. These buffers could be provided from 
the share of reserves in the central bank that exceeds 100 percent backing of the 
monetary base, and could be used as a support for financial institutions during the 
periods of crises (i.e. introduce a limited lender of last resort function). This would 
provide more security to banks and could also potentially stimulate them to lend 
more domestically (as discovered in Chapter 1, currently banks in BH are 
excessively liquid). However, prior to allowing more discretion to the monetary 
authority, more stability in other sectors in the economy, namely more efficient 
government institutions and more developed financial market, are required 
Moreover, the Eurozone has been facing problems recently and its future stability has 
been questioned. Therefore, future pegging solely to this currency might be 
problematic and unjustifiable. However, we do not presently suggest abolition of the 
CBA in BH, since its operation contributes to the increased credibility of the 
monetary authority and consequently assists overall macroeconomic stability. 
Another important fact is that the governing board of the Central Bank BH is chosen 
by the Presidency of BH and these choices are mostly driven by political interests 
rather than the expertise of those chosen. These members then choose governor and 
vice-governors based on the same principle. Even though the members cannot be 
involved in government, some of them had previously been involved in party politics 
and most of them have informal connections with those in the government/political 
parties that chose them. Therefore, the question is how professional these members 
would be in leading monetary policy if there was no CBA. It is likely that they would 
try to promote political interests rather than the interest of the country. Again, it is 
likely that the monetary policy would be inefficient as BH’s fiscal policy and 
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consequently macroeconomic stability is likely to be highly endangered. An 
additional argument for maintaining the CBA is that it is a good instrument for 
limiting moral hazard and adverse selection problems.  
 
As noted in Galic (2012, p.66), a country is not ready for the abandonment of the 
CBA until fiscal policy is credible enough to “amortize certain impacts on the 
credibility of the system at the moment of abandonment of the currency board”. 
Since the confidence in BH’s economic policy makers is low, the abandonment of 
the CBA is likely to lead towards the destabilisation of the monetary sector. It might 
be assumed that in BH political pressures for monetisation of fiscal deficit, if the 
CBA is abandoned, would be strong and could therefore result in inflation and a 
decrease of confidence in the local currency. Furthermore, as noted in Galic (2012), 
changes in legislation in BH may be difficult, since these would require consensus of 
both entities and the international community, which has proved in the past to be 
problematic and require a lengthy process of discussion. Given the fragmented 
political constitution and high level of corruption (which were appraised in Chapters 
1 and 3), even if this consensus was achieved, “it would be extremely difficult for the 
[BH’s] central bank to pursue discretionary monetary policy without influencing 
stability” (Galic, 2012, p. 67). Since BH is heading towards EU accession, one 
suggestion, based on the Estonian example, could be to maintain the CBA until the 
EMU accession. There is a number of studies that advise this strategy (Keller, 2000; 
Sepp and Randveer, 2002c; Galic, 2012). Kaasik (2014) argued that a “CBA offers 
the closest monetary environment to the euro area, preparing the economy for the 
euro adoption”. Katsimi (2008) emphasised some reasons for maintaining the CBA 
until EMU accession: maintenance of credibility, no cost of introducing new 
institutions and policy instrument when switching to another regime, no inflationary 
pressures from moving to a more discretionary environment, no threats of 
speculative attacks (due to weak fundamentals or contagion effect), lower risk of 
contagion in the presence of financial instability. Keller (2000) (as cited in Sepp and 
Randveed, 2002c, p.35) emphasised that the abandonment of the CBA could lead to 
significant fluctuations that could destabilise the markets “as market participants 
speculate about the rate for euro-zone entry”. In addition, he noted that, “abandoning 
a well-functioning and credible currency board could lead to reduced policy 
transparency and discipline, lower investment as a result of greater uncertainty, and 
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the potential for households to shy away from local currency savings. Very 
importantly, there may be no obvious candidate for an alternative monetary policy 
framework since, following an extended period with a CBA, it might be difficult to 
identify a stable quantitative framework linking policy instruments to inflation, while 
the range of available central bank instruments might also be inadequate”. Due to 
political uncertainties, high level of corruption and low level of rule of law in the 
country (these were analysed and compared with some other transition countries in 
Appendix 1.1), a higher level of discretion (after the abandonment of CBA) could 
easily be misused and lead towards a decrease of trust in the currency.  
 
In the recent crisis a lot of central banks in the world implemented expansionary 
monetary policy primarily to stop the collapse of the financial sector and later to  try 
to stimulate growth. However, in order for expansionary monetary policy actions to 
have a positive effect on economic activity a base for intervention is needed, and this 
is usually what small undeveloped economies lack. This base assumes a developed 
financial market which can process newly created money and insure that money 
stays in the country and is made available in the market, especially for investment. 
Namely, if banks are not willing to lend domestically they will just increase their 
excess liquidity, or alternatively they may decide to invest funds outside the country. 
Reviewing the pattern of government/public spending is also important, especially if 
expansionary monetary policy is being implemented through financing fiscal deficits. 
As shown in Chapter 1, currently, a large share of total government expenditures in 
BH is on public administration wages and social expenditures. In this case, an 
increase in these types of public expenditures, which can be characterised as 
generally less productive, compared to capital spending, generated by the 
expansionary monetary policy, is likely to lead towards higher inflation and lower 
stability. Some of BH’s politicians suggest that the high foreign reserves, which have 
to be held under a CBA, have high opportunity costs and that these should be used 
for fiscal purposes. However, the very low share of more productive public 
expenditures in total public spending indicates that it is likely that the reserve money 
would also mainly be used to fund ‘unproductive’ expenditures. This behaviour is 
suggested by the usage of the recent loans from the IMF, which were mostly used for 
higher wages in public sector and pensions. Therefore, the result of such moves 
would likely lead towards increased destabilisation without any positive effect on 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
286 
 
growth. Keller (2000) (as cited in Sepp and Randver, 2002c, p.9) has argued that “an 
effective anti-cyclical monetary policy is difficult enough to pursue in developed, 
large and therefore relatively closed economies. In transition countries, with rapid 
structural transformations, the knowledge of our profession regarding the exact 
transmission channels and relevant time lags is clearly less deep. Therefore, the 
balance of risk appears to favour small transition economies with fixed exchange 
rates to maintain their exchange rate policy”.  
 
An inability to use devaluations of the local currency to stimulate demand for 
domestic exports is also sometimes emphasised as a disadvantage of a CBA. Here 
again, the consequences of such moves, under the local circumstances, have to be 
considered. Namely, import and export flexibilities have to be investigated. Export 
flexibility is quite low in BH due to the limited capacities of domestic producers. 
Furthermore, there are no institutions for certification of the quality of domestic 
products, which is an additional limitation on the potential to increase exports. On 
the other hand, as explained in Chapter 1, the country is highly dependent on 
imports, since it imports a lot of raw materials and intermediate goods, and 
devaluation would increase the prices of these goods and consequently those of the 
final domestic products. As Davies and Green (2010) argue: “There is evidence that 
changes in import prices as a consequence of a fall in the exchange rate are passed 
through to domestic prices more rapidly in EMCs [emerging market economies], 
making inflation more sensitive to parity changes” (p. 225). Therefore, any potential 
increase in aggregate demand caused by devaluation would, to a great extent, leave 
the country through higher imports and further devaluations would be needed. 
Consequently, the stability of the local currency would be undermined once the 
monetary authority deviates from the fixed exchange rate, while the positive effects 
on economic growth are likely to be very limited or even absent. Devaluation of the 
local currency is further likely to decrease the efforts of domestic producers to 
become more productive and competitive since it protects them. It would be better to 
protect against any ‘unfair’ foreign competition through laws and controls rather than 
decreasing overall competitive pressures. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 1, debt 
nominated in the foreign currency (the euro), against which BH would devalue its 
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local currency, is relatively high106, so devaluation would increase the burden of debt. 
In all the above processes, the propensities to consume and import as well as price 
elasticises of domestic and foreign demands for imports/exports have to be assessed. 
However, those calculations are beyond the scope of the thesis, but it has to be 
emphasised that all of these have to be investigated in detail and taken into account 
when discussing the potential effects of changes in the currency and the regime itself.  
 
However, the maintenance and sustainability of CBA depends on the soundness and 
flexibilities of other sectors (which were investigated in Chapter 1 for BH). As noted 
by Kaasik (2014) “CBA cannot be successful without supportive economic policies”. 
Namely, fiscal discipline and effectiveness are an important prerequisite for the 
sustainability of the CBA since ineffective and irresponsible fiscal policy, which is 
unable to stabilise and support the economy, might build pressure for abandoning the 
CBA (Sepp and Randveer, 2002c). Furthermore, wages, prices and consequently real 
effective exchange rate, should be flexible to adjust to internal and external shocks, 
since this adjustment cannot go through nominal exchange rate. In Chapter 1 it was 
argued that wages are not flexible in BH, since their increase has been higher than 
the increase of GDP growth and employment. Productivity, inflation and interest 
rates convergence with the euro area are also important for synchronisation of 
business cycles with the EMU. Inflation rates have had similar trends in BH and the 
Eurozone, as well as the interest rates, although the level of interest rates differ due 
to differences in the country risks and the level of development of financial markets 
(Chapter 1). Moreover, the financial sector should be resilient, well-capitalised and 
liquid. Banks in BH are considered to be very liquid. However, the potential threat 
here is the high presence and dependence on foreign banks, which can withdraw 
money from the country (e.g. at the beginning of the GFC) and which have an 
oligopoly in determining the interest rates in the country (which cannot be affected 
by the central bank), since a very high percentage of total banking sector assets are 
                                                                
106 According to the currency structure of public debt on 31/12/2013, the Euro and SDRs make up 
85% of the total public debt of BH (separate data for the two is not available, but the effective 
payments are in Euros) (Ministry of Finance and Treasury, Information about the public debt of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on 31st of December 2013, Sarajevo, May 2014, p.10;  
http://www.mft.gov.ba/bos/images/stories/dug/informacija_2013_bs.pdf) 
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held by a few banks107. Moreover, as appraised in Chapter 1, a lot of money is 
leaving the country largely due to a maturity mismatch problem which cannot be 
overcome in the domestic market due to undeveloped money and capital markets and 
strict banking rules. In order to overcome restrictions on long-term loans the 
development of the capital market should be encouraged. Moreover, the existing 
legislation in the area of commercial banking and the rigidity of some legal 
regulations (such as maturity harmonisation), which has  resulted in a high level of 
excess liquidity in the commercial banking sector, on one hand, and very low 
liquidity of the business sector, on the other hand, should be loosened. Additionally, 
the market is divided between two entities; there are two banking agencies and two 
stock markets; and integration of the market at the state level is needed. As noted in 
Chapter 3, it is difficult to integrate all of the features which can affect a CBA’s 
sustainability and desirability into one model, but these should at least be identified 
and separately assessed. The effects of CBA on credibility and economic 
performance, which were investigated empirically in this thesis, are just some of the 
features that have to be assessed in making conclusions about the sustainability and 
desirability of CBA. Since some other features affect the sustainability of a CBA 
through affecting the economic performance of a country, we control for the state of 
economy in the empirical analyses. However, some features, which have to be 
considered before making conclusions about the CBA’s sustainability and 
desirability, cannot be quantified, for some there is no data available or not a long 
enough span of data and others are difficult to integrate into model. In the following 
section we assess the limitations of the research presented in this thesis and identify 
how some of these could be addressed in future research. 
 
7.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
The main limitation of this research is the short data span and unavailability of 
relevant data for the country of interest. Since the war in BH stopped 19 years ago 
data for most of the variables is available only for 10-15 years, or less. Moreover, the 
CBA was introduced after the war and there is no data available before the war, and 
                                                                
107 As of the end of 2012, foreign-owned banks accounted for 91.9 per cent of total assets and the five 
largest foreign-owned banks control more than half of total assets of the BHs banking sector (CBBH, 
2012a)  
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therefore this prevents us from conducting a ‘before and after’ analysis which may 
have given us some additional insights into the stabilising effect of the regime. 
Therefore, only cross country identification is possible. Moreover, the availability 
and accuracy of data in transition countries are limited due to the “weaknesses of 
national statistical agencies and the failure to account for the large informal 
economy” (Sanfey and Teksoz, 2005). In the analysis presented in this thesis, where 
possible, this limitation is partially overcome by usage of the survey data; 
considering that the sample is representative. Another limitation is unavailability of 
more details about the surveys conducted. Namely, the variables necessary for 
controlling for a survey design were not provided by the data provider. Moreover, 
not all potentially relevant questions were contained in the surveys. Another 
limitation is the small number of countries with a CBA (currently it is used in only 
three countries in Europe). The surveys were conducted only in two countries with a 
CBA. This prevents us from including both a CBA dummy and country dummies 
due to perfect collinearity.  
 
Studies which investigated the credibility of monetary/ER regimes usually used the 
interest rate differentials relative to the anchor (or some credible) monetary policy as 
a proxy for the credibility of monetary/ER regimes (Weber et al., 1991; Drazen and 
Masson, 1994; Ledesma et al., 2005, Arestis and Mouratidis, 2005; Ho and Ho, 
2009). However, this cannot be conducted for the country of interest since there is no 
money market in BH. One alternative might be to use the difference between interest 
rates on loans in domestic and those indexed to a foreign currency. However, the 
difference between these two is small in BH (significantly smaller than in other 
countries, e.g. Estonia, Croatia, Latvia) and does not vary much over time (as 
presented in Chapter 3). Moreover, only a very small portion of total loans in BH are 
recorded as being ‘indexed to the euro’. Finally, data on interest rates is recorded 
separately for domestic currency loans and those indexed to the euro only from 2007 
and for time-series analysis a longer period is required. 
 
To further analyse the desirability of the CBA it would also be useful to simulate the 
effect of the alternative regimes on BH’s economic performance. At the moment, this 
cannot be conducted since an appropriate and fully specified macroeconomic model 
of the country still does not exist. The available model for BH created by 
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Weyerstrass (2009) does not provide all the relevant and necessary equations and the 
quality of the model itself is questionable108. Therefore, it is not possible to 
empirically address the issue of alternative regimes, which would give us more 
information regarding the desirability of the current regime. This also prevents us 
from including the availability of other tools for stimulating economic activity and 
accommodating economic shocks in the empirical analysis, which is important when 
assessing the desirability and sustainability of the particular monetary regime, in this 
case a CBA. Further research, after the appropriate macroeconomic model of a 
country is available, can go in the direction of conducting more complex analyses 
and examining the relative attractions of alternative exit strategies.  
 
In all the empirical analyses in the thesis, the effect of CBA is captured by a dummy 
variable, which is 1 for countries that have had a CBA and 0 otherwise. Therefore, 
we are comparing the effect of CBA with (the average effect of) all other regimes 
implemented in other countries in the sample. However, it would be useful to 
observe the effect of CBA compared to the specific regimes used in other countries, 
separately, not to all other regimes, but, as noted in Chapter 4, since the interaction 
terms between CBA and trust in government and CBA and perceptions/expectations 
about the economic situation were used, for the simplicity, CBA is compared to all 
other regimes (compared to not having the CBA). Since the effect is captured with 
the dummy variable we had to make an assumption that the CBA variable is 
capturing the effect of CBA, not some other common specific for countries which 
implement a CBA. In order to be more assured we investigated other macroeconomic 
and political circumstances in those countries and we could not find any other 
characteristics which could distinguish these (CBA) countries from countries that 
form the comparison group (Chapter 3). Moreover, CBA countries differ between 
themselves in their level of development, progress in transition and the relationship 
to the EU.  
 
                                                                
108 Some equations which are likely to be important for this kind of simulations are not included in the 
Weyerstrass’s model, such as money supply, bank credit, producer price inflation, the tradable and 
non-tradable inflation (those are used in the Sepp and Randveer (2002c) paper in which alternative 
regimes are assessed for Estonia). Moreover, the Weyerstrass’s model was offered to the Central Bank 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was not accepted due to the failure of the author to provide some 
explanations and diagnostic reports. 
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Further analysis can try to overcome this limitation by using more complicated 
(system of) models (with more controls) and estimators and should also try to 
integrate as many features that can affect sustainability and desirability of a CBA 
into the model (or set of models which should be observed as a system). On the 
policy side, these features do not necessarily have to be integrated, but it is necessary 
to assess all identified pillars and the potential effects of any changes in the monetary 
regime, taking the specific circumstances of the country into account, before finally 
deciding to conduct any change to the currently stable and credible monetary regime. 
According to our analyses, due to political situation in the country and due to 
estimated high current credibility of the regime, we do not suggest the abandonment 
of the CBA in BH in the medium term. The introduction of some small additional 
flexibilities might be desirable, but under very strict and clearly specified 
circumstances.   
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Appendices Chapter 1 
 
Appendix 1.1: World Governance Indicators, 2011  
(selected confidence interval: 90%) 
 
Countries percentile rank (0-100): Dark green – 90th – 100th 
percentile; light green – 75th – 90th percentile; light yellow – 50th 
– 75th percentile; dark yellow – 25th to 50th percentile; light red 
10th – 25th percentile; dark red – 0th to 10th percentile  
 
 
 
  326 
 
 
 
 
 
  327 
 
 
 
 
 
  328 
 
 
 
 
 
  329 
 
 
 
 
 
  330 
 
 
 
  331 
Appendices Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 2.1: Trends in macroeconomic variables in European transition countries (1998-2012) 
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Appendices Chapter 3 
 
Appendix 3.1: Interest rates on short-term and long-term loans in BH, Croatia, Estonia and Latvia and Macedonia 
 
In order to be comparable interest rates on short-term and long-term loans are used in all selected countries and 
differences between those in the local currency and those indexed in the foreign currency are compared. Data is 
available on a monthly basis, herein presented are on (the last day in) the last month of the year. 
Variable 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Country BOS CRO EST LAT BOS CRO EST LAT BOS CRO EST LAT MAC BOS CRO EST LAT MAC 
Interest 
rate 
diff. on 
loans 
Short-
term 
Enterprises -0.77 0.53 -0.21 4.12 -1.51 0.80 1.54 4.93 -0.52 0.88 1.15 3.79 2.14 -0.31 -0.93 0.76 2.51 1.60 
Households 0.48 5.50 24.21 12.27 -0.74 3.68 16.08 9.88 0.07 2.45 1.86 13.82 3.75 0.16 3.78 -6.78 6.04 4.02 
Long-
term 
Enterprises -0.73 0.15 1.70 3.77 -1.39 1.18 2.17 2.84 -0.94 0.96 3.60 0.49 2.36 0.41 -0.74 1.19 -1.26 1.94 
Households 1.55 1.21 8.85 10.24 0.89 2.46 14.41 2.45 -1.69 2.31 11.30 -7.77 4.60 0.40 3.13 12.12 -2.02 4.88 
Interest 
rate on 
loans in 
the 
local 
currency 
Short-
term 
Enterprises 7.03 7.39 6.40 12.32 7.42 8.98 8.45 14.30 8.1 9.29 5.86 10.74 9.45 7.84 6.98 6.23 8.21 9.29 
Households 10.54 
12.3
4 
31.05 20.05 9.14 12.33 23.28 20.12 9.88 12.68 11.02 21.13 13.64 9.67 12.64 10.62 22.81 12.73 
Long-
term 
Enterprises 7.1 6.66 8.13 11.70 7.16 8.1 8.52 11.98 6.8 8.27 7.33 8.95 9.57 8.25 6.45 5.63 7.22 9.17 
Households 9.97 8.01 14.95 17.35 11.09 10.35 19.54 15.60 7.87 11.33 16.68 13.09 14.13 9.1 11.29 16.43 15.89 13.08 
Inflation, CPI 1.52 2.87 6.60 10.11 7.42 6.07 10.37 15.40 -0.39 2.38 -0.08 3.53 -0.74 2.19 1.05 2.97 -1.09 1.61 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HIPC Eurozone (June) 1.9 3.97 -0.13 1.49 
Benchmark interest rate 4 2.5 1 1 
 
*For Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) indexed in euro, for Croatia (CRO) index in foreign currency (mainly euro), for 
Estonia (EST), Latvia (LAT) and Macedonia (MAC) loans in euro 
 
Source: Countries’ national banks (for interest rates), WDI (for inflation rates), 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/interest-rate (Eurozone interest rates), http://www.global-
rates.com/economic-indicators/inflation/consumer-prices/hicp/eurozone.aspx (Eurozone inflation rate) (last accessed on: 
13/10/2014)
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Appendices Chapter 4  
 
Appendix 4.1: General description of the survey data (socio-
demographic characteristics) 
 
Appendix 4.1a: Table 4.1a: Number of respondents, months in which 
surveys were conducted and number of regions (per country)  
 
* For the regions from each country see Appendix 4.1d  
 
 
Appendix 4.1b: Table A.4.1b: Sample characteristics per country, all 
survey waves included 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200702 200801 200802 200901 200902 201001 201002 201101 Total
No. of 
regions*
1,088 1,057 1,035 1,091 1,005 1,042 1,061 1,096 8,475
n.a. n.a. Nov May Oct, Nov May Oct, Nov May
1,004 1,000 1,007 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,045 1,017 8,073
n.a. n.a. Nov May Nov May Nov May
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 8,000
n.a. n.a. Oct  n.a Oct May Oct May
1,032 1,029 1,033 1,020 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032 8,242
n.a. n.a. Oct May Oct May Oct Apr, May
1,033 1,010 1,052 1,052 1,054 1,052 1,056 1,030 8,339
n.a. n.a. Oct May Oct May Oct May
1,031 1,010 1,009 1,009 1,010 1,013 1,008 1,013 8,103
n.a. n.a. Oct May 10 May     Oct May
1,027 1,076 1,001 1,048 1,012 1,127 1,053 1,000 8,344
n.a. n.a. Nov May Nov Apr,May Nov, Dec May
1,039 1,024 1,042 1,054 1,034 1,025 1,052 1,060 8,330
n.a. n.a. Oct May,June Oct Apr,May Nov Apr, May
1,000 1,036 1,018 1,082 1,107 1,134 1,124 1,104 8,605
n.a. n.a. Oct,Nov Apr,May Oct May Oct May
1,002 1,024 1,084 1,071 1,073 1,069 1,070 1,071 8,464
n.a. n.a. Oct May Oct May Oct May
Serbia 4
Macedonia 4
Poland 10
Romania 8
Croatia 6
Czech 8
Hungary 7
Albania 3
Bosnia 12
Bulgaria 9
Male Female  15-18  19-34  35-54  55+ Student Retired Unemployed Employed
All countries 
(absolute) 39122 43845 3998 25151 31216 22610 7866 15668 15011 44304 82975
All countries 
(percent) 47% 53% 5% 30% 38% 27% 9% 19% 18% 53%
Albania 49% 51% 7% 35% 41% 17% 12% 8% 22% 58% 8475
Bosnia 45% 55% 4% 31% 34% 31% 11% 22% 28% 39% 8073
Bulgaria 49% 51% 7% 30% 37% 25% 11% 16% 13% 60% 8000
Croatia 45% 55% 4% 31% 36% 29% 9% 23% 16% 52% 8242
Czech Republic 50% 50% 7% 29% 34% 31% 9% 17% 7% 67% 8339
Hungary 46% 54% 1% 26% 37% 36% 5% 32% 14% 49% 8103
Macedonia 46% 54% 5% 29% 40% 26% 9% 15% 36% 41% 8344
Poland 48% 52% 4% 37% 40% 19% 11% 12% 9% 68% 8330
Romania 45% 55% 4% 26% 36% 35% 7% 30% 12% 51% 8605
Serbia 50% 50% 5% 28% 42% 25% 10% 16% 25% 50% 8464
Employment statusAgeGender No of 
observations
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Appendix 4.1c: Table A.4.1c: Variables used for weighting of the 
sample 
 
* quota sampling applied 
 
Appendix 4.1d: Percentage of respondents per regions in countries 
 
bysort country: tab h_region [aw=h_weight] 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Albania 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                  AL North | 1,398.3899       18.93       18.93 
                AL Central | 3,139.1594       42.50       61.43 
                  AL South |2,849.45065       38.57      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,387      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Bosnia 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
           Una-Sana Canton | 579.068045        8.19        8.19 
              Tuzla Canton |  812.14888       11.49       19.68 
       Zenica-Doboj Canton |  741.44902       10.49       30.17 
     Central Bosnia Canton | 543.713615        7.69       37.86 
Herzegovina-Neretna Canton | 430.812241        6.09       43.96 
   West Herzegovina Canton | 141.249718        2.00       45.95 
           Sarajevo Canton | 826.307053       11.69       57.64 
                 Canton 10 |190.6493194        2.70       60.34 
   RS North District Brcko | 1,751.7973       24.78       85.12 
                   RS East | 928.983302       13.14       98.26 
           Posavski Canton | 73.0308885        1.03       99.30 
 Bosanskopodrinskij Canton | 49.7906057        0.70      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,069      100.00 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Macedonia 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                    Skopje |  2,092.724       28.60       28.60 
                 Northwest | 1,894.9441       25.90       54.50 
                 Southwest | 1,514.6824       20.70       75.20 
                      East |1,814.64947       24.80      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,317      100.00 
Gender Age
Gender*
Age
Education Region
Size of 
town
Region*Size 
of town
Size of 
household
Type of 
community
Ethnicity
Albania x' x' x' x' x' x' x' x'
Bosnia x' x' x' x' x x' x' x'
Bulgaria*
Croatia x' x' x' x x x' x'
Czech x x x' x x
Hungary x x x' x' x' x'
Macedonia x' x' x' x' x' x' x' x' x'
Poland x x
Romania x' x' x' x x
Serbia x x
x- indicates that variable has been taken into account for weighting purposes
x' - indicates that variable has been taken into account for weighting purposes in some, but not 
all waves
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--------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Bulgaria 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Sofia | 1,352.5584       19.32       19.32 
               Blagoevgrad | 560.547643        8.01       27.33 
                   Plovdiv | 988.002658       14.11       41.44 
              Stara Zagora | 686.685237        9.81       51.25 
                     Varna | 700.693303       10.01       61.26 
                    Burgas | 770.801634       11.01       72.28 
                      Ruse | 595.637808        8.51       80.78 
                    Pleven | 840.839964       12.01       92.80 
                   Montana |504.2333771        7.20      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,000      100.00 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Croatia 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                    Zagreb | 1,802.9215       25.01       25.01 
                  Slavonia | 1,125.8522       15.62       40.63 
             North Croatia | 1,382.8526       19.18       59.81 
                      Lika | 656.539028        9.11       68.92 
           Istra & Pomorje | 894.143204       12.40       81.32 
                  Dalmatia | 1,346.6915       18.68      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,209      100.00 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Poland 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                    Warsaw | 2,308.9643       31.68       31.68 
                      Lodz | 545.119735        7.48       39.16 
                Trojmiasto | 493.422975        6.77       45.93 
                  Szczecin | 485.373078        6.66       52.59 
    Silesian Agglomoration | 1,380.4528       18.94       71.53 
                    Cracow | 461.898463        6.34       77.87 
                    Poznan | 381.701528        5.24       83.11 
                   Wroclaw |  432.70621        5.94       89.05 
                 Bydgoszcz | 374.889769        5.14       94.19 
                    Lublin | 423.471181        5.81      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,288      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Romania 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                North-East | 1,249.9856       16.44       16.44 
                South-East | 993.816155       13.07       29.51 
                     South |  1,238.943       16.30       45.81 
                South-West | 817.935925       10.76       56.57 
                      West | 699.235695        9.20       65.76 
                North-West | 954.512092       12.55       78.32 
                    Centre | 870.009657       11.44       89.76 
                 Bucharest | 778.561858       10.24      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,603      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------- 
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-> country = Serbia 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                  Belgrade | 1,678.2645       22.51       22.51 
                 Vojvodina |  2,099.783       28.16       50.66 
       Central-West Serbia | 1,551.8952       20.81       71.48 
         South-East Serbia | 2,127.0574       28.52      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,457      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
-> country = Czech Republic 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                    Prague | 945.017014       12.94       12.94 
            Middle Bohemia | 788.729336       10.80       23.73 
                 Southwest | 836.049883       11.44       35.18 
                 Northwest |  834.03474       11.42       46.60 
                 Northeast | 1,050.2466       14.38       60.97 
                 Southeast | 1,116.8548       15.29       76.26 
            Middle Moravia | 836.005875       11.44       87.71 
            Moravskoslezko | 898.061833       12.29      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,305      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Hungary 
 
                  h_region |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Middle Hungary | 2,159.4971       30.54       30.54 
       Middle Transdanubia | 764.796666       10.81       41.35 
         West Transdanubia | 684.019549        9.67       51.02 
        South Transdanubia | 667.244855        9.44       60.46 
             North Hungary | 823.015808       11.64       72.10 
         North Great Plain |1,031.66549       14.59       86.68 
         South Great Plain | 941.760546       13.32      100.00 
---------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      7,072      100.00 
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Appendix 4.2: Responses to the questions about the local currency 
stability and the stability of euro  
 
Appendix 4.2a: Percentages of responses to selected questions  
 
. tab q1_03 [aw=weight], missing 
 
   Currently, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
 is a very stable | 
  and trustworthy | 
         currency |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 2,053.7515        3.94        3.94 
            Agree | 5,991.7487       11.49       15.42 
   Somewhat agree |  12,087.22       23.17       38.59 
Somewhat disagree | 10,896.007       20.89       59.48 
         Disagree |  9,839.684       18.86       78.34 
Strongly disagree | 8,149.4393       15.62       93.97 
      Do not know | 2,637.5275        5.06       99.02 
        No answer | 510.622547        0.98      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     52,166      100.00 
 
. bysort CBA: tab q1_03 [aw=weight], missing 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------- 
-> CBA = 0 
 
   Currently, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
 is a very stable | 
  and trustworthy | 
         currency |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 1,256.3363        2.98        2.98 
            Agree | 4,331.9589       10.29       13.27 
   Somewhat agree |9,656.61918       22.94       36.21 
Somewhat disagree | 9,262.2809       22.00       58.21 
         Disagree | 8,556.0651       20.32       78.53 
Strongly disagree |  6,517.326       15.48       94.01 
      Do not know | 2,096.3615        4.98       98.99 
        No answer | 427.052081        1.01      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     42,104      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------- 
-> CBA = 1 
 
   Currently, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
 is a very stable | 
  and trustworthy | 
         currency |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 795.318067        7.90        7.90 
            Agree | 1,657.1554       16.47       24.37 
   Somewhat agree | 2,430.0823       24.15       48.52 
Somewhat disagree | 1,636.1714       16.26       64.79 
         Disagree | 1,286.8293       12.79       77.57 
Strongly disagree | 1,631.7987       16.22       93.79 
      Do not know | 540.996528        5.38       99.17 
        No answer | 83.6484418        0.83      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     10,062      100.00 
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. catplot q1_03, percent(CBA) blabel(bar) by(CBA), [aw=weight] 
 
 
 
. tab q1_03  h_edu_medium 
 
   Currently, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
 is a very stable | 
  and trustworthy |   Medium Education 
         currency |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |       813      1,247 |     2,060  
            Agree |     2,312      3,784 |     6,096  
   Somewhat agree |     4,265      7,951 |    12,216  
Somewhat disagree |     3,835      7,006 |    10,841  
         Disagree |     3,663      6,197 |     9,860  
Strongly disagree |     3,099      4,943 |     8,042  
      Do not know |     1,152      1,310 |     2,462  
        No answer |       216        269 |       485  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    19,355     32,707 |    52,062 
 
. tab q1_03  h_edu_low 
 
   Currently, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
 is a very stable | 
  and trustworthy |     Low Education 
         currency |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |     1,625        435 |     2,060  
            Agree |     4,830      1,266 |     6,096  
   Somewhat agree |    10,098      2,118 |    12,216  
Somewhat disagree |     8,765      2,076 |    10,841  
         Disagree |     7,938      1,922 |     9,860  
Strongly disagree |     6,356      1,686 |     8,042  
      Do not know |     1,542        920 |     2,462  
        No answer |       343        142 |       485  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    41,497     10,565 |    52,062 
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. tab q1_04 [aw=weight], missing 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
     will be very | 
stable and trustw |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 1,577.4569        3.02        3.02 
            Agree |  5,260.945       10.09       13.11 
   Somewhat agree | 11,998.074       23.00       36.11 
Somewhat disagree | 10,687.667       20.49       56.60 
         Disagree | 9,075.6999       17.40       73.99 
Strongly disagree |  6,137.451       11.77       85.76 
      Do not know | 6,652.6906       12.75       98.51 
        No answer | 776.015626        1.49      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     52,166      100.00 
 
. bysort CBA: tab q1_04 [aw=weight], missing 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------- 
-> CBA = 0 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
     will be very | 
stable and trustw |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |1,003.34231        2.38        2.38 
            Agree | 3,951.0488        9.38       11.77 
   Somewhat agree |9,792.68902       23.26       35.03 
Somewhat disagree | 8,960.3907       21.28       56.31 
         Disagree |7,639.58231       18.14       74.45 
Strongly disagree | 4,571.5505       10.86       85.31 
      Do not know | 5,525.4433       13.12       98.43 
        No answer | 659.952987        1.57      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     42,104      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------- 
-> CBA = 1 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
     will be very | 
stable and trustw |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 572.704322        5.69        5.69 
            Agree | 1,308.3537       13.00       18.69 
   Somewhat agree | 2,205.9535       21.92       40.62 
Somewhat disagree | 1,729.0231       17.18       57.80 
         Disagree | 1,437.7609       14.29       72.09 
Strongly disagree | 1,563.9037       15.54       87.63 
      Do not know | 1,128.0624       11.21       98.84 
        No answer |116.2383324        1.16      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     10,062      100.00 
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. catplot q1_04, percent(CBA) blabel(bar) by(CBA), [aw=weight] 
 
 
 
. tab q1_04 h_edu_medium 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
     will be very |   Medium Education 
stable and trustw |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |       601        963 |     1,564  
            Agree |     2,091      3,226 |     5,317  
   Somewhat agree |     4,323      7,804 |    12,127  
Somewhat disagree |     3,709      6,997 |    10,706  
         Disagree |     3,328      5,758 |     9,086  
Strongly disagree |     2,270      3,797 |     6,067  
      Do not know |     2,719      3,739 |     6,458  
        No answer |       314        423 |       737  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    19,355     32,707 |    52,062 
 
. tab q1_04 h_edu_low 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
     will be very |     Low Education 
stable and trustw |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |     1,223        341 |     1,564  
            Agree |     4,201      1,116 |     5,317  
   Somewhat agree |     9,992      2,135 |    12,127  
Somewhat disagree |     8,762      1,944 |    10,706  
         Disagree |     7,341      1,745 |     9,086  
Strongly disagree |     4,842      1,225 |     6,067  
      Do not know |     4,606      1,852 |     6,458  
        No answer |       530        207 |       737  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    41,497     10,565 |    52,062 
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. tab q4 [aw=weight], missing 
 
  Exchange rate of the [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
    against the euro in next five years |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
The local currency will loose value aga | 19,099.244       36.61       36.61 
                     Will stay the same | 17,756.655       34.04       70.65 
The local currency will gain value agai | 4,011.8019        7.69       78.34 
                            Do not know | 10,300.153       19.74       98.09 
                              No answer | 998.146653        1.91      100.00 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                  Total |     52,166      100.00 
 
. bysort CBA: tab q4 [aw=weight], missing 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
-> CBA = 0 
 
  Exchange rate of the [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
    against the euro in next five years |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
The local currency will loose value aga | 16,512.163       39.22       39.22 
                     Will stay the same | 12,172.962       28.91       68.13 
The local currency will gain value agai |3,718.63533        8.83       76.96 
                            Do not know | 8,875.0057       21.08       98.04 
                              No answer | 825.233954        1.96      100.00 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                  Total |     42,104      100.00 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
> CBA = 1 
 
  Exchange rate of the [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
    against the euro in next five years |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
The local currency will loose value aga | 2,592.8133       25.77       25.77 
                     Will stay the same | 5,572.4113       55.38       81.15 
The local currency will gain value agai | 295.678432        2.94       84.09 
                            Do not know | 1,428.0817       14.19       98.28 
                              No answer | 173.015204        1.72      100.00 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                  Total |     10,062      100.00 
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. catplot q4, percent(CBA) blabel(bar) by(CBA), [aw=weight 
 
 
 
. tab q4 h_edu_medium 
 
 Exchange rate of the | 
     [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
  against the euro in |   Medium Education 
      next five years |         0          1 |     Total 
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
The local currency wi |     7,224     11,963 |    19,187  
   Will stay the same |     6,313     11,548 |    17,861  
The local currency wi |     1,337      2,650 |     3,987  
          Do not know |     4,072      5,963 |    10,035  
            No answer |       409        583 |       992  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
                Total |    19,355     32,707 |    52,062  
 
 
 Exchange rate of the | 
     [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
  against the euro in |     Low Education 
      next five years |         0          1 |     Total 
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
The local currency wi |    15,482      3,705 |    19,187  
   Will stay the same |    14,580      3,281 |    17,861  
The local currency wi |     3,339        648 |     3,987  
          Do not know |     7,351      2,684 |    10,035  
            No answer |       745        247 |       992  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
                Total |    41,497     10,565 |    52,062 
 
 
. tab q1_09 [aw=weight], missing 
 
    The euro is a | 
  very stable and | 
      trustworthy | 
         currency |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 6,258.3267       12.00       12.00 
            Agree | 12,224.025       23.43       35.43 
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   Somewhat agree | 15,115.191       28.98       64.41 
Somewhat disagree | 7,370.4725       14.13       78.53 
         Disagree | 4,283.8708        8.21       86.75 
Strongly disagree |2,456.28022        4.71       91.45 
      Do not know | 3,774.6941        7.24       98.69 
        No answer | 683.139932        1.31      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     52,166      100.00 
 
. bysort CBA: tab q1_09 [aw=weight], missing 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 0 
 
    The euro is a | 
  very stable and | 
      trustworthy | 
         currency |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 4,374.3967       10.39       10.39 
            Agree | 9,584.6609       22.76       33.15 
   Somewhat agree |12,856.8476       30.54       63.69 
Somewhat disagree | 6,218.5775       14.77       78.46 
         Disagree | 3,577.0263        8.50       86.95 
Strongly disagree | 1,824.4281        4.33       91.29 
      Do not know | 3,119.2709        7.41       98.70 
        No answer |548.7920738        1.30      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     42,104      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 1 
 
    The euro is a | 
  very stable and | 
      trustworthy | 
         currency |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |  1,880.393       18.69       18.69 
            Agree | 2,637.8925       26.22       44.90 
   Somewhat agree | 2,261.7776       22.48       67.38 
Somewhat disagree |1,153.30481       11.46       78.84 
         Disagree | 707.468745        7.03       85.88 
Strongly disagree | 631.025995        6.27       92.15 
      Do not know |  655.80296        6.52       98.66 
        No answer |  134.33437        1.34      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     10,062      100.00 
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. catplot q1_09, percent(CBA) blabel(bar) by(CBA), [aw=weight] 
 
 
 
. tab q1_10 [aw=weight], missing 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
euro will be very | 
       stable and | 
     trustworthy  |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 5,681.6116       10.89       10.89 
            Agree | 11,858.664       22.73       33.62 
   Somewhat agree | 14,251.336       27.32       60.94 
Somewhat disagree | 6,596.4414       12.65       73.59 
         Disagree |  3,849.529        7.38       80.97 
Strongly disagree |2,072.86942        3.97       84.94 
      Do not know | 7,053.0927       13.52       98.46 
        No answer | 802.455999        1.54      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     52,166      100.00 
 
. bysort CBA: tab q1_10 [aw=weight], missing 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 0 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
euro will be very | 
       stable and | 
     trustworthy  |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 3,862.1254        9.17        9.17 
            Agree | 9,329.4631       22.16       31.33 
   Somewhat agree | 12,062.725       28.65       59.98 
Somewhat disagree | 5,455.9969       12.96       72.94 
         Disagree | 3,180.7921        7.55       80.49 
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Strongly disagree | 1,527.3086        3.63       84.12 
      Do not know | 6,006.1872       14.27       98.39 
        No answer | 679.401654        1.61      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     42,104      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 1 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
euro will be very | 
       stable and | 
     trustworthy  |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 1,815.7046       18.05       18.05 
            Agree | 2,527.9369       25.12       43.17 
   Somewhat agree | 2,191.5389       21.78       64.95 
Somewhat disagree | 1,141.1338       11.34       76.29 
         Disagree | 669.122374        6.65       82.94 
Strongly disagree | 544.799225        5.41       88.35 
      Do not know |  1,048.544       10.42       98.78 
        No answer |123.2201518        1.22      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     10,062      100.00 
 
 
. catplot q1_10, percent(CBA) blabel(bar) by(CBA), [aw=weight] 
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Appendix 4.2b: Significance of the differences in the responses to 
selected questions 
 
. tab q1_03 CBA, missing column row chi2 lrchi2 gamma taub 
 
+-------------------+ 
| Key               | 
|-------------------| 
|     frequency     | 
|  row percentage   | 
| column percentage | 
+-------------------+ 
 
   Currently, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
 is a very stable | 
  and trustworthy |          CBA 
         currency |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |     1,282        783 |     2,065  
                  |     62.08      37.92 |    100.00  
                  |      3.04       7.78 |      3.96  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Agree |     4,430      1,683 |     6,113  
                  |     72.47      27.53 |    100.00  
                  |     10.52      16.73 |     11.72  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Somewhat agree |     9,796      2,444 |    12,240  
                  |     80.03      19.97 |    100.00  
                  |     23.27      24.29 |     23.46  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Somewhat disagree |     9,232      1,633 |    10,865  
                  |     84.97      15.03 |    100.00  
                  |     21.93      16.23 |     20.83  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
         Disagree |     8,580      1,301 |     9,881  
                  |     86.83      13.17 |    100.00  
                  |     20.38      12.93 |     18.94  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Strongly disagree |     6,425      1,627 |     8,052  
                  |     79.79      20.21 |    100.00  
                  |     15.26      16.17 |     15.44  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
      Do not know |     1,952        512 |     2,464  
                  |     79.22      20.78 |    100.00  
                  |      4.64       5.09 |      4.72  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
        No answer |       407         79 |       486  
                  |     83.74      16.26 |    100.00  
                  |      0.97       0.79 |      0.93  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    42,104     10,062 |    52,166  
                  |     80.71      19.29 |    100.00  
                  |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
          Pearson chi2(7) =  1.1e+03   Pr = 0.000 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(7) =  1.0e+03   Pr = 0.000 
                    gamma =  -0.1430  ASE = 0.008 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0733  ASE = 0.004 
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. tab q1_04 CBA, missing column row chi2 lrchi2 gamma taub 
 
+-------------------+ 
| Key               | 
|-------------------| 
|     frequency     | 
|  row percentage   | 
| column percentage | 
+-------------------+ 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
     will be very |          CBA 
stable and trustw |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |       992        573 |     1,565  
                  |     63.39      36.61 |    100.00  
                  |      2.36       5.69 |      3.00  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Agree |     4,020      1,315 |     5,335  
                  |     75.35      24.65 |    100.00  
                  |      9.55      13.07 |     10.23  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Somewhat agree |     9,933      2,217 |    12,150  
                  |     81.75      18.25 |    100.00  
                  |     23.59      22.03 |     23.29  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Somewhat disagree |     8,992      1,736 |    10,728  
                  |     83.82      16.18 |    100.00  
                  |     21.36      17.25 |     20.57  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
         Disagree |     7,660      1,446 |     9,106  
                  |     84.12      15.88 |    100.00  
                  |     18.19      14.37 |     17.46  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Strongly disagree |     4,515      1,562 |     6,077  
                  |     74.30      25.70 |    100.00  
                  |     10.72      15.52 |     11.65  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
      Do not know |     5,363      1,105 |     6,468  
                  |     82.92      17.08 |    100.00  
                  |     12.74      10.98 |     12.40  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
        No answer |       629        108 |       737  
                  |     85.35      14.65 |    100.00  
                  |      1.49       1.07 |      1.41  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    42,104     10,062 |    52,166  
                  |     80.71      19.29 |    100.00  
                  |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
          Pearson chi2(7) = 734.1232   Pr = 0.000 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(7) = 677.7127   Pr = 0.000 
                    gamma =  -0.0635  ASE = 0.008 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0327  ASE = 0.004 
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. tab q4 CBA, missing column row chi2 lrchi2 gamma taub 
 
+-------------------+ 
| Key               | 
|-------------------| 
|     frequency     | 
|  row percentage   | 
| column percentage | 
+-------------------+ 
 
 Exchange rate of the | 
     [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
  against the euro in |          CBA 
      next five years |         0          1 |     Total 
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
The local currency wi |    16,626      2,600 |    19,226  
                      |     86.48      13.52 |    100.00  
                      |     39.49      25.84 |     36.86  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Will stay the same |    12,327      5,575 |    17,902  
                      |     68.86      31.14 |    100.00  
                      |     29.28      55.41 |     34.32  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
The local currency wi |     3,702        297 |     3,999  
                      |     92.57       7.43 |    100.00  
                      |      8.79       2.95 |      7.67  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
          Do not know |     8,625      1,420 |    10,045  
                      |     85.86      14.14 |    100.00  
                      |     20.48      14.11 |     19.26  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            No answer |       824        170 |       994  
                      |     82.90      17.10 |    100.00  
                      |      1.96       1.69 |      1.91  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
                Total |    42,104     10,062 |    52,166  
                      |     80.71      19.29 |    100.00  
                      |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
          Pearson chi2(4) =  2.6e+03   Pr = 0.000 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(4) =  2.5e+03   Pr = 0.000 
                    gamma =   0.0374  ASE = 0.008 
          Kendall's tau-b =   0.0175  ASE = 0.004 
 
. tab q1_09 CBA, missing column row chi2 lrchi2 gamma taub 
 
+-------------------+ 
| Key               | 
|-------------------| 
|     frequency     | 
|  row percentage   | 
| column percentage | 
+-------------------+ 
 
    The euro is a | 
  very stable and | 
      trustworthy |          CBA 
         currency |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |     4,391      1,863 |     6,254  
                  |     70.21      29.79 |    100.00  
                  |     10.43      18.52 |     11.99  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Agree |     9,559      2,635 |    12,194  
                  |     78.39      21.61 |    100.00  
                  |     22.70      26.19 |     23.38  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Somewhat agree |    12,990      2,290 |    15,280  
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                  |     85.01      14.99 |    100.00  
                  |     30.85      22.76 |     29.29  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Somewhat disagree |     6,280      1,167 |     7,447  
                  |     84.33      15.67 |    100.00  
                  |     14.92      11.60 |     14.28  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
         Disagree |     3,608        721 |     4,329  
                  |     83.34      16.66 |    100.00  
                  |      8.57       7.17 |      8.30  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Strongly disagree |     1,817        628 |     2,445  
                  |     74.31      25.69 |    100.00  
                  |      4.32       6.24 |      4.69  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
      Do not know |     2,926        629 |     3,555  
                  |     82.31      17.69 |    100.00  
                  |      6.95       6.25 |      6.81  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
        No answer |       533        129 |       662  
                  |     80.51      19.49 |    100.00  
                  |      1.27       1.28 |      1.27  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    42,104     10,062 |    52,166  
                  |     80.71      19.29 |    100.00  
                  |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
          Pearson chi2(7) = 818.7032   Pr = 0.000 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(7) = 781.2549   Pr = 0.000 
                    gamma =  -0.1270  ASE = 0.008 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0646  ASE = 0.004 
 
. tab q1_10 CBA, missing column row chi2 lrchi2 gamma taub 
 
+-------------------+ 
| Key               | 
|-------------------| 
|     frequency     | 
|  row percentage   | 
| column percentage | 
+-------------------+ 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
euro will be very | 
       stable and |          CBA 
     trustworthy  |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |     3,825      1,799 |     5,624  
                  |     68.01      31.99 |    100.00  
                  |      9.08      17.88 |     10.78  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Agree |     9,349      2,523 |    11,872  
                  |     78.75      21.25 |    100.00  
                  |     22.20      25.07 |     22.76  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Somewhat agree |    12,221      2,211 |    14,432  
                  |     84.68      15.32 |    100.00  
                  |     29.03      21.97 |     27.67  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Somewhat disagree |     5,534      1,168 |     6,702  
                  |     82.57      17.43 |    100.00  
                  |     13.14      11.61 |     12.85  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
         Disagree |     3,196        671 |     3,867  
                  |     82.65      17.35 |    100.00  
                  |      7.59       6.67 |      7.41  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
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Strongly disagree |     1,519        550 |     2,069  
                  |     73.42      26.58 |    100.00  
                  |      3.61       5.47 |      3.97  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
      Do not know |     5,809      1,020 |     6,829  
                  |     85.06      14.94 |    100.00  
                  |     13.80      10.14 |     13.09  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
        No answer |       651        120 |       771  
                  |     84.44      15.56 |    100.00  
                  |      1.55       1.19 |      1.48  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    42,104     10,062 |    52,166  
                  |     80.71      19.29 |    100.00  
                  |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
          Pearson chi2(7) = 942.8871   Pr = 0.000 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(7) = 879.3169   Pr = 0.000 
                    gamma =  -0.1486  ASE = 0.008 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0759  ASE = 0.004 
 
 
Appendix 4.2c: Differences in the question about the currency 
stability through waves  
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Appendidx 4.2d Level of eduation  
 
tab h_edu, missing 
 
    education of | 
      respondent |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-----------------+----------------------------------- 
       no answer |         19        0.04        0.04 
   low education |     10,410       20.23       20.27 
medium education |     32,369       62.90       83.17 
  high education |      8,661       16.83      100.00 
-----------------+----------------------------------- 
           Total |     51,459      100.00 
 
Appendix 4.3: Correlation matrix between the questions of interest  
 
 
. corr q1_01 q1_02 q1_03 q1_04 q1_09 q1_10 q22f_1 
(obs=52166) 
 
             |    q1_01    q1_02    q1_03    q1_04    q1_09    q1_10   q22f_1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
       q1_01 |   1.0000 
       q1_02 |   0.4851   1.0000 
       q1_03 |   0.3873   0.4029   1.0000 
       q1_04 |   0.3429   0.4814   0.5584   1.0000 
       q1_09 |   0.1855   0.2687   0.3329   0.2986   1.0000 
       q1_10 |   0.1775   0.3158   0.2892   0.3834   0.6696   1.0000 
      q22f_1 |   0.2686   0.2629   0.2042   0.2024   0.1361   0.1387   1.0000 
 
 
. corr q1_01 q1_02 q1_03 q1_04 q1_09 q1_10 q22f_1 if CBA==1 
(obs=10062) 
 
             |    q1_01    q1_02    q1_03    q1_04    q1_09    q1_10   q22f_1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
       q1_01 |   1.0000 
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       q1_02 |   0.4726   1.0000 
       q1_03 |   0.2704   0.3714   1.0000 
       q1_04 |   0.2929   0.4019   0.6191   1.0000 
       q1_09 |   0.1468   0.2435   0.3047   0.2732   1.0000 
       q1_10 |   0.1536   0.2868   0.3101   0.3379   0.7153   1.0000 
      q22f_1 |   0.1920   0.2427   0.1395   0.1514   0.1048   0.1242   1.0000 
 
 
Appendix 4.4: Responses to the questions about the economic 
situation in a country and trust in government 
 
Appendix 4.4a percentage of responses to questions about the 
economic situation in a country 
 
. tab q1_01 [aw=weight], missing 
 
   Currently, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
 COUNTRY] is very | 
             good |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 611.632021        1.17        1.17 
            Agree | 1,839.2704        3.53        4.70 
   Somewhat agree |5,112.92482        9.80       14.50 
Somewhat disagree |8,226.90875       15.77       30.27 
         Disagree | 14,804.694       28.38       58.65 
Strongly disagree | 20,168.347       38.66       97.31 
      Do not know | 1,114.2688        2.14       99.45 
        No answer | 287.953831        0.55      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     52,166      100.00 
 
. bysort CBA: tab q1_01 [aw=weight], missing 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 0 
 
   Currently, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
 COUNTRY] is very | 
             good |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |475.5686734        1.13        1.13 
            Agree | 1,646.7795        3.91        5.04 
   Somewhat agree | 4,387.9513       10.42       15.46 
Somewhat disagree |7,158.35891       17.00       32.46 
         Disagree | 12,593.465       29.91       62.37 
Strongly disagree |  14,694.96       34.90       97.28 
      Do not know |916.7390192        2.18       99.45 
        No answer |230.1779867        0.55      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     42,104      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 1 
 
   Currently, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
 COUNTRY] is very | 
             good |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 135.968812        1.35        1.35 
            Agree |193.3389679        1.92        3.27 
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   Somewhat agree | 726.338749        7.22       10.49 
Somewhat disagree | 1,071.2585       10.65       21.14 
         Disagree | 2,214.5969       22.01       43.15 
Strongly disagree | 5,465.1132       54.31       97.46 
      Do not know | 197.620738        1.96       99.43 
        No answer | 57.7641687        0.57      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     10,062      100.00 
 
. catplot q1_01, percent(CBA) blabel(bar) by(CBA), [aw=weight] 
 
 
 
. tab q1_02 [aw=weight], missing 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
    COUNTRY] will | 
          improve |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 1,344.7211        2.58        2.58 
            Agree | 5,128.4554        9.83       12.41 
   Somewhat agree | 12,122.802       23.24       35.65 
Somewhat disagree | 9,570.4925       18.35       53.99 
         Disagree | 10,392.391       19.92       73.92 
Strongly disagree | 8,698.7122       16.68       90.59 
      Do not know | 4,418.2932        8.47       99.06 
        No answer | 490.133187        0.94      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     52,166      100.00 
 
. bysort CBA: tab q1_02 [aw=weight], missing 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 0 
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  five years, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
    COUNTRY] will | 
          improve |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree | 992.246665        2.36        2.36 
            Agree | 4,223.4125       10.03       12.39 
   Somewhat agree | 10,315.589       24.50       36.89 
Somewhat disagree | 8,000.7748       19.00       55.89 
         Disagree | 8,406.5203       19.97       75.86 
Strongly disagree | 5,987.8482       14.22       90.08 
      Do not know | 3,743.3642        8.89       98.97 
        No answer | 434.244078        1.03      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     42,104      100.00 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 1 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
    COUNTRY] will | 
          improve |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |  351.98789        3.50        3.50 
            Agree | 905.482696        9.00       12.50 
   Somewhat agree | 1,809.9881       17.99       30.49 
Somewhat disagree | 1,571.1616       15.61       46.10 
         Disagree | 1,985.9678       19.74       65.84 
Strongly disagree | 2,705.4653       26.89       92.73 
      Do not know | 675.855452        6.72       99.44 
        No answer | 56.0910969        0.56      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     10,062      100.00 
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. catplot q1_02, percent(CBA) blabel(bar) by(CBA), [aw=weight] 
 
.  
 
 
. tab q22f_1 [aw=weight], missing 
 
 Trust in Government/cabinet | 
                of ministers |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-----------------------------+----------------------------------- 
          I trust completely | 3,327.2314        6.38        6.38 
            I somewhat trust | 9,088.3189       17.42       23.80 
I neither trust nor distrust | 12,103.678       23.20       47.00 
         I somewhat distrust | 9,553.6678       18.31       65.32 
       I do not trust at all | 16,439.892       31.51       96.83 
                 Do not know | 1,032.1554        1.98       98.81 
                   No answer | 621.056477        1.19      100.00 
-----------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                       Total |     52,166      100.00 
 
. bysort CBA: tab q22f_1 [aw=weight], missing 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 0 
 
 Trust in Government/cabinet | 
                of ministers |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-----------------------------+----------------------------------- 
          I trust completely | 2,537.2489        6.03        6.03 
            I somewhat trust | 7,285.4045       17.30       23.33 
I neither trust nor distrust | 9,989.8537       23.73       47.06 
         I somewhat distrust | 8,102.8022       19.24       66.30 
       I do not trust at all | 12,825.344       30.46       96.76 
                 Do not know | 866.613281        2.06       98.82 
                   No answer | 496.733729        1.18      100.00 
-----------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                       Total |     42,104      100.00 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
-> CBA = 1 
 
 Trust in Government/cabinet | 
                of ministers |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-----------------------------+----------------------------------- 
          I trust completely | 789.207884        7.84        7.84 
            I somewhat trust | 1,802.6535       17.92       25.76 
I neither trust nor distrust | 2,114.9779       21.02       46.78 
         I somewhat distrust |1,452.91364       14.44       61.22 
       I do not trust at all | 3,612.2306       35.90       97.12 
                 Do not know | 165.717432        1.65       98.76 
                   No answer | 124.299069        1.24      100.00 
-----------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                       Total |     10,062      100.00 
 
 
. catplot q22f_1, percent(CBA) blabel(bar) by(CBA), [aw=weight] 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.4b: Statistical significance of the differences in 
responses to selected questions (from 4.4.a) 
 
. tab q1_01 CBA, missing column row chi2 lrchi2 gamma taub 
 
+-------------------+ 
| Key               | 
|-------------------| 
|     frequency     | 
|  row percentage   | 
| column percentage | 
+-------------------+ 
 
   Currently, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
 COUNTRY] is very |          CBA 
1.18
2.058
30.46
19.24
23.73
17.3
6.026
1.235
1.647
35.9
14.44
21.02
17.92
7.843
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
No answer
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             good |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |       476        133 |       609  
                  |     78.16      21.84 |    100.00  
                  |      1.13       1.32 |      1.17  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Agree |     1,662        197 |     1,859  
                  |     89.40      10.60 |    100.00  
                  |      3.95       1.96 |      3.56  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Somewhat agree |     4,486        727 |     5,213  
                  |     86.05      13.95 |    100.00  
                  |     10.65       7.23 |      9.99  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Somewhat disagree |     7,205      1,095 |     8,300  
                  |     86.81      13.19 |    100.00  
                  |     17.11      10.88 |     15.91  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
         Disagree |    12,568      2,242 |    14,810  
                  |     84.86      15.14 |    100.00  
                  |     29.85      22.28 |     28.39  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Strongly disagree |    14,624      5,429 |    20,053  
                  |     72.93      27.07 |    100.00  
                  |     34.73      53.96 |     38.44  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
      Do not know |       856        185 |     1,041  
                  |     82.23      17.77 |    100.00  
                  |      2.03       1.84 |      2.00  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
        No answer |       227         54 |       281  
                  |     80.78      19.22 |    100.00  
                  |      0.54       0.54 |      0.54  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    42,104     10,062 |    52,166  
                  |     80.71      19.29 |    100.00  
                  |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
          Pearson chi2(7) =  1.3e+03   Pr = 0.000 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(7) =  1.3e+03   Pr = 0.000 
                    gamma =   0.2686  ASE = 0.008 
          Kendall's tau-b =   0.1257  ASE = 0.004 
 
. tab q1_02 CBA, missing column row chi2 lrchi2 gamma taub 
 
+-------------------+ 
| Key               | 
|-------------------| 
|     frequency     | 
|  row percentage   | 
| column percentage | 
+-------------------+ 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
    COUNTRY] will |          CBA 
          improve |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |     1,001        355 |     1,356  
                  |     73.82      26.18 |    100.00  
                  |      2.38       3.53 |      2.60  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Agree |     4,281        896 |     5,177  
                  |     82.69      17.31 |    100.00  
                  |     10.17       8.90 |      9.92  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
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   Somewhat agree |    10,474      1,836 |    12,310  
                  |     85.09      14.91 |    100.00  
                  |     24.88      18.25 |     23.60  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Somewhat disagree |     8,045      1,603 |     9,648  
                  |     83.39      16.61 |    100.00  
                  |     19.11      15.93 |     18.49  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
         Disagree |     8,383      1,994 |    10,377  
                  |     80.78      19.22 |    100.00  
                  |     19.91      19.82 |     19.89  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
Strongly disagree |     5,886      2,665 |     8,551  
                  |     68.83      31.17 |    100.00  
                  |     13.98      26.49 |     16.39  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
      Do not know |     3,622        660 |     4,282  
                  |     84.59      15.41 |    100.00  
                  |      8.60       6.56 |      8.21  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
        No answer |       412         53 |       465  
                  |     88.60      11.40 |    100.00  
                  |      0.98       0.53 |      0.89  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    42,104     10,062 |    52,166  
                  |     80.71      19.29 |    100.00  
                  |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
          Pearson chi2(7) =  1.1e+03   Pr = 0.000 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(7) =  1.0e+03   Pr = 0.000 
                    gamma =   0.1144  ASE = 0.008 
          Kendall's tau-b =   0.0584  ASE = 0.004 
 
. tab q22f_1 CBA, missing column row chi2 lrchi2 gamma taub 
 
+-------------------+ 
| Key               | 
|-------------------| 
|     frequency     | 
|  row percentage   | 
| column percentage | 
+-------------------+ 
 
             Trust in | 
Government/cabinet of |          CBA 
            ministers |         0          1 |     Total 
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   I trust completely |     2,611        790 |     3,401  
                      |     76.77      23.23 |    100.00  
                      |      6.20       7.85 |      6.52  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
     I somewhat trust |     7,322      1,832 |     9,154  
                      |     79.99      20.01 |    100.00  
                      |     17.39      18.21 |     17.55  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
I neither trust nor d |    10,044      2,132 |    12,176  
                      |     82.49      17.51 |    100.00  
                      |     23.86      21.19 |     23.34  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
  I somewhat distrust |     8,174      1,467 |     9,641  
                      |     84.78      15.22 |    100.00  
                      |     19.41      14.58 |     18.48  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
I do not trust at all |    12,654      3,556 |    16,210  
                      |     78.06      21.94 |    100.00  
                      |     30.05      35.34 |     31.07  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
          Do not know |       815        162 |       977  
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                      |     83.42      16.58 |    100.00  
                      |      1.94       1.61 |      1.87  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            No answer |       484        123 |       607  
                      |     79.74      20.26 |    100.00  
                      |      1.15       1.22 |      1.16  
----------------------+----------------------+---------- 
                Total |    42,104     10,062 |    52,166  
                      |     80.71      19.29 |    100.00  
                      |    100.00     100.00 |    100.00  
 
          Pearson chi2(6) = 242.4514   Pr = 0.000 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) = 245.4633   Pr = 0.000 
                    gamma =   0.0140  ASE = 0.008 
          Kendall's tau-b =   0.0069  ASE = 0.004 
 
 
 
 
SUR 
. *always margins saved due to use of interation terms in all specifications 
. *age base group 15-43 
.  
. *Gtrust (ONLY FOR THE SMALL DATASET) 
. drop if q22f_1==. 
(0 observations deleted) 
 
. drop if q22f_1==9 
(0 observations deleted) 
 
.  
Appendix 4.5: SUR results of the 'credibility' model (country as 
cluster) 
 
Appendix 4.5a: SUR results of the 'credibility' model (country as 
cluster, unweighted) 
 
. *with EU, ExYu and high level of development dummies (with trust in government) - T 
> HE PREFERRED 
. biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) (ExpCSagree = i.CBA 
i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.CBA#i.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev), vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -39927.996                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.1667734   .2259507    -0.74   0.460    -.6096287    .2760819 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1389598   .0535575    -2.59   0.009    -.2439306    -.033989 
          3  |  -.3424918   .0691528    -4.95   0.000    -.4780289   -.2069548 
          4  |  -.4137683   .0972747    -4.25   0.000    -.6044233   -.2231133 
          5  |     -.5173   .0896251    -5.77   0.000    -.6929619    -.341638 
          8  |  -.4443723   .1565064    -2.84   0.005    -.7511193   -.1376253 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1592245     .06531     2.44   0.015     .0312193    .2872297 
        1 3  |   .1967043    .091192     2.16   0.031     .0179713    .3754372 
        1 4  |    .115451   .1153866     1.00   0.317    -.1107025    .3416046 
        1 5  |   .2382538   .0989456     2.41   0.016     .0443239    .4321837 
        1 8  |  -.2267072   .1897834    -1.19   0.232    -.5986757    .1452614 
             | 
    ECSagree |    .429579   .0761523     5.64   0.000     .2803233    .5788347 
             | 
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       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1690199   .1241431    -1.36   0.173    -.4123359    .0742961 
          3  |  -.5058682   .1487516    -3.40   0.001     -.797416   -.2143204 
          4  |  -.9081869   .1541618    -5.89   0.000    -1.210338   -.6060354 
          5  |  -1.149031   .1751456    -6.56   0.000     -1.49231   -.8057521 
          6  |  -1.379297   .1872718    -7.37   0.000    -1.746343   -1.012251 
          8  |  -1.078279   .1653264    -6.52   0.000    -1.402313   -.7542456 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .1106121   .1723523     0.64   0.521    -.2271922    .4484164 
        1 3  |   .2190222   .1436302     1.52   0.127    -.0624878    .5005323 
        1 4  |   .3108567   .1720757     1.81   0.071    -.0264054    .6481188 
        1 5  |   .6221899   .1610325     3.86   0.000     .3065721    .9378078 
        1 6  |   .7093514   .1645316     4.31   0.000     .3868754    1.031827 
        1 8  |   .5944797   .1632059     3.64   0.000      .274602    .9143574 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0224442    .022427    -1.00   0.317    -.0664003    .0215118 
     h_aged3 |    .077724   .0408985     1.90   0.057    -.0024355    .1578836 
    h_female |  -.0182666   .0184133    -0.99   0.321    -.0543561    .0178229 
  h_edu_high |   .1037622   .0268284     3.87   0.000     .0511794    .1563449 
h_edu_medium |   .0534329   .0469637     1.14   0.255    -.0386142      .14548 
   h_retired |  -.0436992   .0772912    -0.57   0.572    -.1951872    .1077888 
   h_student |  -.0148439   .0581217    -0.26   0.798    -.1287603    .0990725 
h_unemployed |   .0269772    .048424     0.56   0.577    -.0679322    .1218866 
    fall2009 |   .1340979   .0511988     2.62   0.009       .03375    .2344457 
  spring2010 |   .2021588   .0422608     4.78   0.000     .1193293    .2849884 
    fall2010 |   .1872815   .0625615     2.99   0.003     .0646633    .3098997 
  spring2011 |   .3193893   .0475177     6.72   0.000     .2262563    .4125224 
          EU |  -.1971427   .2198096    -0.90   0.370    -.6279616    .2336761 
        ExYu |    .357833   .3245117     1.10   0.270    -.2781983    .9938643 
high_lev_dev |   .3683192   .2879689     1.28   0.201    -.1960895    .9327279 
       _cons |   .3508507   .1910936     1.84   0.066    -.0236858    .7253872 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |  -.2665004   .2819066    -0.95   0.344    -.8190272    .2860264 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   -.056096   .0834276    -0.67   0.501    -.2196111     .107419 
          3  |  -.2504575   .1307149    -1.92   0.055     -.506654    .0057391 
          4  |   -.402186   .1372357    -2.93   0.003     -.671163    -.133209 
          5  |  -.5172362   .1078486    -4.80   0.000    -.7286156   -.3058568 
          8  |   -.520284   .1210606    -4.30   0.000    -.7575585   -.2830095 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2435898   .0856029     2.85   0.004     .0758112    .4113684 
        1 3  |   .3507656   .1301127     2.70   0.007     .0957495    .6057818 
        1 4  |   .3324117   .1524028     2.18   0.029     .0337077    .6311158 
        1 5  |   .4845257   .1190436     4.07   0.000     .2512046    .7178468 
        1 8  |   .3529001   .2414431     1.46   0.144    -.1203198    .8261199 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .3829083   .0509383     7.52   0.000      .283071    .4827455 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1164063   .0865746    -1.34   0.179    -.2860895    .0532769 
          3  |  -.4133238   .0872601    -4.74   0.000    -.5843504   -.2422972 
          4  |  -.9630475   .0920972   -10.46   0.000    -1.143555   -.7825403 
          5  |  -1.260605   .1054158   -11.96   0.000    -1.467216   -1.053994 
          6  |  -1.400986   .1323954   -10.58   0.000    -1.660476   -1.141495 
          8  |  -.8345363   .0871659    -9.57   0.000    -1.005378   -.6636941 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.2388729   .1694523    -1.41   0.159    -.5709933    .0932475 
        1 3  |   .0010624   .1893076     0.01   0.996    -.3699737    .3720986 
        1 4  |   .3377375   .2030683     1.66   0.096     -.060269     .735744 
        1 5  |   .4632517   .2090183     2.22   0.027     .0535833    .8729201 
        1 6  |   .4394058   .1998024     2.20   0.028     .0478002    .8310114 
        1 8  |  -.1575023   .2164904    -0.73   0.467    -.5818158    .2668111 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0173605   .0282355    -0.61   0.539    -.0727012    .0379801 
     h_aged3 |  -.0181263   .0204759    -0.89   0.376    -.0582584    .0220058 
    h_female |   .0036884   .0156358     0.24   0.814    -.0269571     .034334 
  h_edu_high |   .0131233   .0329728     0.40   0.691    -.0515021    .0777488 
h_edu_medium |  -.0028555   .0378686    -0.08   0.940    -.0770766    .0713655 
   h_retired |   .0470598   .0573017     0.82   0.411    -.0652494     .159369 
   h_student |   .0222829   .0443978     0.50   0.616    -.0647352    .1093009 
h_unemployed |   .0319349   .0447834     0.71   0.476    -.0558389    .1197088 
    fall2009 |  -.0060109   .0601755    -0.10   0.920    -.1239528    .1119309 
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  spring2010 |   .0859068   .0559014     1.54   0.124     -.023658    .1954716 
    fall2010 |    .086205   .0729381     1.18   0.237    -.0567511    .2291611 
  spring2011 |   .1935944   .0550383     3.52   0.000     .0857213    .3014675 
          EU |    .030683    .149164     0.21   0.837     -.261673    .3230391 
        ExYu |   .3413127   .2262022     1.51   0.131    -.1020354    .7846609 
high_lev_dev |   .2428495   .1943113     1.25   0.211    -.1379937    .6236928 
       _cons |   .2603832   .1082987     2.40   0.016     .0481216    .4726447 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .8016783    .043028    18.63   0.000      .717345    .8860115 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |    .664974   .0240014                      .6152621    .7094182 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  347.135    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 2.q1_01 
               3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
               h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 
               spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev ExpECSagree 
               2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1373562   .0791573     1.74   0.083    -.0177893    .2925017 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0184149   .0160369    -1.15   0.251    -.0498467    .0130169 
          3  |   -.080672   .0260518    -3.10   0.002    -.1317326   -.0296114 
          4  |  -.1194101   .0315213    -3.79   0.000    -.1811908   -.0576294 
          5  |  -.1421111   .0289239    -4.91   0.000    -.1988009   -.0854213 
          8  |  -.1523869   .0356036    -4.28   0.000    -.2221687    -.082605 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .0689336   .0134944     5.11   0.000     .0424851    .0953821 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0101099   .0071165    -1.42   0.155     -.024058    .0038381 
          3  |  -.0410068   .0102731    -3.99   0.000    -.0611416   -.0208719 
          4  |  -.0952835   .0123117    -7.74   0.000     -.119414   -.0711531 
          5  |   -.125832   .0160771    -7.83   0.000    -.1573424   -.0943215 
          6  |  -.1638014      .0168    -9.75   0.000    -.1967287   -.1308741 
          8  |  -.1145672   .0176221    -6.50   0.000    -.1491059   -.0800286 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0063052   .0071018    -0.89   0.375    -.0202246    .0076141 
     h_aged3 |   .0096493   .0092421     1.04   0.296    -.0084648    .0277634 
    h_female |  -.0023568   .0043854    -0.54   0.591     -.010952    .0062385 
  h_edu_high |   .0186943   .0077287     2.42   0.016     .0035464    .0338422 
h_edu_medium |   .0081295   .0130623     0.62   0.534    -.0174722    .0337313 
   h_retired |   .0003166   .0208644     0.02   0.988    -.0405769    .0412102 
   h_student |   .0010883   .0154725     0.07   0.944    -.0292373    .0314139 
h_unemployed |   .0093024   .0141636     0.66   0.511    -.0184577    .0370625 
    fall2009 |   .0205823   .0154677     1.33   0.183    -.0097339    .0508984 
  spring2010 |   .0458188   .0151539     3.02   0.002     .0161177      .07552 
    fall2010 |   .0434779   .0216573     2.01   0.045     .0010304    .0859255 
  spring2011 |   .0814014   .0151639     5.37   0.000     .0516808     .111122 
          EU |  -.0268566   .0565505    -0.47   0.635    -.1376935    .0839803 
        ExYu |   .1105755   .0910899     1.21   0.225    -.0679574    .2891085 
high_lev_dev |   .0969239   .0740559     1.31   0.191     -.048223    .2420708 
 ExpECSagree |   .0596328   .0097948     6.09   0.000     .0404352    .0788303 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0170281   .0051713    -3.29   0.001    -.0271637   -.0068925 
          3  |  -.0424237   .0069205    -6.13   0.000    -.0559877   -.0288597 
          4  |   -.115775   .0067027   -17.27   0.000     -.128912    -.102638 
          5  |  -.1655083   .0084811   -19.52   0.000    -.1821309   -.1488858 
          6  |  -.1931815   .0088677   -21.78   0.000    -.2105619   -.1758011 
          8  |  -.1157519   .0059521   -19.45   0.000    -.1274177   -.1040861 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 4.5b: SUR results of the 'credibility' model (country as 
cluster, weighted) 
 
. biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) (ExpCSagree = i.CBA 
i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.CBA#i.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) [pweight = weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -38633.398                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.2813552   .2207727    -1.27   0.203    -.7140617    .1513514 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |    -.14705   .0563597    -2.61   0.009    -.2575129   -.0365871 
          3  |   -.346468   .0693847    -4.99   0.000    -.4824595   -.2104764 
          4  |  -.4222047   .0990435    -4.26   0.000    -.6163264    -.228083 
          5  |  -.5271681   .0879037    -6.00   0.000    -.6994562   -.3548799 
          8  |  -.4935988   .1674479    -2.95   0.003    -.8217907    -.165407 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2127486   .0675424     3.15   0.002      .080368    .3451293 
        1 3  |   .2373565     .08234     2.88   0.004     .0759729      .39874 
        1 4  |   .1561711   .1251912     1.25   0.212    -.0891991    .4015413 
        1 5  |   .2744205   .0988204     2.78   0.005      .080736    .4681051 
        1 8  |  -.1176747   .1790415    -0.66   0.511    -.4685897    .2332402 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .4357034   .0841075     5.18   0.000     .2708556    .6005511 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1984457   .1198909    -1.66   0.098    -.4334276    .0365362 
          3  |   -.545137   .1549139    -3.52   0.000    -.8487626   -.2415114 
          4  |  -.9574178   .1540046    -6.22   0.000    -1.259261   -.6555744 
          5  |  -1.214825   .1726699    -7.04   0.000    -1.553252   -.8763983 
          6  |  -1.442863   .1839747    -7.84   0.000    -1.803447    -1.08228 
          8  |  -1.131691   .1878299    -6.03   0.000    -1.499831   -.7635513 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .2199397   .1550368     1.42   0.156    -.0839268    .5238061 
        1 3  |   .2835152   .1484064     1.91   0.056     -.007356    .5743864 
        1 4  |   .4052058   .1675781     2.42   0.016     .0767587    .7336528 
        1 5  |   .7234614   .1557544     4.64   0.000     .4181884    1.028734 
        1 6  |   .8101431   .1634515     4.96   0.000     .4897839    1.130502 
        1 8  |   .6277383   .1970988     3.18   0.001     .2414318    1.014045 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0219936   .0197308    -1.11   0.265    -.0606653     .016678 
     h_aged3 |   .0588254   .0397438     1.48   0.139    -.0190711    .1367219 
    h_female |  -.0211951   .0238095    -0.89   0.373    -.0678609    .0254707 
  h_edu_high |   .0756203   .0434387     1.74   0.082    -.0095179    .1607586 
h_edu_medium |   .0278279   .0467389     0.60   0.552    -.0637787    .1194345 
   h_retired |  -.0569386   .0749265    -0.76   0.447    -.2037919    .0899148 
   h_student |   -.013741    .060685    -0.23   0.821    -.1326814    .1051994 
h_unemployed |   .0278423   .0467494     0.60   0.551    -.0637849    .1194695 
    fall2009 |   .1311455   .0469281     2.79   0.005     .0391682    .2231228 
  spring2010 |   .2039976   .0441984     4.62   0.000     .1173703    .2906249 
    fall2010 |   .1920254   .0643865     2.98   0.003     .0658301    .3182206 
  spring2011 |   .3289018   .0473353     6.95   0.000     .2361263    .4216773 
          EU |  -.1723881   .2099589    -0.82   0.412       -.5839    .2391238 
        ExYu |   .3553076   .3169998     1.12   0.262    -.2660006    .9766158 
high_lev_dev |   .3640911   .2793533     1.30   0.192    -.1834313    .9116136 
       _cons |   .4137104   .1953138     2.12   0.034     .0309023    .7965184 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |  -.2729013   .2673059    -1.02   0.307    -.7968112    .2510086 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0303254    .084658    -0.36   0.720    -.1962521    .1356014 
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          3  |  -.2330045   .1276525    -1.83   0.068    -.4831988    .0171898 
          4  |  -.3849023   .1321073    -2.91   0.004    -.6438278   -.1259768 
          5  |  -.5080617   .1067246    -4.76   0.000    -.7172382   -.2988853 
          8  |  -.5241886   .1391767    -3.77   0.000      -.79697   -.2514073 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |    .244248   .0938262     2.60   0.009      .060352    .4281439 
        1 3  |   .3509446   .1267772     2.77   0.006     .1024658    .5994235 
        1 4  |   .3349502   .1543946     2.17   0.030     .0323424    .6375581 
        1 5  |   .4950568   .1247604     3.97   0.000     .2505309    .7395826 
        1 8  |   .4133488   .2103255     1.97   0.049     .0011184    .8255791 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .3797176   .0515446     7.37   0.000      .278692    .4807432 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |   -.092667   .0924984    -1.00   0.316    -.2739606    .0886266 
          3  |  -.3974543   .0972475    -4.09   0.000     -.588056   -.2068527 
          4  |   -.973283   .0918232   -10.60   0.000    -1.153253   -.7933129 
          5  |   -1.26321   .1085944   -11.63   0.000    -1.476051   -1.050369 
          6  |  -1.414295   .1282781   -11.03   0.000    -1.665715   -1.162875 
          8  |  -.8506775   .0848377   -10.03   0.000    -1.016956   -.6843987 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.2462528    .161975    -1.52   0.128     -.563718    .0712124 
        1 3  |   .0070808   .1799608     0.04   0.969    -.3456359    .3597974 
        1 4  |   .3428358   .2018575     1.70   0.089    -.0527977    .7384693 
        1 5  |   .4782302   .2029656     2.36   0.018      .080425    .8760355 
        1 6  |   .4716131   .1865479     2.53   0.011     .1059859    .8372403 
        1 8  |  -.1231804   .2001402    -0.62   0.538    -.5154479    .2690871 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0117537   .0291206    -0.40   0.686    -.0688291    .0453217 
     h_aged3 |  -.0195565   .0312762    -0.63   0.532    -.0808567    .0417437 
    h_female |  -.0011527   .0149722    -0.08   0.939    -.0304977    .0281923 
  h_edu_high |   .0060045   .0403767     0.15   0.882    -.0731323    .0851413 
h_edu_medium |  -.0034094   .0356111    -0.10   0.924    -.0732058     .066387 
   h_retired |   .0314124   .0627196     0.50   0.616    -.0915158    .1543406 
   h_student |    .020379   .0505638     0.40   0.687    -.0787242    .1194822 
h_unemployed |   .0256666   .0501607     0.51   0.609    -.0726465    .1239797 
    fall2009 |   .0074902   .0608274     0.12   0.902    -.1117293    .1267097 
  spring2010 |   .0899692   .0575456     1.56   0.118    -.0228181    .2027566 
    fall2010 |   .0818546   .0713195     1.15   0.251     -.057929    .2216382 
  spring2011 |   .1876446   .0555301     3.38   0.001     .0788075    .2964817 
          EU |   .0430981   .1458457     0.30   0.768    -.2427543    .3289505 
        ExYu |   .3472788   .2256333     1.54   0.124    -.0949543    .7895118 
high_lev_dev |   .2399773   .1935973     1.24   0.215    -.1394664    .6194211 
       _cons |   .2361363   .1203013     1.96   0.050     .0003501    .4719225 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .8028261   .0426724    18.81   0.000     .7191897    .8864625 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .6656138   .0237668                      .6164071    .7096421 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  353.955    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 2.q1_01 
               3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
               h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 
               spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev ExpECSagree 
               2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1423902   .0768443     1.85   0.064    -.0082218    .2930023 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   -.013148    .015993    -0.82   0.411    -.0444937    .0181977 
          3  |  -.0758984   .0247682    -3.06   0.002    -.1244432   -.0273535 
          4  |  -.1149224   .0306788    -3.75   0.000    -.1750518    -.054793 
          5  |  -.1382688   .0277957    -4.97   0.000    -.1927474   -.0837902 
          8  |  -.1523797   .0380527    -4.00   0.000    -.2269615   -.0777978 
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             | 
    ECSagree |   .0695096   .0145571     4.77   0.000     .0409782     .098041 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0098262   .0063635    -1.54   0.123    -.0222985    .0026461 
          3  |  -.0421243   .0102396    -4.11   0.000    -.0621935   -.0220552 
          4  |   -.096648   .0114405    -8.45   0.000     -.119071   -.0742251 
          5  |  -.1294388   .0150586    -8.60   0.000    -.1589531   -.0999245 
          6  |  -.1666513   .0153553   -10.85   0.000    -.1967472   -.1365555 
          8  |  -.1182752   .0192169    -6.15   0.000    -.1559397   -.0806107 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0053082   .0068386    -0.78   0.438    -.0187116    .0080953 
     h_aged3 |   .0063907   .0107782     0.59   0.553    -.0147343    .0275156 
    h_female |  -.0035578    .005158    -0.69   0.490    -.0136672    .0065516 
  h_edu_high |   .0129833   .0121147     1.07   0.284     -.010761    .0367276 
h_edu_medium |   .0039175   .0126365     0.31   0.757    -.0208495    .0286845 
   h_retired |  -.0042746   .0209494    -0.20   0.838    -.0453346    .0367854 
   h_student |   .0009278   .0164877     0.06   0.955    -.0313875     .033243 
h_unemployed |   .0083712   .0143319     0.58   0.559    -.0197188    .0364612 
    fall2009 |   .0220689   .0143811     1.53   0.125    -.0061176    .0502554 
  spring2010 |   .0463184   .0156358     2.96   0.003     .0156727     .076964 
    fall2010 |   .0431661   .0214803     2.01   0.044     .0010655    .0852667 
  spring2011 |   .0811984   .0148328     5.47   0.000     .0521266    .1102701 
          EU |  -.0209037   .0540847    -0.39   0.699    -.1269079    .0851004 
        ExYu |   .1098501   .0890823     1.23   0.218     -.064748    .2844481 
high_lev_dev |   .0948241   .0717664     1.32   0.186    -.0458355    .2354838 
 ExpECSagree |   .0581326   .0095827     6.07   0.000     .0393507    .0769144 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0150794   .0052519    -2.87   0.004    -.0253729   -.0047858 
          3  |   -.039752   .0069761    -5.70   0.000     -.053425   -.0260791 
          4  |  -.1154468   .0066422   -17.38   0.000    -.1284653   -.1024284 
          5  |  -.1623512   .0081645   -19.89   0.000    -.1783533   -.1463491 
          6  |  -.1906811   .0081245   -23.47   0.000    -.2066048   -.1747574 
          8  |  -.1157131   .0058662   -19.73   0.000    -.1272107   -.1042155 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
Appendix 4.5c: CBA conditional on trust in government (after the SUR 
results of the 'credibility' model, cluster country, wighted) 
 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0497033   .0881515     0.56   0.573    -.1230705    .2224771 
          2  |   .1436595   .0859389     1.67   0.095    -.0247777    .3120966 
          3  |   .1579959   .0844677     1.87   0.061    -.0075577    .3235494 
          4  |   .1286254   .0773143     1.66   0.096    -.0229079    .2801587 
          5  |   .1695044   .0718501     2.36   0.018     .0286807     .310328 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q22f_1 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.5d: CBA conditional on perceptions about the economic 
stability in a country (after the SUR results of the 'credibility' 
model, cluster country, wighted) 
 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_01=(1(1)6))  vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_01           =           1 
2._at        : q1_01           =           2 
3._at        : q1_01           =           3 
4._at        : q1_01           =           4 
5._at        : q1_01           =           5 
6._at        : q1_01           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0851595   .0713891     1.19   0.233    -.0547606    .2250796 
          2  |   .0995831    .073106     1.36   0.173     -.043702    .2428681 
          3  |   .1028625   .0755743     1.36   0.173    -.0452605    .2509855 
          4  |   .1166307   .0828718     1.41   0.159     -.045795    .2790565 
          5  |   .1693551   .0823912     2.06   0.040     .0078714    .3308388 
          6  |   .1850273   .0781243     2.37   0.018     .0319065     .338148 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q1_01 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.5e: CBA conditional on expectations about the economic 
stability in a country (after the SUR results of the 'credibility' 
model, cluster country, wighted) 
 
margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_02=(1(1)6)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_02           =           1 
2._at        : q1_02           =           2 
3._at        : q1_02           =           3 
4._at        : q1_02           =           4 
5._at        : q1_02           =           5 
6._at        : q1_02           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1660164   .0912595     1.82   0.069     -.012849    .3448817 
          2  |   .1206685   .0881387     1.37   0.171    -.0520801    .2934171 
          3  |   .1384653   .0853931     1.62   0.105    -.0289021    .3058326 
          4  |   .1675544    .078261     2.14   0.032     .0141657    .3209432 
          5  |   .1792832   .0762401     2.35   0.019     .0298554     .328711 
          6  |   .1649461   .0694353     2.38   0.018     .0288555    .3010368 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
 
 
 
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 P
r(
C
s
a
g
re
e
=
1
,E
x
p
c
s
a
g
re
e
=
1
)
Strongly agree Agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Disagree Strongly disagree
Currently, the economic situation of [MY COUNTRY] is very good
Average Marginal Effects of 1.CBA with 95% CIs
  376 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q1_02 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.5f: Marginal effect of the CBA in CBA and non-CBA 
subsamples (after the SUR results of the 'credibility' model, 
cluster country, wighted) 
 
. margins if CBA==0, at(CBA=(0 1))  
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =      30237 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |   .2677343   .0384871     6.96   0.000      .192301    .3431677 
          2  |   .4078891   .0595829     6.85   0.000     .2911088    .5246695 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. margins if CBA==1, at(CBA=(0 1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =       7671 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |   .2156819   .0671553     3.21   0.001     .0840599    .3473038 
          2  |   .3667313   .0050819    72.16   0.000      .356771    .3766916 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, over(CBA) at(CBA=(0 1)) contrast (atcontrast(r._at) wald) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
over         : CBA 
1._at        : 0.CBA 
                   CBA             =           0 
               1.CBA 
                   CBA             =           0 
2._at        : 0.CBA 
                   CBA             =           1 
               1.CBA 
                   CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
             |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------+---------------------------------- 
     _at@CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) 0  |          1        3.07     0.0797 
 (2 vs 1) 1  |          1        5.41     0.0200 
      Joint  |          2       39.41     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |            Delta-method 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------ 
     _at@CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) 0  |   .1401548   .0799783     -.0165998    .2969094 
 (2 vs 1) 1  |   .1510494   .0649546      .0237406    .2783582 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Appendix 4.5g: Contrasts (testing for the significance of the 
difference between groups) (after SUR results of the 'credibility' 
model, cluster country, wighted) 
 
. contrast r.q22f_1, asobserved effects 
 
Contrasts of marginal linear predictions 
 
Margins      : asobserved 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
             |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------+---------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
      q22f_1 | 
   (2 vs 1)  |          1        5.67     0.0173 
   (3 vs 1)  |          1       30.71     0.0000 
   (4 vs 1)  |          1       25.09     0.0000 
   (5 vs 1)  |          1       47.14     0.0000 
   (8 vs 1)  |          1       15.21     0.0001 
      Joint  |          5      120.38     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------ 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
      q22f_1 | 
   (2 vs 1)  |  -.1033968   .0434408    -2.38   0.017    -.1885392   -.0182543 
   (3 vs 1)  |  -.2977655   .0537344    -5.54   0.000    -.4030831   -.1924479 
   (4 vs 1)  |  -.3901604   .0778875    -5.01   0.000     -.542817   -.2375038 
   (5 vs 1)  |  -.4708606   .0685765    -6.87   0.000    -.6052681   -.3364531 
   (8 vs 1)  |  -.5177442   .1327564    -3.90   0.000     -.777942   -.2575463 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. contrast ar.q22f_1, asobserved effects 
 
Contrasts of marginal linear predictions 
 
Margins      : asobserved 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
             |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------+---------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
      q22f_1 | 
   (2 vs 1)  |          1        5.67     0.0173 
   (3 vs 2)  |          1       31.30     0.0000 
   (4 vs 3)  |          1        5.53     0.0187 
   (5 vs 4)  |          1        7.67     0.0056 
   (8 vs 5)  |          1        0.34     0.5585 
      Joint  |          5      120.38     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
      q22f_1 | 
   (2 vs 1)  |  -.1033968   .0434408    -2.38   0.017    -.1885392   -.0182543 
   (3 vs 2)  |  -.1943688   .0347422    -5.59   0.000    -.2624621   -.1262754 
   (4 vs 3)  |  -.0923949   .0392904    -2.35   0.019    -.1694027   -.0153871 
   (5 vs 4)  |  -.0807002   .0291441    -2.77   0.006    -.1378216   -.0235788 
   (8 vs 5)  |  -.0468836    .080139    -0.59   0.559    -.2039531    .1101859 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. contrast r.q1_01, asobserved effects 
 
Contrasts of marginal linear predictions 
 
Margins      : asobserved 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
             |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------+---------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       q1_01 | 
   (2 vs 1)  |          1        2.39     0.1223 
   (3 vs 1)  |          1       14.91     0.0001 
   (4 vs 1)  |          1       48.26     0.0000 
   (5 vs 1)  |          1       56.50     0.0000 
   (6 vs 1)  |          1       70.27     0.0000 
   (8 vs 1)  |          1       43.44     0.0000 
      Joint  |          6      138.36     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       q1_01 | 
   (2 vs 1)  |  -.1533169   .0992273    -1.55   0.122    -.3477988    .0411649 
   (3 vs 1)  |  -.4869634   .1261329    -3.86   0.000    -.7341794   -.2397473 
   (4 vs 1)  |  -.8742749    .125853    -6.95   0.000    -1.120942   -.6276075 
   (5 vs 1)  |   -1.06638    .141863    -7.52   0.000    -1.344427   -.7883338 
   (6 vs 1)  |  -1.276633   .1522972    -8.38   0.000     -1.57513   -.9781356 
   (8 vs 1)  |  -1.002888   .1521659    -6.59   0.000    -1.301127   -.7046478 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. contrast ar.q1_01, asobserved effects 
 
Contrasts of marginal linear predictions 
 
Margins      : asobserved 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
             |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------+---------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       q1_01 | 
   (2 vs 1)  |          1        2.39     0.1223 
   (3 vs 2)  |          1       37.75     0.0000 
   (4 vs 3)  |          1       35.87     0.0000 
   (5 vs 4)  |          1        9.41     0.0022 
   (6 vs 5)  |          1       61.76     0.0000 
   (8 vs 6)  |          1        2.87     0.0900 
      Joint  |          6      138.36     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       q1_01 | 
   (2 vs 1)  |  -.1533169   .0992273    -1.55   0.122    -.3477988    .0411649 
   (3 vs 2)  |  -.3336464      .0543    -6.14   0.000    -.4400726   -.2272203 
   (4 vs 3)  |  -.3873115   .0646664    -5.99   0.000    -.5140554   -.2605677 
   (5 vs 4)  |  -.1921053   .0626128    -3.07   0.002    -.3148242   -.0693865 
   (6 vs 5)  |  -.2102524   .0267538    -7.86   0.000    -.2626889    -.157816 
   (8 vs 6)  |   .2737451   .1614653     1.70   0.090    -.0427211    .5902114 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. margins r.CBA, at(q1_01=(1(1)6)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : q1_01           =           1 
2._at        : q1_01           =           2 
3._at        : q1_01           =           3 
4._at        : q1_01           =           4 
5._at        : q1_01           =           5 
6._at        : q1_01           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.74     0.1872 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.43     0.2320 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.32     0.2513 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1       17.89     0.0000 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1       50.44     0.0000 
            Joint  |          5       69.01     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0144236   .0109363     -.0070112    .0358584 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |    .017703   .0148108     -.0113256    .0467317 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0314713   .0274356     -.0223015    .0852441 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0841956   .0199054      .0451818    .1232094 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0998678    .014062      .0723067    .1274289 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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. margins r.CBA, at(q1_02=(1(1)6)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : q1_02           =           1 
2._at        : q1_02           =           2 
3._at        : q1_02           =           3 
4._at        : q1_02           =           4 
5._at        : q1_02           =           5 
6._at        : q1_02           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1       17.16     0.0000 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        3.83     0.0503 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.01     0.9345 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.45     0.5025 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.00     0.9667 
            Joint  |          5       44.32     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0453479   .0109465     -.0668026   -.0238931 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0275511   .0140743     -.0551361    .0000339 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0015381   .0187135     -.0351396    .0382158 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0132668   .0197838     -.0255087    .0520424 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0010702   .0256156     -.0512758    .0491354 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. margins r.CBA, at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1       15.58     0.0001 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1       11.25     0.0008 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        3.02     0.0821 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1       10.27     0.0014 
            Joint  |          4       82.62     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0939562   .0238029      .0473033     .140609 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .1082926   .0322837      .0450178    .1715674 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0789221   .0453908     -.0100422    .1678863 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |    .119801     .03738      .0465375    .1930646 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 4.6: Testing for the joint significance of the variables 
used in the 'credibility' model 
 
. test CBA q22f_1 ECSagree ExpECSagree q1_01 q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
 ( 1)  [CSagree]CBA = 0 
 ( 2)  [ExpCSagree]CBA = 0 
 ( 3)  [CSagree]q22f_1 = 0 
 ( 4)  [ExpCSagree]q22f_1 = 0 
 ( 5)  [CSagree]ECSagree = 0 
 ( 6)  [ExpCSagree]ExpECSagree = 0 
 ( 7)  [CSagree]q1_01 = 0 
 ( 8)  [ExpCSagree]q1_02 = 0 
 ( 9)  [CSagree]h_aged2 = 0 
 (10)  [ExpCSagree]h_aged2 = 0 
 (11)  [CSagree]h_aged3 = 0 
 (12)  [ExpCSagree]h_aged3 = 0 
 (13)  [CSagree]h_female = 0 
 (14)  [ExpCSagree]h_female = 0 
 (15)  [CSagree]h_edu_high = 0 
 (16)  [ExpCSagree]h_edu_high = 0 
 (17)  [CSagree]h_edu_medium = 0 
 (18)  [ExpCSagree]h_edu_medium = 0 
 (19)  [CSagree]h_retired = 0 
 (20)  [ExpCSagree]h_retired = 0 
 (21)  [CSagree]h_student = 0 
 (22)  [ExpCSagree]h_student = 0 
 (23)  [CSagree]h_unemployed = 0 
 (24)  [ExpCSagree]h_unemployed = 0 
 (25)  [CSagree]fall2009 = 0 
 (26)  [ExpCSagree]fall2009 = 0 
 (27)  [CSagree]spring2010 = 0 
 (28)  [ExpCSagree]spring2010 = 0 
 (29)  [CSagree]fall2010 = 0 
 (30)  [ExpCSagree]fall2010 = 0 
 (31)  [CSagree]spring2011 = 0 
 (32)  [ExpCSagree]spring2011 = 0 
 (33)  [CSagree]EU = 0 
 (34)  [ExpCSagree]EU = 0 
 (35)  [CSagree]ExYu = 0 
 (36)  [ExpCSagree]ExYu = 0 
 (37)  [CSagree]high_lev_dev = 0 
 (38)  [ExpCSagree]high_lev_dev = 0 
       Constraint 3 dropped 
       Constraint 4 dropped 
       Constraint 6 dropped 
       Constraint 7 dropped 
       Constraint 8 dropped 
       Constraint 9 dropped 
       Constraint 10 dropped 
       Constraint 11 dropped 
       Constraint 12 dropped 
       Constraint 13 dropped 
       Constraint 14 dropped 
       Constraint 15 dropped 
       Constraint 17 dropped 
       Constraint 18 dropped 
       Constraint 20 dropped 
       Constraint 21 dropped 
       Constraint 22 dropped 
       Constraint 24 dropped 
       Constraint 25 dropped 
       Constraint 26 dropped 
       Constraint 27 dropped 
       Constraint 28 dropped 
       Constraint 29 dropped 
       Constraint 30 dropped 
       Constraint 31 dropped 
       Constraint 32 dropped 
       Constraint 34 dropped 
       Constraint 36 dropped 
       Constraint 38 dropped 
           chi2(  9) =  749.60 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
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Appendix 4.7: SUR results of the 'credibility' model (region as 
cluster) 
 
Appendix 4.7a: SUR results of the 'credibility' model (region as 
cluster, unweighted) 
 
*with region as cluster 
 
Unweighted 
 
. biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) (ExpCSagree = i.CBA 
i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.CBA#i.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev), vce(cluster h_region) nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(67)   =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -39927.996                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.1667734   .2475449    -0.67   0.500    -.6519525    .3184057 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1389598   .0577113    -2.41   0.016    -.2520718   -.0258478 
          3  |  -.3424918     .06535    -5.24   0.000    -.4705755   -.2144081 
          4  |  -.4137683   .0677211    -6.11   0.000    -.5464992   -.2810374 
          5  |     -.5173   .0597395    -8.66   0.000    -.6343872   -.4002128 
          8  |  -.4443723    .123557    -3.60   0.000    -.6865395   -.2022051 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1592245   .1227718     1.30   0.195    -.0814038    .3998529 
        1 3  |   .1967043   .1106396     1.78   0.075    -.0201453    .4135538 
        1 4  |    .115451   .1493887     0.77   0.440    -.1773455    .4082476 
        1 5  |   .2382538   .1207059     1.97   0.048     .0016745    .4748331 
        1 8  |  -.2267072   .2572031    -0.88   0.378    -.7308159    .2774016 
             | 
    ECSagree |    .429579   .0460417     9.33   0.000     .3393389    .5198191 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1690199   .1268161    -1.33   0.183    -.4175748     .079535 
          3  |  -.5058682   .1098627    -4.60   0.000    -.7211951   -.2905413 
          4  |  -.9081869   .0995542    -9.12   0.000     -1.10331   -.7130642 
          5  |  -1.149031   .1121791   -10.24   0.000    -1.368898   -.9291642 
          6  |  -1.379297    .119324   -11.56   0.000    -1.613168   -1.145426 
          8  |  -1.078279   .1502076    -7.18   0.000    -1.372681   -.7838779 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .1106121   .3070649     0.36   0.719     -.491224    .7124482 
        1 3  |   .2190222   .2601213     0.84   0.400    -.2908062    .7288506 
        1 4  |   .3108567   .2699596     1.15   0.250    -.2182544    .8399677 
        1 5  |   .6221899   .2329644     2.67   0.008     .1655882    1.078792 
        1 6  |   .7093514   .2207775     3.21   0.001     .2766354    1.142067 
        1 8  |   .5944797   .2750252     2.16   0.031     .0554401    1.133519 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0224442   .0233946    -0.96   0.337    -.0682968    .0234084 
     h_aged3 |    .077724   .0352739     2.20   0.028     .0085884    .1468597 
    h_female |  -.0182666    .014228    -1.28   0.199     -.046153    .0096198 
  h_edu_high |   .1037622   .0513178     2.02   0.043     .0031812    .2043432 
h_edu_medium |   .0534329   .0373586     1.43   0.153    -.0197886    .1266544 
   h_retired |  -.0436992   .0393511    -1.11   0.267    -.1208259    .0334275 
   h_student |  -.0148439   .0426803    -0.35   0.728    -.0984958     .068808 
h_unemployed |   .0269772   .0312524     0.86   0.388    -.0342764    .0882308 
    fall2009 |   .1340979   .0491067     2.73   0.006     .0378505    .2303453 
  spring2010 |   .2021588   .0359135     5.63   0.000     .1317697     .272548 
    fall2010 |   .1872815   .0483863     3.87   0.000      .092446    .2821169 
  spring2011 |   .3193893    .046728     6.84   0.000     .2278041    .4109746 
          EU |  -.1971427   .1401078    -1.41   0.159     -.471749    .0774636 
        ExYu |    .357833   .1833593     1.95   0.051    -.0015446    .7172106 
high_lev_dev |   .3683192   .1402871     2.63   0.009     .0933615    .6432769 
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       _cons |   .3508507   .1615964     2.17   0.030     .0341276    .6675738 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |  -.2665004   .1658035    -1.61   0.108    -.5914694    .0584686 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   -.056096   .0661142    -0.85   0.396    -.1856775    .0734855 
          3  |  -.2504575   .0844516    -2.97   0.003    -.4159795   -.0849355 
          4  |   -.402186   .0837322    -4.80   0.000     -.566298    -.238074 
          5  |  -.5172362   .0727686    -7.11   0.000    -.6598601   -.3746124 
          8  |   -.520284   .1146148    -4.54   0.000    -.7449249    -.295643 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2435898   .1027535     2.37   0.018     .0421967     .444983 
        1 3  |   .3507656   .1177539     2.98   0.003     .1199723     .581559 
        1 4  |   .3324117   .1291755     2.57   0.010     .0792324    .5855911 
        1 5  |   .4845257   .1006431     4.81   0.000     .2872689    .6817824 
        1 8  |   .3529001   .2477557     1.42   0.154    -.1326923    .8384924 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .3829083   .0369558    10.36   0.000     .3104762    .4553404 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1164063   .0705679    -1.65   0.099    -.2547169    .0219043 
          3  |  -.4133238   .0729775    -5.66   0.000    -.5563571   -.2702905 
          4  |  -.9630475   .0726436   -13.26   0.000    -1.105426   -.8206687 
          5  |  -1.260605   .0711039   -17.73   0.000    -1.399966   -1.121244 
          6  |  -1.400986   .0806204   -17.38   0.000    -1.558999   -1.242972 
          8  |  -.8345363   .0901804    -9.25   0.000    -1.011287    -.657786 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.2388729   .1471335    -1.62   0.104    -.5272494    .0495035 
        1 3  |   .0010624   .1696273     0.01   0.995     -.331401    .3335259 
        1 4  |   .3377375   .1674435     2.02   0.044     .0095543    .6659207 
        1 5  |   .4632517   .1652792     2.80   0.005     .1393104    .7871931 
        1 6  |   .4394058   .1871695     2.35   0.019     .0725603    .8062512 
        1 8  |  -.1575023   .2240997    -0.70   0.482    -.5967297    .2817251 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0173605   .0206097    -0.84   0.400    -.0577548    .0230338 
     h_aged3 |  -.0181263   .0314313    -0.58   0.564    -.0797305    .0434778 
    h_female |   .0036884   .0164441     0.22   0.823    -.0285414    .0359183 
  h_edu_high |   .0131233   .0426657     0.31   0.758       -.0705    .0967467 
h_edu_medium |  -.0028555   .0349715    -0.08   0.935    -.0713983    .0656873 
   h_retired |   .0470598   .0357411     1.32   0.188    -.0229915    .1171111 
   h_student |   .0222829    .038049     0.59   0.558    -.0522918    .0968575 
h_unemployed |   .0319349    .027948     1.14   0.253    -.0228423    .0867121 
    fall2009 |  -.0060109   .0424544    -0.14   0.887    -.0892201    .0771982 
  spring2010 |   .0859068   .0369745     2.32   0.020     .0134381    .1583755 
    fall2010 |    .086205   .0461095     1.87   0.062    -.0041679    .1765779 
  spring2011 |   .1935944   .0426409     4.54   0.000     .1100198     .277169 
          EU |    .030683   .1023585     0.30   0.764    -.1699359     .231302 
        ExYu |   .3413127   .1332256     2.56   0.010     .0801953    .6024302 
high_lev_dev |   .2428495   .0987624     2.46   0.014     .0492787    .4364204 
       _cons |   .2603832   .1088829     2.39   0.017     .0469766    .4737898 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .8016783   .0276482    29.00   0.000     .7474888    .8558678 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |    .664974   .0154224                      .6336484    .6941225 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  840.748    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 2.q1_01 
3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev ExpECSagree 2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1373562   .0453931     3.03   0.002     .0483873    .2263251 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0184149   .0161772    -1.14   0.255    -.0501217    .0132918 
          3  |   -.080672   .0186952    -4.32   0.000     -.117314     -.04403 
          4  |  -.1194101   .0205007    -5.82   0.000    -.1595908   -.0792294 
          5  |  -.1421111   .0178603    -7.96   0.000    -.1771166   -.1071055 
          8  |  -.1523869   .0277634    -5.49   0.000    -.2068022   -.0979715 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .0689336   .0074993     9.19   0.000     .0542353    .0836319 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0101099   .0081652    -1.24   0.216    -.0261135    .0058936 
          3  |  -.0410068   .0079766    -5.14   0.000    -.0566405    -.025373 
          4  |  -.0952835   .0083534   -11.41   0.000    -.1116559   -.0789112 
          5  |   -.125832   .0091018   -13.82   0.000    -.1436712   -.1079927 
          6  |  -.1638014   .0097828   -16.74   0.000    -.1829752   -.1446276 
          8  |  -.1145672   .0181695    -6.31   0.000    -.1501789   -.0789556 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0063052   .0057244    -1.10   0.271    -.0175249    .0049144 
     h_aged3 |   .0096493   .0096991     0.99   0.320    -.0093606    .0286592 
    h_female |  -.0023568   .0043018    -0.55   0.584    -.0107882    .0060746 
  h_edu_high |   .0186943   .0136942     1.37   0.172    -.0081458    .0455344 
h_edu_medium |   .0081295   .0107492     0.76   0.449    -.0129386    .0291977 
   h_retired |   .0003166   .0109651     0.03   0.977    -.0211747    .0218079 
   h_student |   .0010883   .0118816     0.09   0.927    -.0221993    .0243759 
h_unemployed |   .0093024   .0086106     1.08   0.280     -.007574    .0261788 
    fall2009 |   .0205823   .0127337     1.62   0.106    -.0043752    .0455398 
  spring2010 |   .0458188   .0104706     4.38   0.000     .0252968    .0663408 
    fall2010 |   .0434779   .0143674     3.03   0.002     .0153184    .0716375 
  spring2011 |   .0814014   .0127564     6.38   0.000     .0563994    .1064034 
          EU |  -.0268566    .037476    -0.72   0.474    -.1003083     .046595 
        ExYu |   .1105755   .0514041     2.15   0.031     .0098254    .2113256 
high_lev_dev |   .0969239   .0360254     2.69   0.007     .0263154    .1675324 
 ExpECSagree |   .0596328   .0060426     9.87   0.000     .0477894    .0714761 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0170281   .0050909    -3.34   0.001    -.0270061     -.00705 
          3  |  -.0424237   .0062062    -6.84   0.000    -.0545877   -.0302597 
          4  |   -.115775   .0065563   -17.66   0.000    -.1286252   -.1029248 
          5  |  -.1655083   .0066014   -25.07   0.000    -.1784467   -.1525699 
          6  |  -.1931815   .0071789   -26.91   0.000     -.207252    -.179111 
          8  |  -.1157519   .0114292   -10.13   0.000    -.1381527    -.093351 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 4.7b: SUR results of the 'credibility' model (region as 
cluster, weighted) 
 
. biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) (ExpCSagree = i.CBA 
i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.CBA#i.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) [pweight = weight], vce(cluster h_region) nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(67)   =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -38633.398                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.2813552   .2501322    -1.12   0.261    -.7716053     .208895 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |    -.14705   .0640562    -2.30   0.022    -.2725979   -.0215021 
          3  |   -.346468   .0672272    -5.15   0.000    -.4782309    -.214705 
          4  |  -.4222047   .0721191    -5.85   0.000    -.5635556   -.2808538 
          5  |  -.5271681   .0608117    -8.67   0.000    -.6463568   -.4079794 
          8  |  -.4935988   .1122668    -4.40   0.000    -.7136377     -.27356 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2127486   .1314033     1.62   0.105    -.0447971    .4702944 
        1 3  |   .2373565   .1141846     2.08   0.038     .0135587    .4611542 
        1 4  |   .1561711   .1510585     1.03   0.301    -.1398981    .4522404 
        1 5  |   .2744205   .1229857     2.23   0.026      .033373    .5154681 
        1 8  |  -.1176747   .2645326    -0.44   0.656    -.6361491    .4007996 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .4357034   .0494431     8.81   0.000     .3387967    .5326101 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1984457   .1177186    -1.69   0.092    -.4291699    .0322786 
          3  |   -.545137   .1079914    -5.05   0.000    -.7567962   -.3334777 
          4  |  -.9574178   .0965848    -9.91   0.000    -1.146721   -.7681151 
          5  |  -1.214825   .1077502   -11.27   0.000    -1.426012   -1.003639 
          6  |  -1.442863   .1145943   -12.59   0.000    -1.667464   -1.218263 
          8  |  -1.131691   .1591742    -7.11   0.000    -1.443667   -.8197155 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .2199397   .3266504     0.67   0.501    -.4202833    .8601626 
        1 3  |   .2835152   .2476657     1.14   0.252    -.2019006     .768931 
        1 4  |   .4052058   .2662603     1.52   0.128    -.1166549    .9270664 
        1 5  |   .7234614   .2257328     3.20   0.001     .2810333     1.16589 
        1 6  |   .8101431   .2112666     3.83   0.000     .3960682    1.224218 
        1 8  |   .6277383   .2793084     2.25   0.025     .0803039    1.175173 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0219936   .0218456    -1.01   0.314    -.0648103    .0208231 
     h_aged3 |   .0588254   .0352149     1.67   0.095    -.0101946    .1278454 
    h_female |  -.0211951   .0169037    -1.25   0.210    -.0543258    .0119356 
  h_edu_high |   .0756203    .053664     1.41   0.159    -.0295592    .1807999 
h_edu_medium |   .0278279   .0393992     0.71   0.480    -.0493931    .1050488 
   h_retired |  -.0569386   .0402348    -1.42   0.157    -.1357974    .0219203 
   h_student |   -.013741   .0458173    -0.30   0.764    -.1035413    .0760593 
h_unemployed |   .0278423   .0327711     0.85   0.396    -.0363879    .0920725 
    fall2009 |   .1311455   .0484692     2.71   0.007     .0361475    .2261435 
  spring2010 |   .2039976   .0382605     5.33   0.000     .1290084    .2789868 
    fall2010 |   .1920254   .0492987     3.90   0.000     .0954016    .2886491 
  spring2011 |   .3289018   .0493241     6.67   0.000     .2322283    .4255752 
          EU |  -.1723881   .1480406    -1.16   0.244    -.4625425    .1177662 
        ExYu |   .3553076   .1898579     1.87   0.061    -.0168069    .7274222 
high_lev_dev |   .3640911   .1366864     2.66   0.008     .0961907    .6319915 
       _cons |   .4137104   .1725788     2.40   0.017     .0754622    .7519585 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |  -.2729013   .1651637    -1.65   0.098    -.5966163    .0508137 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0303254   .0675745    -0.45   0.654    -.1627689    .1021181 
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          3  |  -.2330045   .0827558    -2.82   0.005    -.3952028   -.0708062 
          4  |  -.3849023   .0842955    -4.57   0.000    -.5501184   -.2196862 
          5  |  -.5080617   .0729349    -6.97   0.000    -.6510115    -.365112 
          8  |  -.5241886    .114387    -4.58   0.000     -.748383   -.2999943 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |    .244248   .1049956     2.33   0.020     .0384603    .4500356 
        1 3  |   .3509446   .1193961     2.94   0.003     .1169326    .5849567 
        1 4  |   .3349502   .1287947     2.60   0.009     .0825173    .5873832 
        1 5  |   .4950568   .1032577     4.79   0.000     .2926754    .6974381 
        1 8  |   .4133488   .2597416     1.59   0.112    -.0957354    .9224329 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .3797176    .037231    10.20   0.000     .3067462     .452689 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |   -.092667   .0711466    -1.30   0.193    -.2321117    .0467777 
          3  |  -.3974543    .078802    -5.04   0.000    -.5519033   -.2430053 
          4  |   -.973283   .0738147   -13.19   0.000    -1.117957   -.8286088 
          5  |   -1.26321   .0732907   -17.24   0.000    -1.406857   -1.119563 
          6  |  -1.414295   .0822998   -17.18   0.000      -1.5756   -1.252991 
          8  |  -.8506775   .0928776    -9.16   0.000    -1.032714   -.6686407 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.2462528   .1480484    -1.66   0.096    -.5364224    .0439168 
        1 3  |   .0070808   .1703103     0.04   0.967    -.3267212    .3408828 
        1 4  |   .3428358   .1687003     2.03   0.042     .0121892    .6734824 
        1 5  |   .4782302   .1654332     2.89   0.004     .1539871    .8024734 
        1 6  |   .4716131   .1866793     2.53   0.012     .1057284    .8374979 
        1 8  |  -.1231804   .2250917    -0.55   0.584     -.564352    .3179912 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0117537   .0220264    -0.53   0.594    -.0549247    .0314174 
     h_aged3 |  -.0195565     .03501    -0.56   0.576    -.0881748    .0490619 
    h_female |  -.0011527   .0163019    -0.07   0.944    -.0331038    .0307984 
  h_edu_high |   .0060045   .0454726     0.13   0.895    -.0831202    .0951292 
h_edu_medium |  -.0034094   .0366909    -0.09   0.926    -.0753223    .0685035 
   h_retired |   .0314124   .0390005     0.81   0.421    -.0450272     .107852 
   h_student |    .020379   .0413855     0.49   0.622    -.0607351    .1014932 
h_unemployed |   .0256666   .0315551     0.81   0.416    -.0361803    .0875135 
    fall2009 |   .0074902   .0444838     0.17   0.866    -.0796965    .0946769 
  spring2010 |   .0899692   .0416213     2.16   0.031     .0083929    .1715456 
    fall2010 |   .0818546   .0460992     1.78   0.076    -.0084982    .1722075 
  spring2011 |   .1876446   .0427254     4.39   0.000     .1039044    .2713848 
          EU |   .0430981   .1098845     0.39   0.695    -.1722715    .2584678 
        ExYu |   .3472788   .1398414     2.48   0.013     .0731946    .6213629 
high_lev_dev |   .2399773   .1007453     2.38   0.017     .0425202    .4374345 
       _cons |   .2361363   .1143445     2.07   0.039     .0120253    .4602473 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .8028261   .0284994    28.17   0.000     .7469683    .8586839 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .6656138    .015873                      .6333368     .695579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  793.546    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 2.q1_01 
               3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
               h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 
               spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev ExpECSagree 
               2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1423902   .0439957     3.24   0.001     .0561603    .2286201 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   -.013148   .0168313    -0.78   0.435    -.0461366    .0198407 
          3  |  -.0758984   .0185011    -4.10   0.000    -.1121599   -.0396368 
          4  |  -.1149224    .020609    -5.58   0.000    -.1553154   -.0745294 
          5  |  -.1382688   .0175406    -7.88   0.000    -.1726477   -.1038899 
          8  |  -.1523797   .0271299    -5.62   0.000    -.2055534   -.0992059 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .0695096   .0079315     8.76   0.000     .0539641    .0850551 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0098262   .0078884    -1.25   0.213    -.0252872    .0056347 
          3  |  -.0421243   .0078221    -5.39   0.000    -.0574553   -.0267933 
          4  |   -.096648   .0082582   -11.70   0.000    -.1128337   -.0804623 
          5  |  -.1294388   .0088155   -14.68   0.000    -.1467169   -.1121606 
          6  |  -.1666513   .0094097   -17.71   0.000    -.1850941   -.1482086 
          8  |  -.1182752   .0190706    -6.20   0.000     -.155653   -.0808975 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0053082   .0057332    -0.93   0.355     -.016545    .0059287 
     h_aged3 |   .0063907    .010189     0.63   0.531    -.0135794    .0263608 
    h_female |  -.0035578   .0045944    -0.77   0.439    -.0125626     .005447 
  h_edu_high |   .0129833    .014478     0.90   0.370     -.015393    .0413596 
h_edu_medium |   .0039175   .0112174     0.35   0.727    -.0180682    .0259033 
   h_retired |  -.0042746   .0113986    -0.38   0.708    -.0266154    .0180663 
   h_student |   .0009278   .0127114     0.07   0.942    -.0239861    .0258416 
h_unemployed |   .0083712   .0092499     0.91   0.365    -.0097583    .0265007 
    fall2009 |   .0220689   .0128179     1.72   0.085    -.0030536    .0471915 
  spring2010 |   .0463184    .011554     4.01   0.000     .0236729    .0689639 
    fall2010 |   .0431661   .0143303     3.01   0.003     .0150792    .0712529 
  spring2011 |   .0811984   .0129502     6.27   0.000     .0558165    .1065803 
          EU |  -.0209037   .0396688    -0.53   0.598    -.0986531    .0568456 
        ExYu |   .1098501    .052905     2.08   0.038     .0061582     .213542 
high_lev_dev |   .0948241   .0353394     2.68   0.007     .0255602    .1640881 
 ExpECSagree |   .0581326   .0059205     9.82   0.000     .0465285    .0697366 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0150794   .0050503    -2.99   0.003    -.0249779   -.0051809 
          3  |   -.039752   .0063674    -6.24   0.000    -.0522319   -.0272722 
          4  |  -.1154468   .0065685   -17.58   0.000    -.1283209   -.1025728 
          5  |  -.1623512   .0065342   -24.85   0.000    -.1751581   -.1495444 
          6  |  -.1906811   .0073438   -25.96   0.000    -.2050747   -.1762875 
          8  |  -.1157131   .0118334    -9.78   0.000    -.1389062     -.09252 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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margins, dydx(CBA) at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0497033    .051279     0.97   0.332    -.0508017    .1502083 
          2  |   .1436595   .0530988     2.71   0.007     .0395877    .2477312 
          3  |   .1579959   .0481343     3.28   0.001     .0636543    .2523374 
          4  |   .1286254   .0505372     2.55   0.011     .0295743    .2276765 
          5  |   .1695044   .0415816     4.08   0.000     .0880059    .2510028 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q22f_1 
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margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_01=(1(1)6))  vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_01           =           1 
2._at        : q1_01           =           2 
3._at        : q1_01           =           3 
4._at        : q1_01           =           4 
5._at        : q1_01           =           5 
6._at        : q1_01           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0851595    .041917     2.03   0.042     .0030038    .1673152 
          2  |   .0995831   .0456326     2.18   0.029     .0101448    .1890214 
          3  |   .1028625   .0455664     2.26   0.024     .0135541    .1921709 
          4  |   .1166307   .0504135     2.31   0.021     .0178221    .2154394 
          5  |   .1693551   .0463009     3.66   0.000      .078607    .2601032 
          6  |   .1850273   .0441401     4.19   0.000     .0985142    .2715404 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q1_01 
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margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_02=(1(1)6)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_02           =           1 
2._at        : q1_02           =           2 
3._at        : q1_02           =           3 
4._at        : q1_02           =           4 
5._at        : q1_02           =           5 
6._at        : q1_02           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1660164   .0498562     3.33   0.001        .0683    .2637327 
          2  |   .1206685   .0507105     2.38   0.017     .0212778    .2200592 
          3  |   .1384653    .049352     2.81   0.005     .0417371    .2351934 
          4  |   .1675544   .0448916     3.73   0.000     .0795685    .2555404 
          5  |   .1792832   .0438739     4.09   0.000     .0932919    .2652744 
          6  |   .1649461   .0423191     3.90   0.000     .0820022      .24789 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
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. margins if CBA==0, at(CBA=(0 1))  
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =      30237 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |   .2677343   .0179271    14.93   0.000     .2325979    .3028707 
          2  |   .4078891   .0362872    11.24   0.000     .3367675    .4790108 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins if CBA==1, at(CBA=(0 1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =       7671 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |   .2156819   .0339075     6.36   0.000     .1492243    .2821394 
          2  |   .3667313   .0188471    19.46   0.000     .3297915     .403671 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.8: Robustness check of the 'credibility' model - question 
about perceptions of financial stability in a country included (SUR, 
cluster country, weighted) 
 
. drop if q11_7==9 
(790 observations deleted) 
 
. drop if q11_7==. 
(0 observations deleted) 
 
. tab q11_7, missing 
 
 Currently, banks | 
and the financial | 
system are stable | 
   in [MY COUNTRY |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |      1,845        4.97        4.97 
            Agree |      6,549       17.64       22.61 
   Somewhat agree |     12,354       33.28       55.90 
Somewhat disagree |      6,806       18.34       74.23 
         Disagree |      4,113       11.08       85.31 
Strongly disagree |      2,087        5.62       90.94 
      Do not know |      3,364        9.06      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     37,118      100.00 
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. biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 
i.q11_7 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) 
(ExpCSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.CBA#i.q1_02 i.q11_7 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) [pweight = weight], 
vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      37118 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -36971.473                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.3787689   .1871438    -2.02   0.043     -.745564   -.0119739 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1154859   .0512194    -2.25   0.024    -.2158741   -.0150976 
          3  |  -.2720284   .0547679    -4.97   0.000    -.3793715   -.1646852 
          4  |  -.3344425    .088404    -3.78   0.000    -.5077112   -.1611737 
          5  |  -.4041918   .0788017    -5.13   0.000    -.5586403   -.2497434 
          8  |  -.3523602   .1461807    -2.41   0.016    -.6388691   -.0658514 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2223023    .064896     3.43   0.001     .0951085     .349496 
        1 3  |   .2301751    .090844     2.53   0.011     .0521241     .408226 
        1 4  |   .1477211   .1060509     1.39   0.164    -.0601348    .3555769 
        1 5  |   .2651288    .094673     2.80   0.005     .0795731    .4506845 
        1 8  |  -.1446068   .2099599    -0.69   0.491    -.5561207    .2669071 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .3502384    .086198     4.06   0.000     .1812934    .5191834 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.2678489     .16763    -1.60   0.110    -.5963976    .0606998 
          3  |  -.6106477   .2023443    -3.02   0.003    -1.007235   -.2140602 
          4  |  -.9877858   .1851404    -5.34   0.000    -1.350654   -.6249174 
          5  |  -1.245038   .2008953    -6.20   0.000    -1.638785   -.8512902 
          6  |  -1.442315   .2075867    -6.95   0.000    -1.849177   -1.035453 
          8  |  -1.133691   .2242836    -5.05   0.000    -1.573279   -.6941033 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .3353532   .1895649     1.77   0.077    -.0361872    .7068936 
        1 3  |   .4136152   .1924874     2.15   0.032     .0363469    .7908835 
        1 4  |   .5354452    .184118     2.91   0.004     .1745807    .8963098 
        1 5  |   .8497311   .1808954     4.70   0.000     .4951827    1.204279 
        1 6  |   .8937215   .1952935     4.58   0.000     .5109532     1.27649 
        1 8  |   .7638037    .227329     3.36   0.001     .3182471     1.20936 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |  -.1781794   .0469539    -3.79   0.000    -.2702074   -.0861514 
          3  |  -.4317594   .0527232    -8.19   0.000     -.535095   -.3284238 
          4  |   -.869402   .0690927   -12.58   0.000    -1.004821   -.7339828 
          5  |  -.9189851   .0688483   -13.35   0.000    -1.053925   -.7840449 
          6  |  -.9337356   .1235584    -7.56   0.000    -1.175906   -.6915656 
          8  |   -.794543   .0891731    -8.91   0.000    -.9693192   -.6197669 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0251718   .0194095    -1.30   0.195    -.0632136    .0128701 
     h_aged3 |   .0511239   .0325148     1.57   0.116    -.0126038    .1148517 
    h_female |  -.0160344   .0216398    -0.74   0.459    -.0584477    .0263788 
  h_edu_high |   .0072638   .0451667     0.16   0.872    -.0812613     .095789 
h_edu_medium |   .0008524   .0426137     0.02   0.984     -.082669    .0843738 
   h_retired |  -.0314382    .072883    -0.43   0.666    -.1742863    .1114098 
   h_student |   .0095092   .0568225     0.17   0.867    -.1018609    .1208793 
h_unemployed |   .0468407   .0456895     1.03   0.305     -.042709    .1363904 
    fall2009 |   .1256321    .049286     2.55   0.011     .0290333    .2222308 
  spring2010 |   .1710936   .0493848     3.46   0.001     .0743011     .267886 
    fall2010 |   .1524966   .0647299     2.36   0.018     .0256283    .2793649 
  spring2011 |    .273395   .0488117     5.60   0.000     .1777259    .3690641 
          EU |  -.1041008   .1874665    -0.56   0.579    -.4715284    .2633269 
        ExYu |   .4023542   .2788469     1.44   0.149    -.1441756     .948884 
high_lev_dev |   .3597047   .2528767     1.42   0.155    -.1359244    .8553339 
       _cons |   .9755197   .2190232     4.45   0.000     .5462421    1.404797 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |  -.2849129   .2559258    -1.11   0.266    -.7865182    .2166924 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0025635   .0762849    -0.03   0.973    -.1520792    .1469521 
          3  |  -.1801737   .1106651    -1.63   0.104    -.3970734    .0367259 
          4  |  -.3143759    .108012    -2.91   0.004    -.5260756   -.1026762 
          5  |  -.4055915   .0903352    -4.49   0.000    -.5826453   -.2285377 
          8  |  -.4148018   .1104342    -3.76   0.000    -.6312488   -.1983548 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2405706   .0854194     2.82   0.005     .0731517    .4079896 
        1 3  |   .3443856   .1136568     3.03   0.002     .1216224    .5671489 
        1 4  |   .3098646   .1342935     2.31   0.021     .0466543     .573075 
        1 5  |   .4677123   .1030406     4.54   0.000     .2657564    .6696681 
        1 8  |   .3908685   .2434654     1.61   0.108     -.086315     .868052 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .3346127   .0490006     6.83   0.000     .2385732    .4306521 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0852421   .0973607    -0.88   0.381    -.2760656    .1055814 
          3  |  -.3681124   .0991234    -3.71   0.000    -.5623906   -.1738341 
          4  |  -.9412913   .0946979    -9.94   0.000    -1.126896   -.7556869 
          5  |  -1.220315   .1107639   -11.02   0.000    -1.437408   -1.003222 
          6  |  -1.359338   .1321732   -10.28   0.000    -1.618393   -1.100283 
          8  |    -.80811   .0912274    -8.86   0.000    -.9869125   -.6293075 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.2336029   .1533163    -1.52   0.128    -.5340972    .0668915 
        1 3  |   .0472093   .1778958     0.27   0.791    -.3014602    .3958787 
        1 4  |   .3786645   .1884122     2.01   0.044     .0093834    .7479457 
        1 5  |   .5144006   .1928349     2.67   0.008     .1364511    .8923501 
        1 6  |   .4884304   .1802115     2.71   0.007     .1352224    .8416384 
        1 8  |  -.1281749   .2179846    -0.59   0.557    -.5554169     .299067 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |   -.151611   .0481797    -3.15   0.002    -.2460414   -.0571805 
          3  |  -.3490888   .0405245    -8.61   0.000    -.4285154   -.2696622 
          4  |  -.6357461   .0631925   -10.06   0.000    -.7596011   -.5118911 
          5  |   -.731487   .0553523   -13.22   0.000    -.8399756   -.6229984 
          6  |  -.7304206   .0861916    -8.47   0.000    -.8993531   -.5614882 
          8  |  -.5975479   .0483952   -12.35   0.000    -.6924009    -.502695 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0174792   .0271545    -0.64   0.520    -.0707011    .0357426 
     h_aged3 |  -.0274353   .0244072    -1.12   0.261    -.0752724    .0204019 
    h_female |    .005787   .0133996     0.43   0.666    -.0204758    .0320497 
  h_edu_high |  -.0386345   .0460237    -0.84   0.401    -.1288392    .0515702 
h_edu_medium |  -.0220597   .0353591    -0.62   0.533    -.0913622    .0472428 
   h_retired |   .0556642   .0590153     0.94   0.346    -.0600038    .1713321 
   h_student |   .0400092    .044907     0.89   0.373    -.0480069    .1280254 
h_unemployed |   .0421451   .0498727     0.85   0.398    -.0556037    .1398938 
    fall2009 |   .0066642   .0674667     0.10   0.921    -.1255681    .1388966 
  spring2010 |   .0708216   .0612473     1.16   0.248    -.0492209    .1908641 
    fall2010 |   .0520014   .0722048     0.72   0.471    -.0895173    .1935201 
  spring2011 |    .148457   .0555832     2.67   0.008     .0395159    .2573982 
          EU |   .1143892   .1316329     0.87   0.385    -.1436066    .3723849 
        ExYu |    .388328   .1963003     1.98   0.048     .0035864    .7730697 
high_lev_dev |   .2353437   .1746962     1.35   0.178    -.1070545     .577742 
       _cons |   .5867312   .1143273     5.13   0.000     .3626537    .8108087 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .7899543   .0425435    18.57   0.000     .7065706    .8733381 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .6583832   .0241022                      .6085218    .7030662 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  344.776    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37118 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 2.q1_01 
               3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 2.q11_7 3.q11_7 4.q11_7 
               5.q11_7 6.q11_7 8.q11_7 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
               h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 
               fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev ExpECSagree 2.q1_02 3.q1_02 
               4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1386755   .0662849     2.09   0.036     .0087594    .2685916 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   -.001976   .0113539    -0.17   0.862    -.0242292    .0202771 
          3  |  -.0512252   .0173934    -2.95   0.003    -.0853156   -.0171349 
          4  |  -.0852188   .0220025    -3.87   0.000    -.1283429   -.0420947 
          5  |  -.0985847   .0198441    -4.97   0.000    -.1374784   -.0596909 
          8  |  -.1095159   .0302079    -3.63   0.000    -.1687222   -.0503095 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .0538159   .0139197     3.87   0.000     .0265338    .0810981 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0120676   .0078493    -1.54   0.124    -.0274519    .0033167 
          3  |  -.0437449   .0119234    -3.67   0.000    -.0671143   -.0203754 
          4  |  -.0918928   .0116543    -7.88   0.000    -.1147349   -.0690508 
          5  |  -.1236089   .0151655    -8.15   0.000    -.1533328    -.093885 
          6  |   -.155912   .0157627    -9.89   0.000    -.1868063   -.1250176 
          8  |  -.1079255   .0202387    -5.33   0.000    -.1475927   -.0682583 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |  -.0600455   .0144116    -4.17   0.000    -.0882918   -.0317993 
          3  |  -.1384153   .0144045    -9.61   0.000    -.1666477    -.110183 
          4  |  -.2496844   .0234691   -10.64   0.000     -.295683   -.2036857 
          5  |  -.2682532    .019274   -13.92   0.000    -.3060295   -.2304768 
          6  |  -.2701455   .0314081    -8.60   0.000    -.3317043   -.2085867 
          8  |  -.2336471    .024132    -9.68   0.000     -.280945   -.1863491 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0064831   .0062945    -1.03   0.303    -.0188202    .0058539 
     h_aged3 |   .0037504   .0081093     0.46   0.644    -.0121435    .0196443 
    h_female |  -.0015979   .0042373    -0.38   0.706    -.0099029    .0067071 
  h_edu_high |  -.0046646   .0126082    -0.37   0.711    -.0293763     .020047 
h_edu_medium |  -.0031697   .0114124    -0.28   0.781    -.0255376    .0191981 
   h_retired |   .0034982   .0193227     0.18   0.856    -.0343736      .04137 
   h_student |   .0074476   .0146895     0.51   0.612    -.0213434    .0362386 
h_unemployed |   .0135034   .0137969     0.98   0.328    -.0135381    .0405448 
    fall2009 |   .0203012   .0156104     1.30   0.193    -.0102947     .050897 
  spring2010 |   .0368862   .0157061     2.35   0.019     .0061029    .0676695 
    fall2010 |   .0312127    .020259     1.54   0.123    -.0084942    .0709196 
  spring2011 |   .0642217   .0140208     4.58   0.000     .0367414     .091702 
          EU |   .0011201   .0477527     0.02   0.981    -.0924736    .0947138 
        ExYu |   .1199281   .0755806     1.59   0.113    -.0282072    .2680634 
high_lev_dev |   .0904842   .0627895     1.44   0.150    -.0325808    .2135493 
 ExpECSagree |   .0500671   .0082992     6.03   0.000      .033801    .0663332 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0145889   .0055677    -2.62   0.009    -.0255014   -.0036764 
          3  |   -.035558   .0072855    -4.88   0.000    -.0498373   -.0212787 
          4  |  -.1096437   .0058991   -18.59   0.000    -.1212056   -.0980817 
          5  |  -.1541513   .0067338   -22.89   0.000    -.1673493   -.1409533 
          6  |  -.1811536   .0060216   -30.08   0.000    -.1929558   -.1693515 
          8  |  -.1100962   .0071016   -15.50   0.000     -.124015   -.0961774 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 4.9: Robustness check of the 'credibility' model - 
questions about perceptions of financial stability in a country and 
perceptions and expectations about the financial situation of a 
household included (SUR, cluster country, weighted)  
 
 
. drop if q1_15==9 
(236 observations deleted) 
 
. drop if q1_15==. 
(0 observations deleted) 
 
. tab q1_15, missing 
 
   Currently, the | 
        financial | 
  situation of my | 
household is good |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |        954        2.59        2.59 
            Agree |      3,745       10.15       12.74 
   Somewhat agree |      9,336       25.31       38.05 
Somewhat disagree |      8,077       21.90       59.95 
         Disagree |      7,768       21.06       81.02 
Strongly disagree |      6,789       18.41       99.42 
      Do not know |        213        0.58      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     36,882      100.00 
 
. drop if q1_19==9 
(184 observations deleted) 
 
. drop if q1_19==. 
(0 observations deleted) 
 
. tab q1_19, missing 
 
 Over the next 12 | 
 months, I expect | 
    the financial | 
  situation of my | 
 household to get |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |      1,587        4.32        4.32 
            Agree |      4,675       12.74       17.06 
   Somewhat agree |      9,371       25.54       42.60 
Somewhat disagree |      7,912       21.56       64.16 
         Disagree |      6,627       18.06       82.22 
Strongly disagree |      5,071       13.82       96.04 
      Do not know |      1,455        3.96      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     36,698      100.00 
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. biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 
i.q11_7 i.q1_15 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) 
(ExpCSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.CBA#i.q1_02 i.q11_7  
i.q1_19 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) [pweight = 
weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      36698 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -36237.638                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.4116985    .179729    -2.29   0.022    -.7639608   -.0594362 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1149297   .0515727    -2.23   0.026    -.2160103   -.0138491 
          3  |  -.2615406   .0508876    -5.14   0.000    -.3612784   -.1618028 
          4  |  -.3225519   .0843447    -3.82   0.000    -.4878645   -.1572393 
          5  |  -.3831914   .0774962    -4.94   0.000    -.5350812   -.2313015 
          8  |  -.3138571   .1437705    -2.18   0.029    -.5956421   -.0320721 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2391658   .0671981     3.56   0.000       .10746    .3708716 
        1 3  |   .2244852   .0939032     2.39   0.017     .0404383     .408532 
        1 4  |   .1509789    .102859     1.47   0.142    -.0506211    .3525788 
        1 5  |   .2638843   .0971792     2.72   0.007     .0734166     .454352 
        1 8  |  -.1782492   .2299011    -0.78   0.438    -.6288471    .2723488 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .3410642   .0858922     3.97   0.000     .1727186    .5094098 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.3027579   .1721789    -1.76   0.079    -.6402224    .0347065 
          3  |  -.6256969   .2047124    -3.06   0.002    -1.026926   -.2244681 
          4  |  -.9794382     .18558    -5.28   0.000    -1.343168   -.6157082 
          5  |  -1.209936   .1963212    -6.16   0.000    -1.594719   -.8251536 
          6  |  -1.385481   .2010159    -6.89   0.000    -1.779465   -.9914967 
          8  |   -1.11322    .222092    -5.01   0.000    -1.548512   -.6779279 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .3739195   .1957492     1.91   0.056    -.0097419     .757581 
        1 3  |   .4421027   .1916933     2.31   0.021     .0663907    .8178146 
        1 4  |   .5658065   .1780228     3.18   0.001     .2168882    .9147247 
        1 5  |    .879655   .1809908     4.86   0.000     .5249195     1.23439 
        1 6  |   .9226867   .1981997     4.66   0.000     .5342224    1.311151 
        1 8  |   .9395365   .2220882     4.23   0.000     .5042517    1.374821 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |  -.1716742   .0481768    -3.56   0.000     -.266099   -.0772493 
          3  |  -.4049492   .0532581    -7.60   0.000    -.5093331   -.3005653 
          4  |  -.8301895   .0660489   -12.57   0.000    -.9596429   -.7007361 
          5  |  -.8691367   .0629466   -13.81   0.000    -.9925096   -.7457637 
          6  |  -.8683874   .1186945    -7.32   0.000    -1.101024   -.6357504 
          8  |  -.7430233   .0866324    -8.58   0.000    -.9128198   -.5732269 
             | 
       q1_15 | 
          2  |   .0574709   .0475257     1.21   0.227    -.0356778    .1506196 
          3  |  -.0529632   .0371934    -1.42   0.154     -.125861    .0199345 
          4  |  -.2334902   .0428668    -5.45   0.000    -.3175076   -.1494728 
          5  |  -.2807253     .06761    -4.15   0.000    -.4132384   -.1482121 
          6  |   -.360658   .0694378    -5.19   0.000    -.4967535   -.2245625 
          8  |  -.3241943   .0963058    -3.37   0.001    -.5129501   -.1354385 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0096603   .0207288    -0.47   0.641     -.050288    .0309674 
     h_aged3 |   .0686507   .0326542     2.10   0.036     .0046498    .1326517 
    h_female |  -.0141891   .0220326    -0.64   0.520    -.0573722    .0289939 
  h_edu_high |  -.0480308    .047175    -1.02   0.309     -.140492    .0444304 
h_edu_medium |   -.022818   .0409554    -0.56   0.577    -.1030891    .0574531 
   h_retired |  -.0145779   .0709584    -0.21   0.837    -.1536539    .1244981 
   h_student |   .0084679   .0543874     0.16   0.876    -.0981294    .1150652 
h_unemployed |   .0771848   .0409406     1.89   0.059    -.0030574     .157427 
    fall2009 |   .1259313   .0470943     2.67   0.007     .0336281    .2182345 
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  spring2010 |   .2106315   .0481245     4.38   0.000     .1163092    .3049537 
    fall2010 |   .1784499   .0638121     2.80   0.005     .0533804    .3035194 
  spring2011 |   .3028505    .051014     5.94   0.000     .2028649    .4028362 
          EU |   -.097314    .180376    -0.54   0.590    -.4508444    .2562164 
        ExYu |   .4167106   .2691408     1.55   0.122    -.1107957    .9442169 
high_lev_dev |   .3667254   .2454013     1.49   0.135    -.1142522    .8477031 
       _cons |   1.068237   .2185145     4.89   0.000     .6399561    1.496517 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |  -.2494746   .2520151    -0.99   0.322    -.7434151    .2444659 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |    .002388    .072676     0.03   0.974    -.1400543    .1448303 
          3  |  -.1608277   .1039625    -1.55   0.122    -.3645905    .0429351 
          4  |  -.2842796   .1015639    -2.80   0.005    -.4833411   -.0852181 
          5  |  -.3673338   .0877577    -4.19   0.000    -.5393356   -.1953319 
          8  |  -.3842227   .1090034    -3.52   0.000    -.5978654   -.1705799 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2315063    .079924     2.90   0.004     .0748581    .3881546 
        1 3  |   .3334362   .1067575     3.12   0.002     .1241953    .5426771 
        1 4  |   .2946944   .1314741     2.24   0.025     .0370099    .5523788 
        1 5  |   .4567078   .0999323     4.57   0.000     .2608441    .6525715 
        1 8  |    .344289    .240068     1.43   0.152    -.1262357    .8148136 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .3227366   .0489572     6.59   0.000     .2267822    .4186909 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0781225   .0981749    -0.80   0.426    -.2705417    .1142967 
          3  |  -.3430888   .0985651    -3.48   0.000    -.5362728   -.1499047 
          4  |  -.8883771   .0934642    -9.50   0.000    -1.071564   -.7051906 
          5  |  -1.137073   .1099708   -10.34   0.000    -1.352612   -.9215338 
          6  |    -1.2571   .1284382    -9.79   0.000    -1.508834   -1.005366 
          8  |  -.7459139   .0913306    -8.17   0.000    -.9249185   -.5669092 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.2590411   .1583724    -1.64   0.102    -.5694453    .0513631 
        1 3  |    .010411   .1915641     0.05   0.957    -.3650477    .3858697 
        1 4  |   .3322936   .1885282     1.76   0.078    -.0372149    .7018021 
        1 5  |   .4752047   .1953641     2.43   0.015     .0922981    .8581114 
        1 6  |   .4544581   .1805551     2.52   0.012     .1005765    .8083396 
        1 8  |  -.1610755   .2132573    -0.76   0.450    -.5790521    .2569012 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |   -.133672   .0384834    -3.47   0.001    -.2090981   -.0582458 
          3  |  -.3220002   .0384424    -8.38   0.000    -.3973459   -.2466544 
          4  |  -.5979561   .0685952    -8.72   0.000    -.7324001   -.4635121 
          5  |   -.682065   .0541625   -12.59   0.000    -.7882215   -.5759085 
          6  |  -.6784492   .0829754    -8.18   0.000     -.841078   -.5158204 
          8  |  -.5515819    .046531   -11.85   0.000    -.6427809   -.4603829 
             | 
       q1_19 | 
          2  |  -.0136373   .0511507    -0.27   0.790    -.1138909    .0866163 
          3  |  -.0427247   .0646921    -0.66   0.509    -.1695189    .0840695 
          4  |  -.2272896   .0729447    -3.12   0.002    -.3702587   -.0843205 
          5  |  -.3298986   .0666712    -4.95   0.000    -.4605716   -.1992255 
          6  |  -.3828741   .0717878    -5.33   0.000    -.5235756   -.2421725 
          8  |  -.2187153   .0629025    -3.48   0.001    -.3420018   -.0954287 
             | 
     h_aged2 |   .0025643    .027183     0.09   0.925    -.0507134     .055842 
     h_aged3 |   .0075851   .0242696     0.31   0.755    -.0399825    .0551526 
    h_female |   .0090452    .013642     0.66   0.507    -.0176927    .0357831 
  h_edu_high |  -.0680337   .0443232    -1.53   0.125    -.1549056    .0188382 
h_edu_medium |  -.0404085   .0328529    -1.23   0.219    -.1047989    .0239819 
   h_retired |   .0734369   .0559266     1.31   0.189    -.0361772     .183051 
   h_student |    .031669   .0419359     0.76   0.450    -.0505239    .1138619 
h_unemployed |   .0563895   .0489101     1.15   0.249    -.0394724    .1522515 
    fall2009 |   .0022967   .0670744     0.03   0.973    -.1291668    .1337602 
  spring2010 |   .0916867    .059171     1.55   0.121    -.0242863    .2076597 
    fall2010 |   .0650411   .0689008     0.94   0.345     -.070002    .2000842 
  spring2011 |   .1652864   .0531688     3.11   0.002     .0610774    .2694953 
          EU |   .1463317   .1221126     1.20   0.231    -.0930045    .3856679 
        ExYu |   .4082006   .1848708     2.21   0.027     .0458604    .7705407 
high_lev_dev |   .2506588   .1669174     1.50   0.133    -.0764932    .5778108 
       _cons |   .6213383   .1200213     5.18   0.000     .3861009    .8565757 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .7790617   .0425407    18.31   0.000     .6956834      .86244 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .6521678   .0244472                      .6016207    .6975127 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  335.378    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      36698 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 2.q1_01 
               3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 2.q11_7 3.q11_7 4.q11_7 
               5.q11_7 6.q11_7 8.q11_7 2.q1_15 3.q1_15 4.q1_15 5.q1_15 6.q1_15 
               8.q1_15 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
               h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU 
               ExYu high_lev_dev ExpECSagree 2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 
               6.q1_02 8.q1_02 2.q1_19 3.q1_19 4.q1_19 5.q1_19 6.q1_19 8.q1_19 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1338151   .0625104     2.14   0.032     .0112968    .2563333 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0006705   .0107041    -0.06   0.950    -.0216501    .0203092 
          3  |  -.0459654    .016097    -2.86   0.004    -.0775148   -.0144159 
          4  |  -.0775768   .0205371    -3.78   0.000    -.1178287   -.0373249 
          5  |   -.088241   .0191021    -4.62   0.000    -.1256804   -.0508016 
          8  |  -.1000319   .0297724    -3.36   0.001    -.1583849    -.041679 
             | 
    ECSagree |     .05175   .0137396     3.77   0.000      .024821    .0786791 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0146248   .0086242    -1.70   0.090     -.031528    .0022784 
          3  |  -.0462799   .0125261    -3.69   0.000    -.0708305   -.0217293 
          4  |  -.0917777   .0117822    -7.79   0.000    -.1148702   -.0686851 
          5  |  -.1188322   .0145613    -8.16   0.000    -.1473718   -.0902926 
          6  |  -.1470214   .0148997    -9.87   0.000    -.1762242   -.1178186 
          8  |  -.1016166   .0193586    -5.25   0.000    -.1395586   -.0636745 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |  -.0544331   .0130266    -4.18   0.000    -.0799648   -.0289015 
          3  |  -.1264292   .0140707    -8.99   0.000    -.1540073    -.098851 
          4  |   -.232824   .0238341    -9.77   0.000     -.279538   -.1861101 
          5  |  -.2484736   .0189481   -13.11   0.000    -.2856112   -.2113359 
          6  |  -.2479386   .0303017    -8.18   0.000    -.3073289   -.1885483 
          8  |  -.2139896   .0233473    -9.17   0.000    -.2597495   -.1682298 
             | 
       q1_15 | 
          2  |   .0078303    .006619     1.18   0.237    -.0051427    .0208033 
          3  |  -.0074986   .0051571    -1.45   0.146    -.0176063    .0026092 
          4  |  -.0348843   .0054727    -6.37   0.000    -.0456106    -.024158 
          5  |   -.042454   .0099211    -4.28   0.000     -.061899    -.023009 
          6  |  -.0555713   .0102022    -5.45   0.000    -.0755673   -.0355754 
          8  |  -.0495433   .0152596    -3.25   0.001    -.0794515    -.019635 
             | 
     h_aged2 |   -.001087   .0062844    -0.17   0.863    -.0134042    .0112302 
     h_aged3 |   .0115368   .0080863     1.43   0.154    -.0043119    .0273856 
    h_female |  -.0008169   .0043321    -0.19   0.850    -.0093076    .0076739 
  h_edu_high |  -.0173369   .0122231    -1.42   0.156    -.0412937    .0066199 
h_edu_medium |  -.0094309   .0105546    -0.89   0.372    -.0301175    .0112558 
   h_retired |   .0086353   .0183023     0.47   0.637    -.0272366    .0445072 
   h_student |   .0059626   .0136434     0.44   0.662     -.020778    .0327032 
h_unemployed |   .0200405   .0125637     1.60   0.111    -.0045839     .044665 
    fall2009 |   .0194469   .0148339     1.31   0.190     -.009627    .0485208 
  spring2010 |   .0455022   .0148934     3.06   0.002     .0163116    .0746928 
    fall2010 |   .0366835   .0195129     1.88   0.060    -.0015611    .0749281 
  spring2011 |    .070366   .0132792     5.30   0.000     .0443393    .0963927 
          EU |   .0068488   .0447708     0.15   0.878    -.0809004     .094598 
        ExYu |   .1235225   .0714798     1.73   0.084    -.0165754    .2636204 
high_lev_dev |    .092668   .0595452     1.56   0.120    -.0240384    .2093744 
 ExpECSagree |   .0476708    .008212     5.80   0.000     .0315755    .0637661 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0154755   .0056995    -2.72   0.007    -.0266464   -.0043047 
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          3  |  -.0356243   .0073911    -4.82   0.000    -.0501106    -.021138 
          4  |  -.1058454   .0058069   -18.23   0.000    -.1172267   -.0944642 
          5  |  -.1439844   .0072317   -19.91   0.000    -.1581583   -.1298105 
          6  |  -.1669578    .006961   -23.98   0.000    -.1806011   -.1533146 
          8  |  -.1042234   .0067058   -15.54   0.000    -.1173666   -.0910802 
             | 
       q1_19 | 
          2  |  -.0018639   .0069847    -0.27   0.790    -.0155536    .0118258 
          3  |  -.0059013   .0088174    -0.67   0.503     -.023183    .0113805 
          4  |  -.0333198   .0100536    -3.31   0.001    -.0530245   -.0136151 
          5  |  -.0497122   .0084817    -5.86   0.000     -.066336   -.0330884 
          6  |  -.0584279   .0095664    -6.11   0.000    -.0771777    -.039678 
          8  |  -.0319833   .0089785    -3.56   0.000    -.0495807   -.0143858 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
Appendix 4.10: Robustness check of the 'credibility' model - large 
database used, 'trust in government' variable excluded (SUR, cluster 
country, weighted)  
 
. *with EU, ExYu and high level of development dummies (without trust in government,  
large) for RC 
.  
biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) (ExpCSagree = i.CBA ExpECSagree i.q1_02 
i.CBA#i.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev) [pweight = weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      59351 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -61243.934                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |   -.233427   .1800014    -1.30   0.195    -.5862232    .1193693 
    ECSagree |   .4320531    .085546     5.05   0.000     .2643861    .5997201 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1078921   .0589575    -1.83   0.067    -.2234466    .0076624 
          3  |  -.5002018   .0646025    -7.74   0.000    -.6268202   -.3735833 
          4  |   -.958737   .0479344   -20.00   0.000    -1.052687   -.8647874 
          5  |  -1.286862   .0955389   -13.47   0.000    -1.474115   -1.099609 
          6  |  -1.556644   .1114523   -13.97   0.000    -1.775086   -1.338201 
          8  |  -1.041216   .1256029    -8.29   0.000    -1.287393   -.7950386 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .3627943   .0763313     4.75   0.000     .2131877     .512401 
        1 3  |   .4085702   .0736776     5.55   0.000     .2641647    .5529757 
        1 4  |   .4962564   .0480115    10.34   0.000     .4021556    .5903571 
        1 5  |   .7760088   .1204914     6.44   0.000       .53985    1.012168 
        1 6  |   .9004714   .1484441     6.07   0.000     .6095263    1.191416 
        1 8  |   .5365258   .1335407     4.02   0.000     .2747908    .7982608 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0080809   .0198026    -0.41   0.683    -.0468932    .0307315 
     h_aged3 |   .0788656   .0348256     2.26   0.024     .0106086    .1471226 
    h_female |  -.0208405   .0200087    -1.04   0.298    -.0600569    .0183758 
  h_edu_high |   .0979967   .0439679     2.23   0.026     .0118213    .1841722 
h_edu_medium |    .053074    .047823     1.11   0.267    -.0406573    .1468054 
   h_retired |  -.0473696   .0643747    -0.74   0.462    -.1735418    .0788025 
   h_student |   .0063973   .0503406     0.13   0.899    -.0922685    .1050631 
h_unemployed |   .0011172   .0417904     0.03   0.979    -.0807905    .0830249 
    fall2009 |  -.0058256   .0666195    -0.09   0.930    -.1363975    .1247463 
  spring2010 |   .0618161   .0901918     0.69   0.493    -.1149566    .2385888 
    fall2010 |    .046943   .0973941     0.48   0.630     -.143946     .237832 
  spring2011 |   .1706283   .0540403     3.16   0.002     .0647112    .2765454 
          EU |  -.2383616   .1467658    -1.62   0.104    -.5260172    .0492941 
        ExYu |   .3204565    .228245     1.40   0.160    -.1268955    .7678084 
high_lev_dev |   .3422049   .2266978     1.51   0.131    -.1021146    .7865244 
       _cons |   .3096416   .1306037     2.37   0.018     .0536631    .5656201 
  400 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |  -.0768688   .1833411    -0.42   0.675    -.4362108    .2824731 
 ExpECSagree |    .388206   .0638945     6.08   0.000     .2629751    .5134369 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0896218   .0484722    -1.85   0.064    -.1846256     .005382 
          3  |  -.4172182   .0628098    -6.64   0.000    -.5403231   -.2941133 
          4  |  -1.009466   .0668675   -15.10   0.000    -1.140524   -.8784078 
          5  |  -1.366978   .0933408   -14.65   0.000    -1.549923   -1.184033 
          6  |   -1.57843   .1190857   -13.25   0.000    -1.811834   -1.345026 
          8  |  -.9684526   .0743707   -13.02   0.000    -1.114217   -.8226887 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.1147599   .0483329    -2.37   0.018    -.2094905   -.0200292 
        1 3  |   .0762192   .0711507     1.07   0.284    -.0632336    .2156721 
        1 4  |    .363546   .0675201     5.38   0.000      .231209     .495883 
        1 5  |   .5397528   .0898176     6.01   0.000     .3637134    .7157921 
        1 6  |   .5820199   .1139507     5.11   0.000     .3586807    .8053591 
        1 8  |   .1319933   .0762785     1.73   0.084    -.0175098    .2814965 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0099821   .0221127    -0.45   0.652    -.0533222     .033358 
     h_aged3 |   .0234953   .0304755     0.77   0.441    -.0362357    .0832262 
    h_female |  -.0016623   .0138031    -0.12   0.904    -.0287158    .0253912 
  h_edu_high |   .0338311   .0389875     0.87   0.386     -.042583    .1102451 
h_edu_medium |    .021965   .0339098     0.65   0.517     -.044497    .0884269 
   h_retired |   .0156953   .0492909     0.32   0.750    -.0809131    .1123037 
   h_student |   .0240534    .041058     0.59   0.558    -.0564188    .1045255 
h_unemployed |    .005228   .0431218     0.12   0.904    -.0792891    .0897451 
  spring2008 |   .0368683    .046909     0.79   0.432    -.0550716    .1288082 
    fall2008 |  -.0200706   .0457279    -0.44   0.661    -.1096956    .0695544 
  spring2009 |  -.0595387   .0584315    -1.02   0.308    -.1740623    .0549848 
    fall2009 |  -.1032323   .0807588    -1.28   0.201    -.2615166    .0550519 
  spring2010 |  -.0234493    .093823    -0.25   0.803    -.2073389    .1604403 
    fall2010 |  -.0283612   .0762899    -0.37   0.710    -.1778866    .1211642 
  spring2011 |    .063669   .0576028     1.11   0.269    -.0492304    .1765683 
          EU |  -.0550611   .1224583    -0.45   0.653    -.2950749    .1849526 
        ExYu |   .2934575   .1765634     1.66   0.097    -.0526005    .6395154 
high_lev_dev |   .2321488   .1901846     1.22   0.222    -.1406062    .6049038 
       _cons |    .179962   .0650637     2.77   0.006     .0524396    .3074845 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |    .789151    .041758    18.90   0.000     .7073068    .8709951 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .6579278   .0236823                      .6089852    .7018794 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  357.142    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      59351 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA ECSagree 2.q1_01 3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 
               h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
               h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
               high_lev_dev ExpECSagree 2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 
               8.q1_02 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1158261    .058883     1.97   0.049     .0004176    .2312346 
    ECSagree |    .070949   .0158509     4.48   0.000     .0398819    .1020161 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0012038   .0030629    -0.39   0.694     -.007207    .0047993 
          3  |   -.035447   .0056694    -6.25   0.000    -.0465588   -.0243352 
          4  |   -.097735   .0051307   -19.05   0.000     -.107791   -.0876791 
          5  |   -.145938   .0109326   -13.35   0.000    -.1673654   -.1245105 
          6  |  -.1913178    .011199   -17.08   0.000    -.2132675   -.1693681 
          8  |  -.1103583   .0180485    -6.11   0.000    -.1457327   -.0749839 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0029207   .0063346    -0.46   0.645    -.0153362    .0094949 
     h_aged3 |   .0167019   .0102486     1.63   0.103     -.003385    .0367889 
    h_female |  -.0036877   .0044684    -0.83   0.409    -.0124457    .0050703 
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  h_edu_high |   .0214937   .0114595     1.88   0.061    -.0009666    .0439539 
h_edu_medium |   .0122223   .0122679     1.00   0.319    -.0118224    .0362669 
   h_retired |  -.0052729   .0182093    -0.29   0.772    -.0409625    .0304167 
   h_student |   .0048907   .0136127     0.36   0.719    -.0217897    .0315711 
h_unemployed |   .0010181   .0130883     0.08   0.938    -.0246345    .0266707 
    fall2009 |  -.0174381   .0233253    -0.75   0.455    -.0631548    .0282786 
  spring2010 |   .0064073   .0275412     0.23   0.816    -.0475726    .0603871 
    fall2010 |   .0031807   .0253181     0.13   0.900    -.0464419    .0528033 
  spring2011 |   .0381845   .0157431     2.43   0.015     .0073287    .0690403 
          EU |  -.0479329   .0405704    -1.18   0.237    -.1274495    .0315836 
        ExYu |    .099475   .0679296     1.46   0.143    -.0336645    .2326145 
high_lev_dev |   .0932582   .0674985     1.38   0.167    -.0390364    .2255529 
 ExpECSagree |   .0619787   .0118367     5.24   0.000     .0387791    .0851783 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0107936   .0030011    -3.60   0.000    -.0166757   -.0049116 
          3  |  -.0407313   .0046169    -8.82   0.000    -.0497802   -.0316825 
          4  |  -.1241875   .0047799   -25.98   0.000    -.1335559   -.1148191 
          5  |  -.1841492   .0086245   -21.35   0.000     -.201053   -.1672455 
          6  |  -.2220869   .0076923   -28.87   0.000    -.2371636   -.2070102 
          8  |  -.1274723   .0074262   -17.17   0.000    -.1420273   -.1129173 
             | 
  spring2008 |   .0058862   .0072946     0.81   0.420    -.0084111    .0201834 
    fall2008 |  -.0032044   .0074125    -0.43   0.666    -.0177326    .0113239 
  spring2009 |  -.0095056   .0097027    -0.98   0.327    -.0285226    .0095114 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_01=(1(1)6)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      59351 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_01           =           1 
2._at        : q1_01           =           2 
3._at        : q1_01           =           3 
4._at        : q1_01           =           4 
5._at        : q1_01           =           5 
6._at        : q1_01           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0491501   .0566289     0.87   0.385    -.0618406    .1601408 
          2  |   .0759284   .0582335     1.30   0.192    -.0382072     .190064 
          3  |   .0810829    .059723     1.36   0.175    -.0359721    .1981378 
          4  |   .0938211   .0603138     1.56   0.120    -.0243917     .212034 
          5  |   .1430518   .0639564     2.24   0.025     .0176996     .268404 
          6  |   .1659611   .0608039     2.73   0.006     .0467877    .2851345 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q1_01 
 
 
 
  
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_02=(1(1)6)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      59351 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_02           =           1 
2._at        : q1_02           =           2 
3._at        : q1_02           =           3 
4._at        : q1_02           =           4 
5._at        : q1_02           =           5 
6._at        : q1_02           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1302628   .0685476     1.90   0.057     -.004088    .2646136 
          2  |   .1066228   .0680581     1.57   0.117    -.0267686    .2400142 
          3  |   .1129218   .0638847     1.77   0.077    -.0122899    .2381334 
          4  |   .1344048   .0592277     2.27   0.023     .0183205     .250489 
          5  |   .1536325    .059116     2.60   0.009     .0377673    .2694977 
          6  |   .1474792   .0572294     2.58   0.010     .0353117    .2596468 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q1_02 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.11: Robustness check of the 'credibility' model - without 
interaction terms (SUR, cluster country, weighted) 
 
 
. biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) (ExpCSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev), vce(cluster country) 
nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -40155.883                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |   .5810782   .2966142     1.96   0.050     -.000275    1.162431 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1014259    .048027    -2.11   0.035    -.1955572   -.0072947 
          3  |  -.2974056   .0634192    -4.69   0.000     -.421705   -.1731062 
          4  |    -.38625   .0800663    -4.82   0.000    -.5431771    -.229323 
          5  |  -.4659293   .0775338    -6.01   0.000    -.6178928   -.3139658 
          8  |  -.4734433    .123933    -3.82   0.000    -.7163474   -.2305391 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .4328878   .0779761     5.55   0.000     .2800574    .5857181 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1060001    .112736    -0.94   0.347    -.3269585    .1149583 
          3  |  -.4381821   .1343578    -3.26   0.001    -.7015185   -.1748457 
          4  |  -.8276483   .1376125    -6.01   0.000    -1.097364   -.5579327 
          5  |  -1.016382   .1711175    -5.94   0.000    -1.351766   -.6809979 
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          6  |   -1.21188   .1899976    -6.38   0.000    -1.584269   -.8394916 
          8  |  -.9577482   .1614891    -5.93   0.000    -1.274261   -.6412354 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0223149   .0227994    -0.98   0.328    -.0670009     .022371 
     h_aged3 |   .0783686   .0414674     1.89   0.059    -.0029061    .1596432 
    h_female |  -.0170187   .0177338    -0.96   0.337    -.0517764    .0177389 
  h_edu_high |   .1046694   .0273524     3.83   0.000     .0510597    .1582791 
h_edu_medium |   .0546857     .04758     1.15   0.250    -.0385693    .1479407 
   h_retired |  -.0454352   .0771655    -0.59   0.556    -.1966769    .1058065 
   h_student |   -.020257   .0584551    -0.35   0.729    -.1348269     .094313 
h_unemployed |    .026416   .0487838     0.54   0.588    -.0691984    .1220304 
    fall2009 |    .135474    .052979     2.56   0.011     .0316371    .2393109 
  spring2010 |   .2010474   .0407316     4.94   0.000     .1212149      .28088 
    fall2010 |   .1811827   .0623248     2.91   0.004     .0590284     .303337 
  spring2011 |   .3159137   .0471404     6.70   0.000     .2235201    .4083072 
          EU |  -.2086655   .2198718    -0.95   0.343    -.6396062    .2222752 
        ExYu |   .3261262   .3290084     0.99   0.322    -.3187185    .9709708 
high_lev_dev |   .3668119   .2887109     1.27   0.204    -.1990511     .932675 
       _cons |   .2091467   .1881776     1.11   0.266    -.1596746    .5779681 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |    .318545   .2111277     1.51   0.131    -.0952578    .7323478 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .0077234   .0831705     0.09   0.926    -.1552878    .1707346 
          3  |  -.1644375   .1182068    -1.39   0.164    -.3961186    .0672436 
          4  |  -.3214661   .1207217    -2.66   0.008    -.5580763   -.0848559 
          5  |  -.3971312   .1126536    -3.53   0.000    -.6179282   -.1763341 
          8  |  -.4244463   .1167749    -3.63   0.000    -.6533209   -.1955717 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .3872394   .0528444     7.33   0.000     .2836663    .4908124 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1421531   .0759185    -1.87   0.061    -.2909506    .0066445 
          3  |  -.3897677   .0929852    -4.19   0.000    -.5720154   -.2075201 
          4  |  -.8840174   .1058864    -8.35   0.000    -1.091551   -.6764838 
          5  |  -1.147444   .1184876    -9.68   0.000    -1.379676   -.9152128 
          6  |  -1.265612   .1353419    -9.35   0.000    -1.530877   -1.000346 
          8  |  -.8382113   .0843294    -9.94   0.000    -1.003494   -.6729286 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0179263   .0288725    -0.62   0.535    -.0745154    .0386628 
     h_aged3 |  -.0157462    .020715    -0.76   0.447    -.0563468    .0248544 
    h_female |   .0052842     .01586     0.33   0.739    -.0258007    .0363692 
  h_edu_high |   .0117289   .0340927     0.34   0.731    -.0550916    .0785493 
h_edu_medium |  -.0038999    .037451    -0.10   0.917    -.0773025    .0695027 
   h_retired |   .0481634   .0568273     0.85   0.397     -.063216    .1595427 
   h_student |   .0219004   .0458252     0.48   0.633    -.0679153    .1117161 
h_unemployed |   .0345444   .0455857     0.76   0.449     -.054802    .1238907 
    fall2009 |  -.0130392   .0565659    -0.23   0.818    -.1239063    .0978279 
  spring2010 |   .0803135   .0559465     1.44   0.151    -.0293397    .1899667 
    fall2010 |   .0739506   .0751146     0.98   0.325    -.0732714    .2211726 
  spring2011 |   .1848963   .0529332     3.49   0.000     .0811492    .2886435 
          EU |  -.0031559   .1577746    -0.02   0.984    -.3123885    .3060768 
        ExYu |   .3123837   .2326063     1.34   0.179    -.1435163    .7682838 
high_lev_dev |   .2533578   .1981033     1.28   0.201    -.1349176    .6416332 
       _cons |   .1418263   .1185628     1.20   0.232    -.0905525    .3742051 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .7974462   .0424975    18.76   0.000     .7141527    .8807397 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .6626066   .0238391                      .6132743    .7067897 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  352.109    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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. margins, dydx(_all) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 2.q1_01 
3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev ExpECSagree 2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1491437   .0788116     1.89   0.058    -.0053241    .3036116 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0165824   .0218182    -0.76   0.447    -.0593453    .0261805 
          3  |  -.0801592   .0311994    -2.57   0.010    -.1413088   -.0190095 
          4  |  -.1192682   .0346891    -3.44   0.001    -.1872575   -.0512788 
          5  |  -.1426846   .0337709    -4.23   0.000    -.2088743    -.076495 
          8  |  -.1477931   .0359383    -4.11   0.000    -.2182309   -.0773553 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .0698977    .014197     4.92   0.000     .0420722    .0977232 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0073181   .0076585    -0.96   0.339    -.0223284    .0076923 
          3  |  -.0387823    .010947    -3.54   0.000    -.0602381   -.0173266 
          4  |  -.0926764   .0124332    -7.45   0.000    -.1170449   -.0683078 
          5  |  -.1243174   .0177841    -6.99   0.000    -.1591736   -.0894612 
          6  |   -.159436   .0197163    -8.09   0.000    -.1980791   -.1207928 
          8  |  -.1141897    .018652    -6.12   0.000    -.1507469   -.0776325 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0064005   .0073065    -0.88   0.381     -.020721      .00792 
     h_aged3 |   .0101969   .0094029     1.08   0.278    -.0082324    .0286262 
    h_female |  -.0019234   .0042607    -0.45   0.652    -.0102743    .0064275 
  h_edu_high |   .0187311   .0081113     2.31   0.021     .0028332    .0346289 
h_edu_medium |   .0082214   .0131599     0.62   0.532    -.0175715    .0340144 
   h_retired |   .0001794   .0208253     0.01   0.993    -.0406374    .0409963 
   h_student |   .0001466   .0158178     0.01   0.993    -.0308557     .031149 
h_unemployed |   .0096559   .0143279     0.67   0.500    -.0184262    .0377381 
    fall2009 |     .01984   .0152906     1.30   0.194    -.0101289     .049809 
  spring2010 |   .0449955   .0146147     3.08   0.002     .0163513    .0736398 
    fall2010 |   .0407951   .0215588     1.89   0.058    -.0014594    .0830496 
  spring2011 |   .0798627   .0143845     5.55   0.000     .0516696    .1080558 
          EU |  -.0341854   .0572126    -0.60   0.550    -.1463201    .0779494 
        ExYu |   .1014058    .092881     1.09   0.275    -.0806375    .2834491 
high_lev_dev |   .0987644   .0746536     1.32   0.186    -.0475539    .2450827 
 ExpECSagree |   .0604278    .010299     5.87   0.000     .0402421    .0806134 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0120289   .0060627    -1.98   0.047    -.0239115   -.0001463 
          3  |   -.039362   .0081456    -4.83   0.000     -.055327    -.023397 
          4  |  -.1169309    .009591   -12.19   0.000    -.1357288    -.098133 
          5  |  -.1663759    .013587   -12.25   0.000     -.193006   -.1397458 
          6  |  -.1889501   .0142768   -13.23   0.000    -.2169322    -.160968 
          8  |  -.1087024   .0064556   -16.84   0.000    -.1213553   -.0960496 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. biprobit (CSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev) (ExpCSagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev), vce(cluster country) 
nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -40155.883                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  406 
CSagree      | 
       1.CBA |   .5810782   .2966142     1.96   0.050     -.000275    1.162431 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1014259    .048027    -2.11   0.035    -.1955572   -.0072947 
          3  |  -.2974056   .0634192    -4.69   0.000     -.421705   -.1731062 
          4  |    -.38625   .0800663    -4.82   0.000    -.5431771    -.229323 
          5  |  -.4659293   .0775338    -6.01   0.000    -.6178928   -.3139658 
          8  |  -.4734433    .123933    -3.82   0.000    -.7163474   -.2305391 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .4328878   .0779761     5.55   0.000     .2800574    .5857181 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1060001    .112736    -0.94   0.347    -.3269585    .1149583 
          3  |  -.4381821   .1343578    -3.26   0.001    -.7015185   -.1748457 
          4  |  -.8276483   .1376125    -6.01   0.000    -1.097364   -.5579327 
          5  |  -1.016382   .1711175    -5.94   0.000    -1.351766   -.6809979 
          6  |   -1.21188   .1899976    -6.38   0.000    -1.584269   -.8394916 
          8  |  -.9577482   .1614891    -5.93   0.000    -1.274261   -.6412354 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0223149   .0227994    -0.98   0.328    -.0670009     .022371 
     h_aged3 |   .0783686   .0414674     1.89   0.059    -.0029061    .1596432 
    h_female |  -.0170187   .0177338    -0.96   0.337    -.0517764    .0177389 
  h_edu_high |   .1046694   .0273524     3.83   0.000     .0510597    .1582791 
h_edu_medium |   .0546857     .04758     1.15   0.250    -.0385693    .1479407 
   h_retired |  -.0454352   .0771655    -0.59   0.556    -.1966769    .1058065 
   h_student |   -.020257   .0584551    -0.35   0.729    -.1348269     .094313 
h_unemployed |    .026416   .0487838     0.54   0.588    -.0691984    .1220304 
    fall2009 |    .135474    .052979     2.56   0.011     .0316371    .2393109 
  spring2010 |   .2010474   .0407316     4.94   0.000     .1212149      .28088 
    fall2010 |   .1811827   .0623248     2.91   0.004     .0590284     .303337 
  spring2011 |   .3159137   .0471404     6.70   0.000     .2235201    .4083072 
          EU |  -.2086655   .2198718    -0.95   0.343    -.6396062    .2222752 
        ExYu |   .3261262   .3290084     0.99   0.322    -.3187185    .9709708 
high_lev_dev |   .3668119   .2887109     1.27   0.204    -.1990511     .932675 
       _cons |   .2091467   .1881776     1.11   0.266    -.1596746    .5779681 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpCSagree   | 
       1.CBA |    .318545   .2111277     1.51   0.131    -.0952578    .7323478 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .0077234   .0831705     0.09   0.926    -.1552878    .1707346 
          3  |  -.1644375   .1182068    -1.39   0.164    -.3961186    .0672436 
          4  |  -.3214661   .1207217    -2.66   0.008    -.5580763   -.0848559 
          5  |  -.3971312   .1126536    -3.53   0.000    -.6179282   -.1763341 
          8  |  -.4244463   .1167749    -3.63   0.000    -.6533209   -.1955717 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .3872394   .0528444     7.33   0.000     .2836663    .4908124 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1421531   .0759185    -1.87   0.061    -.2909506    .0066445 
          3  |  -.3897677   .0929852    -4.19   0.000    -.5720154   -.2075201 
          4  |  -.8840174   .1058864    -8.35   0.000    -1.091551   -.6764838 
          5  |  -1.147444   .1184876    -9.68   0.000    -1.379676   -.9152128 
          6  |  -1.265612   .1353419    -9.35   0.000    -1.530877   -1.000346 
          8  |  -.8382113   .0843294    -9.94   0.000    -1.003494   -.6729286 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0179263   .0288725    -0.62   0.535    -.0745154    .0386628 
     h_aged3 |  -.0157462    .020715    -0.76   0.447    -.0563468    .0248544 
    h_female |   .0052842     .01586     0.33   0.739    -.0258007    .0363692 
  h_edu_high |   .0117289   .0340927     0.34   0.731    -.0550916    .0785493 
h_edu_medium |  -.0038999    .037451    -0.10   0.917    -.0773025    .0695027 
   h_retired |   .0481634   .0568273     0.85   0.397     -.063216    .1595427 
   h_student |   .0219004   .0458252     0.48   0.633    -.0679153    .1117161 
h_unemployed |   .0345444   .0455857     0.76   0.449     -.054802    .1238907 
    fall2009 |  -.0130392   .0565659    -0.23   0.818    -.1239063    .0978279 
  spring2010 |   .0803135   .0559465     1.44   0.151    -.0293397    .1899667 
    fall2010 |   .0739506   .0751146     0.98   0.325    -.0732714    .2211726 
  spring2011 |   .1848963   .0529332     3.49   0.000     .0811492    .2886435 
          EU |  -.0031559   .1577746    -0.02   0.984    -.3123885    .3060768 
        ExYu |   .3123837   .2326063     1.34   0.179    -.1435163    .7682838 
high_lev_dev |   .2533578   .1981033     1.28   0.201    -.1349176    .6416332 
       _cons |   .1418263   .1185628     1.20   0.232    -.0905525    .3742051 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .7974462   .0424975    18.76   0.000     .7141527    .8807397 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .6626066   .0238391                      .6132743    .7067897 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  352.109    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1609884   .0847595     1.90   0.058    -.0051371     .327114 
          2  |    .164161   .0870399     1.89   0.059    -.0064341     .334756 
          3  |     .15659   .0824615     1.90   0.058    -.0050315    .3182114 
          4  |   .1462201   .0772743     1.89   0.058    -.0052347    .2976749 
          5  |   .1406441   .0748457     1.88   0.060    -.0060508     .287339 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q22f_1 
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margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_01=(1(1)6))  vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_01           =           1 
2._at        : q1_01           =           2 
3._at        : q1_01           =           3 
4._at        : q1_01           =           4 
5._at        : q1_01           =           5 
6._at        : q1_01           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1264474   .0743987     1.70   0.089    -.0193714    .2722663 
          2  |    .129842   .0758749     1.71   0.087      -.01887     .278554 
          3  |   .1415261   .0788985     1.79   0.073    -.0131121    .2961642 
          4  |   .1528243   .0822808     1.86   0.063    -.0084431    .3140918 
          5  |   .1550119    .082111     1.89   0.059    -.0059227    .3159465 
          6  |   .1537582   .0799889     1.92   0.055    -.0030171    .3105335 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
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. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_02=(1(1)6)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree=1,ExpCSagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_02           =           1 
2._at        : q1_02           =           2 
3._at        : q1_02           =           3 
4._at        : q1_02           =           4 
5._at        : q1_02           =           5 
6._at        : q1_02           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1917005   .0966689     1.98   0.047     .0022331     .381168 
          2  |   .1875424   .0956547     1.96   0.050     .0000626    .3750222 
          3  |   .1777346   .0930609     1.91   0.056    -.0046615    .3601307 
          4  |   .1475787   .0804927     1.83   0.067    -.0101842    .3053415 
          5  |    .126577   .0694274     1.82   0.068    -.0094982    .2626521 
          6  |   .1164759    .064521     1.81   0.071    -.0099829    .2429346 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q1_02 
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Appendix 4.12: Single equation (probit) – current local currency 
stability 
 
. corr CSagree CBA ECSagree q1_01 q22f_1 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemplo 
> yed EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
(obs=37908) 
 
             |  CSagree      CBA ECSagree    q1_01   q22f_1  h_aged2  h_aged3 h_female h_edu_~h h_edu_~m h_reti~d 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     CSagree |   1.0000 
         CBA |   0.1105   1.0000 
    ECSagree |   0.1855   0.0198   1.0000 
       q1_01 |  -0.2840   0.1280  -0.0697   1.0000 
      q22f_1 |  -0.1696   0.0054  -0.0848   0.2896   1.0000 
     h_aged2 |  -0.0189  -0.0208   0.0087  -0.0007   0.0040   1.0000 
     h_aged3 |   0.0073   0.0210  -0.0109   0.0473   0.0019  -0.4995   1.0000 
    h_female |   0.0011   0.0062   0.0011   0.0012  -0.0053  -0.0011  -0.0129   1.0000 
  h_edu_high |   0.0092  -0.0174   0.0199  -0.0384  -0.0453   0.0152  -0.0731   0.0293   1.0000 
h_edu_medium |   0.0059   0.0250  -0.0245   0.0061   0.0188   0.0546  -0.1319  -0.0750  -0.6629   1.0000 
   h_retired |  -0.0082   0.0108  -0.0079   0.0598   0.0100  -0.3023   0.6739  -0.0020  -0.0845  -0.1000   1.0000 
   h_student |   0.0088   0.0152   0.0050  -0.0217  -0.0002  -0.1994  -0.1494   0.0209  -0.0754   0.1150  -0.1156 
h_unemployed |   0.0095   0.0468   0.0162   0.0386   0.0419   0.0343  -0.1012   0.1713  -0.1042  -0.0506  -0.2224 
          EU |  -0.1312  -0.0417  -0.0735   0.0175   0.0192  -0.0074   0.0344  -0.0153   0.0511   0.0324   0.0324 
        ExYu |   0.1505   0.1502   0.0534   0.0718   0.0499  -0.0017   0.0123   0.0260  -0.0690   0.0013   0.0209 
high_lev_dev |  -0.0080  -0.4117  -0.0737  -0.0586   0.0224  -0.0092   0.0010   0.0057  -0.0600   0.1177   0.0157 
 
             | h_stud~t h_unem~d       EU     ExYu high_l~v 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
   h_student |   1.0000 
h_unemployed |  -0.1177   1.0000 
          EU |  -0.0525  -0.1631   1.0000 
        ExYu |   0.0295   0.1521  -0.8082   1.0000 
high_lev_dev |  -0.0234  -0.1538   0.4386  -0.2692   1.0000 
 
 
*M1_CURRENT TRUST IN CURRENCY - THE PREFERRED ONE* *Economic stability categorical 
(q1_01), trust in government categorical (q22f_1) and interaction term between CBA 
and trust in government (q22f_1) and CBA and economic situation (q1_01) 
 
probit CSagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 h_aged2 
h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev, vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -22074.947                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1443 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     CSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   -.029189   .2226439    -0.13   0.896    -.4655631    .4071851 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1282029   .0481531    -2.66   0.008    -.2225812   -.0338246 
          3  |   -.311946   .0623595    -5.00   0.000    -.4341684   -.1897236 
          4  |  -.3618011   .0874521    -4.14   0.000    -.5332041    -.190398 
          5  |  -.4299958   .0841366    -5.11   0.000    -.5949004   -.2650911 
          8  |  -.4057534   .1437849    -2.82   0.005    -.6875666   -.1239401 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1504067   .0608127     2.47   0.013     .0312161    .2695974 
        1 3  |   .1810903   .0827737     2.19   0.029     .0188569    .3433238 
        1 4  |   .0855859   .1106515     0.77   0.439    -.1312871    .3024588 
        1 5  |   .1879454   .0957741     1.96   0.050     .0002317    .3756592 
        1 8  |  -.2774232   .1701502    -1.63   0.103    -.6109115     .056065 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .5045747   .0901914     5.59   0.000     .3278028    .6813466 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1117364   .1905517    -0.59   0.558    -.4852109     .261738 
          3  |  -.5171765   .2059594    -2.51   0.012    -.9208494   -.1135035 
          4  |  -1.056452   .2060814    -5.13   0.000    -1.460364   -.6525396 
          5  |  -1.364869   .2231044    -6.12   0.000    -1.802145   -.9275922 
          6  |  -1.649039   .2387555    -6.91   0.000    -2.116992   -1.181087 
          8  |   -1.16044    .201318    -5.76   0.000    -1.555016   -.7658641 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .0481576   .2411238     0.20   0.842    -.4244363    .5207516 
        1 3  |   .0373316   .2142662     0.17   0.862    -.3826224    .4572856 
        1 4  |   .1757396   .2451951     0.72   0.474     -.304834    .6563133 
        1 5  |   .5106219   .2172543     2.35   0.019     .0848113    .9364325 
        1 6  |   .6406004   .2287144     2.80   0.005     .1923285    1.088872 
        1 8  |   .4902546   .1761266     2.78   0.005     .1450528    .8354564 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0202112   .0216617    -0.93   0.351    -.0626674     .022245 
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     h_aged3 |   .0820872   .0409051     2.01   0.045     .0019147    .1622596 
    h_female |  -.0167926    .018488    -0.91   0.364    -.0530285    .0194432 
  h_edu_high |   .0984094   .0280624     3.51   0.000     .0434081    .1534107 
h_edu_medium |   .0539457   .0455222     1.19   0.236    -.0352763    .1431676 
   h_retired |  -.0337515   .0761095    -0.44   0.657    -.1829235    .1154204 
   h_student |  -.0182633   .0566751    -0.32   0.747    -.1293444    .0928179 
h_unemployed |   .0306591   .0457436     0.67   0.503    -.0589968     .120315 
    fall2009 |   .1428201   .0492621     2.90   0.004     .0462682     .239372 
  spring2010 |   .2272601    .039999     5.68   0.000     .1488634    .3056568 
    fall2010 |   .2076606   .0627258     3.31   0.001     .0847202     .330601 
  spring2011 |   .3403735   .0471722     7.22   0.000     .2479176    .4328294 
          EU |  -.1576765   .2152139    -0.73   0.464    -.5794881     .264135 
        ExYu |   .3988741   .3158449     1.26   0.207    -.2201705    1.017919 
high_lev_dev |   .3646598     .28312     1.29   0.198    -.1902452    .9195648 
       _cons |   .3816653    .236535     1.61   0.107    -.0819347    .8452654 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 
2.q1_01 3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1880203   .0992009     1.90   0.058    -.0064098    .3824505 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0335663   .0127623    -2.63   0.009    -.0585799   -.0085528 
          3  |  -.0940362   .0171927    -5.47   0.000    -.1277334   -.0603391 
          4  |   -.117794   .0248829    -4.73   0.000    -.1665637   -.0690244 
          5  |  -.1327767   .0247672    -5.36   0.000    -.1813196   -.0842338 
          8  |  -.1582803   .0389023    -4.07   0.000    -.2345273   -.0820333 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .1671239   .0315551     5.30   0.000     .1052771    .2289707 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |    -.02704   .0407013    -0.66   0.506    -.1068131     .052733 
          3  |  -.1537363   .0482831    -3.18   0.001    -.2483694   -.0591032 
          4  |  -.3391219   .0524234    -6.47   0.000    -.4418698    -.236374 
          5  |  -.4250364   .0576765    -7.37   0.000    -.5380802   -.3119927 
          6  |  -.5092652    .058658    -8.68   0.000    -.6242327   -.3942978 
          8  |  -.3539073   .0543414    -6.51   0.000    -.4604144   -.2474001 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0066943   .0071212    -0.94   0.347    -.0206516     .007263 
     h_aged3 |   .0271887   .0138212     1.97   0.049     .0000996    .0542778 
    h_female |   -.005562   .0062372    -0.89   0.373    -.0177867    .0066627 
  h_edu_high |   .0325949   .0092229     3.53   0.000     .0145183    .0506715 
h_edu_medium |   .0178677   .0149131     1.20   0.231    -.0113613    .0470968 
   h_retired |  -.0111791    .025198    -0.44   0.657    -.0605662     .038208 
   h_student |  -.0060491   .0186541    -0.32   0.746    -.0426105    .0305123 
h_unemployed |   .0101548   .0152604     0.67   0.506    -.0197551    .0400647 
    fall2009 |   .0473045   .0152469     3.10   0.002     .0174212    .0771878 
  spring2010 |   .0752725   .0143602     5.24   0.000      .047127    .1034179 
    fall2010 |   .0687808   .0223132     3.08   0.002     .0250478    .1125138 
  spring2011 |   .1127376   .0149454     7.54   0.000     .0834452      .14203 
          EU |  -.0522252   .0697538    -0.75   0.454    -.1889402    .0844898 
        ExYu |    .132114   .1071439     1.23   0.218    -.0778842    .3421122 
high_lev_dev |   .1207816   .0929895     1.30   0.194    -.0614744    .3030377 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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probit CSagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 h_aged2 
h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 spring2011  EU ExYu high_lev_dev [pweight = weight], vce(cluster 
country) nolog  
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -21358.765                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1468 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     CSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.1549252   .2238764    -0.69   0.489    -.5937149    .2838645 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1374525   .0501256    -2.74   0.006    -.2356969   -.0392081 
          3  |  -.3186284   .0627138    -5.08   0.000    -.4415451   -.1957117 
          4  |  -.3735852    .089175    -4.19   0.000     -.548365   -.1988054 
          5  |  -.4413636   .0817853    -5.40   0.000    -.6016599   -.2810674 
          8  |  -.4556819   .1538696    -2.96   0.003    -.7572607   -.1541031 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2029156   .0648582     3.13   0.002     .0757958    .3300354 
        1 3  |   .2218257   .0761423     2.91   0.004     .0725896    .3710619 
        1 4  |   .1286026   .1215051     1.06   0.290    -.1095429    .3667482 
        1 5  |   .2237129   .0949672     2.36   0.018     .0375805    .4098453 
        1 8  |  -.1634062   .1621422    -1.01   0.314    -.4811991    .1543867 
             | 
    ECSagree |    .513579   .0968108     5.30   0.000     .3238334    .7033247 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1492664   .1979602    -0.75   0.451    -.5372613    .2387285 
          3  |  -.5564697   .2243904    -2.48   0.013    -.9962668   -.1166726 
          4  |   -1.10353   .2165589    -5.10   0.000    -1.527978   -.6790822 
          5  |  -1.428688    .233431    -6.12   0.000    -1.886205   -.9711719 
          6  |  -1.712855   .2447577    -7.00   0.000    -2.192571   -1.233138 
          8  |  -1.205771   .2177294    -5.54   0.000    -1.632512   -.7790289 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .1859653   .2299033     0.81   0.419     -.264637    .6365675 
        1 3  |   .1130733   .2266621     0.50   0.618    -.3311764    .5573229 
        1 4  |   .2827245   .2457835     1.15   0.250    -.1990022    .7644512 
        1 5  |   .6238711   .2242118     2.78   0.005     .1844241    1.063318 
        1 6  |   .7519809   .2346028     3.21   0.001     .2921679    1.211794 
        1 8  |   .5162529   .1952453     2.64   0.008     .1335791    .8989267 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0201449   .0190736    -1.06   0.291    -.0575284    .0172387 
     h_aged3 |   .0613338   .0392375     1.56   0.118    -.0155704    .1382379 
    h_female |  -.0193449   .0242683    -0.80   0.425      -.06691    .0282202 
  h_edu_high |   .0679674   .0439154     1.55   0.122    -.0181051      .15404 
h_edu_medium |   .0254547    .045739     0.56   0.578    -.0641921    .1151014 
   h_retired |  -.0450521   .0740708    -0.61   0.543    -.1902283     .100124 
   h_student |  -.0182735    .059132    -0.31   0.757    -.1341701     .097623 
h_unemployed |   .0302375   .0443967     0.68   0.496    -.0567785    .1172534 
    fall2009 |    .137505    .044277     3.11   0.002     .0507236    .2242864 
  spring2010 |   .2270351   .0415935     5.46   0.000     .1455134    .3085569 
    fall2010 |   .2107766    .063927     3.30   0.001      .085482    .3360712 
  spring2011 |   .3500843   .0473277     7.40   0.000     .2573238    .4428448 
          EU |  -.1336745   .2053409    -0.65   0.515    -.5361352    .2687862 
        ExYu |   .3947326   .3078145     1.28   0.200    -.2085727    .9980379 
high_lev_dev |   .3597711   .2744093     1.31   0.190    -.1780613    .8976035 
       _cons |   .4486314   .2499914     1.79   0.073    -.0413428    .9386056 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  413 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 
2.q1_01 3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1953283   .0952595     2.05   0.040     .0086231    .3820335 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0326332   .0137356    -2.38   0.018    -.0595545   -.0057119 
          3  |  -.0927603   .0173619    -5.34   0.000    -.1267889   -.0587316 
          4  |  -.1180528   .0258731    -4.56   0.000    -.1687632   -.0673425 
          5  |  -.1331311   .0243608    -5.46   0.000    -.1808773   -.0853849 
          8  |  -.1661108   .0411314    -4.04   0.000    -.2467269   -.0854947 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .1689539   .0335721     5.03   0.000     .1031538    .2347539 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0294531   .0412567    -0.71   0.475    -.1103148    .0514085 
          3  |   -.160738   .0516371    -3.11   0.002    -.2619448   -.0595312 
          4  |  -.3470822   .0532034    -6.52   0.000     -.451359   -.2428055 
          5  |  -.4377729   .0586873    -7.46   0.000    -.5527979   -.3227478 
          6  |  -.5209674   .0585076    -8.90   0.000    -.6356401   -.4062947 
          8  |  -.3668721   .0560861    -6.54   0.000    -.4767988   -.2569454 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0066271   .0062471    -1.06   0.289    -.0188712    .0056169 
     h_aged3 |   .0201772   .0131159     1.54   0.124    -.0055295    .0458839 
    h_female |   -.006364   .0080597    -0.79   0.430    -.0221606    .0094327 
  h_edu_high |   .0223595   .0145535     1.54   0.124    -.0061648    .0508838 
h_edu_medium |   .0083739   .0150778     0.56   0.579     -.021178    .0379258 
   h_retired |   -.014821   .0243736    -0.61   0.543    -.0625924    .0329504 
   h_student |  -.0060115   .0193483    -0.31   0.756    -.0439335    .0319105 
h_unemployed |   .0099473   .0146676     0.68   0.498    -.0188006    .0386953 
    fall2009 |   .0452355   .0136263     3.32   0.001     .0185285    .0719425 
  spring2010 |   .0746885   .0149572     4.99   0.000     .0453729    .1040042 
    fall2010 |   .0693399   .0227677     3.05   0.002     .0247161    .1139637 
  spring2011 |   .1151684   .0147718     7.80   0.000     .0862163    .1441206 
          EU |  -.0439754   .0661616    -0.66   0.506    -.1736498    .0856991 
        ExYu |   .1298565   .1040476     1.25   0.212     -.074073    .3337861 
high_lev_dev |   .1183551   .0893599     1.32   0.185     -.056787    .2934973 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
margins, dydx(CBA) at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1396641   .0986849     1.42   0.157    -.0537547     .333083 
          2  |   .2091796   .0993151     2.11   0.035     .0145256    .4038336 
          3  |   .2119059   .1031865     2.05   0.040     .0096641    .4141478 
          4  |   .1758496   .0931481     1.89   0.059    -.0067173    .3584164 
          5  |   .2069597    .094257     2.20   0.028     .0222194    .3916999 
  414 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q22f_1 
 
.  
 
 
 
margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_01=(1(1)6)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_01           =           1 
2._at        : q1_01           =           2 
3._at        : q1_01           =           3 
4._at        : q1_01           =           4 
5._at        : q1_01           =           5 
6._at        : q1_01           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0069966   .0575771     0.12   0.903    -.1058524    .1198457 
          2  |   .0558144   .0773627     0.72   0.471    -.0958137    .2074424 
          3  |   .0477077   .0943451     0.51   0.613    -.1372054    .2326207 
          4  |   .1148095   .1243431     0.92   0.356    -.1288986    .3585176 
          5  |   .2358295   .1075709     2.19   0.028     .0249944    .4466646 
          6  |   .2670472   .0931739     2.87   0.004     .0844297    .4496647 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q1_01 
 
 
 
 
 
**MARGINS for subsamples 
. margins if CBA==0, at(CBA=(0 1))  
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =      30237 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |    .384031   .0436782     8.79   0.000     .2984233    .4696386 
          2  |    .575028   .0739696     7.77   0.000     .4300502    .7200058 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins if CBA==1, at(CBA=(0 1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =       7671 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
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          1  |   .3157015   .0832828     3.79   0.000     .1524702    .4789329 
          2  |   .5278074   .0247801    21.30   0.000     .4792392    .5763755 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, over(CBA) at(CBA=(0 1)) contrast (atcontrast(r._at) wald) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
over         : CBA 
1._at        : 0.CBA 
                   CBA             =           0 
               1.CBA 
                   CBA             =           0 
2._at        : 0.CBA 
                   CBA             =           1 
               1.CBA 
                   CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
             |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------+---------------------------------- 
     _at@CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) 0  |          1        3.84     0.0501 
 (2 vs 1) 1  |          1        5.97     0.0146 
      Joint  |          2       36.96     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |            Delta-method 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------ 
     _at@CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) 0  |    .190997   .0975025     -.0001043    .3820984 
 (2 vs 1) 1  |   .2121058   .0868286      .0419248    .3822868 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
. *with region 
 
. probit CSagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011  EU ExYu high_lev_dev, vce(cluster h_region) 
nolog  
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(39)   =    2215.54 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -22074.947                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1443 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     CSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   -.029189   .2616856    -0.11   0.911    -.5420834    .4837054 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1282029   .0564748    -2.27   0.023    -.2388914   -.0175144 
          3  |   -.311946   .0624466    -5.00   0.000     -.434339    -.189553 
          4  |  -.3618011   .0640353    -5.65   0.000    -.4873079   -.2362943 
          5  |  -.4299958   .0570661    -7.54   0.000    -.5418433   -.3181482 
          8  |  -.4057534   .1187808    -3.42   0.001    -.6385594   -.1729473 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1504067   .1189376     1.26   0.206    -.0827067    .3835201 
        1 3  |   .1810903     .10683     1.70   0.090    -.0282927    .3904733 
        1 4  |   .0855859   .1433054     0.60   0.550    -.1952876    .3664593 
        1 5  |   .1879454   .1172743     1.60   0.109    -.0419079    .4177988 
        1 8  |  -.2774232   .2544089    -1.09   0.276    -.7760556    .2212091 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .5045747   .0506806     9.96   0.000     .4052425    .6039069 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1117364   .1676215    -0.67   0.505    -.4402686    .2167957 
          3  |  -.5171765   .1432808    -3.61   0.000    -.7980017   -.2363512 
  417 
          4  |  -1.056452   .1236777    -8.54   0.000    -1.298856   -.8140478 
          5  |  -1.364869   .1359311   -10.04   0.000    -1.631289   -1.098449 
          6  |  -1.649039   .1427339   -11.55   0.000    -1.928793   -1.369286 
          8  |   -1.16044   .1712577    -6.78   0.000    -1.496099   -.8247812 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .0481576    .340988     0.14   0.888    -.6201666    .7164819 
        1 3  |   .0373316   .2994998     0.12   0.901    -.5496772    .6243404 
        1 4  |   .1757396   .3114379     0.56   0.573    -.4346674    .7861467 
        1 5  |   .5106219   .2676952     1.91   0.056     -.014051    1.035295 
        1 6  |   .6406004   .2457431     2.61   0.009     .1589528    1.122248 
        1 8  |   .4902546   .3185458     1.54   0.124    -.1340837    1.114593 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0202112   .0234286    -0.86   0.388    -.0661304     .025708 
     h_aged3 |   .0820872   .0356232     2.30   0.021     .0122669    .1519074 
    h_female |  -.0167926   .0143498    -1.17   0.242    -.0449177    .0113324 
  h_edu_high |   .0984094   .0512158     1.92   0.055    -.0019718    .1987906 
h_edu_medium |   .0539457    .036625     1.47   0.141     -.017838    .1257293 
   h_retired |  -.0337515   .0390706    -0.86   0.388    -.1103285    .0428255 
   h_student |  -.0182633   .0424692    -0.43   0.667    -.1015014    .0649749 
h_unemployed |   .0306591   .0304147     1.01   0.313    -.0289525    .0902708 
    fall2009 |   .1428201   .0490135     2.91   0.004     .0467554    .2388848 
  spring2010 |   .2272601   .0363323     6.26   0.000     .1560502      .29847 
    fall2010 |   .2076606   .0490078     4.24   0.000     .1116071     .303714 
  spring2011 |   .3403735   .0465997     7.30   0.000     .2490398    .4317072 
          EU |  -.1576765   .1356021    -1.16   0.245    -.4234517    .1080986 
        ExYu |   .3988741   .1780145     2.24   0.025     .0499721    .7477761 
high_lev_dev |   .3646598   .1384615     2.63   0.008     .0932803    .6360393 
       _cons |   .3816653   .1808085     2.11   0.035     .0272872    .7360435 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 
2.q1_01 3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1880203   .0530767     3.54   0.000     .0839919    .2920487 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0335663   .0171483    -1.96   0.050    -.0671764    .0000437 
          3  |  -.0940362   .0178741    -5.26   0.000    -.1290688   -.0590037 
          4  |   -.117794   .0198351    -5.94   0.000    -.1566702   -.0789179 
          5  |  -.1327767   .0171696    -7.73   0.000    -.1664286   -.0991248 
          8  |  -.1582803   .0340909    -4.64   0.000    -.2250973   -.0914634 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .1671239   .0166765    10.02   0.000     .1344385    .1998093 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |    -.02704   .0384268    -0.70   0.482    -.1023552    .0482751 
          3  |  -.1537363   .0353078    -4.35   0.000    -.2229384   -.0845342 
          4  |  -.3391219   .0335044   -10.12   0.000    -.4047893   -.2734545 
          5  |  -.4250364   .0343505   -12.37   0.000    -.4923621   -.3577108 
          6  |  -.5092652   .0345461   -14.74   0.000    -.5769744   -.4415561 
          8  |  -.3539073   .0491965    -7.19   0.000    -.4503307   -.2574838 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0066943    .007735    -0.87   0.387    -.0218546     .008466 
     h_aged3 |   .0271887   .0119353     2.28   0.023      .003796    .0505814 
    h_female |   -.005562   .0047853    -1.16   0.245    -.0149411     .003817 
  h_edu_high |   .0325949   .0168623     1.93   0.053    -.0004545    .0656443 
h_edu_medium |   .0178677   .0120661     1.48   0.139    -.0057814    .0415168 
   h_retired |  -.0111791   .0129702    -0.86   0.389    -.0366003    .0142421 
   h_student |  -.0060491   .0140389    -0.43   0.667    -.0335648    .0214666 
h_unemployed |   .0101548   .0100883     1.01   0.314    -.0096179    .0299275 
    fall2009 |   .0473045    .015944     2.97   0.003     .0160548    .0785542 
  spring2010 |   .0752725   .0122538     6.14   0.000     .0512556    .0992894 
    fall2010 |   .0687808   .0165578     4.15   0.000     .0363281    .1012335 
  spring2011 |   .1127376   .0149607     7.54   0.000     .0834151    .1420601 
  418 
          EU |  -.0522252    .044507    -1.17   0.241    -.1394573    .0350068 
        ExYu |    .132114   .0598506     2.21   0.027     .0148089    .2494191 
high_lev_dev |   .1207816   .0450929     2.68   0.007     .0324012    .2091621 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
probit CSagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ECSagree i.q1_01 i.CBA#i.q1_01 h_aged2 
h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 spring2011  EU ExYu high_lev_dev[pweight = weight], vce(cluster 
h_region) nolog  
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(39)   =    2714.68 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -21358.765                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1468 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     CSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.1549252   .2605337    -0.59   0.552    -.6655619    .3557115 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1374525    .061652    -2.23   0.026    -.2582881   -.0166168 
          3  |  -.3186284     .06298    -5.06   0.000    -.4420669     -.19519 
          4  |  -.3735852   .0675092    -5.53   0.000    -.5059008   -.2412696 
          5  |  -.4413636   .0571686    -7.72   0.000     -.553412   -.3293153 
          8  |  -.4556819   .1077213    -4.23   0.000    -.6668117   -.2445521 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2029156   .1272064     1.60   0.111    -.0464044    .4522355 
        1 3  |   .2218257   .1102544     2.01   0.044      .005731    .4379204 
        1 4  |   .1286026   .1449893     0.89   0.375    -.1555712    .4127765 
        1 5  |   .2237129   .1190084     1.88   0.060    -.0095394    .4569652 
        1 8  |  -.1634062    .262235    -0.62   0.533    -.6773774    .3505649 
             | 
    ECSagree |    .513579   .0532661     9.64   0.000     .4091794    .6179787 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.1492664   .1712584    -0.87   0.383    -.4849266    .1863939 
          3  |  -.5564697   .1521496    -3.66   0.000    -.8546775   -.2582619 
          4  |   -1.10353   .1318477    -8.37   0.000    -1.361947   -.8451131 
          5  |  -1.428688   .1428719   -10.00   0.000    -1.708712   -1.148665 
          6  |  -1.712855   .1475594   -11.61   0.000    -2.002066   -1.423644 
          8  |  -1.205771   .1892481    -6.37   0.000     -1.57669   -.8348511 
             | 
   CBA#q1_01 | 
        1 2  |   .1859653   .3563092     0.52   0.602     -.512388    .8843185 
        1 3  |   .1130733   .2884476     0.39   0.695    -.4522737    .6784203 
        1 4  |   .2827245   .3043371     0.93   0.353    -.3137652    .8792142 
        1 5  |   .6238711   .2615752     2.39   0.017     .1111931    1.136549 
        1 6  |   .7519809    .237862     3.16   0.002       .28578    1.218182 
        1 8  |   .5162529   .3153241     1.64   0.102    -.1017709    1.134277 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0201449   .0219208    -0.92   0.358    -.0631088    .0228191 
     h_aged3 |   .0613338   .0354655     1.73   0.084    -.0081774     .130845 
    h_female |  -.0193449   .0172073    -1.12   0.261    -.0530705    .0143807 
  h_edu_high |   .0679674   .0534274     1.27   0.203    -.0367483    .1726832 
h_edu_medium |   .0254547   .0387928     0.66   0.512    -.0505779    .1014872 
   h_retired |  -.0450521   .0401864    -1.12   0.262     -.123816    .0337117 
   h_student |  -.0182735   .0455422    -0.40   0.688    -.1075347    .0709877 
h_unemployed |   .0302375   .0323635     0.93   0.350    -.0331939    .0936688 
    fall2009 |    .137505   .0482026     2.85   0.004     .0430297    .2319804 
  spring2010 |   .2270351   .0387037     5.87   0.000     .1511772    .3028931 
    fall2010 |   .2107766   .0499434     4.22   0.000     .1128892    .3086639 
  spring2011 |   .3500843   .0495201     7.07   0.000     .2530267     .447142 
          EU |  -.1336745   .1435834    -0.93   0.352    -.4150928    .1477438 
        ExYu |   .3947326   .1843535     2.14   0.032     .0334065    .7560588 
high_lev_dev |   .3597711   .1347524     2.67   0.008     .0956612     .623881 
       _cons |   .4486314   .2018609     2.22   0.026     .0529914    .8442714 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
  419 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(CSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ECSagree 
2.q1_01 3.q1_01 4.q1_01 5.q1_01 6.q1_01 8.q1_01 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1953283    .051058     3.83   0.000     .0952564    .2954002 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0326332    .018596    -1.75   0.079    -.0690806    .0038142 
          3  |  -.0927603   .0180108    -5.15   0.000    -.1280607   -.0574598 
          4  |  -.1180528   .0205547    -5.74   0.000    -.1583394   -.0777663 
          5  |  -.1331311   .0171971    -7.74   0.000    -.1668368   -.0994253 
          8  |  -.1661108   .0319272    -5.20   0.000    -.2286869   -.1035347 
             | 
    ECSagree |   .1689539   .0174431     9.69   0.000      .134766    .2031417 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0294531   .0390562    -0.75   0.451    -.1060019    .0470956 
          3  |   -.160738   .0364952    -4.40   0.000    -.2322673   -.0892088 
          4  |  -.3470822   .0344382   -10.08   0.000    -.4145798   -.2795847 
          5  |  -.4377729   .0352028   -12.44   0.000    -.5067692   -.3687766 
          6  |  -.5209674   .0348249   -14.96   0.000    -.5892229   -.4527119 
          8  |  -.3668721   .0525172    -6.99   0.000    -.4698038   -.2639404 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0066271   .0071826    -0.92   0.356    -.0207047    .0074505 
     h_aged3 |   .0201772   .0117753     1.71   0.087    -.0029019    .0432563 
    h_female |   -.006364   .0056794    -1.12   0.262    -.0174955    .0047675 
  h_edu_high |   .0223595   .0175323     1.28   0.202    -.0120031    .0567221 
h_edu_medium |   .0083739   .0127515     0.66   0.511    -.0166186    .0333664 
   h_retired |   -.014821   .0132583    -1.12   0.264    -.0408067    .0111648 
   h_student |  -.0060115   .0149593    -0.40   0.688    -.0353312    .0233082 
h_unemployed |   .0099473   .0106527     0.93   0.350    -.0109315    .0308262 
    fall2009 |   .0452355   .0156087     2.90   0.004      .014643    .0758279 
  spring2010 |   .0746885   .0130016     5.74   0.000      .049206    .1001711 
    fall2010 |   .0693399   .0168021     4.13   0.000     .0364084    .1022713 
  spring2011 |   .1151684   .0158278     7.28   0.000     .0841464    .1461905 
          EU |  -.0439754   .0469464    -0.94   0.349    -.1359885    .0480378 
        ExYu |   .1298565   .0614687     2.11   0.035     .0093801     .250333 
high_lev_dev |   .1183551   .0434919     2.72   0.007     .0331127    .2035976 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
Appendix 4.13: Single equation (probit) - future local currency 
stability 
 
*Economic stability expectations categorical (q1_02), trust in government categorical 
(q22f_1) and interaction term between CBA and trust in government (q22f_1) and CBA 
and economic situation (q1_01) 
.  
. corr ExpCSagree CBA ExpECSagree q1_02 q22f_1 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_u 
> nemployed  
(obs=37908) 
 
             | ExpCSa~e      CBA ExpECS~e    q1_02   q22f_1  h_aged2  h_aged3 h_female h_edu_~h h_edu_~m h_reti~d 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ExpCSagree |   1.0000 
         CBA |   0.0460   1.0000 
 ExpECSagree |   0.2038   0.0136   1.0000 
       q1_02 |  -0.3737   0.0814  -0.1576   1.0000 
      q22f_1 |  -0.1943   0.0054  -0.0874   0.2924   1.0000 
     h_aged2 |  -0.0147  -0.0208   0.0047   0.0117   0.0040   1.0000 
     h_aged3 |  -0.0046   0.0210  -0.0116   0.0395   0.0019  -0.4995   1.0000 
    h_female |   0.0083   0.0062   0.0069   0.0001  -0.0053  -0.0011  -0.0129   1.0000 
  h_edu_high |   0.0146  -0.0174   0.0249  -0.0576  -0.0453   0.0152  -0.0731   0.0293   1.0000 
h_edu_medium |  -0.0031   0.0250  -0.0292   0.0128   0.0188   0.0546  -0.1319  -0.0750  -0.6629   1.0000 
   h_retired |  -0.0003   0.0108  -0.0097   0.0413   0.0100  -0.3023   0.6739  -0.0020  -0.0845  -0.1000   1.0000 
   h_student |   0.0170   0.0152   0.0083  -0.0308  -0.0002  -0.1994  -0.1494   0.0209  -0.0754   0.1150  -0.1156 
h_unemployed |  -0.0025   0.0468   0.0113   0.0382   0.0419   0.0343  -0.1012   0.1713  -0.1042  -0.0506  -0.2224 
 
             | h_stud~t h_unem~d 
-------------+------------------ 
   h_student |   1.0000 
h_unemployed |  -0.1177   1.0000 
 
  420 
probit ExpCSagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.CBA#i.q1_02 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev, vce(cluster country) 
nolog 
- 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -21226.321                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1807 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpCSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.2366268   .3044133    -0.78   0.437    -.8332659    .3600124 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0305206   .0745925    -0.41   0.682    -.1767191     .115678 
          3  |  -.1987121   .1138256    -1.75   0.081    -.4218061    .0243818 
          4  |  -.3176501   .1194098    -2.66   0.008     -.551689   -.0836112 
          5  |   -.395215   .0890106    -4.44   0.000    -.5696727   -.2207573 
          8  |  -.4463742    .107868    -4.14   0.000    -.6577916   -.2349567 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2362305   .0780302     3.03   0.002     .0832942    .3891668 
        1 3  |   .3451125    .115289     2.99   0.003     .1191502    .5710748 
        1 4  |   .3283812   .1352417     2.43   0.015     .0633123      .59345 
        1 5  |    .481902   .0996024     4.84   0.000     .2866849    .6771192 
        1 8  |   .3464832   .2102737     1.65   0.099    -.0656457    .7586121 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .4396729   .0683144     6.44   0.000     .3057791    .5735667 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1608243   .0897909    -1.79   0.073    -.3368113    .0151626 
          3  |  -.5567041   .0782642    -7.11   0.000    -.7100991   -.4033091 
          4  |  -1.244896   .0805082   -15.46   0.000    -1.402689   -1.087103 
          5  |  -1.638434   .1059702   -15.46   0.000    -1.846131   -1.430736 
          6  |   -1.80307    .107701   -16.74   0.000     -2.01416    -1.59198 
          8  |  -1.017605   .0644771   -15.78   0.000    -1.143978   -.8912322 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.1533817    .216452    -0.71   0.479    -.5776199    .2708565 
        1 3  |  -.0061587   .2292878    -0.03   0.979    -.4555545    .4432372 
        1 4  |   .3348362   .2667161     1.26   0.209    -.1879177    .8575901 
        1 5  |   .4097571   .2949326     1.39   0.165    -.1683002    .9878144 
        1 6  |   .4577628   .2564725     1.78   0.074    -.0449142    .9604397 
        1 8  |  -.2468552   .2028864    -1.22   0.224    -.6445053     .150795 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0079499   .0260377    -0.31   0.760    -.0589829    .0430831 
     h_aged3 |  -.0036669   .0194248    -0.19   0.850    -.0417388     .034405 
    h_female |   .0017819   .0158513     0.11   0.910     -.029286    .0328498 
  h_edu_high |  -.0073131   .0319088    -0.23   0.819    -.0698532    .0552271 
h_edu_medium |  -.0072793   .0377394    -0.19   0.847    -.0812471    .0666885 
   h_retired |   .0496214   .0569159     0.87   0.383    -.0619317    .1611745 
   h_student |   .0089133   .0437834     0.20   0.839    -.0769005    .0947271 
h_unemployed |     .03455   .0439801     0.79   0.432    -.0516494    .1207495 
    fall2009 |  -.0077957   .0552199    -0.14   0.888    -.1160248    .1004333 
  spring2010 |   .0997511   .0529074     1.89   0.059    -.0039456    .2034478 
    fall2010 |   .1069347   .0725687     1.47   0.141    -.0352974    .2491668 
  spring2011 |   .2147687   .0558507     3.85   0.000     .1053033    .3242341 
          EU |   .0556914   .1456292     0.38   0.702    -.2297366    .3411194 
        ExYu |   .3824419   .2171548     1.76   0.078    -.0431738    .8080575 
high_lev_dev |   .2330759   .1896901     1.23   0.219    -.1387099    .6048617 
       _cons |   .3611998   .0838536     4.31   0.000     .1968498    .5255499 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  421 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ExpECSagree 
2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1003119   .0625964     1.60   0.109    -.0223748    .2229986 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .0068671   .0192658     0.36   0.722    -.0308932    .0446274 
          3  |  -.0406614   .0293479    -1.39   0.166    -.0981822    .0168594 
          4  |  -.0803873    .030875    -2.60   0.009    -.1409011   -.0198735 
          5  |  -.0941053   .0230894    -4.08   0.000    -.1393597   -.0488508 
          8  |  -.1197765   .0288079    -4.16   0.000     -.176239   -.0633141 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .1395431   .0208498     6.69   0.000     .0986783    .1804079 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0573904   .0238251    -2.41   0.016    -.1040868    -.010694 
          3  |  -.1839387   .0222556    -8.26   0.000    -.2275589   -.1403186 
          4  |  -.4151442    .023187   -17.90   0.000    -.4605899   -.3696984 
          5  |  -.5389022   .0268568   -20.07   0.000    -.5915406   -.4862639 
          6  |  -.5816545   .0248258   -23.43   0.000    -.6303122   -.5329968 
          8  |   -.376293   .0232065   -16.21   0.000     -.421777    -.330809 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0025231   .0082419    -0.31   0.760     -.018677    .0136308 
     h_aged3 |  -.0011638   .0061476    -0.19   0.850    -.0132129    .0108853 
    h_female |   .0005655   .0050235     0.11   0.910    -.0092804    .0104115 
  h_edu_high |   -.002321   .0101233    -0.23   0.819    -.0221624    .0175204 
h_edu_medium |  -.0023103   .0119805    -0.19   0.847    -.0257917    .0211711 
   h_retired |   .0157488   .0179961     0.88   0.382    -.0195229    .0510205 
   h_student |   .0028289   .0139274     0.20   0.839    -.0244683    .0301261 
h_unemployed |   .0109655   .0139933     0.78   0.433     -.016461    .0383919 
    fall2009 |  -.0024742   .0175343    -0.14   0.888    -.0368408    .0318923 
  spring2010 |   .0316589   .0171417     1.85   0.065    -.0019381     .065256 
    fall2010 |   .0339389   .0233416     1.45   0.146    -.0118098    .0796876 
  spring2011 |   .0681632   .0175235     3.89   0.000     .0338177    .1025087 
          EU |   .0176753   .0465324     0.38   0.704    -.0735266    .1088772 
        ExYu |   .1213792   .0709263     1.71   0.087    -.0176337    .2603921 
high_lev_dev |   .0739735   .0592281     1.25   0.212    -.0421114    .1900584 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
probit ExpCSagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.CBA#i.q1_02 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev [pweight = weight], 
vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -20552.351                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1839 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpCSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.2381533    .290547    -0.82   0.412     -.807615    .3313083 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0021443    .078799    -0.03   0.978    -.1565875    .1522989 
          3  |   -.180016   .1140191    -1.58   0.114    -.4034894    .0434573 
          4  |  -.3000034   .1164626    -2.58   0.010     -.528266   -.0717408 
          5  |   -.384338   .0914512    -4.20   0.000    -.5635791   -.2050969 
          8  |  -.4431451   .1274328    -3.48   0.001    -.6929089   -.1933814 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
  422 
        1 2  |   .2339072   .0893321     2.62   0.009     .0588195     .408995 
        1 3  |   .3428627   .1145299     2.99   0.003     .1183882    .5673372 
        1 4  |   .3303813   .1400976     2.36   0.018      .055795    .6049676 
        1 5  |     .49133   .1088759     4.51   0.000     .2779372    .7047228 
        1 8  |   .4007943    .183006     2.19   0.029     .0421091    .7594795 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .4374702   .0701576     6.24   0.000     .2999638    .5749766 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1309803   .1044096    -1.25   0.210    -.3356194    .0736588 
          3  |   -.541197   .0967744    -5.59   0.000    -.7308712   -.3515227 
          4  |  -1.252976   .0870832   -14.39   0.000    -1.423656   -1.082296 
          5  |  -1.635839   .1138972   -14.36   0.000    -1.859073   -1.412604 
          6  |  -1.817354   .1078161   -16.86   0.000     -2.02867   -1.606038 
          8  |  -1.022292   .0705305   -14.49   0.000    -1.160529   -.8840544 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |   -.167864   .2145963    -0.78   0.434     -.588465    .2527371 
        1 3  |  -.0038901   .2275809    -0.02   0.986    -.4499405    .4421603 
        1 4  |   .3312025   .2752497     1.20   0.229    -.2082771     .870682 
        1 5  |   .4250911   .2924379     1.45   0.146    -.1480766    .9982589 
        1 6  |   .4865043   .2509753     1.94   0.053    -.0053983    .9784068 
        1 8  |  -.2168943   .1860019    -1.17   0.244    -.5814513    .1476626 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0022786   .0266289    -0.09   0.932    -.0544702     .049913 
     h_aged3 |  -.0051081   .0293229    -0.17   0.862    -.0625798    .0523637 
    h_female |  -.0022386    .015195    -0.15   0.883    -.0320203     .027543 
  h_edu_high |  -.0146153    .040329    -0.36   0.717    -.0936587     .064428 
h_edu_medium |  -.0097686   .0357828    -0.27   0.785    -.0799016    .0603645 
   h_retired |    .036308   .0618087     0.59   0.557    -.0848347    .1574508 
   h_student |   .0036077   .0493667     0.07   0.942    -.0931491    .1003646 
h_unemployed |   .0265681   .0493515     0.54   0.590    -.0701591    .1232954 
    fall2009 |   .0064044   .0563212     0.11   0.909    -.1039831    .1167919 
  spring2010 |   .1044287   .0548312     1.90   0.057    -.0030384    .2118959 
    fall2010 |   .1025754   .0708433     1.45   0.148    -.0362749    .2414258 
  spring2011 |   .2086741   .0569676     3.66   0.000     .0970196    .3203287 
          EU |   .0689041   .1417098     0.49   0.627    -.2088421    .3466503 
        ExYu |   .3890971   .2160925     1.80   0.072    -.0344364    .8126306 
high_lev_dev |   .2305548   .1884984     1.22   0.221    -.1388954    .6000049 
       _cons |   .3324575   .0950921     3.50   0.000     .1460805    .5188346 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ExpECSagree 
2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1034698   .0622514     1.66   0.096    -.0185408    .2254803 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .0163353   .0202227     0.81   0.419    -.0233005    .0559712 
          3  |  -.0340562    .029048    -1.17   0.241    -.0909891    .0228768 
          4  |  -.0736387   .0301182    -2.44   0.014    -.1326692   -.0146081 
          5  |  -.0886325   .0235208    -3.77   0.000    -.1347325   -.0425325 
          8  |  -.1134889   .0322981    -3.51   0.000     -.176792   -.0501859 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .1380132   .0213058     6.48   0.000     .0962547    .1797718 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0495517   .0263566    -1.88   0.060    -.1012097    .0021062 
          3  |  -.1793215   .0261106    -6.87   0.000    -.2304974   -.1281455 
          4  |  -.4190894   .0248368   -16.87   0.000    -.4677687     -.37041 
          5  |  -.5369101    .028421   -18.89   0.000    -.5926142   -.4812061 
          6  |  -.5827921   .0252288   -23.10   0.000    -.6322396   -.5333445 
          8  |  -.3774567    .022864   -16.51   0.000    -.4222693   -.3326442 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0007189   .0083929    -0.09   0.932    -.0171686    .0157309 
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     h_aged3 |  -.0016115   .0092219    -0.17   0.861    -.0196862    .0164632 
    h_female |  -.0007062   .0047993    -0.15   0.883    -.0101126    .0087001 
  h_edu_high |  -.0046109   .0126982    -0.36   0.717    -.0294988    .0202771 
h_edu_medium |  -.0030818   .0112737    -0.27   0.785    -.0251779    .0190144 
   h_retired |   .0114545   .0194231     0.59   0.555     -.026614     .049523 
   h_student |   .0011382   .0155875     0.07   0.942    -.0294129    .0316892 
h_unemployed |   .0083817   .0155922     0.54   0.591    -.0221784    .0389418 
    fall2009 |   .0020205   .0177644     0.11   0.909     -.032797     .036838 
  spring2010 |   .0329452   .0176551     1.87   0.062    -.0016582    .0675487 
    fall2010 |   .0323605    .022656     1.43   0.153    -.0120444    .0767655 
  spring2011 |   .0658326   .0176832     3.72   0.000     .0311741    .1004911 
          EU |   .0217379   .0451221     0.48   0.630    -.0666997    .1101755 
        ExYu |   .1227525   .0703494     1.74   0.081    -.0151298    .2606347 
high_lev_dev |   .0727355   .0584998     1.24   0.214     -.041922     .187393 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   -.007977   .0715497    -0.11   0.911    -.1482118    .1322578 
          2  |   .0753105   .0642181     1.17   0.241    -.0505546    .2011756 
          3  |   .1074275   .0635761     1.69   0.091    -.0171793    .2320343 
          4  |   .0974073   .0705012     1.38   0.167    -.0407725     .235587 
          5  |   .1502652   .0632234     2.38   0.017     .0263495    .2741808 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q22f_1 
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. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q1_02=(1(1)6)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q1_02           =           1 
2._at        : q1_02           =           2 
3._at        : q1_02           =           3 
4._at        : q1_02           =           4 
5._at        : q1_02           =           5 
6._at        : q1_02           =           6 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0308726   .0868377     0.36   0.722    -.1393261    .2010714 
          2  |  -.0183821    .058773    -0.31   0.754     -.133575    .0968108 
          3  |   .0380499   .0648771     0.59   0.558    -.0891068    .1652066 
          4  |   .1606014   .0701449     2.29   0.022       .02312    .2980828 
          5  |   .1710975   .0729771     2.34   0.019      .028065    .3141301 
          6  |   .1742777   .0635129     2.74   0.006     .0497947    .2987607 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q1_02 
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. **MARGINS for subsamples 
 
. margins if CBA==0, at(CBA=(0 1))  
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =      30237 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |   .4140094   .0296863    13.95   0.000     .3558255    .4721934 
          2  |   .5148438   .0482343    10.67   0.000     .4203064    .6093812 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins if CBA==1, at(CBA=(0 1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =       7671 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |   .3613566   .0555141     6.51   0.000      .252551    .4701621 
          2  |    .475035   .0160035    29.68   0.000     .4436687    .5064012 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, over(CBA) at(CBA=(0 1)) contrast (atcontrast(r._at) wald) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
over         : CBA 
1._at        : 0.CBA 
                   CBA             =           0 
               1.CBA 
                   CBA             =           0 
2._at        : 0.CBA 
                   CBA             =           1 
               1.CBA 
                   CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
             |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------+---------------------------------- 
     _at@CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) 0  |          1        2.52     0.1121 
 (2 vs 1) 1  |          1        3.89     0.0486 
      Joint  |          2       44.52     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
             |            Delta-method 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------ 
     _at@CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) 0  |   .1008343   .0634622     -.0235492    .2252179 
 (2 vs 1) 1  |   .1136784   .0576445      .0006973    .2266595 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
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. *with region 
 
unweighted 
 
. probit ExpCSagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 
i.CBA#i.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev, 
vce(cluster h_region) nolog 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(39)   =    4998.26 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -21226.321                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1807 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpCSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.2366268   .1695984    -1.40   0.163    -.5690335      .09578 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0305206   .0629652    -0.48   0.628    -.1539301     .092889 
          3  |  -.1987121   .0766401    -2.59   0.010     -.348924   -.0485003 
          4  |  -.3176501   .0757332    -4.19   0.000    -.4660845   -.1692158 
          5  |   -.395215    .065187    -6.06   0.000    -.5229791   -.2674509 
          8  |  -.4463742   .1092546    -4.09   0.000    -.6605093    -.232239 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2362305   .0994841     2.37   0.018     .0412453    .4312156 
        1 3  |   .3451125   .1079166     3.20   0.001     .1335999    .5566251 
        1 4  |   .3283812   .1222415     2.69   0.007     .0887923      .56797 
        1 5  |    .481902   .0909811     5.30   0.000     .3035823    .6602218 
        1 8  |   .3464832   .2400624     1.44   0.149    -.1240305    .8169969 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .4396729   .0426955    10.30   0.000     .3559912    .5233546 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1608243   .0821148    -1.96   0.050    -.3217664    .0001177 
          3  |  -.5567041   .0775561    -7.18   0.000    -.7087113   -.4046968 
          4  |  -1.244896   .0702232   -17.73   0.000    -1.382531   -1.107261 
          5  |  -1.638434   .0735987   -22.26   0.000    -1.782684   -1.494183 
          6  |   -1.80307   .0785744   -22.95   0.000    -1.957073   -1.649067 
          8  |  -1.017605   .1067407    -9.53   0.000    -1.226813   -.8083971 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |  -.1533817   .1515397    -1.01   0.311     -.450394    .1436306 
        1 3  |  -.0061587   .1674999    -0.04   0.971    -.3344525    .3221352 
        1 4  |   .3348362   .1637368     2.04   0.041      .013918    .6557545 
        1 5  |   .4097571   .1784451     2.30   0.022      .060011    .7595031 
        1 6  |   .4577628   .2049004     2.23   0.025     .0561653    .8593602 
        1 8  |  -.2468552   .2289189    -1.08   0.281    -.6955279    .2018176 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0079499   .0193027    -0.41   0.680    -.0457825    .0298826 
     h_aged3 |  -.0036669   .0314273    -0.12   0.907    -.0652632    .0579294 
    h_female |   .0017819   .0163386     0.11   0.913    -.0302411    .0338049 
  h_edu_high |  -.0073131   .0416882    -0.18   0.861    -.0890203    .0743942 
h_edu_medium |  -.0072793   .0341589    -0.21   0.831    -.0742296     .059671 
   h_retired |   .0496214   .0356401     1.39   0.164    -.0202319    .1194747 
   h_student |   .0089133   .0373912     0.24   0.812    -.0643721    .0821988 
h_unemployed |     .03455   .0276123     1.25   0.211    -.0195691    .0886691 
    fall2009 |  -.0077957   .0406385    -0.19   0.848    -.0874458    .0718543 
  spring2010 |   .0997511   .0362736     2.75   0.006     .0286562     .170846 
    fall2010 |   .1069347   .0461895     2.32   0.021     .0164049    .1974645 
  spring2011 |   .2147687   .0416644     5.15   0.000      .133108    .2964294 
          EU |   .0556914   .1003873     0.55   0.579     -.141064    .2524468 
        ExYu |   .3824419   .1294329     2.95   0.003      .128758    .6361257 
high_lev_dev |   .2330759   .0959466     2.43   0.015      .045024    .4211278 
       _cons |   .3611998   .1107422     3.26   0.001     .1441491    .5782506 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ExpECSagree 
2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1003119   .0372015     2.70   0.007     .0273984    .1732254 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .0068671   .0172224     0.40   0.690    -.0268883    .0406224 
          3  |  -.0406614   .0204307    -1.99   0.047    -.0807049   -.0006179 
          4  |  -.0803873   .0207107    -3.88   0.000    -.1209795    -.039795 
          5  |  -.0941053   .0173054    -5.44   0.000    -.1280232   -.0601873 
          8  |  -.1197765   .0305899    -3.92   0.000    -.1797316   -.0598215 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .1395431   .0127497    10.94   0.000     .1145542     .164532 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0573904   .0206463    -2.78   0.005    -.0978565   -.0169244 
          3  |  -.1839387   .0205399    -8.96   0.000    -.2241962   -.1436812 
          4  |  -.4151442   .0181236   -22.91   0.000    -.4506657   -.3796226 
          5  |  -.5389022   .0186721   -28.86   0.000    -.5754989   -.5023056 
          6  |  -.5816545   .0200242   -29.05   0.000    -.6209013   -.5424077 
          8  |   -.376293    .031909   -11.79   0.000    -.4388336   -.3137524 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0025231   .0061125    -0.41   0.680    -.0145034    .0094571 
     h_aged3 |  -.0011638   .0099724    -0.12   0.907    -.0207093    .0183817 
    h_female |   .0005655   .0051838     0.11   0.913    -.0095945    .0107256 
  h_edu_high |   -.002321    .013232    -0.18   0.861    -.0282552    .0236132 
h_edu_medium |  -.0023103    .010844    -0.21   0.831    -.0235642    .0189436 
   h_retired |   .0157488   .0113166     1.39   0.164    -.0064313    .0379289 
   h_student |   .0028289   .0118802     0.24   0.812    -.0204558    .0261136 
h_unemployed |   .0109655   .0087969     1.25   0.213    -.0062761     .028207 
    fall2009 |  -.0024742   .0129026    -0.19   0.848    -.0277628    .0228144 
  spring2010 |   .0316589   .0116629     2.71   0.007     .0088001    .0545178 
    fall2010 |   .0339389   .0147883     2.29   0.022     .0049543    .0629234 
  spring2011 |   .0681632   .0130583     5.22   0.000     .0425694     .093757 
          EU |   .0176753   .0319214     0.55   0.580    -.0448895    .0802401 
        ExYu |   .1213792   .0417214     2.91   0.004     .0396068    .2031516 
high_lev_dev |   .0739735    .029895     2.47   0.013     .0153804    .1325666 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
weighted 
 
. probit ExpCSagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 i.CBA#i.q22f_1 ExpECSagree i.q1_02 
i.CBA#i.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev [pweight = 
weight], vce(cluster h_region) nolog 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      37908 
                                                  Wald chi2(39)   =    4202.21 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -20552.351                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1839 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpCSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.2381533   .1702246    -1.40   0.162    -.5717875    .0954808 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0021443   .0657167    -0.03   0.974    -.1309467     .126658 
          3  |   -.180016   .0759428    -2.37   0.018    -.3288612   -.0311709 
          4  |  -.3000034   .0772922    -3.88   0.000    -.4514933   -.1485135 
          5  |   -.384338   .0662745    -5.80   0.000    -.5142337   -.2544423 
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          8  |  -.4431451   .1098704    -4.03   0.000    -.6584872    -.227803 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .2339072   .1019783     2.29   0.022     .0340334     .433781 
        1 3  |   .3428627   .1100155     3.12   0.002     .1272363    .5584891 
        1 4  |   .3303813   .1223211     2.70   0.007     .0906363    .5701263 
        1 5  |     .49133       .095     5.17   0.000     .3051335    .6775265 
        1 8  |   .4007943   .2524599     1.59   0.112     -.094018    .8956065 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .4374702   .0437251    10.01   0.000     .3517705    .5231698 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1309803   .0867097    -1.51   0.131    -.3009281    .0389675 
          3  |   -.541197   .0867825    -6.24   0.000    -.7112875   -.3711065 
          4  |  -1.252976   .0766824   -16.34   0.000    -1.403271   -1.102681 
          5  |  -1.635839   .0785499   -20.83   0.000    -1.789794   -1.481884 
          6  |  -1.817354    .083834   -21.68   0.000    -1.981666   -1.653043 
          8  |  -1.022292   .1109186    -9.22   0.000    -1.239688   -.8048953 
             | 
   CBA#q1_02 | 
        1 2  |   -.167864   .1568031    -1.07   0.284    -.4751923    .1394644 
        1 3  |  -.0038901   .1714296    -0.02   0.982    -.3398859    .3321057 
        1 4  |   .3312025   .1669143     1.98   0.047     .0040564    .6583485 
        1 5  |   .4250911    .180224     2.36   0.018     .0718586    .7783236 
        1 6  |   .4865043   .2050463     2.37   0.018      .084621    .8883876 
        1 8  |  -.2168943   .2292365    -0.95   0.344    -.6661896    .2324009 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0022786   .0205353    -0.11   0.912    -.0425271    .0379699 
     h_aged3 |  -.0051081   .0345425    -0.15   0.882    -.0728102     .062594 
    h_female |  -.0022386   .0161725    -0.14   0.890    -.0339362    .0294589 
  h_edu_high |  -.0146153   .0439624    -0.33   0.740      -.10078    .0715493 
h_edu_medium |  -.0097686   .0352257    -0.28   0.782    -.0788098    .0592726 
   h_retired |    .036308   .0382213     0.95   0.342    -.0386044    .1112205 
   h_student |   .0036077    .040332     0.09   0.929    -.0754415    .0826569 
h_unemployed |   .0265681   .0312752     0.85   0.396    -.0347302    .0878665 
    fall2009 |   .0064044   .0432545     0.15   0.882     -.078373    .0911817 
  spring2010 |   .1044287   .0413854     2.52   0.012     .0233148    .1855427 
    fall2010 |   .1025754   .0463618     2.21   0.027      .011708    .1934429 
  spring2011 |   .2086741   .0420011     4.97   0.000     .1263535    .2909947 
          EU |   .0689041   .1072027     0.64   0.520    -.1412094    .2790176 
        ExYu |   .3890971   .1354449     2.87   0.004       .12363    .6545642 
high_lev_dev |   .2305548   .0976429     2.36   0.018     .0391782    .4219314 
       _cons |   .3324575   .1135079     2.93   0.003     .1099861     .554929 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      37908 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpCSagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 ExpECSagree 
2.q1_02 3.q1_02 4.q1_02 5.q1_02 6.q1_02 8.q1_02 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 
EU ExYu high_lev_dev 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .1034698   .0368078     2.81   0.005     .0313278    .1756117 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .0163353   .0177509     0.92   0.357    -.0184559    .0511265 
          3  |  -.0340562   .0201194    -1.69   0.091    -.0734895    .0053771 
          4  |  -.0736387    .020846    -3.53   0.000    -.1144961   -.0327813 
          5  |  -.0886325   .0174045    -5.09   0.000    -.1227447   -.0545203 
          8  |  -.1134889   .0309733    -3.66   0.000    -.1741955   -.0527824 
             | 
 ExpECSagree |   .1380132   .0130379    10.59   0.000     .1124594     .163567 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.0495517   .0216532    -2.29   0.022    -.0919913   -.0071122 
          3  |  -.1793215   .0226405    -7.92   0.000     -.223696    -.134947 
          4  |  -.4190894   .0194302   -21.57   0.000    -.4571719   -.3810069 
          5  |  -.5369101   .0197639   -27.17   0.000    -.5756466   -.4981736 
          6  |  -.5827921   .0211835   -27.51   0.000     -.624311   -.5412731 
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          8  |  -.3774567   .0324406   -11.64   0.000    -.4410392   -.3138743 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0007189   .0064736    -0.11   0.912    -.0134069    .0119692 
     h_aged3 |  -.0016115   .0108922    -0.15   0.882    -.0229599    .0197369 
    h_female |  -.0007062   .0051025    -0.14   0.890     -.010707    .0092945 
  h_edu_high |  -.0046109    .013866    -0.33   0.739    -.0317877     .022566 
h_edu_medium |  -.0030818   .0111139    -0.28   0.782    -.0248646     .018701 
   h_retired |   .0114545   .0120497     0.95   0.342    -.0121625    .0350715 
   h_student |   .0011382   .0127285     0.09   0.929    -.0238092    .0260855 
h_unemployed |   .0083817   .0098903     0.85   0.397    -.0110028    .0277663 
    fall2009 |   .0020205   .0136441     0.15   0.882    -.0247216    .0287625 
  spring2010 |   .0329452   .0132057     2.49   0.013     .0070624     .058828 
    fall2010 |   .0323605   .0147752     2.19   0.029     .0034016    .0613195 
  spring2011 |   .0658326   .0131012     5.02   0.000     .0401547    .0915105 
          EU |   .0217379   .0338832     0.64   0.521     -.044672    .0881477 
        ExYu |   .1227525   .0433741     2.83   0.005     .0377407    .2077642 
high_lev_dev |   .0727355    .030255     2.40   0.016     .0134367    .1320343 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
Appendix 4.14 Multinomial probit and probit without the interaction 
terms – cheking for the potential bias caused by exclusion of do not 
know answers 
 
Perceptions about the local currency stability 
 
tab q1_03, missing 
 
   Currently, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
 is a very stable | 
  and trustworthy | 
         currency |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |      1,912        3.95        3.95 
            Agree |      5,657       11.70       15.65 
   Somewhat agree |     11,420       23.62       39.27 
Somewhat disagree |     10,178       21.05       60.31 
         Disagree |      9,288       19.21       79.52 
Strongly disagree |      7,625       15.77       95.29 
      Do not know |      2,064        4.27       99.56 
        No answer |        214        0.44      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     48,358      100.00 
 
 
Multinomial (do not know answers separate category) interaction terms 
excluded  
 
drop if q1_03==9 
(214 observations deleted) 
 
. *for multinomial (confidence model) 
. generate MCSagree=0 
 
. replace MCSagree=1 if  q1_03==4 |  q1_03==5 |  q1_03==6 
(27091 real changes made) 
 
. replace MCSagree=2 if  q1_03==8 
(2064 real changes made) 
 
. replace MCSagree=3 if  q1_03==1 |  q1_03==2 |  q1_03==3 
(18989 real changes made) 
 
. drop if MCSagree==0 
(0 observations deleted) 
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. mprobit MCSagree i.CBA ECSagree i.q1_01 i.q22f_1 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev [pweight = weight], vce(cluster 
country) nolog 
 
Multinomial probit regression                     Number of obs   =      48144 
                                                  Wald chi2(7)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -33153.173                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    MCSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1            |  (base outcome) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
       1.CBA |   .3760398   .2360912     1.59   0.111    -.0866905      .83877 
    ECSagree |  -.3504207   .1023947    -3.42   0.001    -.5511106   -.1497307 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.2636971   .2905198    -0.91   0.364    -.8331055    .3057113 
          3  |  -.5576373    .255282    -2.18   0.029    -1.057981   -.0572938 
          4  |  -.9035081   .2114029    -4.27   0.000     -1.31785    -.489166 
          5  |  -.9446327   .2625437    -3.60   0.000    -1.459209   -.4300565 
          6  |  -.9431694     .29107    -3.24   0.001    -1.513656   -.3726827 
          8  |   1.923892   .3300224     5.83   0.000      1.27706    2.570724 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0932139    .095282    -0.98   0.328    -.2799632    .0935355 
          3  |  -.1575646   .1351884    -1.17   0.244     -.422529    .1073998 
          4  |  -.2325708   .1475324    -1.58   0.115    -.5217289    .0565874 
          5  |  -.1495566    .107692    -1.39   0.165    -.3606289    .0615158 
          8  |   .3359921   .1919906     1.75   0.080    -.0403026    .7122868 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.1372325   .0403625    -3.40   0.001    -.2163416   -.0581234 
     h_aged3 |   .0631199   .0701151     0.90   0.368    -.0743032     .200543 
    h_female |   .3060515    .043368     7.06   0.000     .2210517    .3910513 
  h_edu_high |  -.4153595   .1063344    -3.91   0.000     -.623771   -.2069479 
h_edu_medium |  -.2564101   .0803522    -3.19   0.001    -.4138975   -.0989226 
   h_retired |   .1803111   .0886814     2.03   0.042     .0064988    .3541234 
   h_student |   .2429176   .0875691     2.77   0.006     .0712852    .4145499 
h_unemployed |   .1946533   .0630342     3.09   0.002     .0711085     .318198 
    fall2009 |   .1602667   .1407067     1.14   0.255    -.1155133    .4360467 
  spring2010 |   .0247698   .1009226     0.25   0.806    -.1730347    .2225744 
    fall2010 |  -.0839084   .1122323    -0.75   0.455    -.3038797    .1360629 
  spring2011 |   .2192004   .1215738     1.80   0.071    -.0190799    .4574806 
          EU |   .3492434   .2102349     1.66   0.097    -.0628094    .7612962 
        ExYu |   .4032179   .2671993     1.51   0.131     -.120483    .9269189 
high_lev_dev |    .189112   .3067545     0.62   0.538    -.4121158    .7903398 
       _cons |   -1.37005   .2582275    -5.31   0.000    -1.876167   -.8639333 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
       1.CBA |   .8489957   .3879892     2.19   0.029     .0885509     1.60944 
    ECSagree |   .6422572   .1304109     4.92   0.000     .3866565    .8978579 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |  -.0421901   .2259941    -0.19   0.852    -.4851303    .4007501 
          3  |  -.6813418   .2403964    -2.83   0.005     -1.15251   -.2101734 
          4  |  -1.389241   .2204123    -6.30   0.000    -1.821242   -.9572412 
          5  |   -1.76987   .2541545    -6.96   0.000    -2.268003   -1.271736 
          6  |  -2.081984   .2817064    -7.39   0.000    -2.634118   -1.529849 
          8  |  -1.249986   .2558614    -4.89   0.000    -1.751465   -.7485072 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   -.117519   .0705222    -1.67   0.096      -.25574    .0207021 
          3  |  -.3650052   .0848565    -4.30   0.000     -.531321   -.1986895 
          4  |  -.4892931   .1135357    -4.31   0.000     -.711819   -.2667672 
          5  |  -.5538782   .1055826    -5.25   0.000    -.7608164   -.3469401 
          8  |  -.5360612   .1467139    -3.65   0.000    -.8236151   -.2485074 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0191889   .0269611    -0.71   0.477    -.0720316    .0336539 
     h_aged3 |   .1119623   .0553222     2.02   0.043     .0035328    .2203919 
    h_female |   -.018998   .0285723    -0.66   0.506    -.0749986    .0370026 
  h_edu_high |   .0741897   .0614436     1.21   0.227    -.0462375    .1946168 
h_edu_medium |   .0416033   .0746694     0.56   0.577    -.1047459    .1879526 
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   h_retired |  -.0402746   .0835518    -0.48   0.630    -.2040331    .1234839 
   h_student |  -.0463293   .0793222    -0.58   0.559    -.2017979    .1091393 
h_unemployed |   .0500297   .0653188     0.77   0.444    -.0779928    .1780522 
    fall2009 |   .2061683   .0830758     2.48   0.013     .0433427     .368994 
  spring2010 |   .3185293   .0586557     5.43   0.000     .2035662    .4334924 
    fall2010 |   .2953145   .0960237     3.08   0.002     .1071115    .4835174 
  spring2011 |    .507835   .0863572     5.88   0.000     .3385779     .677092 
          EU |  -.1844637   .2811784    -0.66   0.512    -.7355633    .3666359 
        ExYu |    .481735   .4448845     1.08   0.279    -.3902225    1.353692 
high_lev_dev |   .4780588   .3872457     1.23   0.217    -.2809288    1.237046 
       _cons |   .4532183   .3179032     1.43   0.154    -.1698606    1.076297 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Probit perception model (without do not know answers and interaction terms) 
 
. drop if q1_03==8 
(2064 observations deleted) 
 
. generate CSagree=0 
 
. replace CSagree=3 if  q1_03==1 |  q1_03==2 |  q1_03==3 
(18989 real changes made) 
 
. probit CSagree i.CBA ECSagree i.q1_01 i.q22f_1 h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev [pweight = weight], vce(cluster 
country) nolog 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      46080 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -26281.813                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1369 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     CSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .6138864   .2808503     2.19   0.029       .06343    1.164343 
    ECSagree |   .4713505   .0921917     5.11   0.000     .2906581    .6520429 
             | 
       q1_01 | 
          2  |   -.028648   .1660612    -0.17   0.863    -.3541219    .2968259 
          3  |  -.4841942   .1750563    -2.77   0.006    -.8272983   -.1410901 
          4  |  -.9896226   .1604126    -6.17   0.000    -1.304026   -.6752196 
          5  |  -1.262955    .185507    -6.81   0.000    -1.626542   -.8993676 
          6  |  -1.489812   .2061389    -7.23   0.000    -1.893837   -1.085787 
          8  |  -1.042207   .1960878    -5.32   0.000    -1.426532   -.6578819 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0871213   .0493766    -1.76   0.078    -.1838977     .009655 
          3  |  -.2667345   .0603506    -4.42   0.000    -.3850195   -.1484495 
          4  |  -.3546859    .080949    -4.38   0.000    -.5133431   -.1960287 
          5  |   -.400238   .0755494    -5.30   0.000    -.5483121    -.252164 
          8  |  -.4207426   .1070656    -3.93   0.000    -.6305873    -.210898 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0138848   .0193538    -0.72   0.473    -.0518177     .024048 
     h_aged3 |    .080325   .0391933     2.05   0.040     .0035077    .1571424 
    h_female |  -.0173968   .0204182    -0.85   0.394    -.0574158    .0226222 
  h_edu_high |    .062402    .043124     1.45   0.148    -.0221195    .1469234 
h_edu_medium |   .0330758   .0527102     0.63   0.530    -.0702342    .1363858 
   h_retired |  -.0345318   .0581034    -0.59   0.552    -.1484123    .0793488 
   h_student |  -.0307499   .0576937    -0.53   0.594    -.1438275    .0823276 
h_unemployed |   .0385517   .0459462     0.84   0.401    -.0515012    .1286046 
    fall2009 |   .1418092   .0601372     2.36   0.018     .0239424    .2596759 
  spring2010 |   .2242776   .0435319     5.15   0.000     .1389567    .3095985 
    fall2010 |   .2065909   .0695322     2.97   0.003     .0703102    .3428715 
  spring2011 |   .3586436   .0629706     5.70   0.000     .2352234    .4820638 
          EU |  -.1399055   .2036176    -0.69   0.492    -.5389886    .2591776 
        ExYu |   .3484265   .3186748     1.09   0.274    -.2761646    .9730177 
high_lev_dev |   .3572186   .2771033     1.29   0.197    -.1858938    .9003311 
       _cons |   .3134725   .2298011     1.36   0.173    -.1369294    .7638744 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Expectations about the local currency stability 
  432 
 
. tab q1_04, missing 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
 [LOCAL CURRENCY] | 
     will be very | 
stable and trustw |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |      1,442        3.00        3.00 
            Agree |      4,928       10.24       13.23 
   Somewhat agree |     11,381       23.64       36.87 
Somewhat disagree |     10,084       20.95       57.82 
         Disagree |      8,534       17.73       75.55 
Strongly disagree |      5,690       11.82       87.37 
      Do not know |      5,748       11.94       99.31 
        No answer |        334        0.69      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     48,141      100.00 
 
 
. drop if q1_04==9 
(334 observations deleted) 
 
 
. *for multinomial (credibility model) 
. generate MExpCSagree=0 
 
. replace MExpCSagree=1 if  q1_04==4 |  q1_04==5 |  q1_04==6 
(24308 real changes made) 
 
. replace MExpCSagree=2 if  q1_04==8 
(5748 real changes made) 
 
. replace MExpCSagree=3 if  q1_04==1 |  q1_04==2 |  q1_04==3 
(17751 real changes made) 
 
. drop if MExpCSagree==0 
(0 observations deleted) 
 
. mprobit MExpCSagree i.CBA ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.q22f_1 h_aged2 h_aged3 
h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev [pweight = weight], 
vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Multinomial probit regression                     Number of obs   =      47807 
                                                  Wald chi2(7)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -36607.799                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 MExpCSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1            |  (base outcome) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
       1.CBA |  -.0052224   .2148525    -0.02   0.981    -.4263256    .4158809 
 ExpECSagree |  -.4285711   .0648493    -6.61   0.000    -.5556735   -.3014688 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.2627637   .1534866    -1.71   0.087     -.563592    .0380646 
          3  |  -.5433784   .1225524    -4.43   0.000    -.7835767   -.3031801 
          4  |  -1.064886   .1254577    -8.49   0.000    -1.310778   -.8189932 
          5  |  -1.267374   .1100265   -11.52   0.000    -1.483022   -1.051726 
          6  |  -1.152209   .0966405   -11.92   0.000    -1.341621   -.9627969 
          8  |   1.211578   .1213358     9.99   0.000     .9737639    1.449391 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .1060693   .0478582     2.22   0.027      .012269    .1998697 
          3  |   .0725006   .0813942     0.89   0.373    -.0870292    .2320303 
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          4  |  -.1150592   .1030316    -1.12   0.264    -.3169974     .086879 
          5  |   .0337339   .0964765     0.35   0.727    -.1553566    .2228243 
          8  |   .3459668   .1017557     3.40   0.001     .1465294    .5454042 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0057914   .0402083    -0.14   0.885    -.0845982    .0730154 
     h_aged3 |   .0563774   .0649638     0.87   0.385    -.0709493    .1837041 
    h_female |   .1639398   .0293729     5.58   0.000     .1063699    .2215097 
  h_edu_high |  -.2627025   .0571105    -4.60   0.000    -.3746371   -.1507679 
h_edu_medium |  -.1803886   .0384591    -4.69   0.000     -.255767   -.1050102 
   h_retired |   .1309812   .0438426     2.99   0.003     .0450512    .2169112 
   h_student |   .0341463   .0695727     0.49   0.624    -.1022137    .1705062 
h_unemployed |   .0613264   .0421494     1.45   0.146    -.0212848    .1439376 
    fall2009 |   .1896633   .1548715     1.22   0.221    -.1138793    .4932059 
  spring2010 |   .0242929   .1128408     0.22   0.830     -.196871    .2454569 
    fall2010 |   .0369263   .0968114     0.38   0.703    -.1528206    .2266732 
  spring2011 |   .2059762   .1003485     2.05   0.040     .0092967    .4026557 
          EU |   .7274676   .1285716     5.66   0.000      .475472    .9794633 
        ExYu |    .735323    .185362     3.97   0.000     .3720202    1.098626 
high_lev_dev |   .0024854   .1792808     0.01   0.989    -.3488985    .3538693 
       _cons |  -1.037816   .0979305   -10.60   0.000    -1.229756   -.8458754 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
       1.CBA |   .4570424   .2725769     1.68   0.094    -.0771985    .9912833 
 ExpECSagree |   .5143176   .0916729     5.61   0.000      .334642    .6939932 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1665413   .1401734    -1.19   0.235    -.4412761    .1081935 
          3  |  -.6696554   .1606027    -4.17   0.000    -.9844309     -.35488 
          4  |  -1.607211   .1741672    -9.23   0.000    -1.948573    -1.26585 
          5  |  -2.078096   .1854394   -11.21   0.000    -2.441551   -1.714642 
          6  |  -2.262039   .2039382   -11.09   0.000    -2.661751   -1.862327 
          8  |   -1.22926   .1139746   -10.79   0.000    -1.452646   -1.005874 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .0845199   .0992432     0.85   0.394    -.1099933    .2790331 
          3  |  -.1306297   .1371759    -0.95   0.341    -.3994896    .1382302 
          4  |  -.2971909   .1450846    -2.05   0.041    -.5815515   -.0128302 
          5  |  -.3590185   .1383488    -2.60   0.009    -.6301771   -.0878599 
          8  |  -.4154835   .1444797    -2.88   0.004    -.6986586   -.1323084 
             | 
     h_aged2 |   .0010994   .0347911     0.03   0.975      -.06709    .0692887 
     h_aged3 |    .009863    .037982     0.26   0.795    -.0645804    .0843065 
    h_female |   .0161293   .0148561     1.09   0.278    -.0129881    .0452466 
  h_edu_high |  -.0459619   .0490322    -0.94   0.349    -.1420633    .0501395 
h_edu_medium |  -.0264729   .0504101    -0.53   0.599    -.1252748     .072329 
   h_retired |   .0801085   .0750955     1.07   0.286    -.0670759    .2272929 
   h_student |  -.0063043   .0610991    -0.10   0.918    -.1260564    .1134478 
h_unemployed |    .047572   .0631124     0.75   0.451     -.076126      .17127 
    fall2009 |   .0417807   .0735136     0.57   0.570    -.1023034    .1858648 
  spring2010 |   .1465877   .0724243     2.02   0.043     .0046387    .2885367 
    fall2010 |    .135524   .0968875     1.40   0.162     -.054372    .3254199 
  spring2011 |   .2976175   .0824651     3.61   0.000     .1359889    .4592462 
          EU |   .0342117   .1984303     0.17   0.863    -.3547046    .4231279 
        ExYu |   .4448743   .3027429     1.47   0.142    -.1484908    1.038239 
high_lev_dev |   .3003473   .2612352     1.15   0.250    -.2116644     .812359 
       _cons |   .3690078   .1946954     1.90   0.058    -.0125881    .7506038 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Probit expectations model (do not know answers excluded) no interaction 
terms 
 
. drop if q1_04==8 
(5748 observations deleted) 
 
 
. generate ExpCSagree=0 
 
. replace ExpCSagree=1 if  q1_04==1 |  q1_04==2 |  q1_04==3 
(17751 real changes made) 
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. probit ExpCSagree i.CBA ExpECSagree i.q1_02 i.q22f_1 h_aged2 h_aged3 
h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu high_lev_dev [pweight = weight], 
vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      42059 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -22942.825                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1787 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpCSagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   .3412595    .202221     1.69   0.091    -.0550865    .7376054 
 ExpECSagree |   .3893223   .0665493     5.85   0.000      .258888    .5197565 
             | 
       q1_02 | 
          2  |  -.1259544   .1036882    -1.21   0.224    -.3291795    .0772706 
          3  |  -.4955133   .1163707    -4.26   0.000    -.7235958   -.2674309 
          4  |  -1.175078   .1256145    -9.35   0.000    -1.421278   -.9288783 
          5  |  -1.518573   .1330145   -11.42   0.000    -1.779277   -1.257869 
          6  |  -1.661275   .1446747   -11.48   0.000    -1.944832   -1.377718 
          8  |  -.9689635   .0832532   -11.64   0.000    -1.132137   -.8057901 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |   .0626781   .0712713     0.88   0.379    -.0770111    .2023673 
          3  |  -.0958331   .0992278    -0.97   0.334     -.290316    .0986499 
          4  |  -.2191019   .1066619    -2.05   0.040    -.4281553   -.0100485 
          5  |  -.2638808   .1021601    -2.58   0.010    -.4641109   -.0636507 
          8  |  -.3257583    .116177    -2.80   0.005    -.5534609   -.0980556 
             | 
     h_aged2 |   .0061431   .0251216     0.24   0.807    -.0430943    .0553806 
     h_aged3 |   .0107959   .0282661     0.38   0.703    -.0446047    .0661966 
    h_female |   .0053788   .0116282     0.46   0.644     -.017412    .0281697 
  h_edu_high |  -.0230082   .0376529    -0.61   0.541    -.0968065    .0507901 
h_edu_medium |   -.014242   .0370434    -0.38   0.701    -.0868457    .0583618 
   h_retired |   .0495839    .053733     0.92   0.356    -.0557309    .1548987 
   h_student |    .002895   .0449705     0.06   0.949    -.0852456    .0910357 
h_unemployed |    .031102   .0459838     0.68   0.499    -.0590247    .1212287 
    fall2009 |   .0178102   .0575226     0.31   0.757     -.094932    .1305524 
  spring2010 |   .0997597    .055283     1.80   0.071    -.0085929    .2081123 
    fall2010 |   .0904027   .0704389     1.28   0.199     -.047655    .2284605 
  spring2011 |   .2079658   .0612697     3.39   0.001     .0878795    .3280521 
          EU |   .0190861   .1471743     0.13   0.897    -.2693703    .3075424 
        ExYu |   .3316304   .2232556     1.49   0.137    -.1059425    .7692033 
high_lev_dev |    .222418   .1915517     1.16   0.246    -.1530164    .5978524 
       _cons |   .2648924    .141994     1.87   0.062    -.0134108    .5431956 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5.1: Correlation matrix between explanatory variables 
 
. correlate cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu 
(obs=155) 
 
             |      cba     gdpg    l1msg       fb     open      tot    ebrdi   l1ccbi defact~x   vat    eu    
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |   1.0000 
        gdpg |   0.1451   1.0000 
       l1msg |   0.0160   0.1802   1.0000 
          fb |   0.4730   0.5050   0.1282   1.0000 
        open |   0.2494   0.1306  -0.1989   0.2023   1.0000 
         tot |   0.4521   0.0387   0.0519   0.2405   0.2443   1.0000 
       ebrdi |   0.0125  -0.0712  -0.5061  -0.1767   0.4658   0.2678   1.0000 
      l1ccbi |   0.3640  -0.0400  -0.3634   0.1022   0.3188   0.1289   0.3727   1.0000 
  defactofix |   0.5670  -0.0147   0.0587   0.3503   0.2363   0.3974  -0.0552   0.2447   1.0000 
         vat |   0.0750   0.0317   0.0163   0.1546  -0.0790  -0.0021  -0.1550   0.0228   0.0347   1.0000 
        eu |    0.0545  -0.0257  -0.2207  -0.0077   0.3646   0.2056   0.5699   0.3233   0.0495  -0.0743   1 
 
Appendix 5.2: Estimation of inflation regression by OLS 
 
 
. xi: regress lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu i.time 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     155 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 20,   134) =    5.00 
       Model |  78.5777266    20  3.92888633           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  105.337836   134  .786103254           R-squared     =  0.4272 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3418 
       Total |  183.915563   154   1.1942569           Root MSE      =  .88662 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  -.6308146   .2571821    -2.45   0.015    -1.139476   -.1221532 
        gdpg |  -.0621849   .0271283    -2.29   0.023    -.1158399   -.0085298 
       l1msg |   .0237804   .0050624     4.70   0.000     .0137678     .033793 
          fb |    .076469   .0362129     2.11   0.037     .0048461    .1480918 
        open |   .0043217   .0028773     1.50   0.135    -.0013692    .0100125 
         tot |   .0078802   .0088849     0.89   0.377    -.0096927     .025453 
       ebrdi |   .1734574   .2608658     0.66   0.507    -.3424897    .6894045 
      l1ccbi |  -1.578377   .6110523    -2.58   0.011    -2.786932   -.3698222 
  defactofix |   .0840839   .1969969     0.43   0.670    -.3055416    .4737094 
         vat |   .9993783   .6663563     1.50   0.136    -.3185583    2.317315 
          eu |   .0106969   .2309324     0.05   0.963    -.4460471    .4674409 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |   .7701197   .5065317     1.52   0.131    -.2317117    1.771951 
 _Itime_2001 |   .4267333   .4970574     0.86   0.392    -.5563596    1.409826 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.3849064   .4968536    -0.77   0.440    -1.367596    .5977835 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.2420223   .5103924    -0.47   0.636     -1.25149     .767445 
 _Itime_2004 |   .3851175   .5211349     0.74   0.461    -.6455965    1.415832 
 _Itime_2005 |    .064517   .5065685     0.13   0.899    -.9373872    1.066421 
 _Itime_2006 |   .2955697    .520528     0.57   0.571    -.7339441    1.325083 
 _Itime_2007 |   .3762072   .5204501     0.72   0.471    -.6531523    1.405567 
 _Itime_2008 |   .8754101   .4785967     1.83   0.070    -.0711708    1.821991 
 _Itime_2009 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   .6716565   1.125689     0.60   0.552     -1.55476    2.898073 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
*Test for joint significance of time dummies 
 
 
. test  _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 
_Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime 
> _2009 
 
 ( 1)  o._Itime_1999 = 0 
 ( 2)  _Itime_2000 = 0 
 ( 3)  _Itime_2001 = 0 
 ( 4)  _Itime_2002 = 0 
 ( 5)  _Itime_2003 = 0 
 ( 6)  _Itime_2004 = 0 
 ( 7)  _Itime_2005 = 0 
 ( 8)  _Itime_2006 = 0 
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 ( 9)  _Itime_2007 = 0 
 (10)  _Itime_2008 = 0 
 (11)  o._Itime_2009 = 0 
       Constraint 1 dropped 
       Constraint 11 dropped 
 
       F(  9,   134) =    3.04 
            Prob > F =    0.0025 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     155.00    154    0.4622 
            Skewness |      16.94     20    0.6570 
            Kurtosis |       1.89      1    0.1696 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     173.82    175    0.5109 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lninf 
 
         chi2(1)      =     4.78 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0288 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lninf 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 131) =      2.19 
                  Prob > F =      0.0926 
 
 
Appendix 5.3: Estimation of inflation regression by FE and RE model 
+ Hausman test 
 
 
. xi: xtreg lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu i.time, 
fe 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: cba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2002 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       155 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        17 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3489                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.2582                                        avg =       9.1 
       overall = 0.2870                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(19,119)          =      3.36 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2561                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  (omitted) 
        gdpg |  -.0546837   .0271802    -2.01   0.046    -.1085032   -.0008642 
       l1msg |   .0124851   .0050748     2.46   0.015     .0024364    .0225337 
          fb |    .035328   .0410985     0.86   0.392    -.0460511    .1167072 
        open |   .0067485   .0087291     0.77   0.441     -.010536    .0240331 
         tot |   .0233886   .0157799     1.48   0.141    -.0078571    .0546344 
       ebrdi |  -.7084684   .6253588    -1.13   0.260    -1.946741    .5298046 
      l1ccbi |  -1.329348    .664849    -2.00   0.048    -2.645815   -.0128804 
  defactofix |   .0467399   .3033178     0.15   0.878    -.5538597    .6473394 
         vat |   .8948198   .6044297     1.48   0.141    -.3020114    2.091651 
          eu |  -.2835026   .2478527    -1.14   0.255    -.7742756    .2072704 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
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 _Itime_2000 |    .827447   .2975542     2.78   0.006       .23826    1.416634 
 _Itime_2001 |   .7263703   .2706621     2.68   0.008     .1904323    1.262308 
 _Itime_2002 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.0168307   .2833613    -0.06   0.953    -.5779143    .5442529 
 _Itime_2004 |   .7549974   .3206077     2.35   0.020      .120162    1.389833 
 _Itime_2005 |   .6172059   .3259445     1.89   0.061    -.0281967    1.262608 
 _Itime_2006 |   .8646385    .342647     2.52   0.013     .1861632    1.543114 
 _Itime_2007 |   .9742344   .3715395     2.62   0.010     .2385491     1.70992 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.497097   .3806897     3.93   0.000     .7432935    2.250901 
 _Itime_2009 |   .2962255   .5236054     0.57   0.573    -.7405655    1.333016 
       _cons |   1.229915   2.867919     0.43   0.669     -4.44885    6.908681 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .68312727 
     sigma_e |  .75493878 
         rho |  .45018805   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(16, 119) =     4.11             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. estimates store fe 
 
. xi: xtreg lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu i.time, 
re 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       155 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        17 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3310                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.5579                                        avg =       9.1 
       overall = 0.4204                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(20)      =     84.43 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  -.6471789   .3061231    -2.11   0.035    -1.247169   -.0471888 
        gdpg |  -.0600399   .0263035    -2.28   0.022    -.1115938   -.0084861 
       l1msg |   .0186279   .0049564     3.76   0.000     .0089135    .0283422 
          fb |   .0612712   .0370175     1.66   0.098    -.0112817    .1338241 
        open |   .0045083   .0036017     1.25   0.211    -.0025509    .0115674 
         tot |   .0135639   .0100987     1.34   0.179    -.0062293    .0333571 
       ebrdi |   .0018316   .2900018     0.01   0.995    -.5665615    .5702246 
      l1ccbi |  -1.550297   .6113205    -2.54   0.011    -2.748464   -.3521311 
  defactofix |   .0791879   .2217125     0.36   0.721    -.3553605    .5137363 
         vat |   .9094053   .6203551     1.47   0.143    -.3064684    2.125279 
          eu |  -.0749511   .2267764    -0.33   0.741    -.5194246    .3695224 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |   .7672598    .480852     1.60   0.111    -.1751929    1.709712 
 _Itime_2001 |   .5200251   .4718278     1.10   0.270    -.4047404    1.444791 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.2676336   .4701534    -0.57   0.569    -1.189117    .6538501 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.2042607   .4820654    -0.42   0.672    -1.149092    .7405702 
 _Itime_2004 |   .4663733   .4899871     0.95   0.341    -.4939838     1.42673 
 _Itime_2005 |   .2132034   .4741583     0.45   0.653    -.7161298    1.142537 
 _Itime_2006 |   .4551041   .4862486     0.94   0.349    -.4979257    1.408134 
 _Itime_2007 |   .5368049   .4872725     1.10   0.271    -.4182317    1.491841 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.035671    .443925     2.33   0.020     .1655944    1.905748 
 _Itime_2009 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   .6088284    1.26771     0.48   0.631    -1.875837    3.093494 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .26079691 
     sigma_e |  .75493878 
         rho |  .10661539   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimates store re 
 
. hausman fe re 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpg |   -.0546837    -.0600399        .0053562        .0068477 
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       l1msg |    .0124851     .0186279       -.0061428        .0010899 
          fb |     .035328     .0612712       -.0259432        .0178548 
        open |    .0067485     .0045083        .0022403        .0079515 
         tot |    .0233886     .0135639        .0098247        .0121252 
       ebrdi |   -.7084684     .0018316       -.7102999        .5540511 
      l1ccbi |   -1.329348    -1.550297        .2209495        .2613645 
  defactofix |    .0467399     .0791879       -.0324481         .206991 
         vat |    .8948198     .9094053       -.0145855               . 
          eu |   -.2835026    -.0749511       -.2085515        .1000172 
 _Itime_2000 |     .827447     .7672598        .0601872               . 
 _Itime_2001 |    .7263703     .5200251        .2063452               . 
 _Itime_2003 |   -.0168307    -.2042607          .18743               . 
 _Itime_2004 |    .7549974     .4663733        .2886241               . 
 _Itime_2005 |    .6172059     .2132034        .4040025               . 
 _Itime_2006 |    .8646385     .4551041        .4095344               . 
 _Itime_2007 |    .9742344     .5368049        .4374295               . 
 _Itime_2008 |    1.497097     1.035671        .4614259               . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(18) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =   -20.38    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these 
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic 
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test; 
                                        see suest for a generalized test 
 
Appendix 5.4: Inflation model - Between and within variance for all 
variables  
 
 
. xtsum lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
lninf    overall |   1.78142   1.140335   -2.99537    5.68249 |     N =     291 
         between |             .7921285   .6006939   3.406685 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .8346604  -1.814644   4.208096 | T-bar =   11.64 
                 |                                            | 
cba      overall |  .1546392   .3621832          0          1 |     N =     291 
         between |             .3741657          0          1 |     n =      25 
         within  |                    0   .1546392   .1546392 | T-bar =   11.64 
                 |                                            | 
gdpg     overall |  5.149239   5.437408   -18.0147       34.5 |     N =     291 
         between |             2.779035   2.799421    15.9049 |     n =      25 
         within  |             4.772553    -17.613   23.74434 | T-bar =   11.64 
                 |                                            | 
l1msg    overall |  28.37699    29.4667   -14.1329    276.004 |     N =     266 
         between |             17.78962   8.150274   89.80534 |     n =      25 
         within  |             23.54474  -35.08755   214.5757 | T-bar =   10.64 
                 |                                            | 
fb       overall | -2.347059   3.903684      -13.1       25.5 |     N =     289 
         between |             2.590408  -6.516667       3.84 |     n =      25 
         within  |             2.973249  -11.35539   19.31294 | T-bar =   11.56 
                 |                                            | 
open     overall |  103.0023   31.49195    45.1349    203.203 |     N =     289 
         between |             28.61242   57.85231   157.6787 |     n =      25 
         within  |             14.02616   55.97229   185.8942 | T-bar =   11.56 
                 |                                            | 
tot      overall |   106.485   20.79161    73.5077    238.183 |     N =     242 
         between |             14.45807   91.55393   145.8427 |     n =      25 
         within  |             15.13587   53.74685   198.8254 | T-bar =    9.68 
                 |                                            | 
ebrdi    overall |  3.107154   .5478565        1.4          4 |     N =     289 
         between |             .5205618   1.833333      3.925 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .1938693   2.207154   3.807154 | T-bar =   11.56 
                 |                                            | 
l1ccbi   overall |  .7750055   .1651642        .34       .979 |     N =     177 
         between |              .112309   .5425202       .979 |     n =      17 
         within  |             .1228211    .425051   1.064324 | T-bar = 10.4118 
                 |                                            | 
defact~x overall |  .2886598     .45392          0          1 |     N =     291 
         between |              .398462          0          1 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .2376522  -.5446735   1.205326 | T-bar =   11.64 
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                 |                                            | 
vat      overall |  .0171821   .1301735          0          1 |     N =     291 
         between |             .0361258          0         .1 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .1253834  -.0828179   .9338488 | T-bar =   11.64 
                 |                                            | 
eu       overall |  .1821306    .386617          0          1 |     N =     291 
         between |             .2344437          0   .5454545 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .3104754   -.363324   .9321306 | T-bar =   11.64 
 
 
Appendix 5.5: Inflation model - FEVD (with 4 CBA countries) 
 
 
Appendix 5.5a Inflation performance - Stage-by-stage estimation 
 
. *Stage 1 (panel robust SE) 
. xi: xtreg lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu i.time , 
fe robust i.time             
_Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: cba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2002 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       155 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        17 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3489                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.2582                                        avg =       9.1 
       overall = 0.2870                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(16,16)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2561                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 17 clusters in ctyno) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  (omitted) 
        gdpg |  -.0546837   .0196203    -2.79   0.013     -.096277   -.0130905 
       l1msg |   .0124851   .0052811     2.36   0.031     .0012897    .0236805 
          fb |    .035328   .0371683     0.95   0.356    -.0434652    .1141213 
        open |   .0067485   .0080507     0.84   0.414    -.0103183    .0238153 
         tot |   .0233886    .013262     1.76   0.097    -.0047256    .0515028 
       ebrdi |  -.7084684   .8168121    -0.87   0.399    -2.440033    1.023096 
      l1ccbi |  -1.329348   .5704019    -2.33   0.033    -2.538546   -.1201497 
  defactofix |   .0467399   .5175766     0.09   0.929    -1.050473    1.143953 
         vat |   .8948198   .1930988     4.63   0.000     .4854686    1.304171 
          eu |  -.2835026    .245017    -1.16   0.264    -.8029153    .2359102 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |    .827447   .5764563     1.44   0.170    -.3945857     2.04948 
 _Itime_2001 |   .7263703   .3033033     2.39   0.029      .083396    1.369345 
 _Itime_2002 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.0168307   .3726068    -0.05   0.965    -.8067219    .7730605 
 _Itime_2004 |   .7549974   .2426289     3.11   0.007     .2406472    1.269348 
 _Itime_2005 |   .6172059   .3413577     1.81   0.089    -.1064402    1.340852 
 _Itime_2006 |   .8646385    .280688     3.08   0.007     .2696065     1.45967 
 _Itime_2007 |   .9742344   .2977478     3.27   0.005     .3430371    1.605432 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.497097   .3528985     4.24   0.001     .7489858    2.245209 
 _Itime_2009 |   .2962255   .4149905     0.71   0.486    -.5835152    1.175966 
       _cons |   1.229915   3.620088     0.34   0.738    -6.444328    8.904159 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .68312727 
     sigma_e |  .75493878 
         rho |  .45018805   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. *Save fixed effect (unit effects) from stage 1 
. predict fixeff, u 
(136 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 2 (regression of the FE vector on the time-invariant and slowly changing 
explantory variables - by OLS) 
. reg fixeff cba ebrdi l1ccbi   
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     155 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,   151) =   24.54 
       Model |  22.2052649     3  7.40175495           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  45.5462998   151  .301631125           R-squared     =  0.3277 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3144 
       Total |  67.7515647   154  .439945225           Root MSE      =  .54921 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      fixeff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  -.6141823   .1144441    -5.37   0.000    -.8403007   -.3880638 
       ebrdi |   .5598661   .1025604     5.46   0.000     .3572274    .7625048 
      l1ccbi |  -.6626595   .3234178    -2.05   0.042    -1.301668   -.0236509 
       _cons |   -1.20862   .3358441    -3.60   0.000    -1.872181   -.5450599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. * Save the residuals from stage 2 
. predict resfevd, residuals 
(136 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 3 (estimation of pooled OLS by including all explanatory time-variant, time-
invariant variables and unexplained part of the FE vector - error term from the stage 
2) 
 
. regress lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu  resfevd 
i.time 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     155 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 21,   133) =   10.84 
       Model |  116.093589    21  5.52826613           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   67.821974   133  .509939654           R-squared     =  0.6312 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5730 
       Total |  183.915563   154   1.1942569           Root MSE      =   .7141 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  -.6141823   .2071473    -2.96   0.004    -1.023912   -.2044528 
        gdpg |  -.0546837    .021867    -2.50   0.014    -.0979359   -.0114316 
       l1msg |   .0124851   .0042847     2.91   0.004       .00401    .0209601 
          fb |    .035328   .0295582     1.20   0.234    -.0231369     .093793 
        open |   .0067485   .0023346     2.89   0.004     .0021307    .0113664 
         tot |   .0233886   .0073809     3.17   0.002     .0087894    .0379878 
       ebrdi |  -.1486023   .2134339    -0.70   0.487    -.5707663    .2735617 
      l1ccbi |  -1.992007   .4945076    -4.03   0.000    -2.970124    -1.01389 
  defactofix |   .0467399   .1587239     0.29   0.769    -.2672099    .3606896 
         vat |   .8948198   .5368316     1.67   0.098    -.1670124    1.956652 
          eu |  -.2835026   .1891326    -1.50   0.136    -.6575995    .0905943 
     resfevd |          1   .1165875     8.58   0.000     .7693945    1.230606 
             | 
        time | 
       2001  |  -.1010767    .255624    -0.40   0.693     -.606691    .4045376 
       2002  |   -.827447    .264803    -3.12   0.002    -1.351217    -.303677 
       2003  |  -.8442777   .2637907    -3.20   0.002    -1.366046   -.3225099 
       2004  |  -.0724496   .2845577    -0.25   0.799    -.6352937    .4903944 
       2005  |  -.2102411   .2930076    -0.72   0.474    -.7897988    .3693166 
       2006  |   .0371915   .2950501     0.13   0.900    -.5464062    .6207891 
       2007  |   .1467874   .3035534     0.48   0.629    -.4536296    .7472043 
       2008  |   .6696502   .3071827     2.18   0.031     .0620547    1.277246 
       2009  |  -.5312215   .4089178    -1.30   0.196    -1.340045    .2776019 
             | 
       _cons |   .8487422   .8537954     0.99   0.322     -.840032    2.537516 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. *Diagnostic tests after 3rd stage* 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     155.00    154    0.4622 
            Skewness |      21.95     21    0.4022 
            Kurtosis |       1.74      1    0.1868 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     178.70    176    0.4292 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lninf 
 
         chi2(1)      =    32.67 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lninf 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 130) =      0.62 
                  Prob > F =      0.6061 
 
Predict resid, residuals 
 
Kdensity resid, normal 
 
 
. rvfplot, mlabel(cntry) 
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. lvr2plot, mlabel(cntry) 
 
 
 
. hilo resi ctyno time 
10 lowest and highest observations on resi 
 
  +--------------------------+ 
  |      resi   ctyno   time | 
  |--------------------------| 
  | -3.690872       1   2000 | 
  | -2.144845      16   2005 | 
  | -2.134328       8   2003 | 
  | -2.079443      25   2002 | 
  | -1.421205       5   2002 | 
  |--------------------------| 
  | -1.412706       5   2004 | 
  | -1.289507      15   2002 | 
  | -1.166808      15   2000 | 
  | -1.130314      22   2009 | 
  |  -1.11768      14   2001 | 
  +--------------------------+ 
 
  +-------------------------+ 
  |     resi   ctyno   time | 
  |-------------------------| 
  | .7954019      21   2000 | 
  | .7956773      25   2000 | 
  | .8416286       5   2000 | 
  | .8534227       5   2005 | 
  | .9085998      18   2000 | 
  |-------------------------| 
  | .9203253       5   2008 | 
  | .9382645      15   2008 | 
  | 1.113313      15   2007 | 
  |  1.11936      22   2003 | 
  | 1.870186       1   2002 | 
  +-------------------------+ 
 
. predict levi, leverage 
(136 missing values generated) 
 
. hilo levi cntry time, show(5)high 
5 highest observations on levi 
 
  +-------------------------+ 
  |     levi   cntry   time | 
  |-------------------------| 
  |  .268995     UKR   2009 | 
  | .3250492     SRB   2000 | 
  | .4431643     SRB   2001 | 
  | .5485758     BIH   2006 | 
  | .5485758     SRB   2005 | 
  +-------------------------+ 
 
 
ALBALB
ALBALB
ALBALBALB
ALB
ALB
BIH
BIH
BIH
BIH
BIHBIH
BIH
BIH
BIH
BGR
BGRBGRBGR
BGRBGR
BGR
BGR
CRO
CROCRO
CRO
CROCROCRO
CRO
CRO
CZE
CZE
ZE
CZEZEZE
EST
ESTEST
ESTESTEST
EST
EST
HUN
HUN
UNHUNHUN
HUN
HUN
LVALVA
LVA
LVA
LVA
LVA
LVA
LVA
LVA
LVA
LTULTU
LTU
LTUL U LTULTU
MKDMKD
MKDKD
MKDMKD
MKD
MDA
MDAMDAD
DA
MDADA
POL
POL
POL
P LPOLPOL POLP L
POL
ROU
R U
ROU
ROU
R U
ROU
ROU
ROUROU
SRB
SRB
SRB
SRB
SR
SRB
S S B
SVK
S K
S K
S KSVKSVK
SVK
SVK
SVK
SVN
VS N N
SVSV NNUKRUKR UKR
UK
U RUK
UK
UK
UKR
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Normalized residual squared
  443 
Appendix 5.5b: inflation performance – ‘xtfevd’ (only CBA included) 
 
. xtfevd lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu  _itimeb2001 _itimeb2002 
_itimeb2003 _itimeb2004 _itimeb2005 _itimeb2006 _itimeb2007 _itimeb2008 _itimeb2009, 
invariant(cba ebrdi) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      194           number of obs       =      237 
mean squared error         = .4203354           F( 20, 194)         = 4.910439 
root mean squared error    = .6483328           Prob > F            = 4.76e-09 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 99.61948           R-squared           = .6374333 
Total Sum of Squares       = 274.7618           adj. R-squared      = .5589395 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 175.1423 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpg |  -.0186843   .0187171    -1.00   0.319    -.0555995    .0182308 
       l1msg |   .0078899   .0033026     2.39   0.018     .0013762    .0144035 
          fb |  -.0089355   .0251457    -0.36   0.723    -.0585295    .0406585 
        open |   .0122116   .0054566     2.24   0.026     .0014497    .0229736 
         tot |   .0044066   .0050605     0.87   0.385     -.005574    .0143873 
         vat |   .9350791   .5049941     1.85   0.066    -.0609043    1.931063 
          eu |  -.1626722   .2653044    -0.61   0.540    -.6859234    .3605791 
 _itimeb2001 |  -.0754908   .2225219    -0.34   0.735    -.5143636     .363382 
 _itimeb2002 |   -.651487   .2187473    -2.98   0.003    -1.082915   -.2200589 
 _itimeb2003 |  -.7015375   .2223031    -3.16   0.002    -1.139979   -.2630963 
 _itimeb2004 |  -.2855623   .2371017    -1.20   0.230    -.7531903    .1820656 
 _itimeb2005 |  -.4099703   .2448656    -1.67   0.096    -.8929108    .0729703 
 _itimeb2006 |  -.2606088    .246929    -1.06   0.293    -.7476188    .2264013 
 _itimeb2007 |  -.1253398   .2581695    -0.49   0.628    -.6345192    .3838396 
 _itimeb2008 |   .3327671   .2679142     1.24   0.216    -.1956313    .8611655 
 _itimeb2009 |  -.6760545   .3296745    -2.05   0.042    -1.326261   -.0258481 
         cba |  -.7038182   .3345448    -2.10   0.037     -1.36363   -.0440062 
       ebrdi |  -.6298597   .2894539    -2.18   0.031     -1.20074   -.0589791 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   2.193502   1.104957     1.99   0.049     .0142299    4.372773 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.5c Inflation performance - Xtfevd (CBA and defactofix 
included) 
 
. xtfevd lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix vat eu  _itimeb2001 
_itimeb2002 _itimeb2003 _itimeb2004 _itimeb2005 _itimeb2006 _itimeb2007 _itimeb2008 
_itimeb2009, invariant(cba ebrdi) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      193           number of obs       =      237 
mean squared error         = .4194591           F( 21, 193)         = 4.670842 
root mean squared error    = .6476567           Prob > F            = 8.65e-09 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 99.41182           R-squared           = .6381891 
Total Sum of Squares       = 274.7618           adj. R-squared      = .5575784 
Estimation Sum of Squares  =   175.35 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpg |  -.0189399   .0187468    -1.01   0.314    -.0559149    .0180351 
       l1msg |   .0075539   .0032817     2.30   0.022     .0010813    .0140265 
          fb |  -.0090471   .0249388    -0.36   0.717    -.0582348    .0401406 
        open |   .0122489    .005459     2.24   0.026     .0014819    .0230158 
         tot |   .0042656   .0050699     0.84   0.401    -.0057339    .0142651 
  defactofix |  -.1559313   .2408224    -0.65   0.518     -.630913    .3190503 
         vat |   .9328164   .5018904     1.86   0.065    -.0570779    1.922711 
          eu |  -.1662221   .2650648    -0.63   0.531    -.6890178    .3565736 
 _itimeb2001 |  -.0640545   .2224051    -0.29   0.774    -.5027111     .374602 
 _itimeb2002 |  -.6555547   .2197275    -2.98   0.003     -1.08893   -.2221792 
 _itimeb2003 |  -.7005997   .2227122    -3.15   0.002    -1.139862   -.2613374 
 _itimeb2004 |  -.2840184   .2376834    -1.19   0.234    -.7528089     .184772 
 _itimeb2005 |  -.3992297   .2440055    -1.64   0.103    -.8804894    .0820301 
 _itimeb2006 |  -.2485361   .2459721    -1.01   0.314    -.7336747    .2366025 
 _itimeb2007 |  -.1111487   .2562446    -0.43   0.665    -.6165481    .3942506 
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 _itimeb2008 |   .3494022    .266294     1.31   0.191    -.1758179    .8746223 
 _itimeb2009 |  -.6554932   .3300719    -1.99   0.048    -1.306505   -.0044819 
         cba |  -.6012392   .3501566    -1.72   0.088    -1.291864    .0893857 
       ebrdi |  -.6621008   .2853098    -2.32   0.021    -1.224826   -.0993752 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   2.342948   1.100545     2.13   0.035      .172308    4.513588 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.5d: Inflation performance - Xtfevd (CBA, defactofix and 
CCBI included) 
 
 
. xtfevd lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix l1ccbi vat eu _itimeb2001 
_itimeb2002 _itimeb2003 _itimeb2004 _itimeb2005 _itimeb2006 _itimeb2007 _itimeb2008 
_itimeb2009, invariant(cba ebrdi l1ccbi) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      118           number of obs       =      155 
mean squared error         = .4375611           F( 22, 118)         = 3.194856 
root mean squared error    =  .661484           Prob > F            = .0000445 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 67.82197           R-squared           = .6312331 
Total Sum of Squares       = 183.9156           adj. R-squared      = .5187279 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 116.0936 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpg |  -.0546837   .0402868    -1.36   0.177    -.1344626    .0250951 
       l1msg |   .0124851   .0062977     1.98   0.050     .0000139    .0249562 
          fb |    .035328   .0641731     0.55   0.583    -.0917522    .1624083 
        open |   .0067485   .0092904     0.73   0.469     -.011649    .0251461 
         tot |   .0233886   .0241193     0.97   0.334    -.0243742    .0711514 
  defactofix |   .0467399    .339528     0.14   0.891    -.6256179    .7190976 
         vat |   .8948198   .7115343     1.26   0.211    -.5142117    2.303851 
          eu |  -.2835026   .2735224    -1.04   0.302    -.8251514    .2581462 
 _itimeb2001 |  -.1010767   .2943891    -0.34   0.732    -.6840473    .4818939 
 _itimeb2002 |   -.827447    .320393    -2.58   0.011    -1.461912   -.1929816 
 _itimeb2003 |  -.8442777   .3226181    -2.62   0.010    -1.483149   -.2054061 
 _itimeb2004 |  -.0724496   .3710893    -0.20   0.846    -.8073076    .6624083 
 _itimeb2005 |  -.2102411    .392175    -0.54   0.593    -.9868544    .5663722 
 _itimeb2006 |   .0371915   .3896512     0.10   0.924     -.734424     .808807 
 _itimeb2007 |   .1467874   .4352834     0.34   0.737    -.7151922    1.008767 
 _itimeb2008 |   .6696502   .4129752     1.62   0.108    -.1481531    1.487454 
 _itimeb2009 |  -.5312215   .5314657    -1.00   0.320    -1.583668    .5212253 
         cba |  -.6141823   .5673333    -1.08   0.281    -1.737657    .5092921 
       ebrdi |  -.1486023   .5152978    -0.29   0.774    -1.169032    .8718276 
      l1ccbi |  -1.992007   .8656309    -2.30   0.023    -3.706192   -.2778224 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   .8487422   2.421635     0.35   0.727    -3.946754    5.644239 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.5e test for serial correlation 
 
xtserial lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix l1ccbi vat eu 
_itimeb2001 _itimeb2002 _itimeb2003 _itimeb2004 _itimeb2005 _itimeb2006 
_itimeb2007 _itimeb2008 _itimeb2009 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      16) =     11.376 
           Prob > F =      0.0039 
 
.  
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Appendix 5.6: Inflation model - System GMM (4 CBA countries) MSG and 
CCBI treated as endogenous 
 
Appendix 5.6a: One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent 
variable and minimum number of instruments (only with CBA) 
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf cba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu i.time, 
gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg, laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi 
vat eu i.time)  robust  
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 56                      Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(19) =   2361.63                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4639305   .0527785     8.79   0.000     .3604865    .5673746 
             | 
         cba |  -.3061125   .1713281    -1.79   0.074    -.6419095    .0296844 
        gdpg |  -.0064315   .0084673    -0.76   0.448    -.0230271    .0101642 
         msg |   .0088429   .0040539     2.18   0.029     .0008974    .0167885 
          fb |   .0025863   .0167791     0.15   0.878    -.0303001    .0354727 
        open |   .0034007   .0014445     2.35   0.019     .0005696    .0062319 
         tot |   .0037916   .0018184     2.09   0.037     .0002277    .0073555 
       ebrdi |  -.2232649   .1572676    -1.42   0.156    -.5315037    .0849739 
         vat |   .6211287   .0989985     6.27   0.000     .4270953    .8151621 
          eu |   .1692215   .1754875     0.96   0.335    -.1747277    .5131707 
 _Itime_2000 |   .5309532   .2761268     1.92   0.054    -.0102453    1.072152 
 _Itime_2001 |   .5661692   .2160038     2.62   0.009     .1428094    .9895289 
 _Itime_2002 |   .0170196    .280702     0.06   0.952    -.5331462    .5671853 
 _Itime_2003 |   .1426942   .2994785     0.48   0.634    -.4442729    .7296614 
 _Itime_2004 |   .5305055   .2307795     2.30   0.022     .0781861    .9828249 
 _Itime_2005 |   .1986226   .2774023     0.72   0.474    -.3450759    .7423211 
 _Itime_2006 |   .3889961   .2341876     1.66   0.097    -.0700032    .8479955 
 _Itime_2007 |   .4316993   .2407429     1.79   0.073    -.0401481    .9035468 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.013989   .1920099     5.28   0.000     .6376569    1.390322 
       _cons |   .2571777   .6634739     0.39   0.698    -1.043207    1.557563 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
    _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 
    _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lninf 
    L2.msg 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
    _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 
    _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lninf 
    DL.msg 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.11  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.92  Pr > z =  0.356 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =  70.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
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  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =   8.13  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =   6.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.982 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =   1.62  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   7.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.967 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   0.14  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   4.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.998 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   3.31  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
>  _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =   6.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.994 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   1.60  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
Appendix 5.6b: One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent 
variable and minimum number of instruments (with CBA and defactofix) 
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf cba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix vat eu i.time, 
gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg , laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba gdpg fb defactofix 
open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 57                      Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(20) =   3983.41                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4657802   .0517046     9.01   0.000     .3644411    .5671194 
             | 
         cba |  -.3028429   .1634869    -1.85   0.064    -.6232713    .0175855 
        gdpg |  -.0063912   .0082364    -0.78   0.438    -.0225344    .0097519 
         msg |   .0083968    .003905     2.15   0.032     .0007431    .0160504 
          fb |   .0043333   .0174643     0.25   0.804    -.0298962    .0385628 
        open |   .0034576   .0014343     2.41   0.016     .0006464    .0062688 
         tot |   .0038242   .0018474     2.07   0.038     .0002033    .0074451 
       ebrdi |  -.2400691   .1600861    -1.50   0.134    -.5538321    .0736938 
  defactofix |  -.0138704   .0821436    -0.17   0.866     -.174869    .1471282 
         vat |   .6189535   .0978384     6.33   0.000     .4271937    .8107133 
          eu |   .1852163   .1779883     1.04   0.298    -.1636343    .5340669 
 _Itime_2000 |   .5390328   .2676489     2.01   0.044     .0144506    1.063615 
 _Itime_2001 |   .5701964   .2067132     2.76   0.006      .165046    .9753469 
 _Itime_2002 |   .0155312   .2709071     0.06   0.954     -.515437    .5464994 
 _Itime_2003 |   .1451683   .2937011     0.49   0.621    -.4304752    .7208119 
 _Itime_2004 |   .5292617    .228246     2.32   0.020     .0819079    .9766156 
 _Itime_2005 |   .1959581   .2706275     0.72   0.469    -.3344621    .7263782 
 _Itime_2006 |   .3883307   .2326415     1.67   0.095    -.0676382    .8442997 
 _Itime_2007 |   .4292987   .2383272     1.80   0.072    -.0378142    .8964115 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.005695   .1929883     5.21   0.000     .6274447    1.383945 
       _cons |   .3131708   .6786487     0.46   0.644    -1.016956    1.643298 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
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    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lninf 
    L2.msg 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lninf 
    DL.msg 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.10  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.93  Pr > z =  0.355 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =  71.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =   7.28  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =   4.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.996 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =   2.31  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   9.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.918 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  -2.37  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   2.99  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   4.29  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005  
> _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   5.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.995 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   1.53  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
 
Appendix 5.6c: One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent 
variable and minimum number of instruments (with CBA, defactofix and 
CCBI) 
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf cba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi defactofix vat eu 
i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg ccbi, laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba gdpg fb 
defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 74                      Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(21) =  61247.98                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4133376   .0923474     4.48   0.000       .23234    .5943352 
             | 
         cba |  -.2735989   .1209112    -2.26   0.024    -.5105806   -.0366172 
        gdpg |  -.0127862   .0227034    -0.56   0.573    -.0572839    .0317116 
         msg |   .0227702   .0075813     3.00   0.003     .0079112    .0376293 
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          fb |    .003244   .0385821     0.08   0.933    -.0723755    .0788636 
        open |   .0039723   .0022929     1.73   0.083    -.0005217    .0084664 
         tot |   .0037358   .0057687     0.65   0.517    -.0075705    .0150422 
       ebrdi |   .2923156   .2116847     1.38   0.167    -.1225788      .70721 
        ccbi |  -.9374185   .6811244    -1.38   0.169    -2.272398    .3975608 
  defactofix |   .1261089   .1015027     1.24   0.214    -.0728328    .3250506 
         vat |   .5340823   .1606154     3.33   0.001      .219282    .8488826 
          eu |  -.0650747   .1790189    -0.36   0.716    -.4159453     .285796 
 _Itime_2000 |  -.0106298    .305064    -0.03   0.972    -.6085443    .5872847 
 _Itime_2001 |  -.0515282   .3080127    -0.17   0.867     -.655222    .5521657 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.4385532   .3836107    -1.14   0.253    -1.190416      .31331 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.4083327   .3386198    -1.21   0.228    -1.072015    .2553499 
 _Itime_2004 |   .2190135   .2733053     0.80   0.423     -.316655     .754682 
 _Itime_2005 |  -.1600374   .3527307    -0.45   0.650    -.8513768     .531302 
 _Itime_2006 |   .0598999   .2451646     0.24   0.807     -.420614    .5404137 
 _Itime_2007 |   .0013767   .2781369     0.00   0.996    -.5437617     .546515 
 _Itime_2008 |   .8208721   .2662447     3.08   0.002      .299042    1.342702 
       _cons |  -.5378359    1.09392    -0.49   0.623     -2.68188    1.606208 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lninf 
    L2.(msg ccbi) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lninf 
    DL.(msg ccbi) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.01  Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.85  Pr > z =  0.397 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(52)   =  65.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.095 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(52)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(28)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg ccbi, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(36)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005  
> _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(34)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
Appendix 5.6d: *Checking whether the coefficient on lagged dependent 
variable from dynamic estimator is between coefficient on lagged 
dependent variable from OLS and FE - conduct OLS and FE with lagged 
dependent variable  
 
. xi: regress lninf L.lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu 
i.time 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     155 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 21,   133) =    9.21 
       Model |  108.981934    21  5.18961591           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  74.9336284   133   .56341074           R-squared     =  0.5926 
  449 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5282 
       Total |  183.915563   154   1.1942569           Root MSE      =  .75061 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .5027727   .0684412     7.35   0.000     .3673987    .6381467 
             | 
         cba |  -.2480504   .2238754    -1.11   0.270    -.6908674    .1947666 
        gdpg |  -.0201014   .0236702    -0.85   0.397    -.0669202    .0267174 
       l1msg |   .0102729   .0046636     2.20   0.029     .0010485    .0194973 
          fb |   .0334065   .0312129     1.07   0.286    -.0283313    .0951444 
        open |   .0021594   .0024536     0.88   0.380    -.0026937    .0070126 
         tot |   .0052803   .0075302     0.70   0.484    -.0096142    .0201748 
       ebrdi |   .0880168   .2211522     0.40   0.691    -.3494137    .5254474 
      l1ccbi |  -.9934621   .5234022    -1.90   0.060    -2.028731    .0418071 
  defactofix |   .0515366   .1668343     0.31   0.758    -.2784551    .3815284 
         vat |   .6760186   .5658448     1.19   0.234    -.4432005    1.795238 
          eu |  -.0033297   .1955142    -0.02   0.986    -.3900493    .3833898 
 _Itime_1999 |          0  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |   .7113972   .4288988     1.66   0.100    -.1369479    1.559742 
 _Itime_2001 |   .5007893   .4209242     1.19   0.236    -.3317824    1.333361 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.3212202   .4207203    -0.76   0.447    -1.153389    .5109483 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.0419886   .4329499    -0.10   0.923    -.8983467    .8143695 
 _Itime_2004 |   .7417133   .4438497     1.67   0.097    -.1362042    1.619631 
 _Itime_2005 |     .29701   .4300217     0.69   0.491    -.5535562    1.147576 
 _Itime_2006 |   .5269775   .4417979     1.19   0.235    -.3468817    1.400837 
 _Itime_2007 |   .5092991   .4409798     1.15   0.250    -.3629419     1.38154 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.006556   .4055679     2.48   0.014     .2043581    1.808753 
 _Itime_2009 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |   .0179345   .9571418     0.02   0.985    -1.875255    1.911124 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xi: xtreg lninf L.lninf cba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat eu 
i.time , fe 
  
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: cba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2002 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       155 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        17 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3946                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.5269                                        avg =       9.1 
       overall = 0.4437                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(20,118)          =      3.84 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1413                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .2603267    .087271     2.98   0.003     .0875063     .433147 
             | 
         cba |          0  (omitted) 
        gdpg |  -.0375621   .0269393    -1.39   0.166    -.0909093    .0157851 
       l1msg |   .0093101   .0050283     1.85   0.067    -.0006472    .0192675 
          fb |    .026081   .0399195     0.65   0.515    -.0529705    .1051326 
        open |   .0081376   .0084659     0.96   0.338    -.0086272    .0249025 
         tot |   .0222952   .0152853     1.46   0.147    -.0079739    .0525643 
       ebrdi |  -.6281403   .6061836    -1.04   0.302    -1.828549    .5722682 
      l1ccbi |  -1.033191   .6514367    -1.59   0.115    -2.323213    .2568307 
  defactofix |   .0132103   .2939419     0.04   0.964    -.5688747    .5952954 
         vat |   .8146669   .5859342     1.39   0.167    -.3456424    1.974976 
          eu |  -.2388922   .2404811    -0.99   0.323    -.7151102    .2373258 
 _Itime_1999 |          0  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |   .8557655    .288302     2.97   0.004     .2848491    1.426682 
 _Itime_2001 |   .7475509      .2622     2.85   0.005     .2283235    1.266778 
 _Itime_2002 |          0  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2003 |   .1023264   .2772937     0.37   0.713    -.4467907    .6514435 
 _Itime_2004 |   .9153939   .3150921     2.91   0.004     .2914258    1.539362 
 _Itime_2005 |   .6636595   .3160221     2.10   0.038     .0378497    1.289469 
 _Itime_2006 |   .8879307   .3319044     2.68   0.009     .2306695    1.545192 
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 _Itime_2007 |   .9335144   .3600503     2.59   0.011     .2205167    1.646512 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.457121   .3688959     3.95   0.000     .7266061    2.187635 
 _Itime_2009 |   .2796861   .5070794     0.55   0.582    -.7244692    1.283841 
       _cons |   .2254762   2.797574     0.08   0.936    -5.314483    5.765435 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .5244859 
     sigma_e |  .73106778 
         rho |  .33980232   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(16, 118) =     1.47             Prob > F = 0.1230 
 
.  
 
Appendix 5.6e Dynamic estimation (one-step system GMM) of inflation 
performance model with ‘pca’ option used for lowering the number of 
instruments 
 
. *One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent variable and minimum number 
of instruments(with 4 CBA countries)* 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf cba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu i.time, 
gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg, laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi 
vat eu i.time)  robust pca i.time             
 
_Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 36                      Obs per group: min =        38 
Wald chi2(19) =   7649.17                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        38 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .5528311   .1880125     2.94   0.003     .1843334    .9213287 
             | 
         cba |  -.2639115   .1803957    -1.46   0.143    -.6174806    .0896577 
        gdpg |  -.0040119   .0081185    -0.49   0.621    -.0199238    .0119001 
         msg |   .0051613   .0027437     1.88   0.060    -.0002163     .010539 
          fb |   .0055143   .0168516     0.33   0.743    -.0275142    .0385429 
        open |   .0034467   .0018715     1.84   0.066    -.0002214    .0071148 
         tot |   .0034411   .0019785     1.74   0.082    -.0004366    .0073188 
       ebrdi |  -.2174344   .2194684    -0.99   0.322    -.6475846    .2127158 
         vat |    .547241   .1640865     3.34   0.001     .2256373    .8688447 
          eu |   .1280062   .2086674     0.61   0.540    -.2809745    .5369868 
 _Itime_2000 |   .6459994   .2991861     2.16   0.031     .0596054    1.232393 
 _Itime_2001 |   .6586403   .2290491     2.88   0.004     .2097124    1.107568 
 _Itime_2002 |   .0747318   .2897098     0.26   0.796    -.4930889    .6425525 
 _Itime_2003 |   .2522143   .4030073     0.63   0.531    -.5376654    1.042094 
 _Itime_2004 |   .6876901   .2903451     2.37   0.018     .1186242    1.256756 
 _Itime_2005 |   .3309456   .3165856     1.05   0.296    -.2895508     .951442 
 _Itime_2006 |   .5466059   .3456027     1.58   0.114     -.130763    1.223975 
 _Itime_2007 |   .5801986   .3017254     1.92   0.054    -.0111722    1.171569 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.079503   .2483932     4.35   0.000     .5926613    1.566345 
       _cons |   .0976708    .960068     0.10   0.919    -1.784028     1.97937 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
    _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 
    _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.msg 
    L.L.lninf 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
    _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 
    _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.msg 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.64  Pr > z =  0.008 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.87  Pr > z =  0.383 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  30.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.017 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =   8.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.930 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 18 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.730 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.511 
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf cba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix vat eu i.time, 
gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg , laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba gdpg fb defactofix 
open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust pca 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 37                      Obs per group: min =        38 
Wald chi2(20) =  11395.86                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        38 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .5552031   .1910238     2.91   0.004     .1808033     .929603 
             | 
         cba |  -.2601173   .1683082    -1.55   0.122    -.5899953    .0697607 
        gdpg |  -.0038691   .0079841    -0.48   0.628    -.0195177    .0117795 
         msg |   .0049178   .0026706     1.84   0.066    -.0003166    .0101522 
          fb |   .0061045   .0172188     0.35   0.723    -.0276437    .0398527 
        open |   .0034663   .0019353     1.79   0.073    -.0003269    .0072595 
         tot |   .0034546   .0020038     1.72   0.085    -.0004728    .0073819 
       ebrdi |  -.2242757   .2268157    -0.99   0.323    -.6688262    .2202749 
  defactofix |  -.0072699    .074992    -0.10   0.923    -.1542515    .1397118 
         vat |   .5436374   .1668105     3.26   0.001     .2166949    .8705799 
          eu |   .1335212   .2103006     0.63   0.525    -.2786604    .5457027 
 _Itime_2000 |   .6498121   .3017706     2.15   0.031     .0583525    1.241272 
 _Itime_2001 |   .6608526   .2246567     2.94   0.003     .2205337    1.101172 
 _Itime_2002 |   .0739156   .2835974     0.26   0.794    -.4819251    .6297562 
 _Itime_2003 |   .2538546   .4075004     0.62   0.533    -.5448315    1.052541 
 _Itime_2004 |   .6889335   .2995531     2.30   0.021     .1018202    1.276047 
 _Itime_2005 |   .3313031   .3175638     1.04   0.297    -.2911106    .9537168 
 _Itime_2006 |   .5481626   .3555869     1.54   0.123    -.1487751      1.2451 
 _Itime_2007 |   .5808801   .3072423     1.89   0.059    -.0213036    1.183064 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.076146   .2553947     4.21   0.000     .5755818    1.576711 
       _cons |    .118123   .9911652     0.12   0.905    -1.824525    2.060771 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.msg 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.msg 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.59  Pr > z =  0.010 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.87  Pr > z =  0.383 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  30.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.017 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  10.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.858 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 18 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.730 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.511 
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf cba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi defactofix vat eu 
i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg ccbi , laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba gdpg fb 
defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu i.time)  robust pca 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2004 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 40                      Obs per group: min =        55 
Wald chi2(21) =  67321.49                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        55 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4976537    .151398     3.29   0.001      .200919    .7943884 
             | 
         cba |  -.2260211    .211121    -1.07   0.284    -.6398107    .1877684 
        gdpg |   -.007009   .0196149    -0.36   0.721    -.0454535    .0314355 
         msg |   .0169707   .0073696     2.30   0.021     .0025266    .0314148 
          fb |   .0129984   .0415417     0.31   0.754    -.0684218    .0944185 
        open |   .0034144   .0020827     1.64   0.101    -.0006675    .0074964 
         tot |   .0044132   .0054012     0.82   0.414    -.0061729    .0149993 
       ebrdi |   .2220976   .2124077     1.05   0.296    -.1942138    .6384089 
        ccbi |  -1.054577   1.087319    -0.97   0.332    -3.185682    1.076528 
  defactofix |   .0815699   .1065735     0.77   0.444    -.1273104    .2904502 
         vat |   .4849265   .1051745     4.61   0.000     .2787884    .6910647 
          eu |  -.0418527   .2105153    -0.20   0.842    -.4544552    .3707498 
 _Itime_2000 |  -.2151111   .2667061    -0.81   0.420    -.7378455    .3076233 
 _Itime_2001 |  -.2573768   .2123408    -1.21   0.225    -.6735571    .1588035 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.7358616   .2918759    -2.52   0.012    -1.307928   -.1637954 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.6809864   .2942832    -2.31   0.021    -1.257771   -.1042019 
 _Itime_2005 |  -.3917967   .2678245    -1.46   0.143    -.9167232    .1331297 
 _Itime_2006 |  -.1662154   .1840303    -0.90   0.366    -.5269081    .1944773 
 _Itime_2007 |  -.2429351   .1504028    -1.62   0.106    -.5377192     .051849 
 _Itime_2008 |   .5302382   .2404021     2.21   0.027     .0590586    1.001418 
 _Itime_2009 |   -.336566   .2936314    -1.15   0.252    -.9120729    .2389409 
       _cons |   .0199831   1.482004     0.01   0.989    -2.884692    2.924658 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
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  Standard 
    D.(cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.(msg ccbi) 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(msg ccbi) 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.86  Pr > z =  0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.85  Pr > z =  0.397 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =  20.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.311 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 21 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.736 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.671 
 
 
Appendix 5.6f Estiomation of the preferred model (where defactoFIX 
and CCBI are included) with interaction between CBA and MSG 
 
. xtabond2 lninf L.lninf i.cba gdpg c.msg i.cba#c.msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi 
defactofix vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg ccbi cbamsg, 
laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba  
> gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
0b.cba dropped due to collinearity 
0b.cba#co.msg dropped due to collinearity 
1998b.time dropped due to collinearity 
1999.time dropped due to collinearity 
2004.time dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 93                      Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(22) =  18334.71                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |    .415943   .0936605     4.44   0.000     .2323718    .5995143 
             | 
       1.cba |   .0767912   .1667385     0.46   0.645    -.2500103    .4035927 
        gdpg |  -.0131177   .0218015    -0.60   0.547     -.055848    .0296125 
         msg |   .0214536   .0066099     3.25   0.001     .0084984    .0344088 
             | 
   cba#c.msg | 
          1  |  -.0201526   .0092075    -2.19   0.029    -.0381988   -.0021063 
             | 
          fb |   .0166235   .0384847     0.43   0.666    -.0588051     .092052 
        open |    .003348   .0022216     1.51   0.132    -.0010062    .0077022 
         tot |   .0035896   .0053045     0.68   0.499     -.006807    .0139861 
       ebrdi |   .2187959   .1943406     1.13   0.260    -.1621046    .5996964 
        ccbi |  -.4271802   .5049099    -0.85   0.398    -1.416785    .5624249 
  defactofix |   .0885962   .0937916     0.94   0.345     -.095232    .2724243 
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         vat |   .5429553   .1411478     3.85   0.000     .2663106       .8196 
          eu |  -.0062168   .1917987    -0.03   0.974    -.3821353    .3697017 
             | 
        time | 
       2000  |  -.1240813   .3100992    -0.40   0.689    -.7318645    .4837019 
       2001  |  -.1107358   .1894373    -0.58   0.559    -.4820262    .2605545 
       2002  |  -.6718101   .2848722    -2.36   0.018    -1.230149   -.1134708 
       2003  |  -.6484138   .2933601    -2.21   0.027    -1.223389   -.0734386 
       2005  |  -.3882323   .2445444    -1.59   0.112    -.8675305    .0910659 
       2006  |  -.1729429   .2137196    -0.81   0.418    -.5918257    .2459398 
       2007  |  -.2333855   .1420068    -1.64   0.100    -.5117138    .0449428 
       2008  |   .4779356   .2262106     2.11   0.035     .0345708    .9213003 
       2009  |  -.2806911   .2896737    -0.97   0.333    -.8484411    .2870588 
             | 
       _cons |  -.3337998   1.058864    -0.32   0.753    -2.409135    1.741535 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu 1998b.time 1999.time 
    2000.time 2001.time 2002.time 2003.time 2004.time 2005.time 2006.time 
    2007.time 2008.time 2009.time) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.(msg ccbi cbamsg) 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu 1998b.time 1999.time 
    2000.time 2001.time 2002.time 2003.time 2004.time 2005.time 2006.time 
    2007.time 2008.time 2009.time 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(msg ccbi cbamsg) 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.93  Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.69  Pr > z =  0.492 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(70)   =  76.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.292 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(70)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(38)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(52)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg ccbi cbamsg, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(56)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu 1998b.time 1999.time 2000.time 
2001.time 2002.time 2003.time 2004.time 2005.time 2006.time 2007.time 2008.time 
2009.time) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(52)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
. margins, dydx(_all) force 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: continuous option implied because a factor with only one level was specified 
in the dydx() option) 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        153 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : L.lninf 1.cba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi defactofix vat eu 
2000.time 2001.time 2002.time 2003.time 2005.time 2006.time 2007.time 2008.time 
2009.time 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
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         L1. |    .415943   .0936605     4.44   0.000     .2323718    .5995143 
             | 
       1.cba |    -.35234   .1239431    -2.84   0.004     -.595264    -.109416 
        gdpg |  -.0131177   .0218015    -0.60   0.547     -.055848    .0296125 
         msg |   .0168435   .0054402     3.10   0.002     .0061809    .0275061 
          fb |   .0166235   .0384847     0.43   0.666    -.0588051     .092052 
        open |    .003348   .0022216     1.51   0.132    -.0010062    .0077022 
         tot |   .0035896   .0053045     0.68   0.499     -.006807    .0139861 
       ebrdi |   .2187959   .1943406     1.13   0.260    -.1621046    .5996964 
        ccbi |  -.4271802   .5049099    -0.85   0.398    -1.416785    .5624249 
  defactofix |   .0885962   .0937916     0.94   0.345     -.095232    .2724243 
         vat |   .5429553   .1411478     3.85   0.000     .2663106       .8196 
          eu |  -.0062168   .1917987    -0.03   0.974    -.3821353    .3697017 
             | 
        time | 
       2000  |  -.1240813   .3100992    -0.40   0.689    -.7318645    .4837019 
       2001  |  -.1107358   .1894373    -0.58   0.559    -.4820262    .2605545 
       2002  |  -.6718101   .2848722    -2.36   0.018    -1.230149   -.1134708 
       2003  |  -.6484138   .2933601    -2.21   0.027    -1.223389   -.0734386 
       2005  |  -.3882323   .2445444    -1.59   0.112    -.8675305    .0910659 
       2006  |  -.1729429   .2137196    -0.81   0.418    -.5918257    .2459398 
       2007  |  -.2333855   .1420068    -1.64   0.100    -.5117138    .0449428 
       2008  |   .4779356   .2262106     2.11   0.035     .0345708    .9213003 
       2009  |  -.2806911   .2896737    -0.97   0.333    -.8484411    .2870588 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
 
. margins, dydx(cba) at(msg=(-15 -0.39 11.7 23.84 49.7 78.06 89.99)) force 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: continuous option implied because a factor with only one level was specified 
in the dydx() option) 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        153 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.cba 
 
1._at        : msg             =         -15 
2._at        : msg             =        -.39 
3._at        : msg             =        11.7 
4._at        : msg             =       23.84 
5._at        : msg             =        49.7 
6._at        : msg             =       78.06 
7._at        : msg             =       89.99 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.cba        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .3790795    .287608     1.32   0.187    -.1846218    .9427808 
          2  |   .0846507    .169548     0.50   0.618    -.2476573    .4169586 
          3  |  -.1589937   .1070062    -1.49   0.137    -.3687221    .0507347 
          4  |  -.4036457   .1379132    -2.93   0.003    -.6739506   -.1333409 
          5  |  -.9247908   .3441708    -2.69   0.007    -1.599353   -.2502284 
          6  |  -1.496317   .5982139    -2.50   0.012    -2.668795   -.3238393 
          7  |  -1.736737   .7066246    -2.46   0.014    -3.121696   -.3517783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  456 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: msg 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.7: Inflation model - Calculation of the long-run 
coefficient on CBA 
 
 
. nlcom _b[cba]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[cba]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.4663652   .2230883    -2.09   0.037    -.9036101   -.0291202 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.8: Inflation model - FEVD (strong and weak CBA) 
 
Appendix 5.8a Strong and weak CBA - Stage-by-stage estimation 
 
. *Stage 1 (panel robust SE) 
. xi: xtreg lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix 
vat eu i.time , fe robust 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: strongcba omitted because of collinearity 
note: weakcba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2002 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       155 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        17 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3489                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.2582                                        avg =       9.1 
       overall = 0.2870                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(16,16)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2561                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 17 clusters in ctyno) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |  (omitted) 
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     weakcba |  (omitted) 
        gdpg |  -.0546837   .0196203    -2.79   0.013     -.096277   -.0130905 
       l1msg |   .0124851   .0052811     2.36   0.031     .0012897    .0236805 
          fb |    .035328   .0371683     0.95   0.356    -.0434652    .1141213 
        open |   .0067485   .0080507     0.84   0.414    -.0103183    .0238153 
         tot |   .0233886    .013262     1.76   0.097    -.0047256    .0515028 
       ebrdi |  -.7084684   .8168121    -0.87   0.399    -2.440033    1.023096 
      l1ccbi |  -1.329348   .5704019    -2.33   0.033    -2.538546   -.1201497 
  defactofix |   .0467399   .5175766     0.09   0.929    -1.050473    1.143953 
         vat |   .8948198   .1930988     4.63   0.000     .4854686    1.304171 
          eu |  -.2835026    .245017    -1.16   0.264    -.8029153    .2359102 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |    .827447   .5764563     1.44   0.170    -.3945857     2.04948 
 _Itime_2001 |   .7263703   .3033033     2.39   0.029      .083396    1.369345 
 _Itime_2002 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.0168307   .3726068    -0.05   0.965    -.8067219    .7730605 
 _Itime_2004 |   .7549974   .2426289     3.11   0.007     .2406472    1.269348 
 _Itime_2005 |   .6172059   .3413577     1.81   0.089    -.1064402    1.340852 
 _Itime_2006 |   .8646385    .280688     3.08   0.007     .2696065     1.45967 
 _Itime_2007 |   .9742344   .2977478     3.27   0.005     .3430371    1.605432 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.497097   .3528985     4.24   0.001     .7489858    2.245209 
 _Itime_2009 |   .2962255   .4149905     0.71   0.486    -.5835152    1.175966 
       _cons |   1.229915   3.620088     0.34   0.738    -6.444328    8.904159 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .68312727 
     sigma_e |  .75493878 
         rho |  .45018805   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Save fixed effect (unit effects) from stage 1 
. predict fixedef, u 
(136 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 2 (regression of the FE vector on the time-invariant and slowly changing 
explantory variables - by OLS) 
. reg fixedef strongcba weakcba ebrdi l1ccbi   
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     155 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,   150) =   28.17 
       Model |  29.0629202     4  7.26573004           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  38.6886445   150  .257924297           R-squared     =  0.4290 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4137 
       Total |  67.7515647   154  .439945225           Root MSE      =  .50786 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     fixedef |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |   -1.08795   .1401487    -7.76   0.000    -1.364871   -.8110297 
     weakcba |   -.180387   .1351932    -1.33   0.184     -.447516     .086742 
       ebrdi |   .4587825   .0968441     4.74   0.000     .2674278    .6501372 
      l1ccbi |  -.4150091   .3029014    -1.37   0.173    -1.013514    .1834953 
       _cons |  -1.058327    .311925    -3.39   0.001    -1.674661   -.4419925 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. * Save the residuals from stage 2 
. predict rsifevd, residuals 
(136 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 3 (estimation of pooled OLS by including all explanatory time-variant, time-
invariant variables and unexplained part of the FE vector - error term from the stage 
2) 
 
. regress lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi l1ccbi defactofix vat 
eu rsifevd i.time 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     155 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,   132) =   10.27 
       Model |  116.093589    22   5.2769813           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  67.8219739   132  .513802833           R-squared     =  0.6312 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5698 
       Total |  183.915563   154   1.1942569           Root MSE      =   .7168 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |   -1.08795   .3106867    -3.50   0.001    -1.702519   -.4733812 
     weakcba |   -.180387   .2283862    -0.79   0.431    -.6321574    .2713834 
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        gdpg |  -.0546837   .0220891    -2.48   0.015    -.0983782   -.0109893 
       l1msg |   .0124851   .0043159     2.89   0.004     .0039478    .0210223 
          fb |    .035328   .0299553     1.18   0.240    -.0239266    .0945826 
        open |   .0067485   .0024272     2.78   0.006     .0019472    .0115498 
         tot |   .0233886   .0088334     2.65   0.009     .0059153    .0408619 
       ebrdi |  -.2496858   .2367197    -1.05   0.293    -.7179408    .2185692 
      l1ccbi |  -1.744357   .5120116    -3.41   0.001    -2.757167   -.7315473 
  defactofix |   .0467399   .1594452     0.29   0.770    -.2686585    .3621383 
         vat |   .8948198   .5433936     1.65   0.102    -.1800664    1.969706 
          eu |  -.2835026   .1899735    -1.49   0.138     -.659289    .0922838 
     rsifevd |          1   .1241242     8.06   0.000       .75447     1.24553 
             | 
        time | 
       2001  |  -.1010767   .2565943    -0.39   0.694    -.6086456    .4064923 
       2002  |   -.827447   .2658057    -3.11   0.002    -1.353237   -.3016571 
       2003  |  -.8442777   .2647934    -3.19   0.002    -1.368065   -.3204902 
       2004  |  -.0724496   .2860272    -0.25   0.800    -.6382396    .4933404 
       2005  |  -.2102411   .2943228    -0.71   0.476    -.7924407    .3719584 
       2006  |   .0371915   .2966494     0.13   0.900    -.5496104    .6239934 
       2007  |   .1467874   .3053766     0.48   0.632    -.4572777    .7508525 
       2008  |   .6696502   .3084295     2.17   0.032     .0595463    1.279754 
       2009  |  -.5312215    .410756    -1.29   0.198    -1.343738    .2812945 
             | 
       _cons |   .9990358   .9215329     1.08   0.280    -.8238473    2.821919 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Diagnostic tests after 3rd stage* 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     155.00    154    0.4622 
            Skewness |      23.79     22    0.3585 
            Kurtosis |       1.74      1    0.1868 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     180.53    177    0.4122 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lninf 
 
         chi2(1)      =    32.67 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lninf 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 129) =      0.62 
                  Prob > F =      0.6008 
 
 
Appendix 5.8b: Strong and weak CBA - ‘xtfevd’ (only strongcb and 
weakcba included) 
 
. xtfevd lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu  _itimeb2001 
_itimeb2002 _itimeb2003 _itimeb2004 _itimeb2005 _itimeb2006 _itimeb2007 _itimeb2008 
_itimeb2009, invariant(strongcba weakcba ebrdi) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      193           number of obs       =      237 
mean squared error         = .4176935           F( 21, 193)         = 5.007147 
root mean squared error    = .6462921           Prob > F            = 1.46e-09 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 98.99337           R-squared           = .6397121 
Total Sum of Squares       = 274.7618           adj. R-squared      = .5594406 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 175.7684 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
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       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpg |  -.0207467   .0185194    -1.12   0.264    -.0572731    .0157797 
       l1msg |   .0095006   .0033904     2.80   0.006     .0028135    .0161876 
          fb |  -.0095807   .0244901    -0.39   0.696    -.0578833    .0387219 
        open |   .0126077   .0053225     2.37   0.019       .00211    .0231054 
         tot |   .0045037   .0049164     0.92   0.361    -.0051931    .0142005 
         vat |   .9537611   .5000911     1.91   0.058    -.0325844    1.940107 
          eu |  -.1618953   .2591259    -0.62   0.533    -.6729777     .349187 
 _itimeb2001 |  -.0554761   .2208511    -0.25   0.802    -.4910677    .3801155 
 _itimeb2002 |  -.6552779   .2177573    -3.01   0.003    -1.084767   -.2257884 
 _itimeb2003 |  -.6880249   .2209066    -3.11   0.002    -1.123726   -.2523238 
 _itimeb2004 |  -.2728506   .2349661    -1.16   0.247    -.7362816    .1905804 
 _itimeb2005 |  -.4082294   .2428364    -1.68   0.094    -.8871834    .0707245 
 _itimeb2006 |  -.2616122   .2447868    -1.07   0.287     -.744413    .2211886 
 _itimeb2007 |  -.1347947   .2563835    -0.53   0.600     -.640468    .3708786 
 _itimeb2008 |   .3123235   .2657191     1.18   0.241    -.2117628    .8364097 
 _itimeb2009 |   -.681964   .3264695    -2.09   0.038     -1.32587   -.0380579 
   strongcba |  -1.123176   .4110094    -2.73   0.007    -1.933823   -.3125292 
     weakcba |  -.3289956   .4066039    -0.81   0.419    -1.130953    .4729622 
       ebrdi |  -.6337204   .2840473    -2.23   0.027    -1.193956    -.073485 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   2.121916   1.070609     1.98   0.049     .0103208    4.233512 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.8c: Strong and weak CBA – ‘xtfevd’ (strongCBA, weakCBA 
and defactofix included) 
 
 
. xtfevd lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix vat eu 
itimeb2001 _itimeb2002 _itimeb2003 _itimeb2004 _itimeb2005 _itimeb2006 _itimeb2007 
_itimeb2008 _itimeb2009, invariant(strongcba weakcba ebrdi) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      192           number of obs       =      237 
mean squared error         = .4161365           F( 22, 192)         =  4.83689 
root mean squared error    = .6450864           Prob > F            = 1.90e-09 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 98.62434           R-squared           = .6410551 
Total Sum of Squares       = 274.7618           adj. R-squared      = .5587969 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 176.1375 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpg |  -.0213817   .0185746    -1.15   0.251    -.0580181    .0152548 
       l1msg |   .0092708   .0033454     2.77   0.006     .0026723    .0158693 
          fb |  -.0098222   .0243086    -0.40   0.687    -.0577684    .0381239 
        open |   .0127136   .0053448     2.38   0.018     .0021715    .0232557 
         tot |   .0043262   .0049485     0.87   0.383    -.0054341    .0140865 
  defactofix |  -.2112894   .2420742    -0.87   0.384    -.6887558    .2661769 
         vat |     .95331   .4980363     1.91   0.057    -.0290152    1.935635 
          eu |  -.1665969   .2599386    -0.64   0.522    -.6792989    .3461052 
 _itimeb2001 |  -.0371784   .2209248    -0.17   0.867    -.4729297    .3985729 
 _itimeb2002 |  -.6613203   .2188709    -3.02   0.003     -1.09302   -.2296202 
 _itimeb2003 |  -.6848629   .2215356    -3.09   0.002    -1.121819   -.2479069 
 _itimeb2004 |  -.2689794   .2360137    -1.14   0.256    -.7344919    .1965331 
 _itimeb2005 |  -.3934321   .2422239    -1.62   0.106    -.8711937    .0843296 
 _itimeb2006 |   -.245394    .243941    -1.01   0.316    -.7265424    .2357544 
 _itimeb2007 |  -.1168889   .2545226    -0.46   0.647    -.6189084    .3851307 
 _itimeb2008 |    .332003   .2641302     1.26   0.210    -.1889664    .8529724 
 _itimeb2009 |  -.6549303   .3273902    -2.00   0.047    -1.300674   -.0091871 
   strongcba |  -.9550537   .4584606    -2.08   0.039     -1.85932   -.0507877 
     weakcba |  -.2331633   .3901961    -0.60   0.551    -1.002785    .5364581 
       ebrdi |   -.666561   .2795846    -2.38   0.018    -1.218013   -.1151094 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   2.278551   1.064645     2.14   0.034     .1786493    4.378453 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5.8d: Strong and weak CBA - Xtfevd (strongcba, weakcba, 
defactofix and CCBI included) 
 
 
. xtfevd lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg l1msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix l1ccbi vat 
eu _itimeb2001 _itimeb2002 _itimeb2003 _itimeb2004 _itimeb2005 _itimeb2006 
_itimeb2007 _itimeb2008 _itimeb2009, invariant(strongcba weakcba ebrdi l1ccbi) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      117           number of obs       =      155 
mean squared error         = .4375611           F( 23, 117)         = 3.187405 
root mean squared error    =  .661484           Prob > F            = .0000359 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 67.82197           R-squared           = .6312331 
Total Sum of Squares       = 183.9156           adj. R-squared      = .5146145 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 116.0936 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        gdpg |  -.0546837   .0398703    -1.37   0.173    -.1336447    .0242773 
       l1msg |   .0124851   .0061298     2.04   0.044     .0003452    .0246249 
          fb |    .035328   .0623575     0.57   0.572    -.0881676    .1588237 
        open |   .0067485   .0088012     0.77   0.445    -.0106817    .0241788 
         tot |   .0233886   .0227529     1.03   0.306    -.0216723    .0684495 
  defactofix |   .0467399   .3239702     0.14   0.886    -.5948661    .6883458 
         vat |   .8948198   .6930653     1.29   0.199    -.4777597    2.267399 
          eu |  -.2835026   .2645627    -1.07   0.286    -.8074553    .2404501 
 _itimeb2001 |  -.1010767   .2915248    -0.35   0.729    -.6784263    .4762729 
 _itimeb2002 |   -.827447   .3158774    -2.62   0.010    -1.453026   -.2018683 
 _itimeb2003 |  -.8442777   .3179071    -2.66   0.009    -1.473876   -.2146793 
 _itimeb2004 |  -.0724496   .3628616    -0.20   0.842     -.791078    .6461787 
 _itimeb2005 |  -.2102411   .3822739    -0.55   0.583    -.9673146    .5468324 
 _itimeb2006 |   .0371915   .3805621     0.10   0.922    -.7164919    .7908748 
 _itimeb2007 |   .1467874   .4247336     0.35   0.730    -.6943754    .9879501 
 _itimeb2008 |   .6696502    .402042     1.67   0.098    -.1265729    1.465873 
 _itimeb2009 |  -.5312215   .5236243    -1.01   0.312    -1.568232     .505789 
   strongcba |   -1.08795   .8019846    -1.36   0.178    -2.676239    .5003383 
     weakcba |   -.180387   .4686723    -0.38   0.701    -1.108568     .747794 
       ebrdi |  -.2496858   .5158172    -0.48   0.629    -1.271235    .7718631 
      l1ccbi |  -1.744357   .8660747    -2.01   0.046    -3.459572   -.0291414 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   .9990358   2.235198     0.45   0.656    -3.427657    5.425729 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.9. Inflation model - Strong and weak CBA - System GMM  
 
Appendix 5.9a: Strong and weak CBA - One-step robust System GMM with 
one lag of dependent variable and minimum number of instruments 
(with strong and weak CBA only)  
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu 
i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg , laglimits (2 2)) iv(strongcba weakcba 
gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 57                      Obs per group: min =         7 
  461 
Wald chi2(20) =   1586.46                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4641078   .0526576     8.81   0.000     .3609008    .5673148 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.5363993   .1737119    -3.09   0.002    -.8768684   -.1959302 
     weakcba |  -.1737023   .1743658    -1.00   0.319    -.5154529    .1680484 
        gdpg |  -.0076536    .008517    -0.90   0.369    -.0243467    .0090395 
         msg |   .0081731   .0039815     2.05   0.040     .0003695    .0159768 
          fb |    .000564   .0168245     0.03   0.973    -.0324115    .0335395 
        open |   .0040079   .0015229     2.63   0.008      .001023    .0069928 
         tot |   .0047989   .0019469     2.46   0.014      .000983    .0086148 
       ebrdi |  -.2683651   .1417887    -1.89   0.058    -.5462659    .0095357 
         vat |   .6754365   .0831459     8.12   0.000     .5124735    .8383995 
          eu |   .1704956    .178119     0.96   0.338    -.1786112    .5196023 
 _Itime_2000 |   .5760229   .2816288     2.05   0.041     .0240406    1.128005 
 _Itime_2001 |   .6189559   .2122865     2.92   0.004      .202882     1.03503 
 _Itime_2002 |   .0577665   .2785236     0.21   0.836    -.4881297    .6036626 
 _Itime_2003 |   .1889474   .2980574     0.63   0.526    -.3952343    .7731292 
 _Itime_2004 |   .5784878   .2282359     2.53   0.011     .1311537    1.025822 
 _Itime_2005 |   .2452591   .2854024     0.86   0.390    -.3141193    .8046374 
 _Itime_2006 |   .4343248   .2367211     1.83   0.067    -.0296401    .8982897 
 _Itime_2007 |    .477025   .2367251     2.02   0.044     .0130522    .9409977 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.036203   .1987245     5.21   0.000     .6467103    1.425696 
       _cons |   .2161296   .6591434     0.33   0.743    -1.075768    1.508027 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lninf 
    L2.msg 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lninf 
    DL.msg 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.12  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.89  Pr > z =  0.372 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =  70.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.001 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =   8.55  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =   3.52  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =   5.03  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   8.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.964 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   0.44  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   3.80  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   4.75  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
_Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_20 
> 05 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   4.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.999 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   4.17  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
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Appendix 5.9b: Strong and weak CBA - One-step robust System GMM with 
one lag of dependent variable and minimum number of instruments 
(with strong and weak CBA and defactofix)  
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix 
vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm(msg , laglimits (2 2)) iv(strongcba 
weakcb gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 58                      Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(21) =   2392.62                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4687924   .0514528     9.11   0.000     .3679468    .5696381 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.5480212   .1774193    -3.09   0.002    -.8957565   -.2002858 
     weakcba |  -.1867495   .1635761    -1.14   0.254    -.5073527    .1338537 
        gdpg |  -.0078169   .0083088    -0.94   0.347    -.0241018    .0084679 
         msg |   .0076595   .0037731     2.03   0.042     .0002644    .0150546 
          fb |   .0027238   .0177167     0.15   0.878    -.0320003    .0374478 
        open |    .003975   .0014852     2.68   0.007     .0010641    .0068859 
         tot |   .0047488   .0019532     2.43   0.015     .0009206    .0085769 
       ebrdi |  -.2805028   .1425631    -1.97   0.049    -.5599213   -.0010843 
  defactofix |   .0109525   .0811646     0.13   0.893    -.1481272    .1700323 
         vat |   .6631541   .0833685     7.95   0.000     .4997549    .8265533 
          eu |   .1883841   .1807319     1.04   0.297    -.1658438    .5426121 
 _Itime_2000 |   .5938111   .2749572     2.16   0.031      .054905    1.132717 
 _Itime_2001 |   .6311181   .2043528     3.09   0.002      .230594    1.031642 
 _Itime_2002 |   .0646181   .2706158     0.24   0.811    -.4657791    .5950153 
 _Itime_2003 |   .2007303   .2946386     0.68   0.496    -.3767507    .7782113 
 _Itime_2004 |   .5868322   .2302435     2.55   0.011     .1355632    1.038101 
 _Itime_2005 |   .2507414   .2821554     0.89   0.374    -.3022729    .8037557 
 _Itime_2006 |     .44309   .2401043     1.85   0.065    -.0275057    .9136858 
 _Itime_2007 |   .4828501   .2381383     2.03   0.043     .0161077    .9495926 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.033911   .2030037     5.09   0.000     .6360312    1.431791 
       _cons |   .2608055   .6775174     0.38   0.700    -1.067104    1.588715 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lninf 
    L2.msg 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lninf 
    DL.msg 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.10  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.89  Pr > z =  0.373 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =  72.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
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  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =   2.74  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =   4.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.997 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =  -1.86  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   5.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.995 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  -3.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =   1.50  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   1.24  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
_Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_200 
> 4 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =   3.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.999 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =  -0.87  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
 
Appendix 5.9c: Strong and weak CBA - One-step robust System GMM with 
one lag of dependent variable and minimum number of instruments 
(with strong and weak CBA, defactofix and CCBI)  
 
 
 . xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi 
defactofix vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg ccbi , laglimits (2 
2)) iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 75                      Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(22) =   7503.61                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4130802   .0904698     4.57   0.000     .2357627    .5903977 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.5970075   .2130635    -2.80   0.005    -1.014604   -.1794107 
     weakcba |  -.1466866   .1520962    -0.96   0.335    -.4447898    .1514165 
        gdpg |  -.0119486   .0222416    -0.54   0.591    -.0555413    .0316442 
         msg |   .0200228   .0071955     2.78   0.005     .0059199    .0341256 
          fb |   .0051923   .0374304     0.14   0.890    -.0681698    .0785545 
        open |   .0048776   .0025334     1.93   0.054    -.0000878     .009843 
         tot |   .0100397   .0055771     1.80   0.072    -.0008912    .0209707 
       ebrdi |   .1238593   .2101311     0.59   0.556      -.28799    .5357086 
        ccbi |  -.8486154   .7000709    -1.21   0.225    -2.220729    .5234985 
  defactofix |   .1232278     .09563     1.29   0.198    -.0642036    .3106591 
         vat |   .5752745   .1617938     3.56   0.000     .2581644    .8923846 
          eu |  -.0575058   .1734746    -0.33   0.740    -.3975097    .2824982 
 _Itime_2000 |   .0594779    .312698     0.19   0.849    -.5533989    .6723546 
 _Itime_2001 |   .0176935   .2768351     0.06   0.949    -.5248933    .5602803 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.4107094   .3641861    -1.13   0.259    -1.124501    .3030822 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.3787647    .338734    -1.12   0.263    -1.042671    .2851418 
 _Itime_2004 |   .2520283   .2680688     0.94   0.347     -.273377    .7774336 
 _Itime_2005 |  -.1120071   .3529503    -0.32   0.751     -.803777    .5797628 
 _Itime_2006 |   .1047999   .2409124     0.44   0.664    -.3673796    .5769795 
 _Itime_2007 |   .0432424     .26864     0.16   0.872    -.4832823    .5697671 
 _Itime_2008 |   .8475828   .2560735     3.31   0.001      .345688    1.349478 
       _cons |  -.7529306   1.176178    -0.64   0.522    -3.058196    1.552335 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lninf 
    L2.(msg ccbi) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lninf 
    DL.(msg ccbi) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.00  Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.81  Pr > z =  0.419 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(52)   =  67.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.068 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(52)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(28)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg ccbi, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(36)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
_Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_200 
> 4 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
. *One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent variable and minimum number 
of instruments(with strong and weak CBA)* 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu 
i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg , laglimits (2 2)) iv(strongcba weakcba 
gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu i.time)  robust pca 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 37                      Obs per group: min =        38 
Wald chi2(20) =   1855.38                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        38 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |    .531867   .1764894     3.01   0.003     .1859541    .8777799 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.5013883    .228282    -2.20   0.028    -.9488128   -.0539638 
     weakcba |  -.1088541    .145897    -0.75   0.456    -.3948069    .1770988 
        gdpg |  -.0054466   .0081847    -0.67   0.506    -.0214883    .0105952 
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         msg |   .0043889   .0024194     1.81   0.070     -.000353    .0091308 
          fb |   .0037293   .0167635     0.22   0.824    -.0291266    .0365852 
        open |   .0041696   .0020314     2.05   0.040     .0001881    .0081511 
         tot |   .0047209   .0022473     2.10   0.036     .0003163    .0091254 
       ebrdi |   -.287985   .2084227    -1.38   0.167    -.6964859    .1205159 
         vat |   .6203563   .1498961     4.14   0.000     .3265653    .9141473 
          eu |   .1380587    .207803     0.66   0.506    -.2692278    .5453451 
 _Itime_2000 |   .6923616   .3017542     2.29   0.022     .1009341    1.283789 
 _Itime_2001 |   .7094562   .2237341     3.17   0.002     .2709453    1.147967 
 _Itime_2002 |   .1143852   .2887069     0.40   0.692    -.4514698    .6802403 
 _Itime_2003 |   .2838587   .3862335     0.73   0.462     -.473145    1.040862 
 _Itime_2004 |   .7146461   .2792115     2.56   0.010     .1674018    1.261891 
 _Itime_2005 |   .3636931   .3132674     1.16   0.246    -.2502998    .9776859 
 _Itime_2006 |    .575762   .3303548     1.74   0.081    -.0717215    1.223246 
 _Itime_2007 |    .613314   .2905819     2.11   0.035     .0437841    1.182844 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.090378   .2457953     4.44   0.000     .6086284    1.572128 
       _cons |    .143454   .9108596     0.16   0.875    -1.641798    1.928706 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.msg 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.msg 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.73  Pr > z =  0.006 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.85  Pr > z =  0.397 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  29.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.019 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =   8.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.934 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 18 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.730 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.511 
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi defactofix 
vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm(msg , laglimits (2 2)) iv(strongcba 
weakcb gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust pca 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 38                      Obs per group: min =        38 
Wald chi2(21) =   3303.74                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        38 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .5396373   .1813941     2.97   0.003     .1841115    .8951632 
             | 
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   strongcba |  -.5058679   .2191464    -2.31   0.021     -.935387   -.0763488 
     weakcba |  -.1143877   .1349443    -0.85   0.397    -.3788736    .1500983 
        gdpg |  -.0053782   .0080822    -0.67   0.506    -.0212191    .0104627 
         msg |   .0040766   .0023523     1.73   0.083    -.0005338    .0086871 
          fb |   .0041547   .0172298     0.24   0.809    -.0296152    .0379245 
        open |   .0041027   .0020833     1.97   0.049     .0000194     .008186 
         tot |    .004699   .0022594     2.08   0.038     .0002706    .0091274 
       ebrdi |  -.2885296   .2159798    -1.34   0.182    -.7118421     .134783 
  defactofix |   .0134594   .0763594     0.18   0.860    -.1362021     .163121 
         vat |   .6120243   .1550179     3.95   0.000     .3081949    .9158538 
          eu |   .1424486   .2101996     0.68   0.498     -.269535    .5544322 
 _Itime_2000 |   .7056588   .3067214     2.30   0.021     .1044959    1.306822 
 _Itime_2001 |   .7198596   .2210865     3.26   0.001      .286538    1.153181 
 _Itime_2002 |   .1221537   .2834026     0.43   0.666    -.4333052    .6776125 
 _Itime_2003 |   .2969753   .3942519     0.75   0.451    -.4757442    1.069695 
 _Itime_2004 |   .7295099   .2930843     2.49   0.013     .1550752    1.303945 
 _Itime_2005 |   .3749628   .3174762     1.18   0.238    -.2472791    .9972046 
 _Itime_2006 |   .5896336   .3456613     1.71   0.088    -.0878501    1.267117 
 _Itime_2007 |    .625147   .3004856     2.08   0.037     .0362061    1.214088 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.094846    .255861     4.28   0.000     .5933674    1.596324 
       _cons |   .1347081   .9466574     0.14   0.887    -1.720706    1.990123 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.msg 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.msg 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.68  Pr > z =  0.007 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.84  Pr > z =  0.402 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  29.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.019 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =   6.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.984 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 18 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.730 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.511 
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi 
defactofix vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg ccbi , laglimits (2 
2)) iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust 
pca 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2004 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 41                      Obs per group: min =        55 
Wald chi2(22) =   5431.04                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        55 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
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       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .5031731   .1487152     3.38   0.001     .2116966    .7946495 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.5449068    .356888    -1.53   0.127    -1.244394    .1545808 
     weakcba |  -.1167281   .1748934    -0.67   0.505     -.459513    .2260567 
        gdpg |  -.0052871   .0180724    -0.29   0.770    -.0407084    .0301343 
         msg |   .0132457   .0069024     1.92   0.055    -.0002829    .0267742 
          fb |   .0158289   .0415519     0.38   0.703    -.0656114    .0972692 
        open |   .0042664   .0022793     1.87   0.061    -.0002009    .0087336 
         tot |   .0110288    .006496     1.70   0.090    -.0017031    .0237607 
       ebrdi |   .0240833   .2239707     0.11   0.914    -.4148912    .4630579 
        ccbi |  -.9151494    1.07644    -0.85   0.395    -3.024934    1.194635 
  defactofix |   .0721218   .1014604     0.71   0.477    -.1267369    .2709805 
         vat |   .5178367   .1157166     4.48   0.000     .2910363    .7446371 
          eu |  -.0207531   .2047163    -0.10   0.919    -.4219897    .3804834 
 _Itime_2000 |  -.1579008   .2750145    -0.57   0.566    -.6969192    .3811177 
 _Itime_2001 |  -.2026059   .2122965    -0.95   0.340    -.6186994    .2134876 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.7410209   .2719629    -2.72   0.006    -1.274058   -.2079834 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.6838276   .2966671    -2.31   0.021    -1.265285   -.1023707 
 _Itime_2005 |  -.3724798    .264211    -1.41   0.159    -.8903239    .1453643 
 _Itime_2006 |  -.1507162   .1780847    -0.85   0.397    -.4997557    .1983234 
 _Itime_2007 |  -.2317311   .1369876    -1.69   0.091    -.5002218    .0367596 
 _Itime_2008 |   .5141997   .2412265     2.13   0.033     .0414046    .9869949 
 _Itime_2009 |  -.3689911   .2968278    -1.24   0.214     -.950763    .2127808 
       _cons |  -.1249458   1.503263    -0.08   0.934    -3.071288    2.821396 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.(msg ccbi) 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(msg ccbi) 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.86  Pr > z =  0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.80  Pr > z =  0.423 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =  20.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.289 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 21 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.736 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.671 
 
Appedix 5.9d Dynamic estimation (one-step system GMM) of inflation 
performance model with ‘pca’ option used for lowering the number of 
instruments (strong and weak CBA) 
 
. *One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent variable and minimum 
number of instruments(with strong and weak CBA)* 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi 
vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg , laglimits (2 2)) 
iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat  eu i.time)  robust pca 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
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Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 37                      Obs per group: min =        38 
Wald chi2(20) =   1855.38                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        38 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |    .531867   .1764894     3.01   0.003     .1859541    .8777799 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.5013883    .228282    -2.20   0.028    -.9488128   -.0539638 
     weakcba |  -.1088541    .145897    -0.75   0.456    -.3948069    .1770988 
        gdpg |  -.0054466   .0081847    -0.67   0.506    -.0214883    .0105952 
         msg |   .0043889   .0024194     1.81   0.070     -.000353    .0091308 
          fb |   .0037293   .0167635     0.22   0.824    -.0291266    .0365852 
        open |   .0041696   .0020314     2.05   0.040     .0001881    .0081511 
         tot |   .0047209   .0022473     2.10   0.036     .0003163    .0091254 
       ebrdi |   -.287985   .2084227    -1.38   0.167    -.6964859    .1205159 
         vat |   .6203563   .1498961     4.14   0.000     .3265653    .9141473 
          eu |   .1380587    .207803     0.66   0.506    -.2692278    .5453451 
 _Itime_2000 |   .6923616   .3017542     2.29   0.022     .1009341    1.283789 
 _Itime_2001 |   .7094562   .2237341     3.17   0.002     .2709453    1.147967 
 _Itime_2002 |   .1143852   .2887069     0.40   0.692    -.4514698    .6802403 
 _Itime_2003 |   .2838587   .3862335     0.73   0.462     -.473145    1.040862 
 _Itime_2004 |   .7146461   .2792115     2.56   0.010     .1674018    1.261891 
 _Itime_2005 |   .3636931   .3132674     1.16   0.246    -.2502998    .9776859 
 _Itime_2006 |    .575762   .3303548     1.74   0.081    -.0717215    1.223246 
 _Itime_2007 |    .613314   .2905819     2.11   0.035     .0437841    1.182844 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.090378   .2457953     4.44   0.000     .6086284    1.572128 
       _cons |    .143454   .9108596     0.16   0.875    -1.641798    1.928706 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.msg 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.msg 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.73  Pr > z =  0.006 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.85  Pr > z =  0.397 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  29.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.019 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =   8.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.934 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 18 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.730 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.511 
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. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi 
defactofix vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm(msg , laglimits 
(2 2)) iv(strongcba weakcb gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  
robust pca 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set 
matafavor space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of 
observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for 
Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       229 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        25 
Number of instruments = 38                      Obs per group: min =        38 
Wald chi2(21) =   3303.74                                      avg =      9.16 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        38 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .5396373   .1813941     2.97   0.003     .1841115    .8951632 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.5058679   .2191464    -2.31   0.021     -.935387   -.0763488 
     weakcba |  -.1143877   .1349443    -0.85   0.397    -.3788736    .1500983 
        gdpg |  -.0053782   .0080822    -0.67   0.506    -.0212191    .0104627 
         msg |   .0040766   .0023523     1.73   0.083    -.0005338    .0086871 
          fb |   .0041547   .0172298     0.24   0.809    -.0296152    .0379245 
        open |   .0041027   .0020833     1.97   0.049     .0000194     .008186 
         tot |    .004699   .0022594     2.08   0.038     .0002706    .0091274 
       ebrdi |  -.2885296   .2159798    -1.34   0.182    -.7118421     .134783 
  defactofix |   .0134594   .0763594     0.18   0.860    -.1362021     .163121 
         vat |   .6120243   .1550179     3.95   0.000     .3081949    .9158538 
          eu |   .1424486   .2101996     0.68   0.498     -.269535    .5544322 
 _Itime_2000 |   .7056588   .3067214     2.30   0.021     .1044959    1.306822 
 _Itime_2001 |   .7198596   .2210865     3.26   0.001      .286538    1.153181 
 _Itime_2002 |   .1221537   .2834026     0.43   0.666    -.4333052    .6776125 
 _Itime_2003 |   .2969753   .3942519     0.75   0.451    -.4757442    1.069695 
 _Itime_2004 |   .7295099   .2930843     2.49   0.013     .1550752    1.303945 
 _Itime_2005 |   .3749628   .3174762     1.18   0.238    -.2472791    .9972046 
 _Itime_2006 |   .5896336   .3456613     1.71   0.088    -.0878501    1.267117 
 _Itime_2007 |    .625147   .3004856     2.08   0.037     .0362061    1.214088 
 _Itime_2008 |   1.094846    .255861     4.28   0.000     .5933674    1.596324 
       _cons |   .1347081   .9466574     0.14   0.887    -1.720706    1.990123 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.msg 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.msg 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.68  Pr > z =  0.007 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.84  Pr > z =  0.402 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =  29.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.019 
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  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(16)   =   6.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.984 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 18 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.730 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.511 
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi 
ccbi defactofix vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg ccbi , 
laglimits (2 2)) iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat 
eu i.time)  robust pca 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set 
matafavor space, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2004 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of 
observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for 
Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 41                      Obs per group: min =        55 
Wald chi2(22) =   5431.04                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        55 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .5031731   .1487152     3.38   0.001     .2116966    .7946495 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.5449068    .356888    -1.53   0.127    -1.244394    .1545808 
     weakcba |  -.1167281   .1748934    -0.67   0.505     -.459513    .2260567 
        gdpg |  -.0052871   .0180724    -0.29   0.770    -.0407084    .0301343 
         msg |   .0132457   .0069024     1.92   0.055    -.0002829    .0267742 
          fb |   .0158289   .0415519     0.38   0.703    -.0656114    .0972692 
        open |   .0042664   .0022793     1.87   0.061    -.0002009    .0087336 
         tot |   .0110288    .006496     1.70   0.090    -.0017031    .0237607 
       ebrdi |   .0240833   .2239707     0.11   0.914    -.4148912    .4630579 
        ccbi |  -.9151494    1.07644    -0.85   0.395    -3.024934    1.194635 
  defactofix |   .0721218   .1014604     0.71   0.477    -.1267369    .2709805 
         vat |   .5178367   .1157166     4.48   0.000     .2910363    .7446371 
          eu |  -.0207531   .2047163    -0.10   0.919    -.4219897    .3804834 
 _Itime_2000 |  -.1579008   .2750145    -0.57   0.566    -.6969192    .3811177 
 _Itime_2001 |  -.2026059   .2122965    -0.95   0.340    -.6186994    .2134876 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.7410209   .2719629    -2.72   0.006    -1.274058   -.2079834 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.6838276   .2966671    -2.31   0.021    -1.265285   -.1023707 
 _Itime_2005 |  -.3724798    .264211    -1.41   0.159    -.8903239    .1453643 
 _Itime_2006 |  -.1507162   .1780847    -0.85   0.397    -.4997557    .1983234 
 _Itime_2007 |  -.2317311   .1369876    -1.69   0.091    -.5002218    .0367596 
 _Itime_2008 |   .5141997   .2412265     2.13   0.033     .0414046    .9869949 
 _Itime_2009 |  -.3689911   .2968278    -1.24   0.214     -.950763    .2127808 
       _cons |  -.1249458   1.503263    -0.08   0.934    -3.071288    2.821396 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.(msg ccbi) 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 
    _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
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    _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(msg ccbi) 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.86  Pr > z =  0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.80  Pr > z =  0.423 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =  20.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.289 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Extracted 21 principal components from GMM-style instruments 
  Portion of variance explained by the components =  0.736 
  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy =  0.671 
 
 
Appendix 5.9e Estimation of the preferred ‘strongCBA’ and ‘weakCBA’ 
model (defactoFIX and CCBI included) with interactions between 
strong and weak CBA and MSG 
 
 
. xtabond2 lninf L.lninf i.strongcba i.weakcba  gdpg c.msg i.strongcba#c.msg 
i.weakcba#c.msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi defactofix vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, 
laglimits(1 1)) gmm(msg 
>  ccbi strongcbamsg weakcbamsg, laglimits (2 2)) iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb 
defactofix open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
0b.strongcba dropped due to collinearity 
0b.weakcba dropped due to collinearity 
0b.strongcba#co.msg dropped due to collinearity 
0b.weakcba#co.msg dropped due to collinearity 
1998b.time dropped due to collinearity 
1999.time dropped due to collinearity 
2004.time dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 108                     Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(24) =   2580.56                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |               Robust 
          lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          lninf | 
            L1. |   .4512445   .0883423     5.11   0.000     .2780968    .6243923 
                | 
    1.strongcba |  -.2555598   .2465148    -1.04   0.300    -.7387199    .2276003 
      1.weakcba |   -.439393   .1252994    -3.51   0.000    -.6849754   -.1938107 
           gdpg |  -.0074923   .0213009    -0.35   0.725    -.0492413    .0342566 
            msg |   .0158064   .0052688     3.00   0.003     .0054796    .0261331 
                | 
strongcba#c.msg | 
             1  |  -.0181627   .0060566    -3.00   0.003    -.0300335   -.0062919 
                | 
  weakcba#c.msg | 
             1  |   .0126184   .0079425     1.59   0.112    -.0029485    .0281853 
                | 
             fb |   .0137444   .0363032     0.38   0.705    -.0574087    .0848974 
           open |   .0041846   .0024095     1.74   0.082     -.000538    .0089072 
            tot |   .0093109   .0059136     1.57   0.115    -.0022796    .0209013 
          ebrdi |  -.0043847   .1678415    -0.03   0.979     -.333348    .3245786 
           ccbi |  -.4953554   .4888827    -1.01   0.311    -1.453548     .462837 
     defactofix |   .1275156   .0841562     1.52   0.130    -.0374275    .2924587 
            vat |   .7611455   .1846367     4.12   0.000     .3992641    1.123027 
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             eu |   .0380904   .1733737     0.22   0.826    -.3017158    .3778967 
                | 
           time | 
          2000  |  -.1086016   .3014018    -0.36   0.719    -.6993383    .4821351 
          2001  |  -.0981274   .1897969    -0.52   0.605    -.4701224    .2738676 
          2002  |  -.6895505   .2808223    -2.46   0.014    -1.239952   -.1391488 
          2003  |  -.6538419   .3018307    -2.17   0.030    -1.245419   -.0622646 
          2005  |  -.4074378   .2494761    -1.63   0.102    -.8964019    .0815263 
          2006  |  -.1847647   .2151966    -0.86   0.391    -.6065424    .2370129 
          2007  |  -.2426678   .1536809    -1.58   0.114    -.5438767    .0585412 
          2008  |   .5160649   .2319276     2.23   0.026     .0614953    .9706346 
          2009  |  -.2813677   .2737482    -1.03   0.304    -.8179044    .2551689 
                | 
          _cons |  -.1916945   1.021083    -0.19   0.851     -2.19298    1.809591 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu 1998b.time 
    1999.time 2000.time 2001.time 2002.time 2003.time 2004.time 2005.time 
    2006.time 2007.time 2008.time 2009.time) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.(msg ccbi strongcbamsg weakcbamsg) 
    L.L.lninf 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu 1998b.time 
    1999.time 2000.time 2001.time 2002.time 2003.time 2004.time 2005.time 
    2006.time 2007.time 2008.time 2009.time 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(msg ccbi strongcbamsg weakcbamsg) 
    D.L.lninf 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.05  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.55  Pr > z =  0.579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(83)   =  91.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.247 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(83)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(39)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(44)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(66)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg ccbi strongcbamsg weakcbamsg, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(71)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb defactofix open tot ebrdi vat eu 1998b.time 1999.time 
2000.time 2001.time 2002.time 2003.time 2004.time 2005.time 2006.time 2007.time 
2008.time 200 
> 9.time) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(63)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
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. margins, dydx(_all) force 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: continuous option implied because a factor with only one level was specified 
in the dydx() option) 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        153 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : L.lninf 1.strongcba 1.weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi 
defactofix vat eu 2000.time 2001.time 2002.time 2003.time 2005.time 2006.time 
2007.time 2008.time 
               2009.time 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4512445   .0883423     5.11   0.000     .2780968    .6243923 
             | 
 1.strongcba |   -.642318   .2280948    -2.82   0.005    -1.089376   -.1952604 
   1.weakcba |  -.1706952   .1311069    -1.30   0.193    -.4276601    .0862697 
        gdpg |  -.0074923   .0213009    -0.35   0.725    -.0492413    .0342566 
         msg |   .0150716   .0045569     3.31   0.001     .0061403     .024003 
          fb |   .0137444   .0363032     0.38   0.705    -.0574087    .0848974 
        open |   .0041846   .0024095     1.74   0.082     -.000538    .0089072 
         tot |   .0093109   .0059136     1.57   0.115    -.0022796    .0209013 
       ebrdi |  -.0043847   .1678415    -0.03   0.979     -.333348    .3245786 
        ccbi |  -.4953554   .4888827    -1.01   0.311    -1.453548     .462837 
  defactofix |   .1275156   .0841562     1.52   0.130    -.0374275    .2924587 
         vat |   .7611455   .1846367     4.12   0.000     .3992641    1.123027 
          eu |   .0380904   .1733737     0.22   0.826    -.3017158    .3778967 
             | 
        time | 
       2000  |  -.1086016   .3014018    -0.36   0.719    -.6993383    .4821351 
       2001  |  -.0981274   .1897969    -0.52   0.605    -.4701224    .2738676 
       2002  |  -.6895505   .2808223    -2.46   0.014    -1.239952   -.1391488 
       2003  |  -.6538419   .3018307    -2.17   0.030    -1.245419   -.0622646 
       2005  |  -.4074378   .2494761    -1.63   0.102    -.8964019    .0815263 
       2006  |  -.1847647   .2151966    -0.86   0.391    -.6065424    .2370129 
       2007  |  -.2426678   .1536809    -1.58   0.114    -.5438767    .0585412 
       2008  |   .5160649   .2319276     2.23   0.026     .0614953    .9706346 
       2009  |  -.2813677   .2737482    -1.03   0.304    -.8179044    .2551689 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
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. margins, dydx(strongcba) at(msg=(-15 -0.39 11.7 23.84 49.7 78.06 89.99)) force 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: continuous option implied because a factor with only one level was specified 
in the dydx() option) 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        153 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.strongcba 
 
1._at        : msg             =         -15 
2._at        : msg             =        -.39 
3._at        : msg             =        11.7 
4._at        : msg             =       23.84 
5._at        : msg             =        49.7 
6._at        : msg             =       78.06 
7._at        : msg             =       89.99 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.strongcba  | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0168801   .2947853     0.06   0.954    -.5608885    .5946487 
          2  |  -.2484764   .2474669    -1.00   0.315    -.7335026    .2365499 
          3  |   -.468063   .2277024    -2.06   0.040    -.9143516   -.0217744 
          4  |  -.6885577   .2306695    -2.99   0.003    -1.140662   -.2364537 
          5  |  -1.158244   .3035672    -3.82   0.000    -1.753225   -.5632635 
          6  |  -1.673337   .4373431    -3.83   0.000    -2.530514   -.8161604 
          7  |  -1.890018   .5005951    -3.78   0.000    -2.871166   -.9088695 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. marginsplot 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: msg 
 
 
 
. margins, dydx(weakcba) at(msg=(-15 -0.39 11.7 23.84 49.7 78.06 89.99)) force 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: continuous option implied because a factor with only one level was specified 
in the dydx() option) 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        153 
Model VCE    : Robust 
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Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.weakcba 
 
1._at        : msg             =         -15 
2._at        : msg             =        -.39 
3._at        : msg             =        11.7 
4._at        : msg             =       23.84 
5._at        : msg             =        49.7 
6._at        : msg             =       78.06 
7._at        : msg             =       89.99 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.weakcba    | 
         _at | 
          1  |   -.628669   .2213456    -2.84   0.005    -1.062498   -.1948395 
          2  |  -.4443142   .1273034    -3.49   0.000    -.6938242   -.1948042 
          3  |  -.2917578   .0971443    -3.00   0.003    -.4821571   -.1013584 
          4  |  -.1385704   .1455876    -0.95   0.341    -.4239169    .1467761 
          5  |   .1877413   .3289887     0.57   0.568    -.4570647    .8325473 
          6  |    .545599   .5483488     0.99   0.320    -.5291448    1.620343 
          7  |   .6961365   .6418453     1.08   0.278    -.5618572     1.95413 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. marginsplot  
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: msg 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.10: Inflation model - Calculation of the long-run 
coefficients on strongCBA and weakCBA 
 
 
. nlcom _b[strongcba]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[strongcba]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.017188   .3722709    -2.73   0.006    -1.746825   -.2875501 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[weakcba]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[weakcba]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.2499262    .271412    -0.92   0.357     -.781884    .2820315 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.11: Inflation model - Preferred dynamic model with 
‘defactofix’ variable treated as endogenous 
 
Appendix 5.11a CBA 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf cba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi defactofix vat eu 
i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg ccbi defactofix, laglimits (2 2)) 
iv(cba gdpg fb  open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 87                      Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(21) =  14429.42                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4392953   .0898076     4.89   0.000     .2632756     .615315 
             | 
         cba |  -.2044083   .1588469    -1.29   0.198    -.5157424    .1069259 
        gdpg |  -.0127972   .0229637    -0.56   0.577    -.0578052    .0322107 
         msg |   .0215845   .0080562     2.68   0.007     .0057946    .0373744 
          fb |  -.0007123   .0354056    -0.02   0.984    -.0701059    .0686813 
        open |   .0039272    .002135     1.84   0.066    -.0002573    .0081118 
         tot |   .0050696   .0057321     0.88   0.376    -.0061651    .0163044 
       ebrdi |   .2465187   .2370199     1.04   0.298    -.2180318    .7110691 
        ccbi |  -.8513596    .560217    -1.52   0.129    -1.949365    .2466455 
  defactofix |   .0241084   .1598802     0.15   0.880    -.2892511    .3374678 
         vat |   .5556165   .1374824     4.04   0.000      .286156     .825077 
          eu |   -.051247   .1871418    -0.27   0.784    -.4180381    .3155441 
 _Itime_2000 |   .0521562    .322855     0.16   0.872     -.580628    .6849404 
 _Itime_2001 |   .0086322   .3090609     0.03   0.978    -.5971161    .6143805 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.4152494   .3677885    -1.13   0.259    -1.136102    .3056028 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.3537186   .3174832    -1.11   0.265    -.9759742    .2685371 
 _Itime_2004 |   .2851059   .2639978     1.08   0.280    -.2323204    .8025321 
 _Itime_2005 |   -.102917    .328698    -0.31   0.754    -.7471533    .5413192 
 _Itime_2006 |   .1176817   .2116082     0.56   0.578    -.2970628    .5324262 
 _Itime_2007 |   .0533394   .2473593     0.22   0.829    -.4314759    .5381548 
 _Itime_2008 |   .8508683   .2394767     3.55   0.000     .3815026    1.320234 
       _cons |  -.6449889   .9789124    -0.66   0.510    -2.563622    1.273644 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
    _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 
    _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lninf 
    L2.(msg ccbi defactofix) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
    _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 
    _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lninf 
    DL.(msg ccbi defactofix) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.96  Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.83  Pr > z =  0.409 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(65)   =  83.36  Prob > chi2 =  0.062 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(65)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(33)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(47)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg ccbi defactofix, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(51)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
>  _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(48)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
 
Appendix 5.11b STRONG AND WEAK CBA 
 
. xi: xtabond2 lninf L.lninf strongcba weakcba gdpg msg fb open tot ebrdi ccbi 
defactofix vat eu i.time, gmm(L.lninf, laglimits(1 1)) gmm( msg ccbi defactofix, 
laglimits (2 2)) iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb  open tot ebrdi  vat eu i.time) robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       153 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        17 
Number of instruments = 88                      Obs per group: min =         7 
Wald chi2(22) =   6272.07                                      avg =      9.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lninf | 
         L1. |   .4407372    .086425     5.10   0.000     .2713472    .6101272 
             | 
   strongcba |  -.4847145   .2495969    -1.94   0.052    -.9739154    .0044865 
     weakcba |   -.057327   .1892578    -0.30   0.762    -.4282655    .3136115 
        gdpg |  -.0121406   .0230984    -0.53   0.599    -.0574127    .0331314 
         msg |   .0189493   .0078209     2.42   0.015     .0036206    .0342779 
          fb |   .0018322   .0353625     0.05   0.959     -.067477    .0711414 
        open |   .0048184   .0022824     2.11   0.035      .000345    .0092917 
         tot |   .0109916   .0050438     2.18   0.029      .001106    .0208772 
       ebrdi |   .0878779   .2344187     0.37   0.708    -.3715742      .54733 
        ccbi |  -.7999091   .5798765    -1.38   0.168    -1.936446     .336628 
  defactofix |  -.0139783   .1497631    -0.09   0.926    -.3075087     .279552 
         vat |   .5902754   .1423941     4.15   0.000     .3111881    .8693627 
          eu |  -.0443724   .1811441    -0.24   0.806    -.3994083    .3106635 
 _Itime_2000 |   .1072465   .3344192     0.32   0.748    -.5482031    .7626961 
 _Itime_2001 |   .0654581   .2798495     0.23   0.815    -.4830368    .6139531 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.4007956   .3520024    -1.14   0.255    -1.090708    .2891165 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.3342281   .3160889    -1.06   0.290    -.9537509    .2852947 
 _Itime_2004 |   .3088003   .2584708     1.19   0.232    -.1977931    .8153937 
 _Itime_2005 |   -.065391   .3286733    -0.20   0.842    -.7095788    .5787968 
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 _Itime_2006 |   .1522146   .2057552     0.74   0.459    -.2510582    .5554874 
 _Itime_2007 |   .0851243   .2350442     0.36   0.717    -.3755538    .5458024 
 _Itime_2008 |   .8646356   .2291321     3.77   0.000     .4155448    1.313726 
       _cons |  -.8084344     1.0473    -0.77   0.440    -2.861104    1.244236 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.lninf 
    L2.(msg ccbi defactofix) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.lninf 
    DL.(msg ccbi defactofix) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.95  Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.79  Pr > z =  0.430 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(65)   =  86.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.041 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(65)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(33)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.lninf, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(47)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(msg ccbi defactofix, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(14)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(51)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(strongcba weakcba gdpg fb open tot ebrdi vat eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
_Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_20 
> 05 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(47)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000  
 
 
. nlcom _b[ccbi]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ccbi]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.597884   1.087846    -1.47   0.142    -3.730022    .5342542 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
nlcom _b[ccbi]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[ccbi]/(1-_b[l.lninf]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lninf |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   -1.44588   1.144994    -1.26   0.207    -3.690027    .7982679 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendices Chapter 6 
 
Appendix 6.1: Growth model - Correlation matrix 
 
cor cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov eu aze2006 
aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 cbal1lninf cbal1fb 
 
            |      cba defact~x  l1lninf     l1fb      yit     popg     educ    l1inv  l1ebrdi     open      tot      gov       eu 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |   1.0000 
  defactofix |   0.3985   1.0000 
     l1lninf |  -0.1897  -0.0950   1.0000 
        l1fb |   0.2684   0.2953   0.0933   1.0000 
         yit |  -0.0648   0.0381  -0.1567   0.2241   1.0000 
        popg |  -0.2071  -0.0630  -0.0790  -0.0222   0.2182   1.0000 
        educ |   0.1917   0.2475  -0.0316   0.2766   0.3737  -0.2397   1.0000 
       l1inv |   0.0441   0.2810  -0.1472   0.2451   0.3986  -0.0414   0.1563   1.0000 
     l1ebrdi |   0.2765  -0.0606  -0.4882  -0.1471   0.3515  -0.1084   0.3580   0.2021   1.0000 
        open |   0.2618   0.2661   0.0428   0.0085   0.0749   0.0122   0.1157   0.1439   0.2092   1.0000 
         tot |   0.1022   0.0569   0.0035   0.5187   0.1857   0.1351   0.1236   0.2388   0.0556  -0.1362   1.0000 
         gov |   0.0412   0.2407   0.0618  -0.1837   0.2390  -0.2594   0.4964   0.1403   0.3113   0.3482  -0.1821   1.0000 
          eu |   0.1880   0.1048  -0.2410   0.0029   0.5060   0.0390   0.4936   0.2175   0.5888   0.3622  -0.0609   0.3033   1.0000 
     aze2006 |  -0.0281   0.1023   0.0139   0.0962   0.0274   0.1162  -0.1249   0.1609  -0.0613  -0.0032   0.1383  -0.0599  -0.0385 
     aze2007 |  -0.0281   0.1023   0.0044   0.0392   0.0509   0.1196  -0.1248   0.0410  -0.0613  -0.0217   0.1474  -0.0600  -0.0385 
     lva2009 |  -0.0281   0.1023   0.0493  -0.0411   0.0979  -0.0315   0.0710   0.0545   0.0716  -0.0461  -0.0097   0.0631   0.1238 
     arm2009 |  -0.0281  -0.0466   0.0087   0.0076   0.0979   0.0312   0.0076   0.1844   0.0105  -0.1253   0.0213  -0.0495  -0.0385 
 
             |  aze2006  aze2007  lva2009  arm2009 –– 
-------------+------------------------------------- 
     aze2006 |   1.0000 
     aze2007 |  -0.0048   1.0000 
     lva2009 |  -0.0048  -0.0048   1.0000 
     arm2009 |  -0.0048  -0.0048  -0.0048   1.0000 
 
Appendix 6.2: Growth model – OLS estimation and diagnostic tests  
 
. *OLS* 
. xi: regress gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot 
gov eu i.time 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2000 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     211 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,   188) =   12.45 
       Model |  3617.45006    22  164.429548           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2483.58611   188  13.2105644           R-squared     =  0.5929 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5453 
       Total |  6101.03617   210  29.0525532           Root MSE      =  3.6346 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |   .0136442   .9782945     0.01   0.989    -1.916201    1.943489 
  defactofix |   .6822965   .7344438     0.93   0.354    -.7665135    2.131106 
     l1lninf |  -1.267199   .6786705    -1.87   0.063    -2.605987     .071589 
        l1fb |   .2040996   .1155468     1.77   0.079    -.0238353    .4320345 
         yit |   .0165124   .2777045     0.06   0.953     -.531305    .5643298 
        popg |  -22.35853   41.03362    -0.54   0.586     -103.304    58.58695 
        educ |   -.030927   .0206452    -1.50   0.136    -.0716529     .009799 
       l1inv |    .067696   .0461214     1.47   0.144    -.0232859    .1586779 
     l1ebrdi |  -2.755845   .8875001    -3.11   0.002    -4.506583   -1.005106 
        open |   .0094838   .0100338     0.95   0.346    -.0103095     .029277 
         tot |   .0125687   .0156314     0.80   0.422    -.0182666    .0434041 
         gov |  -.1032536   .0410912    -2.51   0.013    -.1843128   -.0221945 
          eu |   1.034472   .9812314     1.05   0.293    -.9011662    2.970111 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2001 |   .2732949   1.137281     0.24   0.810    -1.970178    2.516767 
 _Itime_2002 |   -.323897    1.24255    -0.26   0.795     -2.77503    2.127236 
 _Itime_2003 |   .9404849    1.38599     0.68   0.498    -1.793607    3.674576 
 _Itime_2004 |    .552599    1.57438     0.35   0.726    -2.553122     3.65832 
 _Itime_2005 |   .5752839   1.763548     0.33   0.745    -2.903602    4.054169 
 _Itime_2006 |   1.862646   1.981391     0.94   0.348     -2.04597    5.771263 
 _Itime_2007 |   1.406016   2.050591     0.69   0.494    -2.639107     5.45114 
 _Itime_2008 |  -2.495724   2.437021    -1.02   0.307    -7.303144    2.311696 
 _Itime_2009 |  -11.46674   2.589524    -4.43   0.000      -16.575    -6.35848 
       _cons |   42.09454    41.3255     1.02   0.310    -39.42674    123.6158 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. *Diagnostic tests after OLS* 
. test _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 
_Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_ 
> 2009 
 
 ( 1)  o._Itime_1999 = 0 
 ( 2)  o._Itime_2000 = 0 
 ( 3)  _Itime_2001 = 0 
 ( 4)  _Itime_2002 = 0 
 ( 5)  _Itime_2003 = 0 
 ( 6)  _Itime_2004 = 0 
 ( 7)  _Itime_2005 = 0 
 ( 8)  _Itime_2006 = 0 
 ( 9)  _Itime_2007 = 0 
 (10)  _Itime_2008 = 0 
 (11)  _Itime_2009 = 0 
       Constraint 1 dropped 
       Constraint 2 dropped 
 
       F(  9,   188) =   13.11 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     211.00    210    0.4676 
            Skewness |      39.96     22    0.0109 
            Kurtosis |       2.12      1    0.1455 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     253.08    233    0.1748 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of gdppcg 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.01 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.9265 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of gdppcg 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 185) =     12.66 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
. predict resid, residuals 
(89 missing values generated) 
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. kdensity resid, normal 
 
 
rvfplot, mlabel(cntry) 
 
lvrplot, mlabel(cntry) 
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. hilo resid cntry time 
10 lowest and highest observations on resid 
 
  +--------------------------+ 
  |     resid   cntry   time | 
  |--------------------------| 
  | -10.46123     LVA   2009 | 
  | -10.37951     ARM   2009 | 
  | -10.18907     EST   2008 | 
  | -8.248364     LVA   2008 | 
  | -8.186865     KGZ   2005 | 
  |--------------------------| 
  |  -6.81614     UKR   2009 | 
  | -6.568299     KGZ   2006 | 
  | -6.549735     KGZ   2002 | 
  |  -5.79646     KAZ   2008 | 
  | -5.491123     CRO   2006 | 
  +--------------------------+ 
 
  +-------------------------+ 
  |    resid   cntry   time | 
  |-------------------------| 
  | 5.456204     UKR   2004 | 
  | 5.570442     ARM   2002 | 
  | 5.706831     KAZ   2001 | 
  | 6.205907     ROU   2008 | 
  | 6.593705     TJK   2009 | 
  |-------------------------| 
  | 7.602277     KGZ   2009 | 
  | 9.797885     POL   2009 | 
  | 10.89322     AZE   2005 | 
  | 11.41376     AZE   2007 | 
  | 19.03766     AZE   2006 | 
  +-------------------------+ 
 
. predict levg, leverage 
(89 missing values generated) 
 
. hilo levg cntry time, show(5)high 
5 highest observations on levg 
 
  +-------------------------+ 
  |     levg   cntry   time | 
  |-------------------------| 
  | .2498109     BIH   2007 | 
  | .2521123     RUS   2008 | 
  | .2743592     BIH   2009 | 
  | .2966747     AZE   2000 | 
  | .4109208     SRB   2007 | 
  +-------------------------+ 
 
 
. test  aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 
 
 ( 1)  aze2006 = 0 
 ( 2)  aze2007 = 0 
 ( 3)  lva2009 = 0 
 ( 4)  arm2009 = 0 
 
       F(  4,   182) =   28.53 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
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Appendix 6.3: Growth model - OLS with country-time dummies for 
outliers – estimation and diagnostic tests 
 
. xi: regress gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot 
gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2000 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     211 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 26,   184) =   19.43 
       Model |  4472.24461    26  172.009408           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1628.79156   184  8.85212807           R-squared     =  0.7330 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6953 
       Total |  6101.03617   210  29.0525532           Root MSE      =  2.9753 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |   .0028747   .8068582     0.00   0.997    -1.589009    1.594758 
  defactofix |   .0689172      .6232     0.11   0.912    -1.160619    1.298454 
     l1lninf |  -1.323807   .5606108    -2.36   0.019    -2.429859   -.2177549 
        l1fb |   .1822829   .0949466     1.92   0.056    -.0050412    .3696069 
         yit |  -.1153624    .228573    -0.50   0.614    -.5663234    .3355986 
        popg |  -46.29363   33.81417    -1.37   0.173     -113.007    20.41972 
        educ |   .0019909   .0173852     0.11   0.909    -.0323092     .036291 
       l1inv |   .0601007   .0389306     1.54   0.124     -.016707    .1369085 
     l1ebrdi |   -2.38907   .7304977    -3.27   0.001    -3.830298   -.9478411 
        open |   .0095985   .0083027     1.16   0.249    -.0067823    .0259793 
         tot |  -.0051524   .0130132    -0.40   0.693    -.0308267    .0205219 
         gov |  -.1294429   .0337847    -3.83   0.000    -.1960981   -.0627877 
          eu |   .8145401   .8115415     1.00   0.317     -.786583    2.415663 
     aze2006 |   22.82109   3.213293     7.10   0.000     16.48146    29.16073 
     aze2007 |   14.58037   3.182797     4.58   0.000     8.300901    20.85984 
     lva2009 |   -12.2097   3.182448    -3.84   0.000    -18.48848    -5.93092 
     arm2009 |  -12.15751   3.176461    -3.83   0.000    -18.42448    -5.89054 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2001 |   .3311203   .9312389     0.36   0.723    -1.506159    2.168399 
 _Itime_2002 |  -.2226854   1.019052    -0.22   0.827    -2.233215    1.787844 
 _Itime_2003 |   1.148187   1.138096     1.01   0.314     -1.09721    3.393584 
 _Itime_2004 |   .9624805   1.291356     0.75   0.457    -1.585288    3.510249 
 _Itime_2005 |   1.124899    1.44725     0.78   0.438     -1.73044    3.980238 
 _Itime_2006 |   1.443823   1.632137     0.88   0.378    -1.776287    4.663932 
 _Itime_2007 |   1.640097   1.686212     0.97   0.332    -1.686699    4.966894 
 _Itime_2008 |   -1.38609   2.003118    -0.69   0.490    -5.338122    2.565942 
 _Itime_2009 |   -8.81296   2.154567    -4.09   0.000    -13.06379   -4.562128 
       _cons |    67.9565   34.07475     1.99   0.048     .7290552    135.1839 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Diagnostic tests after OLS* 
. test _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 
_Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_ 
> 2009 
 
 ( 1)  o._Itime_1999 = 0 
 ( 2)  o._Itime_2000 = 0 
 ( 3)  _Itime_2001 = 0 
 ( 4)  _Itime_2002 = 0 
 ( 5)  _Itime_2003 = 0 
 ( 6)  _Itime_2004 = 0 
 ( 7)  _Itime_2005 = 0 
 ( 8)  _Itime_2006 = 0 
 ( 9)  _Itime_2007 = 0 
 (10)  _Itime_2008 = 0 
 (11)  _Itime_2009 = 0 
       Constraint 1 dropped 
       Constraint 2 dropped 
 
       F(  9,   184) =   11.88 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
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. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     211.00    210    0.4676 
            Skewness |      40.99     26    0.0311 
            Kurtosis |       2.72      1    0.0992 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     254.70    237    0.2049 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of gdppcg 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.37 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2417 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of gdppcg 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 181) =      0.69 
                  Prob > F =      0.5588 
 
 
. predict resi, residuals 
(89 missing values generated) 
 
. kdensity resi, normal 
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Appendix 6.4: Growth model – Fixed and random effects estimations  
 
*FE model* 
 
. xi: xtreg gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot 
gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time, fe 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: cba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       211 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        24 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7269                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.3238                                        avg =       8.8 
       overall = 0.6267                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(24,163)          =     18.08 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3049                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  (omitted) 
  defactofix |  -.8146296   .9873261    -0.83   0.411    -2.764228    1.134969 
     l1lninf |   -1.04398   .6607603    -1.58   0.116    -2.348734    .2607736 
        l1fb |   .1017036   .1177439     0.86   0.389    -.1307964    .3342036 
         yit |  -.6888733   .2183326    -3.16   0.002    -1.119998   -.2577483 
        popg |  -153.7705   73.09014    -2.10   0.037    -298.0961   -9.444889 
        educ |  -.0445416   .0486068    -0.92   0.361    -.1405217    .0514385 
       l1inv |   .0314903   .0513857     0.61   0.541    -.0699771    .1329578 
     l1ebrdi |  -2.894078   3.712939    -0.78   0.437    -10.22574    4.437584 
        open |   .0434588   .0162058     2.68   0.008     .0114585    .0754591 
         tot |  -.0161965   .0145608    -1.11   0.268    -.0449487    .0125558 
         gov |  -.1108882   .0558521    -1.99   0.049    -.2211752   -.0006012 
          eu |  -.5039566   .9202699    -0.55   0.585    -2.321144    1.313231 
     aze2006 |   20.53851    3.13901     6.54   0.000     14.34015    26.73688 
     aze2007 |   11.72412   3.165784     3.70   0.000     5.472882    17.97535 
     lva2009 |  -13.98651   3.177718    -4.40   0.000    -20.26131   -7.711709 
     arm2009 |  -14.31888   3.230568    -4.43   0.000    -20.69804    -7.93972 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.459042   .8228779     1.77   0.078    -.1658328    3.083917 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.766063   .8187571     2.16   0.032      .149325    3.382801 
 _Itime_2003 |   3.987397   .8343029     4.78   0.000     2.339962    5.634832 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.043893   .8523823     5.92   0.000     3.360758    6.727028 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.199033   .8524543     7.27   0.000     4.515756     7.88231 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.286308   .9297091     7.84   0.000     5.450482    9.122135 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.452767   .9383083     9.01   0.000      6.59996    10.30557 
 _Itime_2008 |    6.05729   .9739753     6.22   0.000     4.134055    7.980526 
 _Itime_2009 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   180.0914   73.53415     2.45   0.015     34.88907    325.2938 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.8140341 
     sigma_e |  2.7968994 
         rho |  .50305378   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(23, 163) =     1.97             Prob > F = 0.0082 
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*RE model* 
 
. xi: xtreg gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot 
gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time, re 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       211 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        24 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7058                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8417                                        avg =       8.8 
       overall = 0.7326                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(26)      =    493.68 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  -.0312795   .8759536    -0.04   0.972    -1.748117    1.685558 
  defactofix |   .0653488   .6530205     0.10   0.920    -1.214548    1.345245 
     l1lninf |  -1.276424   .5629833    -2.27   0.023    -2.379851   -.1729966 
        l1fb |   .1830978   .0971337     1.89   0.059    -.0072807    .3734763 
         yit |   -.095953   .2366472    -0.41   0.685     -.559773    .3678671 
        popg |  -52.13858   36.15419    -1.44   0.149    -122.9995    18.72233 
        educ |     .00106   .0184137     0.06   0.954    -.0350301    .0371501 
       l1inv |   .0553196   .0398415     1.39   0.165    -.0227683    .1334076 
     l1ebrdi |  -2.323929   .7724565    -3.01   0.003    -3.837916    -.809942 
        open |    .011942   .0087843     1.36   0.174    -.0052748    .0291589 
         tot |  -.0058388   .0130806    -0.45   0.655    -.0314763    .0197986 
         gov |  -.1314148   .0349782    -3.76   0.000    -.1999709   -.0628587 
          eu |    .635639   .8186637     0.78   0.437    -.9689124     2.24019 
     aze2006 |    22.5706   3.178035     7.10   0.000     16.34176    28.79943 
     aze2007 |   14.25788   3.152831     4.52   0.000      8.07845    20.43732 
     lva2009 |  -12.41058   3.158823    -3.93   0.000    -18.60176   -6.219404 
     arm2009 |  -12.69124   3.155165    -4.02   0.000    -18.87525   -6.507225 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |   8.734762   2.208778     3.95   0.000     4.405637    13.06389 
 _Itime_2001 |   9.059416   2.012051     4.50   0.000      5.11587    13.00296 
 _Itime_2002 |   8.500647   1.823363     4.66   0.000     4.926922    12.07437 
 _Itime_2003 |   9.863448   1.656723     5.95   0.000     6.616331    13.11057 
 _Itime_2004 |   9.724918   1.498803     6.49   0.000     6.787318    12.66252 
 _Itime_2005 |   9.876668    1.33888     7.38   0.000     7.252512    12.50082 
 _Itime_2006 |   10.17915   1.240468     8.21   0.000     7.747879    12.61042 
 _Itime_2007 |   10.40197   1.172677     8.87   0.000     8.103567    12.70038 
 _Itime_2008 |   7.347916    1.06209     6.92   0.000     5.266257    9.429575 
 _Itime_2009 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |    64.5521   36.60287     1.76   0.078    -7.188213    136.2924 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .48064621 
     sigma_e |  2.7968994 
         rho |  .02868517   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estimates store random 
 
. hausman fixed random 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |    .0028747    -.0312795        .0341542               . 
  defactofix |    .0689172     .0653488        .0035684               . 
     l1lninf |   -1.323807    -1.276424       -.0473831               . 
        l1fb |    .1822829     .1830978       -.0008149               . 
         yit |   -.1153624     -.095953       -.0194094               . 
        popg |   -46.29363    -52.13858        5.844949               . 
        educ |    .0019909       .00106        .0009309               . 
       l1inv |    .0601007     .0553196        .0047811               . 
     l1ebrdi |    -2.38907    -2.323929       -.0651406               . 
        open |    .0095985      .011942       -.0023435               . 
         tot |   -.0051524    -.0058388        .0006864               . 
         gov |   -.1294429    -.1314148        .0019719               . 
          eu |    .8145401      .635639        .1789011               . 
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     aze2006 |    22.82109      22.5706        .2504958        .4747032 
     aze2007 |    14.58037     14.25788        .3224866        .4357275 
     lva2009 |    -12.2097    -12.41058        .2008825        .3870562 
     arm2009 |   -12.15751    -12.69124        .5337279        .3671968 
 _Itime_2001 |    .3311203     9.059416       -8.728296               . 
 _Itime_2002 |   -.2226854     8.500647       -8.723332               . 
 _Itime_2003 |    1.148187     9.863448       -8.715261               . 
 _Itime_2004 |    .9624805     9.724918       -8.762437               . 
 _Itime_2005 |    1.124899     9.876668       -8.751769        .5494861 
 _Itime_2006 |    1.443823     10.17915       -8.735329        1.060712 
 _Itime_2007 |    1.640097     10.40197       -8.761876        1.211668 
 _Itime_2008 |    -1.38609     7.347916       -8.734006        1.698365 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                             b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from fit 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(25) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =    -0.20    chi2<0 ==> model fitted on these 
                                        data fails to meet the asymptotic 
                                        assumptions of the Hausman test; 
                                        see suest for a generalized test 
 
. xttest0  
 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
 
        gdppcg[ctyno,t] = Xb + u[ctyno] + e[ctyno,t] 
 
        Estimated results: 
                         |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
                ---------+----------------------------- 
                  gdppcg |   29.05255       5.390042 
                       e |   7.822646       2.796899 
                       u |   .2310208       .4806462 
 
        Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                              chi2(1) =     2.01 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0784 
 
Appendix 6.5: Growth model - FEVD 
 
Appendix 6.5a: Growth model - Between and within effects 
 
. xtsum cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov eu 
cbal1lninf cbal1fb 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
cba      overall |       .16   .3672186          0          1 |     N =     300 
         between |             .3741657          0          1 |     n =      25 
         within  |                    0        .16        .16 |     T =      12 
                 |                                            | 
defact~x overall |  .3033333   .4604661          0          1 |     N =     300 
         between |             .3937298          0          1 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .2504177       -.53       1.22 |     T =      12 
                 |                                            | 
l1lninf  overall |   2.89359   .5115875   .3885427   5.715971 |     N =     275 
         between |             .3570453   2.520275   3.863841 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .3726835   .7374492    4.74572 |     T =      11 
                 |                                            | 
l1fb     overall | -2.135042   3.750397  -13.13681   25.46177 |     N =     273 
         between |             2.492413  -6.438151   2.912338 |     n =      25 
         within  |              2.83499  -11.38511   21.48492 | T-bar =   10.92 
                 |                                            | 
yit      overall |  12.54333   4.109064          0         20 |     N =     300 
         between |             2.269606   4.583333       14.5 |     n =      25 
         within  |             3.452941   7.043333   18.04333 |     T =      12 
                 |                                            | 
popg     overall |  .9991076   .0075943   .9718928   1.034805 |     N =     275 
         between |             .0065562   .9858042   1.013155 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .0040322   .9723614   1.026627 |     T =      11 
                 |                                            | 
educ     overall |  45.50164    18.4419    13.3479    87.6183 |     N =     267 
         between |             16.11634   15.24345   70.41013 |     n =      25 
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         within  |             9.377196   18.87013   71.67195 | T-bar =   10.68 
                 |                                            | 
l1inv    overall |  25.47524   6.766868      4.386     57.991 |     N =     264 
         between |             4.403091   13.90618   32.81645 |     n =      24 
         within  |              5.20965   12.07824   50.64979 |     T =      11 
                 |                                            | 
l1ebrdi  overall |  3.089649   .5522207    1.41625          4 |     N =     274 
         between |             .5298104   1.799318   3.915227 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .1872695   2.267376   3.768626 |     T =   10.96 
                 |                                            | 
open     overall |  102.8195   31.22955    45.1349    203.203 |     N =     298 
         between |             28.39026   57.85231   157.0112 |     n =      25 
         within  |             14.09477   55.78941   185.7113 |     T =   11.92 
                 |                                            | 
tot      overall |  106.5036   20.74314    73.5077    238.183 |     N =     248 
         between |             14.57014   91.55393   145.8427 |     n =      25 
         within  |             14.97536   53.76543   198.8439 |     T =    9.92 
                 |                                            | 
gov      overall |  36.38287   9.321389    3.09956    62.8461 |     N =     297 
         between |             8.346872   21.66292   49.46571 |     n =      25 
         within  |             4.452042  -.7212324   53.27864 | T-bar =   11.88 
                 |                                            | 
eu       overall |       .18   .3848294          0          1 |     N =     300 
         between |             .2340762          0         .5 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .3087357       -.32        .93 |     T =      12 
                 |                                            | 
cbal1l~f overall |  .4276988    .986831          0    3.35593 |     N =     275 
         between |             1.001378          0   2.853096 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .0876046   .0725165    .974297 |     T =      11 
                 |                                            | 
cbal1fb  overall | -.0345027   .9541556   -4.68313   3.374847 |     N =     273 
         between |             .5472353  -2.052314   1.580108 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .7872503   -4.05974   2.971546 | T-bar =   10.92 
 
Appnedix 6.5b: Growth model - FEVD estimated by using a 3-stages 
procedure  
 
3 stages 
 
. **CBA (4 countries)** 
. *Stage 1 (panel robust SE) 
. xi: xtreg gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot 
gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time , fe robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: cba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       211 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        24 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7269                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.3238                                        avg =       8.8 
       overall = 0.6267                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(20,23)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3049                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 24 clusters in ctyno) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  (omitted) 
  defactofix |  -.8146296   .7942158    -1.03   0.316     -2.45759     .828331 
     l1lninf |   -1.04398   .8754877    -1.19   0.245    -2.855064    .7671043 
        l1fb |   .1017036   .1138939     0.89   0.381    -.1339039    .3373111 
         yit |  -.6888733   .2535229    -2.72   0.012    -1.213325   -.1644213 
        popg |  -153.7705   40.24269    -3.82   0.001    -237.0188   -70.52213 
        educ |  -.0445416   .0638235    -0.70   0.492    -.1765706    .0874873 
       l1inv |   .0314903   .0724473     0.43   0.668    -.1183783     .181359 
     l1ebrdi |  -2.894078   3.879948    -0.75   0.463    -10.92036    5.132207 
        open |   .0434588   .0151035     2.88   0.009     .0122149    .0747027 
         tot |  -.0161965   .0180372    -0.90   0.379    -.0535092    .0211163 
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         gov |  -.1108882   .0882642    -1.26   0.222    -.2934765    .0717001 
          eu |  -.5039566   .9971896    -0.51   0.618      -2.5668    1.558887 
     aze2006 |   20.53851   1.177344    17.44   0.000     18.10299    22.97403 
     aze2007 |   11.72412   1.035585    11.32   0.000     9.581845    13.86639 
     lva2009 |  -13.98651    1.71791    -8.14   0.000    -17.54028   -10.43274 
     arm2009 |  -14.31888   1.975586    -7.25   0.000    -18.40569   -10.23207 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.459042   .6273596     2.33   0.029     .1612499    2.756834 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.766063   .7205152     2.45   0.022     .2755636    3.256562 
 _Itime_2003 |   3.987397   .7525256     5.30   0.000     2.430679    5.544114 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.043893   .6539156     7.71   0.000     3.691165     6.39662 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.199033   1.116281     5.55   0.000      3.88983    8.508236 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.286308   .9692477     7.52   0.000     5.281267     9.29135 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.452767   1.052611     8.03   0.000     6.275274    10.63026 
 _Itime_2008 |    6.05729   1.394932     4.34   0.000     3.171653    8.942928 
 _Itime_2009 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   180.0914   41.04663     4.39   0.000     95.17999    265.0028 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.8140341 
     sigma_e |  2.7968994 
         rho |  .50305378   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Save fixed effect (unit effects) from stage 1 
. predict fixedeff, u 
(89 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 2 (regression of the FE vector on the time-invariant and slowly changing 
explantory variables - by OLS) 
. reg fixedeff cba l1ebrdi popg open gov educ  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     211 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,   204) =   22.07 
       Model |  435.191935     6  72.5319892           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  670.329791   204  3.28593035           R-squared     =  0.3937 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3758 
       Total |  1105.52173   210  5.26438917           Root MSE      =  1.8127 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    fixedeff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |   .2141747   .3998075     0.54   0.593    -.5741101     1.00246 
     l1ebrdi |   1.211426   .2702099     4.48   0.000      .678664    1.744189 
        popg |   95.08174   18.13671     5.24   0.000     59.32229    130.8412 
        open |  -.0283921   .0044044    -6.45   0.000     -.037076   -.0197082 
         gov |  -.0171296   .0173659    -0.99   0.325    -.0513693      .01711 
        educ |   .0479532    .008142     5.89   0.000        .0319    .0640064 
       _cons |  -97.48203   18.20847    -5.35   0.000     -133.383    -61.5811 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. * Save the residuals from stage 2 
. predict resdfevd, residuals 
(89 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 3 (estimation of pooled OLS by including all explanatory time-variant, time-
invariant variables and unexplained part of the FE vector - error term from the stage 
2) 
. regress gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov 
eu resdfevd aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     211 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 27,   183) =   25.65 
       Model |  4825.94487    27  178.738699           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   1275.0913   183  6.96771202           R-squared     =  0.7910 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7602 
       Total |  6101.03617   210  29.0525532           Root MSE      =  2.6396 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |   .2141747   .7164582     0.30   0.765    -1.199406    1.627755 
  defactofix |  -.8146296   .5666391    -1.44   0.152    -1.932615    .3033561 
     l1lninf |   -1.04398   .4989219    -2.09   0.038    -2.028359   -.0596012 
        l1fb |   .1017036   .0849924     1.20   0.233    -.0659875    .2693947 
         yit |  -.6888733   .2181815    -3.16   0.002    -1.119348   -.2583985 
        popg |  -58.68874   30.05032    -1.95   0.052    -117.9784    .6008878 
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        educ |   .0034116   .0154255     0.22   0.825    -.0270231    .0338462 
       l1inv |   .0314903   .0347718     0.91   0.366    -.0371149    .1000956 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.682652   .6556374    -2.57   0.011    -2.976232   -.3890714 
        open |   .0150667    .007406     2.03   0.043     .0004545    .0296789 
         tot |  -.0161965   .0116489    -1.39   0.166    -.0391799     .006787 
         gov |  -.1280178   .0299744    -4.27   0.000    -.1871577   -.0688779 
          eu |  -.5039566   .7434009    -0.68   0.499    -1.970695    .9627823 
    resdfevd |          1   .1403548     7.12   0.000     .7230782    1.276922 
     aze2006 |   20.53851   2.868777     7.16   0.000     14.87838    26.19864 
     aze2007 |   11.72412   2.852091     4.11   0.000     6.096907    17.35133 
     lva2009 |  -13.98651   2.834458    -4.93   0.000    -19.57893   -8.394089 
     arm2009 |  -14.31888   2.834435    -5.05   0.000    -19.91125   -8.726506 
             | 
        time | 
       2001  |   1.459042    .841225     1.73   0.085    -.2007047    3.118789 
       2002  |   1.766063   .9462111     1.87   0.064    -.1008229    3.632949 
       2003  |   3.987397    1.08551     3.67   0.000     1.845673     6.12912 
       2004  |   5.043893   1.280921     3.94   0.000      2.51662    7.571165 
       2005  |   6.199033   1.468283     4.22   0.000     3.302093    9.095973 
       2006  |   7.286308     1.6641     4.38   0.000      4.00302     10.5696 
       2007  |   8.452767   1.775482     4.76   0.000     4.949719    11.95581 
       2008  |    6.05729    2.06149     2.94   0.004     1.989945    10.12464 
       2009  |  -1.44e-07   2.276834    -0.00   1.000    -4.492221     4.49222 
             | 
       _cons |   82.60938   30.30097     2.73   0.007     22.82521    142.3936 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Diagnostic tests after 3rd stage* 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     211.00    210    0.4676 
            Skewness |      34.57     27    0.1502 
            Kurtosis |       4.79      1    0.0287 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     250.35    238    0.2786 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of gdppcg 
 
         chi2(1)      =     2.35 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.1252 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of gdppcg 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 180) =      2.36 
                  Prob > F =      0.0733 
 
. predict resd, residuals 
(89 missing values generated) 
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. xtserial gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot 
gov eu res 
> dfevd aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009  
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      21) =     12.400 
           Prob > F =      0.0020 
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Appendix 6.5c: Growth model - FEVD estimated by using ‘xtfevd’ 
command 
 
. xtfevd gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov 
eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009  _Itime_2001 _ Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 
_Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009, invariant(cba l1ebrdi 
popg open gov educ) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      161           number of obs       =      211 
mean squared error         = 6.043087           F( 28, 161)         = 14.48251 
root mean squared error    = 2.458269           Prob > F            = 4.11e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1275.091           R-squared           = .7910041 
Total Sum of Squares       = 6101.036           adj. R-squared      = .7273967 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4825.945 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  defactofix |  -.8146296   1.136658    -0.72   0.475     -3.05931    1.430051 
     l1lninf |   -1.04398   .7766185    -1.34   0.181    -2.577653    .4896925 
        l1fb |   .1017036   .1419908     0.72   0.475     -.178701    .3821082 
         yit |  -.6888733   .4264105    -1.62   0.108    -1.530952    .1532057 
       l1inv |   .0314903   .0545337     0.58   0.564    -.0762032    .1391839 
         tot |  -.0161965   .0185765    -0.87   0.385    -.0528816    .0204887 
          eu |  -.5039566   1.189929    -0.42   0.672    -2.853838    1.845925 
     aze2006 |   20.53851   3.237682     6.34   0.000     14.14471    26.93231 
     aze2007 |   11.72412   3.301798     3.55   0.001     5.203699    18.24453 
     lva2009 |  -13.98651   3.312015    -4.22   0.000     -20.5271   -7.445915 
     arm2009 |  -14.31888   3.363808    -4.26   0.000    -20.96176   -7.676003 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.459042   .9589177     1.52   0.130    -.4346363    3.352721 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.766063   1.166511     1.51   0.132    -.5375729    4.069699 
 _Itime_2003 |   3.987397   1.456347     2.74   0.007     1.111391    6.863402 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.043893   1.717731     2.94   0.004     1.651703    8.436083 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.199033   2.046121     3.03   0.003     2.158337    10.23973 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.286308   2.417103     3.01   0.003     2.512993    12.05962 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.452767   2.540041     3.33   0.001     3.436673    13.46886 
 _Itime_2008 |    6.05729   3.107008     1.95   0.053    -.0784541    12.19303 
 _Itime_2009 |  -1.44e-07   3.355038    -0.00   1.000    -6.625557    6.625556 
         cba |   .2141747   1.364171     0.16   0.875    -2.479802    2.908151 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.682652   1.131441    -1.49   0.139    -3.917031    .5517274 
        popg |  -58.68874   49.91269    -1.18   0.241    -157.2567    39.87924 
        open |   .0150667   .0140415     1.07   0.285    -.0126626     .042796 
         gov |  -.1280178   .0523622    -2.44   0.016    -.2314231   -.0246126 
        educ |   .0034116   .0280833     0.12   0.903    -.0520475    .0588706 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   82.60938    50.3086     1.64   0.103    -16.74044    181.9592 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 6.5d: Growth model - FEVD estimated by using ‘xtfevd’ 
command, when some or all of these variables (defactofix, inflation 
and fiscal balance) are excluded  
 
 
. xtfevd gdppcg cba yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov eu  aze2006 aze2007 
lva2009 arm2009  _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
_Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009, invariant(cba l1ebrdi popg open gov 
educ) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      164           number of obs       =      211 
mean squared error         = 6.171605           F( 25, 164)         =  15.6739 
root mean squared error    = 2.484272           Prob > F            = 1.74e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1302.209           R-squared           = .7865594 
Total Sum of Squares       = 6101.036           adj. R-squared      =  .726692 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4798.827 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yit |  -.6621969    .426989    -1.55   0.123    -1.505302    .1809077 
       l1inv |   .0256383   .0550035     0.47   0.642    -.0829679    .1342445 
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         tot |  -.0153826   .0185079    -0.83   0.407    -.0519271    .0211618 
          eu |  -.8509592   1.168169    -0.73   0.467     -3.15755    1.455631 
     aze2006 |   20.06522   3.244804     6.18   0.000     13.65824     26.4722 
     aze2007 |   10.85893   3.296061     3.29   0.001     4.350739    17.36711 
     lva2009 |  -14.80286   3.404457    -4.35   0.000    -21.52508   -8.080643 
     arm2009 |  -14.74286   3.368894    -4.38   0.000    -21.39486   -8.090863 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.413153   .9591884     1.47   0.143    -.4807977    3.307103 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.982669   1.182499     1.68   0.096    -.3522165    4.317554 
 _Itime_2003 |   4.320024   1.488128     2.90   0.004     1.381664    7.258385 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.530041   1.769071     3.13   0.002     2.036949    9.023133 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.579685   2.100037     3.13   0.002      2.43309    10.72628 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.735206   2.487712     3.11   0.002     2.823133    12.64728 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.961264   2.615821     3.43   0.001     3.796236    14.12629 
 _Itime_2008 |   6.367587   3.194333     1.99   0.048     .0602672    12.67491 
 _Itime_2009 |  -1.47e-07   3.415133    -0.00   1.000    -6.743299    6.743298 
         cba |     .20636   1.199804     0.17   0.864    -2.162695    2.575415 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.010972   1.021709    -0.99   0.324    -3.028371    1.006428 
        popg |  -57.22434   50.70812    -1.13   0.261    -157.3493     42.9006 
        open |   .0123902   .0133155     0.93   0.353    -.0139017     .038682 
         gov |  -.1537282   .0487131    -3.16   0.002    -.2499138   -.0575425 
        educ |   .0047975   .0260385     0.18   0.854    -.0466164    .0562113 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |    76.1918   50.70366     1.50   0.135    -23.92433    176.3079 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtfevd gdppcg cba defactofix yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov eu  aze2006 
aze2007 lva2009 arm2009  _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 
_Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009, invariant(cba l1ebrdi popg open gov 
educ) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      163           number of obs       =      211 
mean squared error         = 6.164829           F( 26, 163)         = 15.25497 
root mean squared error    = 2.482907           Prob > F            = 2.23e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1300.779           R-squared           = .7867938 
Total Sum of Squares       = 6101.036           adj. R-squared      = .7253171 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4800.257 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  defactofix |  -.4090803   1.177875    -0.35   0.729    -2.734942    1.916782 
         yit |  -.6509779    .431911    -1.51   0.134     -1.50384    .2018841 
       l1inv |   .0270581   .0569311     0.48   0.635    -.0853594    .1394756 
         tot |  -.0158791   .0187309    -0.85   0.398    -.0528655    .0211073 
          eu |  -.8687623   1.186844    -0.73   0.465    -3.212333    1.474809 
     aze2006 |   20.04557   3.287659     6.10   0.000     13.55368    26.53747 
     aze2007 |   10.85279   3.378237     3.21   0.002     4.182043    17.52354 
     lva2009 |  -14.63276    3.35555    -4.36   0.000    -21.25871   -8.006808 
     arm2009 |  -14.79266   3.399144    -4.35   0.000    -21.50469   -8.080628 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.424628   .9642297     1.48   0.141    -.4793634     3.32862 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.951503   1.193966     1.63   0.104    -.4061324    4.309138 
 _Itime_2003 |   4.301772   1.504134     2.86   0.005     1.331672    7.271871 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.509954   1.783771     3.09   0.002     1.987676    9.032231 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.575749    2.12134     3.10   0.002     2.386899     10.7646 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.724299    2.51344     3.07   0.002     2.761198     12.6874 
 _Itime_2007 |    8.94626   2.650793     3.37   0.001     3.711938    14.18058 
 _Itime_2008 |   6.344626   3.229608     1.96   0.051    -.0326387    12.72189 
 _Itime_2009 |  -2.26e-07     3.4485    -0.00   1.000    -6.809493    6.809493 
         cba |    .457859   1.310891     0.35   0.727    -2.130659    3.046377 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.144498   1.075802    -1.06   0.289    -3.268803    .9798078 
        popg |  -55.81065   51.35885    -1.09   0.279    -157.2251     45.6038 
        open |   .0131693   .0139922     0.94   0.348    -.0144601    .0407987 
         gov |  -.1501541   .0496804    -3.02   0.003    -.2482542    -.052054 
        educ |   .0063786   .0266491     0.24   0.811    -.0462433    .0590005 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   74.88616   51.38472     1.46   0.147    -26.57938    176.3517 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. xtfevd gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf  yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov eu  
aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009  _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 
_Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009, invariant(cba l1ebrdi 
popg open gov educ) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      162           number of obs       =      211 
mean squared error         = 6.070748           F( 27, 162)         = 14.88962 
root mean squared error    = 2.463889           Prob > F            = 2.67e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1280.928           R-squared           = .7900475 
Total Sum of Squares       = 6101.036           adj. R-squared      = .7278394 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4820.108 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  defactofix |  -.7951543   1.161249    -0.68   0.494     -3.08829    1.497982 
     l1lninf |  -1.052473   .7678049    -1.37   0.172     -2.56867    .4637232 
         yit |   -.642272    .428293    -1.50   0.136    -1.488029     .203485 
       l1inv |   .0356407   .0553157     0.64   0.520     -.073592    .1448735 
         tot |  -.0136897   .0185666    -0.74   0.462    -.0503534     .022974 
          eu |  -.6410211    1.16992    -0.55   0.585     -2.95128    1.669237 
     aze2006 |   20.61677   3.234293     6.37   0.000     14.22996    27.00358 
     aze2007 |   11.50133   3.299686     3.49   0.001     4.985392    18.01728 
     lva2009 |  -14.14655     3.3162    -4.27   0.000    -20.69511   -7.598001 
     arm2009 |  -14.17851   3.376633    -4.20   0.000     -20.8464   -7.510621 
 _Itime_2001 |    1.52678   .9645778     1.58   0.115    -.3779871    3.431547 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.911259    1.18051     1.62   0.107    -.4199132    4.242431 
 _Itime_2003 |   4.068836   1.480585     2.75   0.007     1.145101    6.992571 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.169594   1.746933     2.96   0.004     1.719899    8.619289 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.361126   2.085952     3.05   0.003     2.241964    10.48029 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.417547   2.469866     3.00   0.003     2.540264    12.29483 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.622172   2.597899     3.32   0.001      3.49206    13.75228 
 _Itime_2008 |   6.156137    3.17948     1.94   0.055    -.1224332    12.43471 
 _Itime_2009 |   7.69e-08   3.423001     0.00   1.000    -6.759455    6.759455 
         cba |   .4920759    1.29389     0.38   0.704    -2.062989     3.04714 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.926557   1.122932    -1.72   0.088    -4.144029    .2909141 
        popg |  -64.13291    50.9057    -1.26   0.210    -164.6572    36.39138 
        open |   .0163219   .0140627     1.16   0.247     -.011448    .0440919 
         gov |  -.1411927   .0491324    -2.87   0.005    -.2382152   -.0441702 
        educ |    .010072   .0265439     0.38   0.705    -.0423447    .0624887 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   87.50513   51.37562     1.70   0.090    -13.94711    188.9574 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 6.6: Growth model – separating a CBA to strong and weak - 
FEVD 
 
Appendix 6.6a: Estimating growth model (with strong and weak CBA) 
with 3-stage FEVD procedure 
 
. *Stage 1 (panel robust SE) 
. xi: xtreg gdppcg strongcba weakcba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv 
l1ebrdi open tot gov eu  aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time , fe robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: strongcba omitted because of collinearity 
note: weakcba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       211 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        24 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7269                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.3238                                        avg =       8.8 
       overall = 0.6267                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(20,23)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3049                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 24 clusters in ctyno) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  495 
             |               Robust 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |  (omitted) 
     weakcba |  (omitted) 
  defactofix |  -.8146296   .7942158    -1.03   0.316     -2.45759     .828331 
     l1lninf |   -1.04398   .8754877    -1.19   0.245    -2.855064    .7671043 
        l1fb |   .1017036   .1138939     0.89   0.381    -.1339039    .3373111 
         yit |  -.6888733   .2535229    -2.72   0.012    -1.213325   -.1644213 
        popg |  -153.7705   40.24269    -3.82   0.001    -237.0188   -70.52213 
        educ |  -.0445416   .0638235    -0.70   0.492    -.1765706    .0874873 
       l1inv |   .0314903   .0724473     0.43   0.668    -.1183783     .181359 
     l1ebrdi |  -2.894078   3.879948    -0.75   0.463    -10.92036    5.132207 
        open |   .0434588   .0151035     2.88   0.009     .0122149    .0747027 
         tot |  -.0161965   .0180372    -0.90   0.379    -.0535092    .0211163 
         gov |  -.1108882   .0882642    -1.26   0.222    -.2934765    .0717001 
          eu |  -.5039566   .9971896    -0.51   0.618      -2.5668    1.558887 
     aze2006 |   20.53851   1.177344    17.44   0.000     18.10299    22.97403 
     aze2007 |   11.72412   1.035585    11.32   0.000     9.581845    13.86639 
     lva2009 |  -13.98651    1.71791    -8.14   0.000    -17.54028   -10.43274 
     arm2009 |  -14.31888   1.975586    -7.25   0.000    -18.40569   -10.23207 
 _Itime_1999 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.459042   .6273596     2.33   0.029     .1612499    2.756834 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.766063   .7205152     2.45   0.022     .2755636    3.256562 
 _Itime_2003 |   3.987397   .7525256     5.30   0.000     2.430679    5.544114 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.043893   .6539156     7.71   0.000     3.691165     6.39662 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.199033   1.116281     5.55   0.000      3.88983    8.508236 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.286308   .9692477     7.52   0.000     5.281267     9.29135 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.452767   1.052611     8.03   0.000     6.275274    10.63026 
 _Itime_2008 |    6.05729   1.394932     4.34   0.000     3.171653    8.942928 
 _Itime_2009 |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   180.0914   41.04663     4.39   0.000     95.17999    265.0028 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.8140341 
     sigma_e |  2.7968994 
         rho |  .50305378   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Save fixed effect (unit effects) from stage 1 
. predict fixedeff1, u 
(89 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 2 (regression of the FE vector on the time-invariant and slowly changing 
explantory variables - by OLS) 
. reg fixedeff1 strongcba weakcba l1ebrdi popg open gov educ  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     211 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  7,   203) =   18.92 
       Model |  436.554082     7  62.3648688           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  668.967644   203  3.29540712           R-squared     =  0.3949 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3740 
       Total |  1105.52173   210  5.26438917           Root MSE      =  1.8153 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   fixedeff1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |  -.0872524   .6165374    -0.14   0.888    -1.302891    1.128386 
     weakcba |   .3669469   .4655871     0.79   0.432    -.5510599    1.284954 
     l1ebrdi |    1.21911    .270863     4.50   0.000     .6850438    1.753175 
        popg |   96.00191   18.21915     5.27   0.000     60.07886    131.9249 
        open |  -.0278373   .0044943    -6.19   0.000    -.0366988   -.0189757 
         gov |  -.0178776   .0174298    -1.03   0.306    -.0522442     .016489 
        educ |   .0481601     .00816     5.90   0.000     .0320708    .0642494 
       _cons |  -98.46594   18.29882    -5.38   0.000    -134.5461   -62.38582 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. * Save the residuals from stage 2 
. predict resfevd1, residuals 
(89 missing values generated) 
 
 
 
 
 
  496 
. *Stage 3 (estimation of pooled OLS by including all explanatory time-variant, time-
invariant variables and unexplained part of the FE vector - error term from the stage 
2) 
 
. regress gdppcg strongcba weakcba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv 
l1ebrdi open tot gov eu resfevd1 aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     211 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 28,   182) =   24.60 
       Model |  4825.94487    28  172.355174           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   1275.0913   182  7.00599617           R-squared     =  0.7910 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7589 
       Total |  6101.03617   210  29.0525532           Root MSE      =  2.6469 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |  -.0872525   1.163678    -0.07   0.940    -2.383287    2.208782 
     weakcba |   .3669468   .7731113     0.47   0.636    -1.158467     1.89236 
  defactofix |  -.8146296   .5772616    -1.41   0.160    -1.953615    .3243561 
     l1lninf |   -1.04398   .5019711    -2.08   0.039    -2.034411   -.0535488 
        l1fb |   .1017036   .0862037     1.18   0.240    -.0683835    .2717907 
         yit |  -.6888733   .2320359    -2.97   0.003      -1.1467    -.231047 
        popg |  -57.76857   30.31969    -1.91   0.058    -117.5919    2.054732 
        educ |   .0036185    .015481     0.23   0.815    -.0269269    .0341639 
       l1inv |   .0314903   .0351443     0.90   0.371    -.0378523     .100833 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.674969   .6697857    -2.50   0.013    -2.996512   -.3534251 
        open |   .0156215   .0075822     2.06   0.041     .0006612    .0305818 
         tot |  -.0161965   .0120956    -1.34   0.182     -.040062    .0076691 
         gov |  -.1287658    .030096    -4.28   0.000    -.1881477   -.0693839 
          eu |  -.5039566   .7456561    -0.68   0.500    -1.975199    .9672855 
    resfevd1 |          1    .140742     7.11   0.000     .7223042    1.277696 
     aze2006 |   20.53851   2.886427     7.12   0.000     14.84335    26.23368 
     aze2007 |   11.72412   2.867076     4.09   0.000     6.067135     17.3811 
     lva2009 |  -13.98651   2.847274    -4.91   0.000    -19.60442   -8.368599 
     arm2009 |  -14.31888   2.842655    -5.04   0.000    -19.92768   -8.710082 
             | 
        time | 
       2001  |   1.459042   .8466058     1.72   0.087    -.2113822    3.129467 
       2002  |   1.766063   .9628546     1.83   0.068    -.1337303    3.665856 
       2003  |   3.987397   1.110318     3.59   0.000     1.796645    6.178148 
       2004  |   5.043893   1.314028     3.84   0.000     2.451205     7.63658 
       2005  |   6.199033   1.510823     4.10   0.000     3.218052    9.180014 
       2006  |   7.286308   1.716786     4.24   0.000     3.898945    10.67367 
       2007  |   8.452767   1.840555     4.59   0.000     4.821197    12.08434 
       2008  |    6.05729   2.127148     2.85   0.005     1.860249    10.25433 
       2009  |  -1.01e-07   2.367823    -0.00   1.000    -4.671915    4.671915 
             | 
       _cons |   81.62547   30.60988     2.67   0.008      21.2296    142.0213 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Diagnostic tests after 3rd stage* 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     211.00    211    0.4871 
            Skewness |      38.05     28    0.0974 
            Kurtosis |       4.79      1    0.0287 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     253.84    240    0.2578 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of gdppcg 
 
         chi2(1)      =     2.35 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.1252 
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. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of gdppcg 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 179) =      2.37 
                  Prob > F =      0.0722 
 
.  
 
. xtserial gdppcg strongcba weakcba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv 
l1ebrdi open  
> tot gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      21) =     12.400 
           Prob > F =      0.0020 
 
 
Appendix 6.6b: FEVD - Estimating growth model (with strong and weak 
CBA) with ‘xtfevd’ command 
 
 
. *Xtfevd command (treating cba, ebrdi and l1cbi as invariant, slowly moving 
variables) 
 
 
. xtfevd gdppcg strongcba weakcba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi 
open tot gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 
_Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009, 
invariant(strongcba weakcba  l1ebrdi popg open gov educ) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      160           number of obs       =      211 
mean squared error         = 6.043087           F( 29, 160)         = 13.98637 
root mean squared error    = 2.458269           Prob > F            = 9.84e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1275.091           R-squared           = .7910041 
Total Sum of Squares       = 6101.036           adj. R-squared      = .7256929 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4825.945 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  defactofix |  -.8146296   1.152951    -0.71   0.481    -3.091594    1.462335 
     l1lninf |   -1.04398   .7794749    -1.34   0.182    -2.583366    .4954061 
        l1fb |   .1017036    .141814     0.72   0.474     -.178365    .3817723 
         yit |  -.6888733   .4304095    -1.60   0.111     -1.53889    .1611432 
       l1inv |   .0314903   .0538978     0.58   0.560    -.0749524    .1379331 
         tot |  -.0161965    .018468    -0.88   0.382     -.052669     .020276 
          eu |  -.5039566   1.161178    -0.43   0.665    -2.797169    1.789256 
     aze2006 |   20.53851   3.232696     6.35   0.000     14.15426    26.92277 
     aze2007 |   11.72412   3.303871     3.55   0.001     5.199296    18.24894 
     lva2009 |  -13.98651   3.309913    -4.23   0.000    -20.52326   -7.449756 
     arm2009 |  -14.31888   3.362426    -4.26   0.000    -20.95934    -7.67842 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.459042   .9596797     1.52   0.130    -.4362308    3.354315 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.766063   1.175264     1.50   0.135    -.5549686    4.087094 
 _Itime_2003 |   3.987397    1.46183     2.73   0.007     1.100426    6.874368 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.043893    1.73743     2.90   0.004     1.612639    8.475147 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.199033   2.071412     2.99   0.003     2.108198    10.28987 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.286308    2.43642     2.99   0.003     2.474619      12.098 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.452767   2.594503     3.26   0.001     3.328879    13.57665 
 _Itime_2008 |    6.05729   3.143448     1.93   0.056    -.1507097    12.26529 
 _Itime_2009 |  -1.01e-07   3.420591    -0.00   1.000     -6.75533     6.75533 
   strongcba |  -.0872525   2.255228    -0.04   0.969    -4.541106    4.366601 
     weakcba |   .3669468    1.44982     0.25   0.801    -2.496305    3.230199 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.674969   1.159061    -1.45   0.150       -3.964    .6140633 
        popg |  -57.76857    50.3144    -1.15   0.253    -157.1346    41.59742 
        open |   .0156215   .0139033     1.12   0.263    -.0118361    .0430791 
         gov |  -.1287658   .0516255    -2.49   0.014    -.2307211   -.0268105 
        educ |   .0036185   .0277309     0.13   0.896    -.0511473    .0583843 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   81.62547   50.76872     1.61   0.110    -18.63776    181.8887 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.6c: FEVD - Estimating growth model (with strong and weak 
CBA) with ‘xtfevd’ command (withough some of the variables) 
 
. xtfevd gdppcg strongcba weakcba yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov eu  
aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009  _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 
_Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009, invariant(strongcba 
weakcba l1ebrdi popg open gov educ) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      163           number of obs       =      211 
mean squared error         = 6.171605           F( 26, 163)         = 15.07293 
root mean squared error    = 2.484272           Prob > F            = 4.21e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1302.209           R-squared           = .7865594 
Total Sum of Squares       = 6101.036           adj. R-squared      = .7250152 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4798.828 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         yit |  -.6621969   .4297683    -1.54   0.125    -1.510828    .1864341 
       l1inv |   .0256383   .0541917     0.47   0.637      -.08137    .1326466 
         tot |  -.0153826   .0183033    -0.84   0.402    -.0515248    .0207595 
          eu |  -.8509593   1.141391    -0.75   0.457    -3.104779     1.40286 
     aze2006 |   20.06522   3.240712     6.19   0.000     13.66603    26.46441 
     aze2007 |   10.85893   3.293474     3.30   0.001      4.35555     17.3623 
     lva2009 |  -14.80286   3.405169    -4.35   0.000    -21.52679    -8.07893 
     arm2009 |  -14.74286   3.366974    -4.38   0.000    -21.39137   -8.094351 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.413153   .9591526     1.47   0.143    -.4808134    3.307119 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.982669   1.182246     1.68   0.095     -.351823    4.317161 
 _Itime_2003 |   4.320025   1.482897     2.91   0.004      1.39186    7.248189 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.530041   1.774832     3.12   0.002     2.025413    9.034668 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.579685   2.108432     3.12   0.002     2.416323    10.74305 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.735207   2.487977     3.11   0.002     2.822385    12.64803 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.961264   2.645105     3.39   0.001     3.738174    14.18435 
 _Itime_2008 |   6.367587   3.207992     1.98   0.049     .0330069    12.70217 
 _Itime_2009 |  -3.56e-08   3.463386    -0.00   1.000    -6.838886    6.838886 
   strongcba |  -.2838851   2.081555    -0.14   0.892    -4.394174    3.826404 
     weakcba |   .4548307   1.337434     0.34   0.734      -2.1861    3.095761 
     l1ebrdi |  -.9984754   1.034976    -0.96   0.336    -3.042164    1.045213 
        popg |  -55.72777   51.03869    -1.09   0.277      -156.51    45.05449 
        open |   .0132925   .0133547     1.00   0.321    -.0130781     .039663 
         gov |  -.1549447    .047972    -3.23   0.001    -.2496714   -.0602179 
        educ |    .005134    .025755     0.20   0.842    -.0457224    .0559904 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   74.59155   51.04677     1.46   0.146    -26.20665    175.3898 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtfevd gdppcg strongcba weakcba defactofix yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi open tot gov 
eu  aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009  _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 
_Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009, invariant(strongcba 
weakcba  l1ebrdi popg open gov educ) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      162           number of obs       =      211 
mean squared error         = 6.164829           F( 27, 162)         =  14.6852 
root mean squared error    = 2.482907           Prob > F            = 5.54e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1300.779           R-squared           = .7867938 
Total Sum of Squares       = 6101.036           adj. R-squared      = .7236216 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4800.257 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  defactofix |  -.4090803   1.190327    -0.34   0.732    -2.759637    1.941476 
         yit |  -.6509779   .4362421    -1.49   0.138    -1.512432    .2104762 
       l1inv |   .0270581   .0561859     0.48   0.631    -.0838932    .1380093 
         tot |  -.0158791   .0185622    -0.86   0.394    -.0525342     .020776 
          eu |  -.8687623   1.159381    -0.75   0.455    -3.158211    1.420686 
     aze2006 |   20.04557   3.282955     6.11   0.000     13.56267    26.52848 
     aze2007 |   10.85279   3.378278     3.21   0.002     4.181655    17.52393 
     lva2009 |  -14.63276   3.354731    -4.36   0.000     -21.2574   -8.008121 
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     arm2009 |  -14.79266   3.397257    -4.35   0.000    -21.50128   -8.084045 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.424628    .964105     1.48   0.141    -.4792052    3.328462 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.951503    1.19672     1.63   0.105    -.4116783    4.314684 
 _Itime_2003 |   4.301772   1.501952     2.86   0.005     1.335843      7.2677 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.509954   1.793413     3.07   0.002     1.968472    9.051435 
 _Itime_2005 |    6.57575   2.134664     3.08   0.002     2.360394     10.7911 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.724299   2.519372     3.07   0.003     2.749254    12.69934 
 _Itime_2007 |    8.94626   2.689412     3.33   0.001     3.635436    14.25708 
 _Itime_2008 |   6.344626   3.252812     1.95   0.053    -.0787527      12.768 
 _Itime_2009 |  -2.01e-07   3.507983    -0.00   1.000     -6.92727     6.92727 
   strongcba |   .0762231    2.27959     0.03   0.973     -4.42532    4.577766 
     weakcba |   .6512833    1.40209     0.46   0.643    -2.117445    3.420012 
     l1ebrdi |   -1.13477   1.099125    -1.03   0.303     -3.30523     1.03569 
        popg |  -54.64562   51.69602    -1.06   0.292    -156.7306    47.43932 
        open |   .0138718   .0138706     1.00   0.319    -.0135187    .0412623 
         gov |  -.1511011   .0489874    -3.08   0.002    -.2478372    -.054365 
        educ |   .0066405    .026371     0.25   0.802    -.0454348    .0587159 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   73.64043   51.73498     1.42   0.157    -28.52145    175.8023 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtfevd gdppcg strongcba weakcba defactofix l1lninf  yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi 
open tot gov eu  aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009  _I time_2001 _Itime_2002 
_Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009, 
invariant(strongcba weakcba  l1ebrdi popg open gov educ) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      161           number of obs       =      211 
mean squared error         = 6.070748           F( 28, 161)         = 14.36005 
root mean squared error    = 2.463889           Prob > F            = 6.43e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1280.928           R-squared           = .7900475 
Total Sum of Squares       = 6101.036           adj. R-squared      = .7261489 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4820.108 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  defactofix |  -.7951543   1.177418    -0.68   0.500    -3.120328     1.53002 
     l1lninf |  -1.052473   .7701544    -1.37   0.174     -2.57338    .4684339 
         yit |   -.642272   .4325974    -1.48   0.140    -1.496569    .2120248 
       l1inv |   .0356407   .0545686     0.65   0.515    -.0721219    .1434033 
         tot |  -.0136897   .0183811    -0.74   0.457    -.0499888    .0226094 
          eu |  -.6410211   1.143299    -0.56   0.576    -2.898817    1.616775 
     aze2006 |   20.61677   3.230855     6.38   0.000     14.23645    26.99709 
     aze2007 |   11.50133    3.30142     3.48   0.001     4.981663    18.02101 
     lva2009 |  -14.14655   3.314625    -4.27   0.000     -20.6923   -7.600804 
     arm2009 |  -14.17851   3.375087    -4.20   0.000    -20.84366   -7.513363 
 _Itime_2001 |    1.52678   .9640719     1.58   0.115    -.3770771    3.430637 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.911259   1.183992     1.61   0.108     -.426898    4.249416 
 _Itime_2003 |   4.068836   1.480736     2.75   0.007     1.144665    6.993006 
 _Itime_2004 |   5.169594    1.75974     2.94   0.004     1.694446    8.644742 
 _Itime_2005 |   6.361126   2.101863     3.03   0.003     2.210351     10.5119 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.417547   2.478877     2.99   0.003     2.522241    12.31285 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.622172   2.640801     3.26   0.001     3.407096    13.83725 
 _Itime_2008 |   6.156137   3.205412     1.92   0.057    -.1739363    12.48621 
 _Itime_2009 |   1.48e-07   3.481967     0.00   1.000    -6.876217    6.876217 
   strongcba |    .193222   2.250569     0.09   0.932    -4.251219    4.637663 
     weakcba |   .6435438   1.383189     0.47   0.642    -2.087988    3.375076 
     l1ebrdi |   -1.91894   1.154523    -1.66   0.098    -4.198902    .3610223 
        popg |   -63.2206   51.30601    -1.23   0.220    -164.5401    38.09892 
        open |    .016872    .013905     1.21   0.227    -.0105877    .0443316 
         gov |  -.1419343   .0485038    -2.93   0.004    -.2377199   -.0461487 
        educ |   .0102771   .0262755     0.39   0.696    -.0416119    .0621662 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   86.52962   51.82314     1.67   0.097    -15.81114    188.8704 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 6.7: Dynamic estimation of growth model 
 
 
Appendix 6.7a: Dynamic estimation of growth model – Equation 6.5 
 
. *One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent variable and minimum 
number of instruments (with 4 CBA countries)* with defactoorfix, lagged 
inflation and lagged fiscal balance  
 
 
. xi: xtabond2 gdppcg L.gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv 
l1ebrdi open tot gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time, gmm(L.gdppc, 
laglimits(1 1)) gmm(lninf fb inv ebrdi, laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba defactofix yit popg 
educ open tot gov eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       211 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        24 
Number of instruments = 114                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(27) = 348468.36                                      avg =      8.79 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      gdppcg | 
         L1. |    .224201   .0794835     2.82   0.005     .0684162    .3799859 
             | 
         cba |  -.0392862   .5404047    -0.07   0.942     -1.09846    1.019888 
  defactofix |   .0380669   .5472831     0.07   0.945    -1.034588    1.110722 
     l1lninf |  -1.103777   .6187332    -1.78   0.074    -2.316472    .1089176 
        l1fb |   .1031044   .1294611     0.80   0.426    -.1506347    .3568435 
         yit |  -.1256583    .125556    -1.00   0.317    -.3717436     .120427 
        popg |  -48.10207   33.16512    -1.45   0.147    -113.1045    16.90037 
        educ |   .0049183   .0215698     0.23   0.820    -.0373578    .0471945 
       l1inv |   .0411641   .0760009     0.54   0.588     -.107795    .1901232 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.729295     .96004    -1.80   0.072    -3.610938    .1523491 
        open |   .0101361   .0074117     1.37   0.171    -.0043906    .0246627 
         tot |  -.0108618   .0109205    -0.99   0.320    -.0322656     .010542 
         gov |  -.1188664   .0439525    -2.70   0.007    -.2050118    -.032721 
          eu |   .3503412   .7629867     0.46   0.646    -1.145085    1.845768 
     aze2006 |   20.28882   2.713537     7.48   0.000     14.97039    25.60726 
     aze2007 |   10.53514   2.966509     3.55   0.000     4.720893    16.34939 
     lva2009 |  -12.05169    5.65327    -2.13   0.033    -23.13189   -.9714834 
     arm2009 |  -14.19495   3.220656    -4.41   0.000    -20.50732   -7.882577 
 _Itime_2000 |   8.749638   1.792351     4.88   0.000     5.236694    12.26258 
 _Itime_2001 |   8.436127   1.950402     4.33   0.000     4.613408    12.25885 
 _Itime_2002 |   7.881245   1.831438     4.30   0.000     4.291691     11.4708 
 _Itime_2003 |   9.389126   1.680104     5.59   0.000     6.096182    12.68207 
 _Itime_2004 |   9.171672   1.640492     5.59   0.000     5.956368    12.38698 
 _Itime_2005 |   9.297892   1.839624     5.05   0.000     5.692294    12.90349 
 _Itime_2006 |   9.817982   1.547482     6.34   0.000     6.784972    12.85099 
 _Itime_2007 |   9.897621   1.326613     7.46   0.000     7.297508    12.49773 
 _Itime_2008 |   6.714931   1.624215     4.13   0.000     3.531528    9.898333 
       _cons |   57.91533   34.66826     1.67   0.095    -10.03322    125.8639 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.gdppcg 
    L2.(lninf fb inv ebrdi) 
Instruments for levels equation 
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  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.gdppcg 
    DL.(lninf fb inv ebrdi) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.09  Pr > z =  0.002 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.14  Pr > z =  0.886 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(86)   = 150.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(86)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(36)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(50)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.gdppcg, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(69)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(lninf fb inv ebrdi, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(78)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_ 
> 2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 
_Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(67)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
 
 
. *Calculation of the long-run coefficient on CBA 
. nlcom _b[cba]/(1-_b[l.gdppcg]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[cba]/(1-_b[l.gdppcg]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0506397   .6967095    -0.07   0.942    -1.416165    1.314886 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 6.7b: Growth model - Checking whether the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable from GMM is between the OLS and FE 
 
. xi: regress gdppcg L.gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi 
open tot gov eu cbal1lninf cbal1fb i.time 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2000 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     211 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 25,   185) =   17.25 
       Model |  4269.67597    25  170.787039           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   1831.3602   185  9.89924435           R-squared     =  0.6998 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6593 
       Total |  6101.03617   210  29.0525532           Root MSE      =  3.1463 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      gdppcg | 
         L1. |   .5145435   .0693186     7.42   0.000      .377787       .6513 
             | 
         cba |   2.887661   9.393183     0.31   0.759    -15.64387    21.41919 
  defactofix |   .2604671   .6636977     0.39   0.695    -1.048922    1.569856 
     l1lninf |  -.6655765   .6062577    -1.10   0.274    -1.861644    .5304911 
        l1fb |   .1838756   .1033126     1.78   0.077    -.0199467    .3876979 
         yit |    .132998   .2466302     0.54   0.590    -.3535713    .6195674 
        popg |  -30.20599   35.63992    -0.85   0.398    -100.5189    40.10694 
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        educ |  -.0322826   .0194047    -1.66   0.098    -.0705655    .0060003 
       l1inv |   .0201363   .0406596     0.50   0.621    -.0600798    .1003523 
     l1ebrdi |  -1.687365   .7829621    -2.16   0.032    -3.232048   -.1426829 
        open |   .0115875   .0088047     1.32   0.190     -.005783    .0289579 
         tot |  -.0004069   .0137247    -0.03   0.976     -.027484    .0266702 
         gov |  -.0531341   .0363216    -1.46   0.145    -.1247918    .0185236 
          eu |   .8358156   .8733461     0.96   0.340    -.8871827    2.558814 
  cbal1lninf |  -1.092708   3.552312    -0.31   0.759    -8.100957    5.915542 
     cbal1fb |  -.6707896   .3459496    -1.94   0.054    -1.353303     .011724 
 _Itime_1999 |          0  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |          0  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2001 |   -1.32417   1.010917    -1.31   0.192    -3.318577    .6702372 
 _Itime_2002 |  -2.134354   1.108198    -1.93   0.056    -4.320686    .0519769 
 _Itime_2003 |  -.6082979   1.221335    -0.50   0.619    -3.017833    1.801237 
 _Itime_2004 |  -1.629256   1.391467    -1.17   0.243    -4.374439    1.115927 
 _Itime_2005 |  -1.731505   1.564004    -1.11   0.270    -4.817082    1.354073 
 _Itime_2006 |  -.3370645   1.752933    -0.19   0.848    -3.795372    3.121243 
 _Itime_2007 |  -1.415571   1.829221    -0.77   0.440    -5.024386    2.193243 
 _Itime_2008 |  -5.389398   2.178681    -2.47   0.014    -9.687652   -1.091145 
 _Itime_2009 |  -13.15362   2.320437    -5.67   0.000    -17.73154   -8.575701 
       _cons |   42.52026   35.85063     1.19   0.237    -28.20838    113.2489 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
. xi: xtreg gdppcg L.gdppcg cba defactofix l1lninf l1fb yit popg educ l1inv l1ebrdi 
open tot gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time, fe 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
note: cba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_1999 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       211 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        24 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7332                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.3778                                        avg =       8.8 
       overall = 0.6317                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(25,162)          =     17.80 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4113                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      gdppcg | 
         L1. |   .1699785   .0871162     1.95   0.053    -.0020513    .3420083 
             | 
         cba |          0  (omitted) 
  defactofix |  -.7802154   .9790917    -0.80   0.427    -2.713643    1.153212 
     l1lninf |  -1.023647   .6552261    -1.56   0.120    -2.317533    .2702379 
        l1fb |   .0653824   .1182178     0.55   0.581    -.1680641    .2988289 
         yit |  -.7226916   .2171693    -3.33   0.001    -1.151539   -.2938439 
        popg |  -147.0211   72.55131    -2.03   0.044    -290.2893   -3.752838 
        educ |  -.0450993   .0481944    -0.94   0.351    -.1402696    .0500709 
       l1inv |   .0350048   .0509807     0.69   0.493    -.0656675    .1356772 
     l1ebrdi |  -3.770869     3.7087    -1.02   0.311     -11.0945    3.552761 
        open |   .0426758    .016073     2.66   0.009     .0109362    .0744154 
         tot |  -.0154203   .0144425    -1.07   0.287    -.0439402    .0130997 
         gov |  -.1042761   .0554809    -1.88   0.062    -.2138351    .0052829 
          eu |  -.4898017   .9124755    -0.54   0.592    -2.291681    1.312078 
     aze2006 |   18.21631   3.332124     5.47   0.000     11.63631    24.79631 
     aze2007 |   8.171773   3.628662     2.25   0.026     1.006197    15.33735 
     lva2009 |  -11.89894   3.327408    -3.58   0.000    -18.46962   -5.328253 
     arm2009 |  -13.60155   3.224134    -4.22   0.000     -19.9683   -7.234798 
 _Itime_1999 |          0  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2000 |          0  (omitted) 
 _Itime_2001 |   1.034626   .8443808     1.23   0.222     -.632786    2.702038 
 _Itime_2002 |   1.379701   .8355981     1.65   0.101    -.2703676     3.02977 
 _Itime_2003 |   3.766921   .8348925     4.51   0.000     2.118245    5.415596 
 _Itime_2004 |   4.668681   .8667381     5.39   0.000      2.95712    6.380243 
 _Itime_2005 |   5.835671   .8654806     6.74   0.000     4.126593    7.544749 
 _Itime_2006 |   7.162562   .9239849     7.75   0.000     5.337955     8.98717 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.176671   .9410315     8.69   0.000     6.318401    10.03494 
 _Itime_2008 |   5.711128    .981857     5.82   0.000      3.77224    7.650017 
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 _Itime_2009 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |   175.2928   72.95051     2.40   0.017     31.23626    319.3493 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   2.961208 
     sigma_e |   2.773123 
         rho |  .53276457   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(23, 162) =     1.33             Prob > F = 0.1563 
 
 
Appendix 6.7c: Growth model – some variables excluded 
 
. *One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent variable and minimum 
number of instruments (with 4 CBA countries)* without defactoorfix and 
inflation  
 
. xi: xtabond2 gdppcg L.gdppcg cba yit popg educ inv ebrdi open tot gov eu aze2006 
aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time, gmm(L.gdppc, laglimits(1 1)) gmm(inv ebrdi, laglimits 
(2 2)) iv(cba yit popg educ open tot gov eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       210 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        24 
Number of instruments = 75                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(24) =  4.47e+08                                      avg =      8.75 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      gdppcg | 
         L1. |   .1557199   .0677275     2.30   0.021     .0229764    .2884634 
             | 
         cba |   .6313482   .6432404     0.98   0.326    -.6293798    1.892076 
         yit |  -.0724769   .1764425    -0.41   0.681    -.4182978     .273344 
        popg |  -53.34085   36.12291    -1.48   0.140    -124.1405    17.45876 
        educ |    .008998   .0215688     0.42   0.677     -.033276     .051272 
         inv |   .1034526   .0339553     3.05   0.002     .0369015    .1700037 
       ebrdi |  -1.781249   1.008622    -1.77   0.077    -3.758113    .1956143 
        open |   .0058138   .0070274     0.83   0.408    -.0079598    .0195873 
         tot |  -.0084263   .0161636    -0.52   0.602    -.0401063    .0232538 
         gov |  -.1350244   .0416304    -3.24   0.001    -.2166185   -.0534303 
          eu |   .3805078   .9338237     0.41   0.684    -1.449753    2.210769 
     aze2006 |   23.11203   3.069191     7.53   0.000     17.09652    29.12753 
     aze2007 |    13.2607   3.135026     4.23   0.000     7.116167    19.40524 
     lva2009 |  -13.17536   5.055244    -2.61   0.009    -23.08345   -3.267261 
     arm2009 |  -13.98767   3.321402    -4.21   0.000     -20.4975   -7.477843 
 _Itime_2000 |   8.644948   1.766119     4.89   0.000     5.183419    12.10648 
 _Itime_2001 |   8.492865    1.89053     4.49   0.000     4.787493    12.19824 
 _Itime_2002 |   8.154398   1.887345     4.32   0.000      4.45527    11.85353 
 _Itime_2003 |   9.606871   1.617647     5.94   0.000      6.43634     12.7774 
 _Itime_2004 |   9.509297   1.510221     6.30   0.000     6.549318    12.46928 
 _Itime_2005 |   9.594517   1.778372     5.40   0.000     6.108973    13.08006 
 _Itime_2006 |   9.815025   1.457604     6.73   0.000     6.958174    12.67188 
 _Itime_2007 |   9.772542   1.266414     7.72   0.000     7.290417    12.25467 
 _Itime_2008 |   7.011497   1.515008     4.63   0.000     4.042135    9.980859 
       _cons |   58.39906   36.63256     1.59   0.111    -13.39944    130.1976 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
    _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 
    _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.gdppcg 
  504 
    L2.(inv ebrdi) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
    _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 
    _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.gdppcg 
    DL.(inv ebrdi) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.83  Pr > z =  0.005 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.58  Pr > z =  0.561 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(50)   = 109.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(50)   =   0.07  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =   0.70  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(30)   =  -0.63  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.gdppcg, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(31)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   0.07  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(inv ebrdi, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =   0.01  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(38)   =   0.06  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_2002 _Itime_ 
> 2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(33)   =   9.71  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =  -9.65  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
. *One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent variable and minimum 
number of instruments (with 4 CBA countries)* with defactoorfix and without 
inflation  
 
. xi: xtabond2 gdppcg L.gdppcg cba defactofix yit popg educ inv ebrdi open tot gov eu 
aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time, gmm(L.gdppc, laglimits(1 1)) gmm(inv ebrdi, 
laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu i.time)  robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       210 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        24 
Number of instruments = 76                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(25) = 609130.12                                      avg =      8.75 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      gdppcg | 
         L1. |   .1392481   .0733134     1.90   0.058    -.0044436    .2829398 
             | 
         cba |   .2120582   .8027844     0.26   0.792     -1.36137    1.785487 
  defactofix |   .4159919   .7084561     0.59   0.557    -.9725565     1.80454 
         yit |  -.1586578   .1640105    -0.97   0.333    -.4801125    .1627968 
        popg |  -53.93048   35.02933    -1.54   0.124    -122.5867    14.72574 
        educ |   .0071976   .0230141     0.31   0.754    -.0379092    .0523043 
         inv |   .0928871   .0351097     2.65   0.008     .0240733    .1617008 
       ebrdi |   -1.24364   .9632369    -1.29   0.197     -3.13155    .6442695 
        open |   .0053417   .0067006     0.80   0.425    -.0077912    .0184745 
         tot |  -.0092665   .0159463    -0.58   0.561    -.0405207    .0219877 
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         gov |  -.1420776   .0449795    -3.16   0.002    -.2302359   -.0539193 
          eu |   .2302227   .8976968     0.26   0.798    -1.529231    1.989676 
     aze2006 |   23.24468   3.106153     7.48   0.000     17.15673    29.33263 
     aze2007 |   13.24331   3.109204     4.26   0.000     7.149387    19.33724 
     lva2009 |  -14.38427   5.948364    -2.42   0.016    -26.04284   -2.725686 
     arm2009 |  -14.05549   3.360964    -4.18   0.000    -20.64286   -7.468125 
 _Itime_2000 |   7.835424   1.792918     4.37   0.000     4.321369    11.34948 
 _Itime_2001 |   7.779612   1.932032     4.03   0.000     3.992898    11.56633 
 _Itime_2002 |   7.558305   1.888872     4.00   0.000     3.856184    11.26043 
 _Itime_2003 |   9.076448   1.679965     5.40   0.000     5.783777    12.36912 
 _Itime_2004 |   9.136296   1.604562     5.69   0.000     5.991413    12.28118 
 _Itime_2005 |   9.271744   1.721839     5.38   0.000     5.897002    12.64649 
 _Itime_2006 |   9.572377   1.504041     6.36   0.000     6.624512    12.52024 
 _Itime_2007 |   9.675217   1.303298     7.42   0.000       7.1208    12.22963 
 _Itime_2008 |   7.002938   1.528852     4.58   0.000     4.006442    9.999433 
       _cons |    59.6709   35.26989     1.69   0.091    -9.456804    128.7986 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.gdppcg 
    L2.(inv ebrdi) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.gdppcg 
    DL.(inv ebrdi) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.87  Pr > z =  0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.59  Pr > z =  0.553 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(50)   = 109.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(50)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(30)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.gdppcg, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(31)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(inv ebrdi, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(38)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_2 
> 002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 
_Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  -0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
. *One-step robust System GMM with one lag of dependent variable and minimum 
number of instruments (with 4 CBA countries)* with defactoorfix and 
inflation  
 
. xi: xtabond2 gdppcg L.gdppcg cba defactofix lninf  yit popg educ inv ebrdi open tot 
gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time, gmm(L.gdppc, laglimits(1 1)) gmm(lninf 
inv ebrdi, lag limits (2 2)) iv(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu i.time)  
robust 
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
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  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       210 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        24 
Number of instruments = 95                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(26) =  13839.65                                      avg =      8.75 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      gdppcg | 
         L1. |   .2030068   .0747743     2.71   0.007     .0564519    .3495617 
             | 
         cba |  -.1103925    .716017    -0.15   0.877     -1.51376    1.292975 
  defactofix |   .4455914   .7173826     0.62   0.535    -.9604527    1.851635 
       lninf |  -.6537562   .8438847    -0.77   0.439     -2.30774    1.000228 
         yit |  -.1928442   .1746329    -1.10   0.269    -.5351184    .1494299 
        popg |  -50.13675   31.31664    -1.60   0.109    -111.5162    11.24274 
        educ |   .0065232   .0225599     0.29   0.772    -.0376934    .0507397 
         inv |   .0800689   .0391936     2.04   0.041     .0032508     .156887 
       ebrdi |  -1.084131   1.263958    -0.86   0.391    -3.561444    1.393181 
        open |   .0090125   .0072453     1.24   0.214    -.0051879     .023213 
         tot |  -.0077038   .0149768    -0.51   0.607    -.0370577    .0216501 
         gov |  -.1348228     .04224    -3.19   0.001    -.2176117   -.0520339 
          eu |   .0811958   .7854628     0.10   0.918    -1.458283    1.620675 
     aze2006 |   21.42311   2.358287     9.08   0.000     16.80095    26.04527 
     aze2007 |   11.47322   2.699182     4.25   0.000     6.182916    16.76352 
     lva2009 |  -12.87344   6.138368    -2.10   0.036    -24.90442   -.8424619 
     arm2009 |  -13.69858   3.220683    -4.25   0.000    -20.01101   -7.386162 
 _Itime_2000 |   8.074314   2.265829     3.56   0.000     3.633371    12.51526 
 _Itime_2001 |   7.781077   2.229305     3.49   0.000      3.41172    12.15043 
 _Itime_2002 |   7.433851    2.01076     3.70   0.000     3.492833    11.37487 
 _Itime_2003 |   9.002215   1.801829     5.00   0.000     5.470694    12.53374 
 _Itime_2004 |   9.086501   1.790828     5.07   0.000     5.576543    12.59646 
 _Itime_2005 |   9.216422   1.774548     5.19   0.000     5.738372    12.69447 
 _Itime_2006 |   9.647289   1.583481     6.09   0.000     6.543724    12.75086 
 _Itime_2007 |   9.792356   1.343252     7.29   0.000     7.159631    12.42508 
 _Itime_2008 |    7.12201    1.64343     4.33   0.000     3.900947    10.34307 
       _cons |   56.88492   31.41471     1.81   0.070    -4.686786    118.4566 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.gdppcg 
    L2.(lninf inv ebrdi) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.gdppcg 
    DL.(lninf inv ebrdi) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.90  Pr > z =  0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.28  Pr > z =  0.783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(68)   = 127.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(68)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(28)   =   5.16  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(40)   =  -5.16  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.gdppcg, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(50)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
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  gmm(lninf inv ebrdi, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(58)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_2 002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 
_Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(50)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
 
Appendix 6.7d: Dynamic estimation of growth model (CBA divided to 
strong and weak CBA) 
 
. xi: xtabond2 gdppcg L.gdppcg strongcba weakcba defactofix lninf fb yit popg educ 
inv ebrdi open tot gov eu aze2006 aze2007 lva2009 arm2009 i.time, gmm(L.gdppc, 
laglimits(1 1)) gmm(lninf fb inv ebrdi, laglimits (2 2)) iv(cba defactofix yit popg 
educ open tot gov eu i.time)  robust  
 
i.time            _Itime_1998-2009    (naturally coded; _Itime_1998 omitted) 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
_Itime_1999 dropped due to collinearity 
_Itime_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate robust weighting matrix for Hansen test. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, one-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of obs      =       210 
Time variable : time                            Number of groups   =        24 
Number of instruments = 114                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(28) =  22897.53                                      avg =      8.75 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      gdppcg | 
         L1. |   .1280044   .0875631     1.46   0.144    -.0436161    .2996249 
             | 
   strongcba |   -1.62993   2.416363    -0.67   0.500    -6.365914    3.106053 
     weakcba |   .3381877   .8294035     0.41   0.683    -1.287413    1.963789 
  defactofix |  -.0614471   .7445943    -0.08   0.934    -1.520825    1.397931 
       lninf |  -1.594183   .8937731    -1.78   0.074    -3.345946    .1575799 
          fb |   .2218096    .098942     2.24   0.025     .0278868    .4157323 
         yit |  -.2250792   .2055921    -1.09   0.274    -.6280323    .1778738 
        popg |  -39.31064   36.45884    -1.08   0.281    -110.7687    32.14738 
        educ |   .0073097   .0183107     0.40   0.690    -.0285787     .043198 
         inv |   .0859166   .0392705     2.19   0.029     .0089479    .1628853 
       ebrdi |  -1.574837   1.136526    -1.39   0.166    -3.802388    .6527135 
        open |   .0131361   .0087004     1.51   0.131    -.0039164    .0301886 
         tot |  -.0138158   .0172442    -0.80   0.423    -.0476138    .0199822 
         gov |  -.1186955    .045215    -2.63   0.009    -.2073153   -.0300757 
          eu |   .3595713   .6520291     0.55   0.581    -.9183823    1.637525 
     aze2006 |   22.84915   2.160128    10.58   0.000     18.61538    27.08292 
     aze2007 |   14.29831   2.858433     5.00   0.000     8.695886    19.90074 
     lva2009 |  -11.26372   5.261366    -2.14   0.032    -21.57581    -.951633 
     arm2009 |  -13.45295   2.662998    -5.05   0.000    -18.67233   -8.233573 
 _Itime_2000 |   7.592943   2.335759     3.25   0.001      3.01494    12.17095 
 _Itime_2001 |   7.284139   2.152325     3.38   0.001      3.06566    11.50262 
 _Itime_2002 |   6.800666   1.975843     3.44   0.001     2.928086    10.67325 
 _Itime_2003 |   8.211506   1.586329     5.18   0.000     5.102358    11.32065 
 _Itime_2004 |   8.243767   1.705761     4.83   0.000     4.900537      11.587 
 _Itime_2005 |   8.340013   1.662312     5.02   0.000      5.08194    11.59808 
 _Itime_2006 |   8.698516   1.488385     5.84   0.000     5.781335     11.6157 
 _Itime_2007 |   8.945411   1.165478     7.68   0.000     6.661117    11.22971 
 _Itime_2008 |   6.649818   1.502282     4.43   0.000     3.705398    9.594237 
       _cons |   51.92749   36.26256     1.43   0.152    -19.14582    123.0008 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009) 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.L.gdppcg 
    L2.(lninf fb inv ebrdi) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 
    _Itime_2001 _Itime_2002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 
    _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 _Itime_2009 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.L.gdppcg 
    DL.(lninf fb inv ebrdi) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.86  Pr > z =  0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.40  Pr > z =  0.688 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(85)   = 151.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(85)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(35)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(50)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(L.gdppcg, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(68)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(lninf fb inv ebrdi, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(78)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(cba defactofix yit popg educ open tot gov eu _Itime_1999 _Itime_2000 _Itime_2001 
_Itime_2 
> 002 _Itime_2003 _Itime_2004 _Itime_2005 _Itime_2006 _Itime_2007 _Itime_2008 
_Itime_2009) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(67)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
.  
. *Calculation of the long-run coefficient 
. nlcom _b[strongcba]/(1-_b[l.gdppcg]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[strongcba]/(1-_b[l.gdppcg]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -1.869196   2.738976    -0.68   0.495     -7.23749    3.499099 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[weakcba]/(1-_b[l.gdppcg]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[weakcba]/(1-_b[l.gdppcg]) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      gdppcg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .3878319   .9438577     0.41   0.681    -1.462095    2.237759 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendices for growth volatility model 
 
Appendix 6.8: Growth volatility model - Correlation matrix  
 
. correlate cba mnlninf mnfb mncred mnmsg mnopen mninv mnebrdi mntot mngov sdinf sdfb sdcred sdmsg sdopen sdinv sdebrdi sdtot sdgov 
(obs=68) 
 
             |      cba  mnlninf     mnfb   mncred    mnmsg   mnopen    mninv  mnebrdi    mntot    mngov    sdinf     sdfb   sdcred 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |   1.0000 
     mnlninf |  -0.2771   1.0000 
        mnfb |   0.2165   0.2251   1.0000 
      mncred |   0.2114  -0.2208  -0.3163   1.0000 
       mnmsg |  -0.1423   0.5934   0.4941  -0.5771   1.0000 
      mnopen |   0.2910  -0.0855  -0.0574   0.3842  -0.1853   1.0000 
       mninv |   0.0399  -0.2078   0.0854   0.2063  -0.1537   0.1814   1.0000 
     mnebrdi |   0.1904  -0.5330  -0.3399   0.6053  -0.6945   0.2851   0.0919   1.0000 
       mntot |   0.0874   0.1572   0.4959   0.0045   0.1726  -0.1683   0.0986   0.0391   1.0000 
       mngov |   0.0955   0.0353  -0.3409   0.5195  -0.3113   0.3754  -0.0294   0.2227  -0.2145   1.0000 
       sdinf |  -0.0789   0.6407  -0.0016  -0.1322   0.3777  -0.1031  -0.3618  -0.4037  -0.0025   0.1031   1.0000 
        sdfb |   0.0077   0.1841   0.3001   0.1076   0.0357  -0.1272  -0.0910  -0.0220   0.4873  -0.0036   0.1815   1.0000 
      sdcred |   0.0564  -0.0462  -0.0240   0.3400  -0.0999   0.1676   0.1022   0.1755  -0.0044   0.2330   0.0492   0.1138   1.0000 
       sdmsg |  -0.0255   0.1542   0.1471  -0.2716   0.4302  -0.2370  -0.0714  -0.3542   0.1638  -0.1516   0.2478   0.4804  -0.0967 
      sdopen |   0.2103  -0.1279   0.1019   0.0681   0.0106   0.3731   0.1393   0.0167  -0.0525  -0.0088  -0.1006   0.1755   0.0405 
       sdinv |   0.1079  -0.0597  -0.0171   0.1387  -0.1506   0.0586   0.4862   0.0367   0.1922  -0.1231  -0.0461   0.2173   0.0424 
     sdebrdi |   0.0764   0.2889   0.0709  -0.2429   0.3843  -0.1634  -0.2145  -0.3626  -0.1932   0.1151   0.5980  -0.1691   0.0429 
       sdtot |  -0.1579   0.2273   0.6178  -0.2267   0.3450  -0.2797   0.0080  -0.1792   0.8339  -0.3478   0.0069   0.5307  -0.0519 
       sdgov |  -0.0324  -0.0845  -0.1074   0.1756  -0.1323  -0.0581   0.1355   0.0517  -0.0116  -0.0850  -0.0478   0.0787   0.0601 
 
 
             |    sdmsg   sdopen    sdinv  sdebrdi    sdtot    sdgov 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
       sdmsg |   1.0000 
      sdopen |   0.2576   1.0000 
       sdinv |   0.2278   0.2583   1.0000 
     sdebrdi |   0.1221  -0.1900  -0.1995   1.0000 
       sdtot |   0.2960  -0.0380   0.1393  -0.1789   1.0000 
       sdgov |   0.0434  -0.0895   0.2311  -0.0538  -0.0396   1.0000 
 
Appendix 6.9: Growth volatility model - OLS and FE estimations and 
diagnostic tests 
 
Appendix 6.9a: Growth volatility model – estimated with OLS 
 
. xi: regress lnsdgdpg cba mnlninf mnfb sdmsg mncred mnopen mninv mnebrdi sdtot mngov 
i.time 
i.time            _Itime_1-4          (naturally coded; _Itime_1 omitted) 
note: _Itime_2 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      70 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 12,    57) =    7.45 
       Model |  53.4257957    12  4.45214964           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  34.0832805    57   .59795229           R-squared     =  0.6105 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5285 
       Total |  87.5090762    69  1.26824748           Root MSE      =  .77327 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnsdgdpg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  -.2909527   .3110434    -0.94   0.354    -.9138064    .3319009 
     mnlninf |   .0873947   .4124313     0.21   0.833    -.7384848    .9132742 
        mnfb |   -.003791   .0465732    -0.08   0.935    -.0970523    .0894702 
       sdmsg |   .0021179   .0087002     0.24   0.809     -.015304    .0195398 
      mncred |  -.0081426   .0076151    -1.07   0.289    -.0233916    .0071065 
      mnopen |  -.0005552   .0037112    -0.15   0.882    -.0079868    .0068763 
       mninv |   .0166146   .0185705     0.89   0.375    -.0205721    .0538013 
     mnebrdi |  -.0389592   .2886037    -0.13   0.893     -.616878    .5389597 
       sdtot |   -.009734   .0199648    -0.49   0.628    -.0497128    .0302448 
       mngov |  -.0118984   .0139415    -0.85   0.397    -.0398157     .016019 
    _Itime_2 |  (omitted) 
    _Itime_3 |   .2349784   .2431929     0.97   0.338    -.2520071    .7219638 
    _Itime_4 |   2.089941   .2988884     6.99   0.000     1.491427    2.688455 
       _cons |   .2618367     1.8876     0.14   0.890    -3.518017     4.04169 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. test  _Itime_2 _Itime_3 _Itime_4 
 
 ( 1)  o._Itime_2 = 0 
 ( 2)  _Itime_3 = 0 
 ( 3)  _Itime_4 = 0 
       Constraint 1 dropped 
 
       F(  2,    57) =   29.46 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
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. estat imtest  
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      70.00     69    0.4438 
            Skewness |      21.31     12    0.0460 
            Kurtosis |       0.00      1    0.9598 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      91.31     82    0.2257 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnsdgdpg 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.36 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.5458 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnsdgdpg 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 54) =      3.68 
                  Prob > F =      0.0174 
 
Appendix 6.9b: Growth volatility model – estimated with FE 
 
. xi: xtreg lnsdgdpg cba mnlninf mnfb sdmsg mncred mnopen mninv mnebrdi sdtot mngov 
i.time, fe  
i.time            _Itime_1-4          (naturally coded; _Itime_1 omitted) 
note: cba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        70 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        24 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7198                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.1614                                        avg =       2.9 
       overall = 0.1938                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(11,35)           =      8.17 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6293                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnsdgdpg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  (omitted) 
     mnlninf |  -.4922498   .6650691    -0.74   0.464    -1.842412    .8579123 
        mnfb |  -.0218301   .0670222    -0.33   0.747    -.1578924    .1142321 
       sdmsg |   .0102652   .0143599     0.71   0.479    -.0188869    .0394174 
      mncred |   .0095414   .0156806     0.61   0.547    -.0222918    .0413747 
      mnopen |   .0134795   .0128675     1.05   0.302    -.0126429    .0396019 
       mninv |  -.0043306   .0325464    -0.13   0.895    -.0704034    .0617421 
     mnebrdi |   .5279664   2.383398     0.22   0.826     -4.31059    5.366522 
       sdtot |  -.0092178   .0287452    -0.32   0.750    -.0675737     .049138 
       mngov |   .0073202   .0466596     0.16   0.876    -.0874037    .1020441 
    _Itime_2 |  (omitted) 
    _Itime_3 |   .0164111   .4518118     0.04   0.971    -.9008155    .9336378 
    _Itime_4 |   1.531839   .6767495     2.26   0.030     .1579641    2.905713 
       _cons |  -2.177287   7.877055    -0.28   0.784    -18.16856    13.81399 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   1.127091 
     sigma_e |  .75832308 
         rho |  .68838322   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(23, 35) =     1.06              Prob > F = 0.4337 
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. xttest3 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (24)  =    2898.20 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
 
. xtserial lnsdgdpg cba mnlninf mnfb sdmsg mncred mnopen mninv mnebrdi sdtot 
mngov time2 time3 time4 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      21) =      1.201 
           Prob > F =      0.2855 
 
 
Appendix 6.10: Growth volatility model - Between and within effects 
 
. xtsum lnsdgdpg cba mnlninf mnfb sdmsg mncred mnopen mninv mnebrdi sdtot mngov 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
lnsdgdpg overall |   .718022   1.080679  -2.512017   2.684023 |     N =     100 
         between |             .4431941  -.3255604   1.575824 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .9886345  -1.697646   2.553148 |     T =       4 
                 |                                            | 
cba      overall |       .16   .3684529          0          1 |     N =     100 
         between |             .3741657          0          1 |     n =      25 
         within  |                    0        .16        .16 |     T =       4 
                 |                                            | 
mnlninf  overall |   2.87096   .4471348   1.693078   5.106167 |     N =     100 
         between |             .3432977   2.499878   3.802948 |     n =      25 
         within  |              .292656   2.028603   4.174179 |     T =       4 
                 |                                            | 
mnfb     overall |  -2.37524   3.312008   -11.0075   12.42793 |     N =     100 
         between |             2.451754  -6.519593   2.473491 |     n =      25 
         within  |             2.267257  -8.171591   7.579199 |     T =       4 
                 |                                            | 
sdmsg    overall |  14.29999    15.4573   .8326664   79.37995 |     N =      99 
         between |              9.48929    3.24449   38.64995 |     n =      25 
         within  |             12.27698  -21.09449   63.84012 |     T =    3.96 
                 |                                            | 
mncred   overall |  36.62961   20.12363   7.424119    98.8027 |     N =     100 
         between |             15.94451   10.68834    62.7205 |     n =      25 
         within  |             12.58718    1.32907   74.17355 |     T =       4 
                 |                                            | 
mnopen   overall |  103.0911   30.29766    50.3587   182.0003 |     N =     100 
         between |              28.5004   57.85231   157.0112 |     n =      25 
         within  |             11.41443   69.12999   136.2494 |     T =       4 
                 |                                            | 
mninv    overall |  25.23141   5.866623   8.677333     43.125 |     N =      96 
         between |             4.137591    14.2795   31.65808 |     n =      24 
         within  |             4.223533     13.662   37.10258 |     T =       4 
                 |                                            | 
mnebrdi  overall |  3.110508   .5487099    1.41625          4 |     N =     100 
         between |             .5243443   1.829896   3.922188 |     n =      25 
         within  |             .1856802   2.228217     3.7153 |     T =       4 
                 |                                            | 
sdtot    overall |  4.359198   7.313583    .107677   32.04279 |     N =      74 
         between |             6.141459    .994316   22.14266 |     n =      25 
         within  |             4.047778  -11.35077   16.89533 |     T =    2.96 
                 |                                            | 
mngov    overall |  36.35975   8.961845    17.5763   58.13747 |     N =     100 
         between |             8.308116   21.66292   49.46571 |     n =      25 
         within  |             3.658079   24.52424   49.31682 |     T =       4 
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Appendix 6.11: Growth volatility model - FEVD 
 
Appendix 6.11a: Growth volatility model - FEVD 3 stages  
 
. *Stage 1 (panel robust SE) 
. xi: xtreg lnsdgdpg cba mnlninf mnfb sdmsg mncred mnopen mninv mnebrdi sdtot mngov 
i.time, fe robust 
i.time            _Itime_1-4          (naturally coded; _Itime_1 omitted) 
note: cba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        70 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        24 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7198                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.1614                                        avg =       2.9 
       overall = 0.1938                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(11,23)           =     23.96 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6293                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 24 clusters in ctyno) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    lnsdgdpg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  (omitted) 
     mnlninf |  -.4922498   .6211893    -0.79   0.436    -1.777278    .7927781 
        mnfb |  -.0218301   .0400767    -0.54   0.591    -.1047351    .0610748 
       sdmsg |   .0102652   .0080805     1.27   0.217    -.0064505     .026981 
      mncred |   .0095414   .0135365     0.70   0.488    -.0184608    .0375437 
      mnopen |   .0134795   .0111331     1.21   0.238    -.0095511    .0365102 
       mninv |  -.0043306   .0318648    -0.14   0.893     -.070248    .0615867 
     mnebrdi |   .5279664   1.156774     0.46   0.652    -1.865002    2.920935 
       sdtot |  -.0092178   .0402346    -0.23   0.821    -.0924494    .0740137 
       mngov |   .0073202   .0395686     0.18   0.855    -.0745337    .0891741 
    _Itime_2 |  (omitted) 
    _Itime_3 |   .0164111   .3032203     0.05   0.957    -.6108479    .6436702 
    _Itime_4 |   1.531839   .4783389     3.20   0.004     .5423193    2.521358 
       _cons |  -2.177287   4.202452    -0.52   0.609    -10.87072    6.516148 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   1.127091 
     sigma_e |  .75832308 
         rho |  .68838322   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Save fixed effect (unit effects) from stage 1 
. predict fixedeff, u 
(299 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 2 (regression of the FE vector on the time-invariant and slowly changing 
explantory variables - by OLS) 
. reg fixedeff cba mnebrdi mngov  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      70 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    66) =   40.12 
       Model |  53.9216069     3   17.973869           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  29.5656409    66  .447964255           R-squared     =  0.6459 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6298 
       Total |  83.4872478    69  1.20996011           Root MSE      =   .6693 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    fixedeff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  -.6589329   .2162816    -3.05   0.003    -1.090753   -.2271128 
     mnebrdi |  -1.127531   .1596616    -7.06   0.000    -1.446306   -.8087567 
       mngov |  -.0470683   .0095318    -4.94   0.000    -.0660991   -.0280374 
       _cons |   5.406343    .543863     9.94   0.000     4.320486    6.492201 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. * Save the residuals from stage 2 
. predict resfevd, residuals 
(299 missing values generated) 
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. *Stage 3 (estimation of pooled OLS by including all explanatory time-variant, time-
invariant variables and unexplained part of the FE  
> vector - error term from the stage 2) 
. regress lnsdgdpg cba mnlninf mnfb sdmsg mncred mnopen mninv mnebrdi sdtot mngov 
resfevd i.time  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      70 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 13,    56) =   14.42 
       Model |  67.3821901    13  5.18324539           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  20.1268862    56  .359408682           R-squared     =  0.7700 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7166 
       Total |  87.5090762    69  1.26824748           Root MSE      =  .59951 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnsdgdpg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         cba |  -.6589329    .248272    -2.65   0.010    -1.156282   -.1615842 
     mnlninf |  -.4922498   .3330067    -1.48   0.145    -1.159343    .1748428 
        mnfb |  -.0218301   .0362233    -0.60   0.549    -.0943942    .0507339 
       sdmsg |   .0102652   .0068707     1.49   0.141    -.0034984    .0240289 
      mncred |   .0095414   .0065505     1.46   0.151    -.0035808    .0226637 
      mnopen |   .0134795   .0036539     3.69   0.001     .0061599    .0207992 
       mninv |  -.0043307   .0147845    -0.29   0.771    -.0339476    .0252863 
     mnebrdi |  -.5995651   .2411585    -2.49   0.016    -1.082664   -.1164666 
       sdtot |  -.0092178   .0154786    -0.60   0.554    -.0402252    .0217896 
       mngov |  -.0397481   .0116962    -3.40   0.001    -.0631783   -.0163179 
     resfevd |          1   .1604751     6.23   0.000     .6785297     1.32147 
             | 
        time | 
          3  |   .0164111   .1917784     0.09   0.932    -.3677671    .4005894 
          4  |   1.531839   .2484292     6.17   0.000     1.034175    2.029502 
             | 
       _cons |   3.229056   1.538945     2.10   0.040     .1461798    6.311932 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Diagnostic tests after 3rd stage* 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      70.00     69    0.4438 
            Skewness |      13.19     13    0.4330 
            Kurtosis |       1.32      1    0.2499 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      84.52     83    0.4330 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnsdgdpg 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.97 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.3245 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnsdgdpg 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 53) =      0.77 
                  Prob > F =      0.5151 
 
predict res, residuals 
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kdensity res, normal 
 
rvfplot, mlabel(cntry) 
 
lvr2plot, mlabel(cntry) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
D
e
n
s
it
y
-2 -1 0 1 2
Residuals
Kernel density estimate
Normal density
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.1799
Kernel density estimate
ALB
ALB
ALB
ARM
ARM
ARM
AZE
AZE
AZE
BLR BLR
BLR
BIH
BIH BIH
BGR
BGR
BGR
CRO
CRO
CRO
CZE
CZE
CZE
EST
EST
EST
GEO
GEO
GEO
HUN
HUN
HUN
KAZ
KAZ
KAZ
KGZ
KGZ
LVA
LVA
LVA
LTU
LTU
LTU
MDA
MDA
MDA
POL
POL
POL
ROU
ROU
ROU
RUS
RUS
RUS
SRB
SRB
SVK
SVK
SVK
SVN
SVN
SVN
TJK
TJK
TJK
UKR
UKR
UKR
-2
-1
0
1
2
R
e
s
id
u
a
ls
-1 0 1 2 3
Fitted values
ALBALB
ALBARM
ARM
ARM
AZE
AZE
AZE
BLR
BLR
BLR
BIH
BIH
BIH
BGR BGRBGR
CRO
CRO
CROCZE
CZE
ZE
EST
EST
EST
GEO
GEO
GEO
HUN
HUN
HUN
KAZ
KAZ
KAZ
KGZ
KGZ
LVA
LVA
LVA
LTU
LTU
LTU
MDAMDA
MDA
POLPOL
POL
ROU
ROU
R U
RUS
RUS
RUS
SRB
SRB
SVK
SVK
SVK
SVN
SVN
SVN
TJK
TJK
TJK
UKR
UKR
UKR
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
0 .02 .04 .06 .08 .1
Normalized residual squared
  515 
. hilo res cntry time 
10 lowest and highest observations on res 
 
  +--------------------------+ 
  |       res   cntry   time | 
  |--------------------------| 
  |  -1.45669     AZE      2 | 
  | -1.419738     LTU      3 | 
  | -.9811749     BGR      3 | 
  | -.8582078     ROU      2 | 
  | -.7885178     POL      4 | 
  |--------------------------| 
  | -.6887646     GEO      4 | 
  | -.6836675     ALB      4 | 
  | -.6758925     TJK      4 | 
  | -.6729501     EST      2 | 
  |  -.607364     KAZ      3 | 
  +--------------------------+ 
 
  +-------------------------+ 
  |      res   cntry   time | 
  |-------------------------| 
  | .5018888     BGR      2 | 
  | .5136604     LTU      4 | 
  | .5813437     POL      2 | 
  | .6857823     ROU      3 | 
  | .7164961     GEO      2 | 
  |-------------------------| 
  | .7979323     KAZ      2 | 
  | .8826559     TJK      3 | 
  | .9060773     LTU      2 | 
  |  1.16013     ALB      2 | 
  | 1.402287     AZE      3 | 
  +-------------------------+ 
 
. predict lev, leverage 
(299 missing values generated) 
 
. hilo lev cntry time, show(5)high 
5 highest observations on lev 
 
  +-------------------------+ 
  |      lev   cntry   time | 
  |-------------------------| 
  | .3549501     BLR      2 | 
  | .3747917     BIH      2 | 
  | .4127378     TJK      2 | 
  | .4653097     TJK      4 | 
  | .4868824     AZE      4 | 
  +-------------------------+ 
 
.  
F-TEST – JOINT TEST 
 
       F( 13,    56) =   14.42 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test cba mnlninf mnfb sdmsg mncred mnopen mninv mnebrdi sdtot mngov 
resfevd8 time3 time4 
 
 ( 1)  cba = 0 
 ( 2)  mnlninf = 0 
 ( 3)  mnfb = 0 
 ( 4)  sdmsg = 0 
 ( 5)  mncred = 0 
 ( 6)  mnopen = 0 
 ( 7)  mninv = 0 
 ( 8)  mnebrdi = 0 
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 ( 9)  sdtot = 0 
 (10)  mngov = 0 
 (11)  resfevd8 = 0 
 (12)  time3 = 0 
 (13)  time4 = 0 
 
       F( 13,    56) =   14.42 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
Appendix 6.11b: Growth volatility model – FEVD estimated with ‘xtfevd’ 
command (treating cba, ebrdi and gov as invariant, slowly moving variables) 
 
. xtfevd lnsdgdpg cba mnlninf mnfb mncred sdmsg mnopen mninv mnebrdi sdtot mngov 
time2 time3, invariant(cba mnebrdi mngov) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       34           number of obs       =       70 
mean squared error         = .2875269           F( 14, 34)          = 4.854013 
root mean squared error    = .5362154           Prob > F            = .0001338 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 20.12689           R-squared           = .7700023 
Total Sum of Squares       = 87.50908           adj. R-squared      =   .53324 
Estimation Sum of Squares = 67.38219 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
    lnsdgdpg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     mnlninf |  -.4922498   1.693271    -0.29   0.773     -3.93339     2.94889 
        mnfb |  -.0218301   .0687684    -0.32   0.753    -.1615844    .1179242 
      mncred |   .0095414   .0228193     0.42   0.678    -.0368329    .0559158 
       sdmsg |   .0102652   .0162387     0.63   0.532    -.0227357    .0432662 
      mnopen |   .0134795   .0169688     0.79   0.432    -.0210052    .0479642 
       mninv |  -.0043307   .0270016    -0.16   0.874    -.0592046    .0505433 
       sdtot |  -.0092178   .0406634    -0.23   0.822    -.0918558    .0734201 
       time2 |  -1.531839   .5167234    -2.96   0.006    -2.581947   -.4817303 
       time3 |  -1.515427   .3594462    -4.22   0.000     -2.24591   -.7849449 
         cba |  -.6589329   .5683701    -1.16   0.254       -1.814    .4961342 
     mnebrdi |  -.5995651   1.029093    -0.58   0.564    -2.690933    1.491803 
       mngov |  -.0397481   .0299994    -1.32   0.194    -.1007141     .021218 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   4.760895   7.077149     0.67   0.506    -9.621603    19.14339 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.12: Growth volatility model - Dividing a CBA variable to strong and weak 
 
**STRONG AND WEAK CBA** 
 
. *Stage 1 (panel robust SE) 
. xi: xtreg lnsdgdpg strongcba weakcba mnlninf mnfb mncred sdmsg mnopen mninv mnebrdi 
sdtot mngov i.time , fe robust 
i.time            _Itime_1-4          (naturally coded; _Itime_1 omitted) 
note: strongcba omitted because of collinearity 
note: weakcba omitted because of collinearity 
note: _Itime_2 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        70 
Group variable: ctyno                           Number of groups   =        24 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7198                         Obs per group: min =         2 
       between = 0.1614                                        avg =       2.9 
       overall = 0.1938                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(11,23)           =     23.96 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6293                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 24 clusters in ctyno) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    lnsdgdpg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |  (omitted) 
     weakcba |  (omitted) 
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     mnlninf |  -.4922498   .6211893    -0.79   0.436    -1.777278    .7927781 
        mnfb |  -.0218301   .0400767    -0.54   0.591    -.1047351    .0610748 
      mncred |   .0095414   .0135365     0.70   0.488    -.0184608    .0375437 
       sdmsg |   .0102652   .0080805     1.27   0.217    -.0064505     .026981 
      mnopen |   .0134795   .0111331     1.21   0.238    -.0095511    .0365102 
       mninv |  -.0043306   .0318648    -0.14   0.893     -.070248    .0615867 
     mnebrdi |   .5279664   1.156774     0.46   0.652    -1.865002    2.920935 
       sdtot |  -.0092178   .0402346    -0.23   0.821    -.0924494    .0740137 
       mngov |   .0073202   .0395686     0.18   0.855    -.0745337    .0891741 
    _Itime_2 |  (omitted) 
    _Itime_3 |   .0164111   .3032203     0.05   0.957    -.6108479    .6436702 
    _Itime_4 |   1.531839   .4783389     3.20   0.004     .5423193    2.521358 
       _cons |  -2.177287   4.202452    -0.52   0.609    -10.87072    6.516148 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   1.127091 
     sigma_e |  .75832308 
         rho |  .68838322   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Save fixed effect (unit effects) from stage 1 
. predict fixeff1, u 
(299 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 2 (regression of the FE vector on the time-invariant and slowly changing 
explantory variables - by OLS) 
. reg fixeff1 strongcba weakcba mnebrdi mngov  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      70 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    65) =   30.17 
       Model |  54.2606052     4  13.5651513           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  29.2266426    65  .449640655           R-squared     =  0.6499 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6284 
       Total |  83.4872478    69  1.20996011           Root MSE      =  .67055 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     fixeff1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |  -.8257747   .2896103    -2.85   0.006    -1.404166   -.2473829 
     weakcba |  -.4850217    .295075    -1.64   0.105    -1.074327    .1042839 
     mnebrdi |  -1.148424   .1617597    -7.10   0.000     -1.47148   -.8253675 
       mngov |  -.0462107   .0096005    -4.81   0.000    -.0653843   -.0270371 
       _cons |   5.441608   .5463912     9.96   0.000     4.350389    6.532827 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. * Save the residuals from stage 2 
. predict resfevd1, residuals 
(299 missing values generated) 
 
. *Stage 3 (estimation of pooled OLS by including all explanatory time-variant, time-
invariant variables and unexplained part of the FE  
> vector - error term from the stage 2) 
. regress lnsdgdpg strongcba weakcba mnlninf mnfb mncred sdmsg mnopen mninv mnebrdi 
sdtot mngov resfevd1 i.time 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      70 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 14,    55) =   13.15 
       Model |    67.38219    14  4.81301357           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  20.1268862    55  .365943386           R-squared     =  0.7700 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7115 
       Total |  87.5090762    69  1.26824748           Root MSE      =  .60493 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    lnsdgdpg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   strongcba |  -.8257747   .3518768    -2.35   0.023    -1.530951   -.1205979 
     weakcba |  -.4850217   .2942845    -1.65   0.105    -1.074781    .1047377 
     mnlninf |  -.4922498   .3465269    -1.42   0.161    -1.186705    .2022056 
        mnfb |  -.0218301    .036671    -0.60   0.554    -.0953205    .0516603 
      mncred |   .0095414   .0070769     1.35   0.183     -.004641    .0237239 
       sdmsg |   .0102652   .0070593     1.45   0.152    -.0038819    .0244124 
      mnopen |   .0134795   .0037182     3.63   0.001      .006028     .020931 
       mninv |  -.0043306   .0149366    -0.29   0.773    -.0342643     .025603 
     mnebrdi |  -.6204575   .2583066    -2.40   0.020    -1.138115   -.1027996 
       sdtot |  -.0092178   .0156216    -0.59   0.558    -.0405242    .0220886 
       mngov |  -.0388905   .0117629    -3.31   0.002    -.0624639   -.0153171 
    resfevd1 |          1    .163098     6.13   0.000     .6731443    1.326856 
             | 
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        time | 
          3  |   .0164111   .1951499     0.08   0.933    -.3746781    .4075003 
          4  |   1.531839   .2574752     5.95   0.000     1.015847    2.047831 
             | 
       _cons |   3.264321   1.598819     2.04   0.046     .0602167    6.468425 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Diagnostic tests after 3rd stage* 
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      70.00     69    0.4438 
            Skewness |      15.10     14    0.3716 
            Kurtosis |       1.32      1    0.2499 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      86.42     84    0.4066 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of lnsdgdpg 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.97 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.3245 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of lnsdgdpg 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 52) =      0.76 
                  Prob > F =      0.5222 
 
.  
. xtserial lnsdgdpg strongcba weakcba mnlninf mnfb mncred sdmsg mnopen mninv 
mnebrdi sdtot mn 
> gov  
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      21) =      1.751 
           Prob > F =      0.1999 
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. xtfevd lnsdgdpg strongcba weakcba mnlninf mnfb mncred sdmsg mnopen mninv mnebrdi 
sdtot mngov, invariant(strongcba weakcba mnebrdi mngov) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       35           number of obs       =       70 
mean squared error         =  .433659           F( 13, 35)          = .7686513 
root mean squared error    = .6585279           Prob > F            = .6676881 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 30.35613           R-squared           = .6531088 
Total Sum of Squares       = 87.50908           adj. R-squared      = .3161288 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 57.15295 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
    lnsdgdpg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     mnlninf |    -.88089   1.864108    -0.47   0.639     -4.66523     2.90345 
        mnfb |  -.0482196   .0779786    -0.62   0.540    -.2065245    .1100854 
      mncred |   .0372983   .0199338     1.87   0.070    -.0031696    .0777662 
       sdmsg |   .0172395    .021916     0.79   0.437    -.0272522    .0617313 
      mnopen |   .0189091   .0217503     0.87   0.391    -.0252463    .0630645 
       mninv |  -.0331048   .0331482    -1.00   0.325    -.1003993    .0341896 
       sdtot |   .0066768   .0402087     0.17   0.869    -.0749513    .0883049 
   strongcba |  -1.303729   1.118235    -1.17   0.252    -3.573867    .9664093 
     weakcba |  -.3826583   .8603364    -0.44   0.659    -2.129234    1.363917 
     mnebrdi |  -1.157013   1.167862    -0.99   0.329    -3.527898    1.213872 
       mngov |  -.0543552   .0409103    -1.33   0.193    -.1374076    .0286971 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   6.015632   8.727523     0.69   0.495    -11.70218    23.73345 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendices for estimations based on subjective assessments 
(perceptions and expectations) about the economic situation in a 
country 
. summarize ESagree CBA gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun q22f_1 h_aged1 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_edu_low h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_employed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d2 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     ESagree |     80472    .1805597    .3846553          0          1 
         CBA |     80472    .1948752    .3961071          0          1 
       gdppc |     80472    9323.208    5133.889    3377.22   21627.16 
        gdpg |     80472    2.161013    4.704099      -7.53      15.73 
       lgdpg |     80472    2.326327    4.735376      -8.87      14.09 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         inf |     80472    4.434921    2.871202       -.91      12.47 
        linf |     80472    4.473237    2.832755        -.7      12.56 
          un |     80472    13.93123     8.68461       4.27      34.75 
         lun |     80472    13.67687    8.852218       4.21      34.97 
      q22f_1 |     50637    3.637222     1.48625          1          9 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_aged1 |     80472    .3043667    .4601416          0          1 
     h_aged2 |     80472    .3788398    .4851012          0          1 
     h_aged3 |     80472    .2711875    .4445754          0          1 
    h_female |     80472    .5265682    .4992967          0          1 
  h_edu_high |     80472    .1711403    .3766338          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
h_edu_medium |     80472    .6275475     .483461          0          1 
   h_edu_low |     80472     .201014     .400761          0          1 
   h_retired |     80472    .1872825    .3901406          0          1 
   h_student |     80472    .0926409    .2899304          0          1 
h_unemployed |     80472    .1818148    .3856942          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  h_employed |     80472    .5382618     .498537          0          1 
    h_inc_d1 |     80472    .1733646    .3785646          0          1 
    h_inc_d2 |     80472    .3150288    .4645302          0          1 
    h_inc_d3 |     80472    .2721319    .4450602          0          1 
    h_inc_d4 |     80472    .2394746    .4267655          0          1 
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Appendix 6.13: Subjective assessments - Correlation matrix 
 
. corr ESagree ExpESagree CBA q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1  
> h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
(obs=44968) 
 
             |  ESagree ExpESa~e      CBA   q22f_1    gdppc     gdpg    lgdpg      inf     linf       un      lun  h_aged2  h_aged3 h_female h_edu_~h h_edu_~m 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     ESagree |   1.0000 
  ExpESagree |   0.3667   1.0000 
         CBA |  -0.0625  -0.0672   1.0000 
      q22f_1 |  -0.1997  -0.2507   0.0038   1.0000 
       gdppc |  -0.0339   0.0080  -0.3586   0.0213   1.0000 
        gdpg |   0.1404   0.0618   0.0002  -0.0864  -0.1946   1.0000 
       lgdpg |   0.1482   0.0409   0.0605  -0.0500  -0.1716   0.6558   1.0000 
         inf |  -0.0773  -0.0773  -0.0813   0.1009  -0.2065  -0.2963   0.0312   1.0000 
        linf |  -0.0788  -0.0691  -0.0306   0.0813  -0.1819  -0.4445  -0.0671   0.9499   1.0000 
          un |   0.0397   0.0255   0.2002  -0.0632  -0.5980   0.2608   0.2215  -0.2138  -0.2089   1.0000 
         lun |   0.0449   0.0279   0.1967  -0.0697  -0.5990   0.2725   0.2374  -0.2287  -0.2226   0.9946   1.0000 
     h_aged2 |   0.0027  -0.0094  -0.0176  -0.0000  -0.0223   0.0143   0.0078   0.0302   0.0272   0.0009   0.0010   1.0000 
     h_aged3 |  -0.0378  -0.0375   0.0112   0.0087   0.0330  -0.0519  -0.0433  -0.0021  -0.0021   0.0035   0.0025  -0.5112   1.0000 
    h_female |  -0.0073  -0.0016   0.0065  -0.0015  -0.0015  -0.0058  -0.0008  -0.0177  -0.0162   0.0182   0.0184  -0.0039  -0.0053   1.0000 
  h_edu_high |   0.0334   0.0589  -0.0097  -0.0424  -0.0565   0.0079  -0.0020   0.0499   0.0450  -0.0343  -0.0333   0.0162  -0.0750   0.0265   1.0000 
h_edu_medium |  -0.0094  -0.0165   0.0292   0.0065   0.1358  -0.0086  -0.0047  -0.0680  -0.0574  -0.0574  -0.0588   0.0645  -0.1489  -0.0787  -0.6412   1.0000 
   h_retired |  -0.0451  -0.0369  -0.0007   0.0198   0.0392  -0.0891  -0.0798   0.0236   0.0199  -0.0245  -0.0254  -0.3156   0.6834   0.0075  -0.0873  -0.1164 
   h_student |   0.0156   0.0297   0.0142  -0.0013  -0.0447   0.0305   0.0231  -0.0025  -0.0066   0.0293   0.0282  -0.1937  -0.1530   0.0194  -0.0678   0.1124 
h_unemployed |  -0.0144  -0.0319   0.0402   0.0359  -0.1666   0.0268   0.0345  -0.0169  -0.0124   0.2089   0.2086   0.0389  -0.1087   0.1702  -0.1027  -0.0482 
    h_inc_d1 |  -0.0526  -0.0354   0.0909   0.0549  -0.0749  -0.0888  -0.0571   0.1192   0.1109  -0.0240  -0.0289   0.0042  -0.0670  -0.0237   0.0583  -0.0098 
    h_inc_d3 |   0.0103   0.0275  -0.0012  -0.0211   0.0090   0.0141  -0.0022  -0.0402  -0.0331  -0.0107  -0.0096   0.0151  -0.0488  -0.0013  -0.0505   0.0834 
    h_inc_d4 |   0.0555   0.0796  -0.0259  -0.0600   0.0241   0.0204   0.0121  -0.0640  -0.0591   0.0052   0.0100   0.0641  -0.1273  -0.0170   0.2043  -0.0275 
  spring2008 |        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
    fall2008 |        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
  spring2009 |   0.0307   0.0035  -0.0116   0.0326  -0.0178  -0.2426   0.2934   0.4634   0.5042  -0.0734  -0.0904   0.0103  -0.0083  -0.0013  -0.0125  -0.0014 
    fall2009 |   0.0051   0.0307   0.0021  -0.0413  -0.0108  -0.4827  -0.3921   0.0153   0.1730  -0.0720  -0.0488   0.0027   0.0021   0.0019   0.0066  -0.0121 
  spring2010 |  -0.0186   0.0144  -0.0031  -0.0125  -0.0227  -0.0429  -0.3448  -0.2166  -0.2121   0.0546   0.0065  -0.0140   0.0089   0.0007  -0.0053   0.0114 
    fall2010 |   0.0075  -0.0093   0.0043  -0.0097  -0.0235   0.2891   0.1077  -0.1970  -0.2761   0.0155   0.0675   0.0083  -0.0061  -0.0023   0.0095   0.0044 
  spring2011 |  -0.0245  -0.0390   0.0082   0.0308   0.0749   0.4713   0.3341  -0.0605  -0.1820   0.0739   0.0639  -0.0071   0.0034   0.0011   0.0017  -0.0026 
          EU |  -0.0383  -0.0031  -0.0111   0.0202   0.5473  -0.1754  -0.1533   0.0814   0.0773  -0.7051  -0.7009  -0.0134   0.0419  -0.0094   0.0461   0.0332 
        ExYu |  -0.0357  -0.0419   0.1148   0.0388  -0.3320  -0.0511  -0.0165  -0.0186   0.0082   0.7436   0.7274   0.0027   0.0052   0.0211  -0.0637  -0.0009 
 
             | h_reti~d h_stud~t h_unem~d h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spr~2008 fall2008 spr~2009 fall2009 spr~2010 fall2010 spr~2011       EU     ExYu 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   h_retired |   1.0000 
   h_student |  -0.1195   1.0000 
h_unemployed |  -0.2336  -0.1163   1.0000 
    h_inc_d1 |  -0.0594   0.0852   0.0173   1.0000 
    h_inc_d3 |  -0.0468  -0.0020  -0.0253  -0.2705   1.0000 
    h_inc_d4 |  -0.1459   0.0038  -0.1492  -0.2533  -0.3530   1.0000 
  spring2008 |        .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
    fall2008 |        .        .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
  spring2009 |  -0.0083  -0.0084   0.0050   0.0135  -0.0032  -0.0197        .        .   1.0000 
    fall2009 |   0.0115  -0.0213  -0.0031  -0.0028   0.0069   0.0058        .        .  -0.2444   1.0000 
  spring2010 |   0.0033   0.0100   0.0012  -0.0201   0.0103   0.0081        .        .  -0.2505  -0.2483   1.0000 
    fall2010 |  -0.0106   0.0050   0.0085  -0.0053   0.0079   0.0097        .        .  -0.2514  -0.2491  -0.2554   1.0000 
  spring2011 |   0.0043   0.0143  -0.0116   0.0149  -0.0219  -0.0041        .        .  -0.2486  -0.2464  -0.2525  -0.2533   1.0000 
          EU |   0.0497  -0.0553  -0.1639   0.0107   0.0075  -0.0321        .        .   0.0006   0.0094  -0.0042   0.0013  -0.0070   1.0000 
        ExYu |   0.0049   0.0312   0.1568   0.0313  -0.0227  -0.0001        .        .  -0.0036  -0.0025   0.0053   0.0002   0.0006  -0.8122   1.0000 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.14: Subjective assessments of economic situation (SUR 
estimation (country used as cluster))  
 
Appendix 6.14a: Subjective assessments – Estiomation of Equation 6.7 
(SUR estimation (country used as cluster)) – unweighted  
 
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) 
ExpESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un 
i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 
spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu), vce(cluster 
country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -38656.081                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.0939387   1.096015    -0.09   0.932    -2.242089    2.054211 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1933874   .1229044    -1.57   0.116    -.4342755    .0475008 
          3  |  -.4967098   .1223846    -4.06   0.000    -.7365792   -.2568403 
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          4  |  -.7816309   .1670688    -4.68   0.000     -1.10908   -.4541822 
          5  |  -1.080655   .1607635    -6.72   0.000    -1.395745   -.7655639 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000254   .0000182    -1.40   0.163    -.0000611    .0000103 
        gdpg |   .0674839   .0203872     3.31   0.001     .0275257    .1074421 
       lgdpg |   .0522686   .0300137     1.74   0.082    -.0065571    .1110943 
         inf |   .0215793   .0379625     0.57   0.570    -.0528258    .0959843 
        linf |  -.0927844   .0326011    -2.85   0.004    -.1566813   -.0288874 
          un |  -.0778433   .0312713    -2.49   0.013     -.139134   -.0165526 
         lun |   .0567817   .0315132     1.80   0.072    -.0049829    .1185464 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .0916801   .1641647     0.56   0.577    -.2300768    .4134371 
        1 3  |   .1735826   .2033536     0.85   0.393    -.2249832    .5721484 
        1 4  |   .1803468   .2411693     0.75   0.455    -.2923363      .65303 
        1 5  |    .325337   .2098974     1.55   0.121    -.0860544    .7367285 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000937   .0001117    -0.84   0.402    -.0003127    .0001253 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0332722   .0442916    -0.75   0.453    -.1200822    .0535377 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0468546    .032604    -1.44   0.151    -.1107573    .0170482 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1342061   .1708397     0.79   0.432    -.2006335    .4690457 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.0878488   .1486419    -0.59   0.555    -.3791816    .2034839 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0145683   .0509579    -0.29   0.775    -.1144439    .0853073 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0152795   .0691311     0.22   0.825     -.120215     .150774 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0385482   .0265874    -1.45   0.147    -.0906586    .0135622 
     h_aged3 |  -.0727358   .0428372    -1.70   0.090    -.1566951    .0112236 
    h_female |  -.0253912   .0158438    -1.60   0.109    -.0564446    .0056621 
  h_edu_high |   .0978325   .0831727     1.18   0.239    -.0651829     .260848 
h_edu_medium |   .0281025   .0622893     0.45   0.652    -.0939823    .1501874 
   h_retired |  -.0409382   .0510292    -0.80   0.422    -.1409537    .0590773 
   h_student |    .055946   .0482939     1.16   0.247    -.0387083    .1506003 
h_unemployed |  -.0376038    .043289    -0.87   0.385    -.1224487    .0472411 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0107848   .0506347    -0.21   0.831     -.110027    .0884575 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0481595   .0395555     1.22   0.223    -.0293678    .1256868 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1197827   .0271616     4.41   0.000     .0665469    .1730184 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |     .74455   .1219226     6.11   0.000     .5055862    .9835138 
    fall2009 |   .7579144   .1568354     4.83   0.000     .4505228    1.065306 
  spring2010 |   .4080622   .1600781     2.55   0.011     .0943149    .7218094 
    fall2010 |    .075537   .1265944     0.60   0.551    -.1725835    .3236574 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .3696049   .1955842     1.89   0.059     -.013733    .7529428 
        ExYu |   .5335493   .2859823     1.87   0.062    -.0269656    1.094064 
       _cons |  -.3339893   .2631855    -1.27   0.204    -.8498234    .1818448 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |   1.768284   .5968111     2.96   0.003     .5985558    2.938012 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1447494   .1361474    -1.06   0.288    -.4115933    .1220945 
          3  |  -.4546894   .1615512    -2.81   0.005    -.7713241   -.1380548 
          4  |  -.7658915   .1663286    -4.60   0.000     -1.09189   -.4398934 
          5  |  -1.006841   .1561922    -6.45   0.000    -1.312972   -.7007101 
             | 
       gdppc |  -1.37e-06   .0000135    -0.10   0.920    -.0000279    .0000252 
        gdpg |    .051463    .008277     6.22   0.000     .0352404    .0676855 
       lgdpg |  -.0144984   .0117677    -1.23   0.218    -.0375627    .0085659 
         inf |   .0253231   .0396355     0.64   0.523    -.0523611    .1030073 
        linf |  -.0727604   .0320945    -2.27   0.023    -.1356644   -.0098564 
          un |   .0306104   .0403014     0.76   0.448     -.048379    .1095997 
         lun |  -.0240526   .0359734    -0.67   0.504    -.0945593     .046454 
             | 
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  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0333383   .1369319    -0.24   0.808    -.3017198    .2350433 
        1 3  |   .0404658   .1646672     0.25   0.806     -.282276    .3632076 
        1 4  |   .1018359    .179434     0.57   0.570    -.2498484    .4535201 
        1 5  |     .04846   .2107456     0.23   0.818    -.3645937    .4615137 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |   -.000243   .0000755    -3.22   0.001    -.0003909   -.0000951 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0569014   .0265918     2.14   0.032     .0047823    .1090204 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |   .0127098    .014243     0.89   0.372     -.015206    .0406255 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0792672   .0947573    -0.84   0.403     -.264988    .1064537 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .1042902   .0833669     1.25   0.211    -.0591058    .2676863 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0816272   .0087105    -9.37   0.000    -.0986996   -.0645549 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0341368   .0177677     1.92   0.055    -.0006873    .0689609 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0707196   .0293847    -2.41   0.016    -.1283126   -.0131266 
     h_aged3 |  -.0948035   .0385373    -2.46   0.014    -.1703353   -.0192718 
    h_female |  -.0006671    .011109    -0.06   0.952    -.0224404    .0211061 
  h_edu_high |    .122323   .0506255     2.42   0.016     .0230988    .2215472 
h_edu_medium |   .0076858   .0340247     0.23   0.821    -.0590014     .074373 
   h_retired |   .0410001    .028878     1.42   0.156    -.0155997       .0976 
   h_student |   .1339003   .0334103     4.01   0.000     .0684174    .1993833 
h_unemployed |  -.0238648   .0329979    -0.72   0.470    -.0885395      .04081 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1198922   .0466881     2.57   0.010     .0283853    .2113992 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1741856   .0233923     7.45   0.000     .1283375    .2200338 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2531831   .0341142     7.42   0.000     .1863206    .3200457 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5277808   .0801648     6.58   0.000     .3706607     .684901 
    fall2009 |   .5324743   .0952949     5.59   0.000     .3456998    .7192488 
  spring2010 |   .2227363   .0484298     4.60   0.000     .1278157     .317657 
    fall2010 |   .0599323   .0807129     0.74   0.458    -.0982621    .2181267 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1357343   .0942332     1.44   0.150    -.0489593     .320428 
        ExYu |   .0514488   .1578718     0.33   0.745    -.2579742    .3608718 
       _cons |   .0268061   .2426928     0.11   0.912     -.448863    .5024752 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .6547694   .0518805    12.62   0.000     .5530855    .7564534 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |    .574872   .0347352                      .5028292    .6389832 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  159.283    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Marginal effects after biprobit 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 
               h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 
               h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 
               spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0840565   .0126968    -6.62   0.000    -.1089418   -.0591712 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0529719   .0345667    -1.53   0.125    -.1207214    .0147775 
          3  |  -.1275707   .0365776    -3.49   0.000    -.1992614   -.0558799 
          4  |  -.1816679   .0421056    -4.31   0.000    -.2641933   -.0991425 
          5  |  -.2162407   .0416067    -5.20   0.000    -.2977884    -.134693 
             | 
       gdppc |  -7.70e-06   3.02e-06    -2.55   0.011    -.0000136   -1.79e-06 
        gdpg |   .0118509   .0032671     3.63   0.000     .0054475    .0182543 
       lgdpg |   .0058952   .0037082     1.59   0.112    -.0013726    .0131631 
         inf |   .0067412   .0052327     1.29   0.198    -.0035148    .0169971 
        linf |  -.0180187   .0053245    -3.38   0.001    -.0284546   -.0075829 
          un |  -.0107389   .0046953    -2.29   0.022    -.0199415   -.0015364 
         lun |   .0076635   .0048274     1.59   0.112    -.0017981    .0171251 
     h_aged2 |  -.0089037   .0050627    -1.76   0.079    -.0188264    .0010189 
     h_aged3 |   -.014975   .0079353    -1.89   0.059     -.030528    .0005779 
    h_female |  -.0036957   .0023721    -1.56   0.119     -.008345    .0009536 
  h_edu_high |   .0198968   .0135978     1.46   0.143    -.0067543    .0465479 
h_edu_medium |   .0044185   .0104119     0.42   0.671    -.0159884    .0248255 
   h_retired |  -.0039709   .0080949    -0.49   0.624    -.0198366    .0118948 
   h_student |   .0143991     .00746     1.93   0.054    -.0002222    .0290204 
h_unemployed |   -.006554   .0069544    -0.94   0.346    -.0201844    .0070765 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0041075    .008092     0.51   0.612    -.0117526    .0199676 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0151785   .0066239     2.29   0.022      .002196    .0281611 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0292463   .0051631     5.66   0.000     .0191268    .0393659 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1323783   .0174772     7.57   0.000     .0981235     .166633 
    fall2009 |   .1345286   .0241674     5.57   0.000     .0871614    .1818959 
  spring2010 |   .0694094   .0265155     2.62   0.009       .01744    .1213788 
    fall2010 |   .0137319   .0193567     0.71   0.478    -.0242065    .0516704 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0597496   .0295293     2.02   0.043     .0018733    .1176259 
        ExYu |   .0794266   .0356209     2.23   0.026     .0096108    .1492423 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
Appendix 6.14b: Subjective assessments – Estiomation of Equation 6.7 
(SUR estimation (country used as cluster)) – weighted  
 
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) 
(ExpESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un 
i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 
spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) [pweight = 
weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
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note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -37435.157                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.0813144   1.098671    -0.07   0.941     -2.23467    2.072041 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1835807   .1236662    -1.48   0.138     -.425962    .0588006 
          3  |  -.4846145   .1201924    -4.03   0.000    -.7201873   -.2490418 
          4  |  -.7592442   .1640373    -4.63   0.000    -1.080751    -.437737 
          5  |  -1.068169   .1584092    -6.74   0.000    -1.378645   -.7576927 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000265   .0000187    -1.42   0.156    -.0000631    .0000101 
        gdpg |   .0675421   .0198369     3.40   0.001     .0286626    .1064217 
       lgdpg |   .0530103   .0310276     1.71   0.088    -.0078026    .1138233 
         inf |   .0131946   .0433106     0.30   0.761    -.0716927    .0980819 
        linf |  -.0863672   .0375056    -2.30   0.021    -.1598769   -.0128575 
          un |  -.0693475   .0315386    -2.20   0.028     -.131162    -.007533 
         lun |   .0503011   .0325574     1.54   0.122    -.0135102    .1141124 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1023437   .1563998     0.65   0.513    -.2041943    .4088817 
        1 3  |   .1848917   .1915993     0.96   0.335    -.1906362    .5604195 
        1 4  |   .1376489   .2494291     0.55   0.581    -.3512232     .626521 
        1 5  |   .3378396   .1997603     1.69   0.091    -.0536834    .7293626 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000983    .000113    -0.87   0.385    -.0003198    .0001233 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0356236   .0481581    -0.74   0.459    -.1300117    .0587645 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0461451   .0320774    -1.44   0.150    -.1090156    .0167254 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1538337    .176447     0.87   0.383    -.1919961    .4996635 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.1046361    .155022    -0.67   0.500    -.4084737    .1992015 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0175849   .0508473    -0.35   0.729    -.1172439     .082074 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0188023   .0689761     0.27   0.785    -.1163883     .153993 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0338185   .0262051    -1.29   0.197    -.0851795    .0175426 
     h_aged3 |  -.0563513    .040855    -1.38   0.168    -.1364256    .0237231 
    h_female |  -.0237768   .0183893    -1.29   0.196    -.0598192    .0122655 
  h_edu_high |   .1201054    .076492     1.57   0.116    -.0298162    .2700271 
h_edu_medium |   .0415476   .0594362     0.70   0.485    -.0749452    .1580403 
   h_retired |  -.0705393   .0391136    -1.80   0.071    -.1472005     .006122 
   h_student |   .0649747   .0559882     1.16   0.246      -.04476    .1747095 
h_unemployed |  -.0254136   .0445708    -0.57   0.569    -.1127708    .0619436 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0030182   .0474837     0.06   0.949    -.0900481    .0960845 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0594578   .0402124     1.48   0.139     -.019357    .1382725 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1217082   .0277472     4.39   0.000     .0673248    .1760916 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .7616047    .126222     6.03   0.000     .5142142    1.008995 
    fall2009 |   .7979278   .1501419     5.31   0.000      .503655    1.092201 
  spring2010 |   .4298769   .1536603     2.80   0.005     .1287082    .7310456 
    fall2010 |   .0927391   .1263528     0.73   0.463    -.1549079     .340386 
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  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |    .410091   .1926013     2.13   0.033     .0325994    .7875826 
        ExYu |   .5404449   .2847823     1.90   0.058    -.0177181    1.098608 
       _cons |  -.4307795   .2731933    -1.58   0.115    -.9662284    .1046695 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |   1.466809   .5719684     2.56   0.010     .3457715    2.587846 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1555984   .1345757    -1.16   0.248    -.4193619    .1081652 
          3  |  -.4613222   .1555926    -2.96   0.003     -.766278   -.1563664 
          4  |  -.7680513   .1596939    -4.81   0.000    -1.081046    -.455057 
          5  |  -1.023271   .1498681    -6.83   0.000    -1.317007    -.729535 
             | 
       gdppc |  -2.05e-06    .000013    -0.16   0.874    -.0000274    .0000233 
        gdpg |   .0501434   .0083463     6.01   0.000      .033785    .0665018 
       lgdpg |  -.0120658    .011982    -1.01   0.314    -.0355502    .0114185 
         inf |   .0223086   .0435499     0.51   0.608    -.0630476    .1076649 
        linf |  -.0682003   .0350265    -1.95   0.052    -.1368511    .0004504 
          un |   .0350268   .0418053     0.84   0.402    -.0469102    .1169637 
         lun |  -.0263125   .0380134    -0.69   0.489    -.1008174    .0481925 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0056534   .1357299    -0.04   0.967    -.2716791    .2603722 
        1 3  |   .0653206    .161225     0.41   0.685    -.2506746    .3813158 
        1 4  |   .1147825   .1774387     0.65   0.518    -.2329909    .4625559 
        1 5  |   .0700396   .2104078     0.33   0.739    -.3423521    .4824313 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0002134   .0000721    -2.96   0.003    -.0003547   -.0000721 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0502109   .0268229     1.87   0.061    -.0023611    .1027829 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |    .008615   .0144125     0.60   0.550     -.019633     .036863 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0670055   .0926698    -0.72   0.470    -.2486351     .114624 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .0961332   .0818324     1.17   0.240    -.0642555    .2565218 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0841303   .0090602    -9.29   0.000    -.1018879   -.0663728 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0434161    .017567     2.47   0.013     .0089855    .0778467 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0657137   .0315745    -2.08   0.037    -.1275985   -.0038289 
     h_aged3 |  -.1048379   .0374164    -2.80   0.005    -.1781727    -.031503 
    h_female |   .0023863   .0163009     0.15   0.884    -.0295628    .0343354 
  h_edu_high |   .1210229   .0484257     2.50   0.012     .0261104    .2159355 
h_edu_medium |    .007769   .0346903     0.22   0.823    -.0602228    .0757609 
   h_retired |   .0314658   .0288029     1.09   0.275    -.0249869    .0879184 
   h_student |   .1444603    .035454     4.07   0.000     .0749718    .2139487 
h_unemployed |  -.0195781   .0329647    -0.59   0.553    -.0841878    .0450316 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1119978   .0451494     2.48   0.013     .0235067     .200489 
    h_inc_d3 |     .16563   .0264656     6.26   0.000     .1137584    .2175016 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2489366   .0402373     6.19   0.000      .170073    .3278003 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5194534   .0832414     6.24   0.000     .3563032    .6826036 
    fall2009 |   .5311858   .0971086     5.47   0.000     .3408566    .7215151 
  spring2010 |   .2297941   .0485064     4.74   0.000     .1347233    .3248648 
    fall2010 |   .0705984   .0858341     0.82   0.411    -.0976333      .23883 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1472248   .0919176     1.60   0.109    -.0329303    .3273799 
        ExYu |   .0147525    .147887     0.10   0.921    -.2751008    .3046057 
       _cons |   .0084825   .2362955     0.04   0.971    -.4546482    .4716132 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .6673776   .0534663    12.48   0.000     .5625855    .7721697 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .5832522    .035278                      .5098932    .6481893 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  155.805    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Marginal effect after biprobit 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 
               h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 
               h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 
               spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0818665   .0120847    -6.77   0.000     -.105552    -.058181 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0499753   .0335876    -1.49   0.137    -.1158058    .0158551 
          3  |  -.1231011   .0348277    -3.53   0.000    -.1913622     -.05484 
          4  |  -.1764173   .0404769    -4.36   0.000    -.2557506   -.0970839 
          5  |  -.2112781   .0401294    -5.26   0.000    -.2899304   -.1326259 
             | 
       gdppc |  -7.75e-06   3.03e-06    -2.56   0.010    -.0000137   -1.82e-06 
        gdpg |   .0115336   .0031857     3.62   0.000     .0052897    .0177775 
       lgdpg |   .0060215    .003806     1.58   0.114    -.0014382    .0134812 
         inf |   .0059137   .0061552     0.96   0.337    -.0061502    .0179777 
        linf |  -.0171371   .0060487    -2.83   0.005    -.0289923   -.0052819 
          un |  -.0093233   .0048896    -1.91   0.057    -.0189068    .0002601 
         lun |    .006724   .0051349     1.31   0.190    -.0033403    .0167883 
     h_aged2 |  -.0078689    .005027    -1.57   0.118    -.0177217    .0019839 
     h_aged3 |  -.0128961   .0073762    -1.75   0.080    -.0273532     .001561 
    h_female |  -.0032836   .0025453    -1.29   0.197    -.0082724    .0017052 
  h_edu_high |   .0227459   .0121273     1.88   0.061    -.0010231    .0465149 
h_edu_medium |   .0062903   .0097768     0.64   0.520    -.0128718    .0254525 
   h_retired |  -.0086129   .0062977    -1.37   0.171    -.0209561    .0037303 
   h_student |   .0159609   .0085624     1.86   0.062    -.0008211    .0327429 
h_unemployed |  -.0045338   .0072876    -0.62   0.534    -.0188174    .0097497 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0056144    .007582     0.74   0.459    -.0092461    .0204748 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0161532   .0067562     2.39   0.017     .0029113     .029395 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0288949   .0054118     5.34   0.000     .0182879    .0395018 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1327581    .018096     7.34   0.000     .0972905    .1682257 
    fall2009 |   .1384861   .0232351     5.96   0.000     .0929461    .1840261 
  spring2010 |   .0719989   .0252399     2.85   0.004     .0225297    .1214681 
    fall2010 |   .0165057    .018805     0.88   0.380    -.0203515    .0533628 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |    .065353   .0287886     2.27   0.023     .0089284    .1217777 
        ExYu |   .0778294   .0347433     2.24   0.025     .0097339     .145925 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 6.14c: Caluculating the marginal effect of CBA in two 
hypothetical populations - after biprobit (SUR) country as cluster, 
weighted 
 
. margins if CBA==0, at(CBA=(0 1))  
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =      32667 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1344986   .0121306    11.09   0.000      .110723    .1582742 
          2  |   .0484029   .0052574     9.21   0.000     .0380986    .0587071 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins if CBA==1, at(CBA=(0 1)) 
 
Predictive margins                                Number of obs   =       
8165 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
 
1._at        : CBA             =           0 
 
2._at        : CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |     Margin   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _at | 
          1  |   .1475188   .0124191    11.88   0.000     .1231777    .1718599 
          2  |   .0823428   .0031651    26.02   0.000     .0761394    .0885462 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
margins, over(CBA) at(CBA=(0 1)) contrast (atcontrast(r._at) wald) vsquish 
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
over         : CBA 
1._at        : 0.CBA 
                   CBA             =           0 
               1.CBA 
                   CBA             =           0 
2._at        : 0.CBA 
                   CBA             =           1 
               1.CBA 
                   CBA             =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
             |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------+---------------------------------- 
     _at@CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) 0  |          1       44.68     0.0000 
 (2 vs 1) 1  |          1       30.33     0.0000 
      Joint  |          2       45.92     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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             |            Delta-method 
             |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------ 
     _at@CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) 0  |  -.0860957   .0128808     -.1113416   -.0608499 
 (2 vs 1) 1  |   -.065176   .0118341     -.0883704   -.0419816 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. 
 
Appendix 6.14d: Marginal effect of CBA conditional on the level of 
trust in government - after biprobit (SUR) country as cluster, 
weighted 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      
40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.1818534   .0489674    -3.71   0.000    -.2778278    -.085879 
          2  |  -.1407803   .0207826    -6.77   0.000    -.1815134   -.1000472 
          3  |  -.0889738   .0139914    -6.36   0.000    -.1163964   -.0615512 
          4  |  -.0603518   .0097986    -6.16   0.000    -.0795568   -.0411468 
          5  |  -.0295749   .0066971    -4.42   0.000     -.042701   -.0164488 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q22f_1 
 
 
 
. margins r.CBA, at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.88     0.3481 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        4.16     0.0413 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        5.66     0.0174 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        9.85     0.0017 
            Joint  |          4       61.47     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0410731   .0437774     -.0447291    .1268752 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0928796   .0455275      .0036474    .1821118 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .1215016   .0510894      .0213682    .2216349 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .1522785   .0485231      .0571749    .2473821 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 6.14e: Estimating the effect of CBA conditional on 
macroeconomic variables - after biprobit (SUR) country as cluster, 
weighted 
 
margins, dydx(CBA) at(gdppc=(3377.22(5000)21627.16)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : gdppc           =     3377.22 
2._at        : gdppc           =     8377.22 
3._at        : gdppc           =    13377.22 
4._at        : gdppc           =    18377.22 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   -.008627   .0686269    -0.13   0.900    -.1431333    .1258793 
          2  |  -.0983082   .0153983    -6.38   0.000    -.1284883    -.068128 
          3  |  -.1132628   .0179134    -6.32   0.000    -.1483725   -.0781532 
          4  |  -.1003209   .0254228    -3.95   0.000    -.1501486   -.0504932 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: gdppc 
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. margins r.CBA, at(gdppc=(3377.22(5000)21627.16)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) 
vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : gdppc           =     3377.22 
2._at        : gdppc           =     8377.22 
3._at        : gdppc           =    13377.22 
4._at        : gdppc           =    18377.22 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.32     0.2498 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.91     0.1671 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.52     0.2170 
            Joint  |          3      125.84     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0896811   .0779219     -.2424053     .063043 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1046358   .0757448     -.2530929    .0438213 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0916939   .0742741     -.2372686    .0538807 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(gdpg=(-7.53(2)15.73)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : gdpg            =       -7.53 
2._at        : gdpg            =       -5.53 
3._at        : gdpg            =       -3.53 
4._at        : gdpg            =       -1.53 
5._at        : gdpg            =         .47 
6._at        : gdpg            =        2.47 
7._at        : gdpg            =        4.47 
8._at        : gdpg            =        6.47 
9._at        : gdpg            =        8.47 
10._at       : gdpg            =       10.47 
11._at       : gdpg            =       12.47 
12._at       : gdpg            =       14.47 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.0358537   .0152298    -2.35   0.019    -.0657036   -.0060037 
          2  |  -.0449764   .0133746    -3.36   0.001    -.0711901   -.0187627 
          3  |  -.0560141   .0103988    -5.39   0.000    -.0763953   -.0356329 
          4  |  -.0692166   .0083752    -8.26   0.000    -.0856317   -.0528014 
          5  |  -.0848009   .0127807    -6.64   0.000    -.1098507   -.0597512 
          6  |  -.1029272   .0233431    -4.41   0.000    -.1486787   -.0571756 
          7  |  -.1236743   .0378695    -3.27   0.001    -.1978971   -.0494516 
          8  |    -.14702   .0557326    -2.64   0.008    -.2562538   -.0377861 
          9  |  -.1728258   .0766563    -2.25   0.024    -.3230695   -.0225822 
         10  |  -.2008315   .1003847    -2.00   0.045    -.3975818   -.0040812 
         11  |  -.2306572   .1266296    -1.82   0.069    -.4788468    .0175323 
         12  |  -.2618159   .1550814    -1.69   0.091    -.5657698    .0421381 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
  532 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: gdpg 
 
 
 
. margins r.CBA, at(gdpg=(-7.53(2)15.73)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : gdpg            =       -7.53 
2._at        : gdpg            =       -5.53 
3._at        : gdpg            =       -3.53 
4._at        : gdpg            =       -1.53 
5._at        : gdpg            =         .47 
6._at        : gdpg            =        2.47 
7._at        : gdpg            =        4.47 
8._at        : gdpg            =        6.47 
9._at        : gdpg            =        8.47 
10._at       : gdpg            =       10.47 
11._at       : gdpg            =       12.47 
12._at       : gdpg            =       14.47 
 
------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
--------------------+---------------------------------- 
            _at#CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        9.22     0.0024 
 (3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        6.82     0.0090 
 (4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        5.21     0.0225 
 (5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        4.14     0.0420 
 (6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        3.41     0.0649 
 (7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.90     0.0885 
 (8 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.54     0.1112 
 (9 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.27     0.1319 
(10 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.07     0.1506 
(11 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.91     0.1673 
(12 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.78     0.1826 
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             Joint  |          6      792.64     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |            Delta-method 
                    |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
            _at#CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0091228    .003004     -.0150104   -.0032351 
 (3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0201605   .0077221     -.0352956   -.0050253 
 (4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0333629   .0146193     -.0620162   -.0047096 
 (5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0489472   .0240671     -.0961178   -.0017767 
 (6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0670735   .0363314     -.1382818    .0041348 
 (7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0878207   .0515614     -.1888792    .0132378 
 (8 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1111663   .0697848      -.247942    .0256093 
 (9 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1369722    .090914     -.3151603     .041216 
(10 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1649778   .1147634       -.38991    .0599544 
(11 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1948036   .1410763      -.471308    .0817008 
(12 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.2259622   .1695573     -.5582884     .106364 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(lgdpg=(-8.87(2)14.09)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : lgdpg           =       -8.87 
2._at        : lgdpg           =       -6.87 
3._at        : lgdpg           =       -4.87 
4._at        : lgdpg           =       -2.87 
5._at        : lgdpg           =        -.87 
6._at        : lgdpg           =        1.13 
7._at        : lgdpg           =        3.13 
8._at        : lgdpg           =        5.13 
9._at        : lgdpg           =        7.13 
10._at       : lgdpg           =        9.13 
11._at       : lgdpg           =       11.13 
12._at       : lgdpg           =       13.13 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.0216954   .0324176    -0.67   0.503    -.0852326    .0418419 
          2  |  -.0330956   .0281091    -1.18   0.239    -.0881884    .0219972 
          3  |  -.0455488   .0225744    -2.02   0.044    -.0897937   -.0013038 
          4  |  -.0589212   .0164331    -3.59   0.000    -.0911295   -.0267128 
          5  |  -.0730298   .0119296    -6.12   0.000    -.0964114   -.0496483 
          6  |  -.0876458   .0139574    -6.28   0.000    -.1150019   -.0602898 
          7  |  -.1025013   .0218843    -4.68   0.000    -.1453936   -.0596089 
          8  |  -.1172994   .0318779    -3.68   0.000    -.1797789     -.05482 
          9  |  -.1317282   .0423225    -3.11   0.002    -.2146788   -.0487775 
         10  |  -.1454752   .0524661    -2.77   0.006    -.2483068   -.0426435 
         11  |  -.1582438   .0618359    -2.56   0.010      -.27944   -.0370476 
         12  |  -.1697687   .0701282    -2.42   0.015    -.3072175     -.03232 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: lgdpg 
 
 
 
margins r.CBA, at(lgdpg=(-8.87(2)14.09)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : lgdpg           =       -8.87 
2._at        : lgdpg           =       -6.87 
3._at        : lgdpg           =       -4.87 
4._at        : lgdpg           =       -2.87 
5._at        : lgdpg           =        -.87 
6._at        : lgdpg           =        1.13 
7._at        : lgdpg           =        3.13 
8._at        : lgdpg           =        5.13 
9._at        : lgdpg           =        7.13 
10._at       : lgdpg           =        9.13 
11._at       : lgdpg           =       11.13 
12._at       : lgdpg           =       13.13 
 
------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
--------------------+---------------------------------- 
            _at#CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        5.80     0.0160 
 (3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        4.70     0.0301 
 (4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        3.94     0.0470 
 (5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        3.41     0.0648 
 (6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        3.03     0.0817 
 (7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.76     0.0967 
 (8 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.57     0.1092 
 (9 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.43     0.1188 
(10 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.35     0.1255 
(11 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.30     0.1295 
(12 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.28     0.1311 
-.
3
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 P
r(
E
s
a
g
re
e
=
1
,E
x
p
e
s
a
g
re
e
=
1
)
-8.87 -6.87 -4.87 -2.87 -.87 1.13 3.13 5.13 7.13 9.13 11.13 13.13
lgdpg
Average Marginal Effects of 1.CBA with 95% CIs
  535 
             Joint  |          5     1364.99     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |            Delta-method 
                    |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
            _at#CBA | 
 (2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0114003   .0047323     -.0206754   -.0021251 
 (3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0238534   .0110002     -.0454135   -.0022933 
 (4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0372258   .0187445     -.0739644   -.0004872 
 (5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0513345   .0277964     -.1058145    .0031455 
 (6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0659505   .0378849     -.1402035    .0083026 
 (7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0808059   .0486527     -.1761634    .0145516 
 (8 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0956041   .0596829     -.2125805    .0213723 
 (9 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1100328   .0705342     -.2482774    .0282117 
(10 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1237798   .0807813     -.2821082    .0345486 
(11 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1365485   .0900562     -.3130555    .0399585 
(12 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.1480734   .0980862     -.3403187     .044172 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(inf=(-0.91(2)12.47)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : inf             =        -.91 
2._at        : inf             =        1.09 
3._at        : inf             =        3.09 
4._at        : inf             =        5.09 
5._at        : inf             =        7.09 
6._at        : inf             =        9.09 
7._at        : inf             =       11.09 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.1044183   .0411343    -2.54   0.011      -.18504   -.0237966 
          2  |  -.0969917   .0284478    -3.41   0.001    -.1527484    -.041235 
          3  |  -.0856072   .0134736    -6.35   0.000     -.112015   -.0591993 
          4  |  -.0718343   .0217926    -3.30   0.001    -.1145469   -.0291217 
          5  |  -.0584731    .045969    -1.27   0.203    -.1485707    .0316245 
          6  |  -.0487755   .0683443    -0.71   0.475    -.1827279    .0851769 
          7  |  -.0452849   .0855945    -0.53   0.597     -.213047    .1224772 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: inf 
 
 
 
. margins r.CBA, at(inf=(-0.91(2)12.47)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : inf             =        -.91 
2._at        : inf             =        1.09 
3._at        : inf             =        3.09 
4._at        : inf             =        5.09 
5._at        : inf             =        7.09 
6._at        : inf             =        9.09 
7._at        : inf             =       11.09 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.31     0.5764 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.35     0.5526 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.35     0.5557 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.32     0.5694 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.29     0.5903 
(7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.24     0.6238 
            Joint  |          5     1309.52     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0074265    .013293     -.0186272    .0334803 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0188111   .0316753     -.0432713    .0808935 
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(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |    .032584   .0552995      -.075801     .140969 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0459452    .080761     -.1123435    .2042338 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0556428   .1033419     -.1469036    .2581891 
(7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0591334   .1205631      -.177166    .2954328 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(linf=(-0.7(2)12.56)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : linf            =         -.7 
2._at        : linf            =         1.3 
3._at        : linf            =         3.3 
4._at        : linf            =         5.3 
5._at        : linf            =         7.3 
6._at        : linf            =         9.3 
7._at        : linf            =        11.3 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.1197694   .0643349    -1.86   0.063    -.2458634    .0063247 
          2  |  -.0990858   .0356352    -2.78   0.005    -.1689295   -.0292421 
          3  |    -.08429   .0159189    -5.29   0.000    -.1154904   -.0530896 
          4  |  -.0722945   .0162026    -4.46   0.000    -.1040511   -.0405379 
          5  |   -.061335   .0232663    -2.64   0.008    -.1069361   -.0157339 
          6  |  -.0508233   .0272491    -1.87   0.062    -.1042306    .0025839 
          7  |  -.0408278   .0281222    -1.45   0.147    -.0959462    .0142906 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: linf 
 
. margins r.CBA, at(linf=(-0.7(2)12.56)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish 
 
 
 
margins r.CBA, at(linf=(-0.7(2)12.56)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : linf            =         -.7 
2._at        : linf            =         1.3 
3._at        : linf            =         3.3 
4._at        : linf            =         5.3 
5._at        : linf            =         7.3 
6._at        : linf            =         9.3 
7._at        : linf            =        11.3 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.47     0.4918 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.42     0.5146 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.45     0.5044 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.53     0.4686 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.66     0.4162 
(7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.85     0.3556 
            Joint  |          5      401.49     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
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(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0206836   .0300897     -.0382912    .0796583 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0354793   .0544359      -.071213    .1421717 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0474749   .0711098     -.0918978    .1868475 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0584344   .0806213     -.0995804    .2164492 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |    .068946   .0848075     -.0972736    .2351656 
(7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0789416   .0854503     -.0885379     .246421 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(un=(4.27(5)34.75)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : un              =        4.27 
2._at        : un              =        9.27 
3._at        : un              =       14.27 
4._at        : un              =       19.27 
5._at        : un              =       24.27 
6._at        : un              =       29.27 
7._at        : un              =       34.27 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .0675096   .0599621     1.13   0.260    -.0500139    .1850331 
          2  |   .0187886   .0389626     0.48   0.630    -.0575768    .0951539 
          3  |  -.0117139   .0251068    -0.47   0.641    -.0609223    .0374945 
          4  |  -.0282291    .018515    -1.52   0.127    -.0645178    .0080596 
          5  |  -.0338424   .0168221    -2.01   0.044    -.0668131   -.0008716 
          6  |  -.0313315   .0172285    -1.82   0.069    -.0650987    .0024358 
          7  |  -.0242151   .0170558    -1.42   0.156    -.0576439    .0092138 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  540 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: un 
 
. margins r.CBA, at(un=(4.27(5)34.75)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish 
 
 
 
margins r.CBA, at(un=(4.27(5)34.75)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : un              =        4.27 
2._at        : un              =        9.27 
3._at        : un              =       14.27 
4._at        : un              =       19.27 
5._at        : un              =       24.27 
6._at        : un              =       29.27 
7._at        : un              =       34.27 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        4.21     0.0402 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        3.45     0.0634 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.96     0.0853 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.53     0.1120 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        2.10     0.1475 
(7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        1.74     0.1870 
            Joint  |          6      545.50     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
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(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   -.048721   .0237475     -.0952653   -.0021768 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0792235   .0426749     -.1628647    .0044177 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0957387   .0556312     -.2047739    .0132965 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   -.101352    .063777     -.2263525    .0236486 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   -.098841    .068237      -.232583    .0349009 
(7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0917247    .069507     -.2279559    .0445066 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
margins, dydx(CBA) at(lun=(4.21(5)34.97)) vsquish 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : lun             =        4.21 
2._at        : lun             =        9.21 
3._at        : lun             =       14.21 
4._at        : lun             =       19.21 
5._at        : lun             =       24.21 
6._at        : lun             =       29.21 
7._at        : lun             =       34.21 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.0612213   .0406891    -1.50   0.132    -.1409705     .018528 
          2  |  -.0736985   .0265711    -2.77   0.006    -.1257769     -.02162 
          3  |  -.0794044   .0098352    -8.07   0.000    -.0986811   -.0601278 
          4  |   -.073949   .0331959    -2.23   0.026    -.1390118   -.0088863 
          5  |  -.0544758   .0663135    -0.82   0.411    -.1844478    .0754962 
          6  |  -.0207376   .0979595    -0.21   0.832    -.2127347    .1712595 
          7  |   .0248721   .1270219     0.20   0.845    -.2240863    .2738304 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  542 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: lun 
 
. margins r.CBA, at(lun=(4.21(5)34.97)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish 
 
 
 
margins r.CBA, at(lun=(4.21(5)34.97)) contrast(atcontrast(r)) vsquish  
 
Contrasts of predictive margins 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
1._at        : lun             =        4.21 
2._at        : lun             =        9.21 
3._at        : lun             =       14.21 
4._at        : lun             =       19.21 
5._at        : lun             =       24.21 
6._at        : lun             =       29.21 
7._at        : lun             =       34.21 
 
------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |         df        chi2     P>chi2 
-------------------+---------------------------------- 
           _at#CBA | 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.69     0.4065 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.21     0.6459 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.03     0.8571 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.00     0.9480 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.09     0.7608 
(7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |          1        0.30     0.5862 
            Joint  |          5      162.48     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   |            Delta-method 
                   |   Contrast   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+------------------------------------------------ 
           _at#CBA | 
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 P
r(
E
s
a
g
re
e
=
1
,E
x
p
e
s
a
g
re
e
=
1
)
4.21 9.21 14.21 19.21 24.21 29.21 34.21
lun
Average Marginal Effects of 1.CBA with 95% CIs
  543 
(2 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0124772   .0150321     -.0419395    .0169851 
(3 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0181832   .0395708     -.0957405    .0593742 
(4 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |  -.0127278   .0706827     -.1512633    .1258077 
(5 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0067454   .1033577     -.1958319    .2093228 
(6 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0404837   .1329818     -.2201559    .3011232 
(7 vs 1) (1 vs 0)  |   .0860933   .1581646     -.2239036    .3960903 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Appendix 6.15: Subjective assessments of the economic situation in a 
country(SUR estimation (region used as cluster)) 
 
Appendix 6.15a: Subjective assessments – Estiomation of Equation 6.7 
(SUR estimation (region used as cluster)) – unweighted  
 
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) 
(ExpESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un 
i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 
spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu), vce(cluster 
h_region) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(67)   =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -38656.081                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.0939387   1.252844    -0.07   0.940    -2.549467     2.36159 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1933874   .0672376    -2.88   0.004    -.3251706   -.0616041 
          3  |  -.4967098   .0734953    -6.76   0.000    -.6407578   -.3526617 
          4  |  -.7816309   .0863562    -9.05   0.000    -.9508859   -.6123759 
          5  |  -1.080655   .0813016   -13.29   0.000    -1.240003   -.9213065 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000254    .000011    -2.32   0.020    -.0000469   -3.93e-06 
        gdpg |   .0674839   .0120569     5.60   0.000     .0438527     .091115 
       lgdpg |   .0522686   .0169905     3.08   0.002     .0189679    .0855693 
         inf |   .0215793   .0299885     0.72   0.472    -.0371972    .0803557 
        linf |  -.0927844   .0285565    -3.25   0.001     -.148754   -.0368147 
          un |  -.0778433   .0240877    -3.23   0.001    -.1250543   -.0306324 
         lun |   .0567817   .0223874     2.54   0.011     .0129033    .1006602 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .0916801    .100391     0.91   0.361    -.1050827    .2884429 
        1 3  |   .1735826   .1123297     1.55   0.122    -.0465796    .3937448 
        1 4  |   .1803468   .1345539     1.34   0.180    -.0833741    .4440677 
        1 5  |    .325337   .1232647     2.64   0.008     .0837427    .5669314 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000937   .0001445    -0.65   0.517     -.000377    .0001896 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0332722   .0560646    -0.59   0.553    -.1431568    .0766123 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
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          1  |  -.0468546   .0279775    -1.67   0.094    -.1016895    .0079803 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1342061   .1580792     0.85   0.396    -.1756235    .4440357 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.0878488   .1312803    -0.67   0.503    -.3451536    .1694559 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0145683   .0532533    -0.27   0.784    -.1189428    .0898062 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0152795   .0584602     0.26   0.794    -.0993004    .1298594 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0385482   .0244466    -1.58   0.115    -.0864626    .0093662 
     h_aged3 |  -.0727358   .0321817    -2.26   0.024    -.1358108   -.0096607 
    h_female |  -.0253912   .0189583    -1.34   0.180    -.0625487    .0117663 
  h_edu_high |   .0978325   .0543099     1.80   0.072    -.0086129     .204278 
h_edu_medium |   .0281025   .0432101     0.65   0.515    -.0565877    .1127928 
   h_retired |  -.0409382   .0384131    -1.07   0.287    -.1162265    .0343501 
   h_student |    .055946   .0429312     1.30   0.193    -.0281976    .1400896 
h_unemployed |  -.0376038   .0294695    -1.28   0.202     -.095363    .0201554 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0107848   .0454972    -0.24   0.813    -.0999575     .078388 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0481595   .0354837     1.36   0.175    -.0213872    .1177062 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1197827   .0373483     3.21   0.001     .0465814     .192984 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |     .74455   .0798972     9.32   0.000     .5879545    .9011456 
    fall2009 |   .7579144   .1262302     6.00   0.000     .5105077    1.005321 
  spring2010 |   .4080622   .0891309     4.58   0.000     .2333688    .5827555 
    fall2010 |    .075537   .0741736     1.02   0.308    -.0698406    .2209145 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .3696049   .1711011     2.16   0.031     .0342529    .7049569 
        ExYu |   .5335493   .1997304     2.67   0.008     .1420849    .9250138 
       _cons |  -.3339893   .1866906    -1.79   0.074    -.6998962    .0319176 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |   1.768284   1.026355     1.72   0.085    -.2433355    3.779904 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1447494   .0765913    -1.89   0.059    -.2948656    .0053668 
          3  |  -.4546894    .083817    -5.42   0.000    -.6189677   -.2904112 
          4  |  -.7658915   .0865565    -8.85   0.000    -.9355391   -.5962439 
          5  |  -1.006841   .0791888   -12.71   0.000    -1.162048   -.8516339 
             | 
       gdppc |  -1.37e-06   8.46e-06    -0.16   0.872     -.000018    .0000152 
        gdpg |    .051463   .0094852     5.43   0.000     .0328723    .0700537 
       lgdpg |  -.0144984   .0082885    -1.75   0.080    -.0307436    .0017468 
         inf |   .0253231   .0276541     0.92   0.360     -.028878    .0795242 
        linf |  -.0727604   .0260822    -2.79   0.005    -.1238806   -.0216403 
          un |   .0306104   .0297124     1.03   0.303    -.0276249    .0888457 
         lun |  -.0240526   .0264856    -0.91   0.364    -.0759635    .0278583 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0333383   .1195692    -0.28   0.780    -.2676897    .2010132 
        1 3  |   .0404658   .1142992     0.35   0.723    -.1835565    .2644881 
        1 4  |   .1018359   .1168111     0.87   0.383    -.1271097    .3307815 
        1 5  |     .04846   .1148247     0.42   0.673    -.1765922    .2735122 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |   -.000243   .0001197    -2.03   0.042    -.0004776   -8.39e-06 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0569014   .0460026     1.24   0.216    -.0332621    .1470649 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |   .0127098   .0207599     0.61   0.540    -.0279788    .0533984 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0792672     .12343    -0.64   0.521    -.3211855    .1626512 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .1042902   .0990008     1.05   0.292    -.0897478    .2983282 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0816272   .0451657    -1.81   0.071    -.1701503    .0068958 
             | 
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   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0341368   .0455886     0.75   0.454    -.0552152    .1234889 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0707196   .0232767    -3.04   0.002    -.1163412   -.0250981 
     h_aged3 |  -.0948035   .0329844    -2.87   0.004    -.1594517   -.0301553 
    h_female |  -.0006671   .0137877    -0.05   0.961    -.0276905    .0263562 
  h_edu_high |    .122323   .0325876     3.75   0.000     .0584524    .1861935 
h_edu_medium |   .0076858   .0258129     0.30   0.766    -.0429066    .0582782 
   h_retired |   .0410001    .026243     1.56   0.118    -.0104352    .0924354 
   h_student |   .1339003   .0419914     3.19   0.001     .0515988    .2162019 
h_unemployed |  -.0238648   .0259293    -0.92   0.357    -.0746853    .0269558 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1198922   .0362574     3.31   0.001     .0488291    .1909554 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1741856   .0213341     8.16   0.000     .1323716    .2159996 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2531831   .0302217     8.38   0.000     .1939497    .3124166 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5277808   .0715521     7.38   0.000     .3875412    .6680204 
    fall2009 |   .5324743   .0780413     6.82   0.000     .3795162    .6854324 
  spring2010 |   .2227363   .0594285     3.75   0.000     .1062587     .339214 
    fall2010 |   .0599323   .0500543     1.20   0.231    -.0381723     .158037 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1357343   .1039016     1.31   0.191    -.0679091    .3393778 
        ExYu |   .0514488   .1268875     0.41   0.685    -.1972461    .3001437 
       _cons |   .0268061   .1457478     0.18   0.854    -.2588544    .3124665 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .6547694   .0288692    22.68   0.000     .5981868    .7113521 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |    .574872   .0193286                      .5357581     .611524 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  514.407    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Marginal effects after biprobit 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 
               h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 
               h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 
               spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0840565   .0101568    -8.28   0.000    -.1039635   -.0641494 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0529719    .018186    -2.91   0.004    -.0886158   -.0173281 
          3  |  -.1275707   .0195207    -6.54   0.000    -.1658305   -.0893108 
          4  |  -.1816679    .020939    -8.68   0.000    -.2227075   -.1406282 
          5  |  -.2162407   .0203108   -10.65   0.000    -.2560492   -.1764322 
             | 
       gdppc |  -7.70e-06   4.12e-06    -1.87   0.062    -.0000158    3.71e-07 
        gdpg |   .0118509   .0023483     5.05   0.000     .0072483    .0164535 
       lgdpg |   .0058952   .0021965     2.68   0.007     .0015901    .0102003 
         inf |   .0067412   .0056088     1.20   0.229    -.0042519    .0177343 
        linf |  -.0180187   .0052575    -3.43   0.001    -.0283232   -.0077143 
          un |  -.0107389   .0040784    -2.63   0.008    -.0187324   -.0027455 
         lun |   .0076635   .0038306     2.00   0.045     .0001558    .0151713 
     h_aged2 |  -.0089037   .0040671    -2.19   0.029    -.0168752   -.0009323 
     h_aged3 |   -.014975   .0057012    -2.63   0.009    -.0261492   -.0038009 
    h_female |  -.0036957   .0029934    -1.23   0.217    -.0095627    .0021713 
  h_edu_high |   .0198968    .008619     2.31   0.021     .0030038    .0367898 
h_edu_medium |   .0044185   .0071804     0.62   0.538    -.0096548    .0184919 
   h_retired |  -.0039709   .0061221    -0.65   0.517      -.01597    .0080283 
   h_student |   .0143991   .0070147     2.05   0.040     .0006506    .0281476 
h_unemployed |   -.006554   .0050135    -1.31   0.191    -.0163803    .0032724 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0041075   .0075309     0.55   0.585    -.0106528    .0188677 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0151785   .0058762     2.58   0.010     .0036613    .0266958 
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    h_inc_d4 |   .0292463   .0063418     4.61   0.000     .0168167     .041676 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1323783   .0145969     9.07   0.000     .1037689    .1609876 
    fall2009 |   .1345286   .0213605     6.30   0.000     .0926629    .1763943 
  spring2010 |   .0694094    .015319     4.53   0.000     .0393848     .099434 
    fall2010 |   .0137319    .011522     1.19   0.233    -.0088508    .0363147 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0597496    .027881     2.14   0.032     .0051039    .1143953 
        ExYu |   .0794266   .0307199     2.59   0.010     .0192167    .1396365 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
Appendix 6.15b: Subjective assessments – Estiomation of Equation 6.7 
(SUR estimation (region used as cluster)) – weighted  
 
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) 
(ExpESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un 
i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 
spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) [pweight = 
weight], vce(cluster h_region) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(67)   =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -37435.157                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.0813144   1.312079    -0.06   0.951    -2.652942    2.490313 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1835807   .0711956    -2.58   0.010    -.3231216   -.0440398 
          3  |  -.4846145   .0755439    -6.42   0.000    -.6326778   -.3365513 
          4  |  -.7592442   .0876326    -8.66   0.000     -.931001   -.5874874 
          5  |  -1.068169    .083968   -12.72   0.000    -1.232743   -.9035947 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000265   .0000114    -2.32   0.020    -.0000489   -4.10e-06 
        gdpg |   .0675421   .0122778     5.50   0.000      .043478    .0916062 
       lgdpg |   .0530103   .0173001     3.06   0.002     .0191027     .086918 
         inf |   .0131946   .0308809     0.43   0.669    -.0473309    .0737201 
        linf |  -.0863672   .0303306    -2.85   0.004    -.1458141   -.0269202 
          un |  -.0693475     .02609    -2.66   0.008    -.1204829   -.0182121 
         lun |   .0503011   .0246554     2.04   0.041     .0019775    .0986247 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1023437   .1016792     1.01   0.314    -.0969438    .3016312 
        1 3  |   .1848917   .1109106     1.67   0.096    -.0324891    .4022725 
        1 4  |   .1376489   .1395508     0.99   0.324    -.1358657    .4111635 
        1 5  |   .3378396   .1234671     2.74   0.006     .0958485    .5798307 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000983   .0001518    -0.65   0.517    -.0003957    .0001992 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0356236   .0595859    -0.60   0.550    -.1524097    .0811626 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
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          1  |  -.0461451   .0280941    -1.64   0.100    -.1012086    .0089184 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1538337   .1608472     0.96   0.339     -.161421    .4690885 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.1046361   .1342144    -0.78   0.436    -.3676915    .1584193 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0175849   .0521555    -0.34   0.736    -.1198079     .084638 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0188023   .0571542     0.33   0.742    -.0932179    .1308225 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0338185   .0254004    -1.33   0.183    -.0836023    .0159654 
     h_aged3 |  -.0563513   .0322897    -1.75   0.081     -.119638    .0069354 
    h_female |  -.0237768   .0176309    -1.35   0.177    -.0583329    .0107792 
  h_edu_high |   .1201054   .0505143     2.38   0.017     .0210992    .2191116 
h_edu_medium |   .0415476   .0412567     1.01   0.314    -.0393141    .1224093 
   h_retired |  -.0705393   .0355889    -1.98   0.047    -.1402923   -.0007862 
   h_student |   .0649747   .0475452     1.37   0.172    -.0282122    .1581616 
h_unemployed |  -.0254136   .0313318    -0.81   0.417    -.0868229    .0359957 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0030182   .0470339     0.06   0.949    -.0891666     .095203 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0594578   .0361432     1.65   0.100    -.0113816    .1302971 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1217082   .0374894     3.25   0.001     .0482302    .1951861 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .7616047   .0853841     8.92   0.000     .5942549    .9289546 
    fall2009 |   .7979278    .121426     6.57   0.000     .5599371    1.035918 
  spring2010 |   .4298769   .0886764     4.85   0.000     .2560743    .6036796 
    fall2010 |   .0927391   .0695475     1.33   0.182    -.0435715    .2290496 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |    .410091   .1707413     2.40   0.016     .0754442    .7447377 
        ExYu |   .5404449   .2024105     2.67   0.008     .1437277    .9371621 
       _cons |  -.4307795   .2054549    -2.10   0.036    -.8334637   -.0280953 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |   1.466809   1.077306     1.36   0.173     -.644672     3.57829 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1555984   .0771756    -2.02   0.044    -.3068599   -.0043369 
          3  |  -.4613222   .0831979    -5.54   0.000    -.6243871   -.2982573 
          4  |  -.7680513   .0870018    -8.83   0.000    -.9385717   -.5975309 
          5  |  -1.023271   .0808946   -12.65   0.000    -1.181822   -.8647205 
             | 
       gdppc |  -2.05e-06   8.50e-06    -0.24   0.810    -.0000187    .0000146 
        gdpg |   .0501434    .009483     5.29   0.000     .0315572    .0687297 
       lgdpg |  -.0120658   .0084296    -1.43   0.152    -.0285876     .004456 
         inf |   .0223086   .0295347     0.76   0.450    -.0355783    .0801956 
        linf |  -.0682003   .0283087    -2.41   0.016    -.1236843   -.0127163 
          un |   .0350268   .0317199     1.10   0.269    -.0271431    .0971967 
         lun |  -.0263125   .0280836    -0.94   0.349    -.0813554    .0287305 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0056534   .1252283    -0.05   0.964    -.2510964    .2397895 
        1 3  |   .0653206   .1157788     0.56   0.573    -.1616017    .2922429 
        1 4  |   .1147825   .1186538     0.97   0.333    -.1177748    .3473397 
        1 5  |   .0700396   .1160028     0.60   0.546    -.1573217     .297401 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0002134   .0001255    -1.70   0.089    -.0004594    .0000327 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0502109   .0483779     1.04   0.299    -.0446079    .1450298 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |    .008615   .0208565     0.41   0.680     -.032263    .0494929 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0670055   .1332933    -0.50   0.615    -.3282556    .1942446 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .0961332   .1076461     0.89   0.372    -.1148493    .3071157 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0841303    .043336    -1.94   0.052    -.1690673    .0008066 
             | 
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   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0434161   .0434881     1.00   0.318    -.0418191    .1286513 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0657137   .0241908    -2.72   0.007    -.1131268   -.0183006 
     h_aged3 |  -.1048379   .0330659    -3.17   0.002    -.1696458   -.0400299 
    h_female |   .0023863   .0159919     0.15   0.881    -.0289573    .0337299 
  h_edu_high |   .1210229   .0339545     3.56   0.000     .0544733    .1875725 
h_edu_medium |    .007769   .0262368     0.30   0.767    -.0436541    .0591922 
   h_retired |   .0314658   .0279883     1.12   0.261    -.0233904    .0863219 
   h_student |   .1444603   .0437445     3.30   0.001     .0587225     .230198 
h_unemployed |  -.0195781   .0281214    -0.70   0.486     -.074695    .0355388 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1119978   .0345222     3.24   0.001     .0443355    .1796601 
    h_inc_d3 |     .16563   .0238803     6.94   0.000     .1188255    .2124345 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2489366   .0333536     7.46   0.000     .1835648    .3143085 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5194534   .0799731     6.50   0.000     .3627089    .6761978 
    fall2009 |   .5311858   .0825463     6.44   0.000     .3693982    .6929735 
  spring2010 |   .2297941   .0619744     3.71   0.000     .1083265    .3512616 
    fall2010 |   .0705984   .0543799     1.30   0.194    -.0359842     .177181 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1472248   .1079777     1.36   0.173    -.0644075    .3588571 
        ExYu |   .0147525   .1363619     0.11   0.914    -.2525119    .2820168 
       _cons |   .0084825    .153636     0.06   0.956    -.2926385    .3096035 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .6673776    .029976    22.26   0.000     .6086256    .7261296 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .5832522   .0197787                      .5431589    .6206918 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  495.672    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Marginal effects after biprobit 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 
               h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 
               h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 
               spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0818665   .0102024    -8.02   0.000    -.1018628   -.0618702 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0499753   .0184461    -2.71   0.007     -.086129   -.0138217 
          3  |  -.1231011   .0192749    -6.39   0.000    -.1608793    -.085323 
          4  |  -.1764173   .0206181    -8.56   0.000     -.216828   -.1360066 
          5  |  -.2112781   .0199858   -10.57   0.000    -.2504495   -.1721067 
             | 
       gdppc |  -7.75e-06   4.33e-06    -1.79   0.073    -.0000162    7.31e-07 
        gdpg |   .0115336    .002421     4.76   0.000     .0067885    .0162787 
       lgdpg |   .0060215   .0022291     2.70   0.007     .0016524    .0103905 
         inf |   .0059137   .0057968     1.02   0.308    -.0054477    .0172752 
        linf |  -.0171371   .0054936    -3.12   0.002    -.0279043   -.0063699 
          un |  -.0093233   .0043647    -2.14   0.033     -.017878   -.0007687 
         lun |    .006724   .0041802     1.61   0.108     -.001469    .0149169 
     h_aged2 |  -.0078689   .0041438    -1.90   0.058    -.0159905    .0002528 
     h_aged3 |  -.0128961   .0056564    -2.28   0.023    -.0239824   -.0018099 
    h_female |  -.0032836   .0027391    -1.20   0.231    -.0086521    .0020849 
  h_edu_high |   .0227459   .0078321     2.90   0.004     .0073953    .0380965 
h_edu_medium |   .0062903    .006741     0.93   0.351    -.0069219    .0195025 
   h_retired |  -.0086129   .0056455    -1.53   0.127    -.0196778     .002452 
   h_student |   .0159609   .0076927     2.07   0.038     .0008835    .0310383 
h_unemployed |  -.0045338    .005301    -0.86   0.392    -.0149235    .0058559 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0056144   .0076539     0.73   0.463    -.0093871    .0206158 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0161532   .0059706     2.71   0.007      .004451    .0278554 
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    h_inc_d4 |   .0288949   .0063144     4.58   0.000     .0165188    .0412709 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1327581   .0157048     8.45   0.000     .1019773    .1635389 
    fall2009 |   .1384861   .0209065     6.62   0.000     .0975101    .1794621 
  spring2010 |   .0719989   .0152103     4.73   0.000     .0421873    .1018106 
    fall2010 |   .0165057   .0106724     1.55   0.122    -.0044119    .0374233 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |    .065353   .0276063     2.37   0.018     .0112457    .1194604 
        ExYu |   .0778294   .0310239     2.51   0.012     .0170236    .1386352 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
Appendix 6.15c: Marginal effect of CBA conditional on the level of 
trust in government - after biprobit (SUR) region as cluster, 
weighted 
 
. margins, dydx(CBA) at(q22f_1=(1(1)5)) vsquish  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 
1._at        : q22f_1          =           1 
2._at        : q22f_1          =           2 
3._at        : q22f_1          =           3 
4._at        : q22f_1          =           4 
5._at        : q22f_1          =           5 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1.CBA        | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.1818534   .0304365    -5.97   0.000    -.2415078    -.122199 
          2  |  -.1407803   .0214429    -6.57   0.000    -.1828077   -.0987529 
          3  |  -.0889738   .0130735    -6.81   0.000    -.1145974   -.0633502 
          4  |  -.0603518   .0086702    -6.96   0.000    -.0773452   -.0433585 
          5  |  -.0295749   .0065103    -4.54   0.000    -.0423349   -.0168149 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: q22f_1 
 
 
.  
 
 
Appendix 6.16: Subjective assessments – Robustness check (SUR 
estimation (country used as cluster weighted))  
  
 
Appendix 6.16a: SUR (with peprceptions/expectations about the fin. 
stab. of country) 
 
 
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA i.q11_7 i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf 
i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 
spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU 
ExYu) (ExpESagree = i.CBA i.q11_7 i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) 
[pweight = weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      39970 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -36114.974                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |   .1544142   1.097663     0.14   0.888    -1.996965    2.305794 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |  -.0465114   .0442382    -1.05   0.293    -.1332168     .040194 
          3  |  -.2237367   .0484722    -4.62   0.000    -.3187405   -.1287329 
          4  |  -.3928741    .068916    -5.70   0.000     -.527947   -.2578012 
          5  |   -.491881   .0562325    -8.75   0.000    -.6020947   -.3816673 
          6  |   -.682095   .0683423    -9.98   0.000    -.8160434   -.5481466 
          8  |  -.4929967   .0586179    -8.41   0.000    -.6078857   -.3781077 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1757589   .1135554    -1.55   0.122    -.3983234    .0468057 
          3  |  -.4494719   .1108862    -4.05   0.000    -.6668049   -.2321389 
          4  |  -.7066106   .1530272    -4.62   0.000    -1.006538   -.4066827 
          5  |  -.9791683   .1497142    -6.54   0.000    -1.272603   -.6857339 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000275   .0000177    -1.56   0.120    -.0000621    7.14e-06 
        gdpg |   .0700218   .0194318     3.60   0.000     .0319361    .1081075 
       lgdpg |   .0481137   .0312665     1.54   0.124    -.0131676     .109395 
         inf |   .0249241   .0437918     0.57   0.569    -.0609063    .1107544 
        linf |  -.0920495   .0389634    -2.36   0.018    -.1684163   -.0156827 
          un |  -.0636624   .0284386    -2.24   0.025     -.119401   -.0079239 
         lun |   .0428495    .029267     1.46   0.143    -.0145126    .1002117 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1172668   .1523339     0.77   0.441    -.1813021    .4158356 
        1 3  |   .1959322   .1859281     1.05   0.292    -.1684802    .5603447 
        1 4  |   .1377933   .2445623     0.56   0.573    -.3415401    .6171266 
        1 5  |    .331557   .2006026     1.65   0.098    -.0616168    .7247308 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0001316   .0001151    -1.14   0.253    -.0003572    .0000939 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0390955   .0477898    -0.82   0.413    -.1327618    .0545709 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0376357   .0311245    -1.21   0.227    -.0986385    .0233672 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1448533   .1750001     0.83   0.408    -.1981406    .4878471 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.1065401   .1557467    -0.68   0.494    -.4117981    .1987178 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0232533   .0493989    -0.47   0.638    -.1200734    .0735668 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0242069   .0667793     0.36   0.717    -.1066782    .1550921 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0337726   .0290089    -1.16   0.244     -.090629    .0230839 
     h_aged3 |  -.0633796   .0394149    -1.61   0.108    -.1406314    .0138723 
    h_female |  -.0150875   .0188216    -0.80   0.423    -.0519772    .0218023 
  h_edu_high |   .0796964   .0759597     1.05   0.294    -.0691819    .2285747 
h_edu_medium |   .0195348   .0589988     0.33   0.741    -.0961008    .1351703 
   h_retired |  -.0620543   .0357979    -1.73   0.083    -.1322168    .0081082 
   h_student |   .0764199   .0565827     1.35   0.177    -.0344802      .18732 
h_unemployed |  -.0165192   .0417889    -0.40   0.693    -.0984239    .0653856 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0029748   .0464195     0.06   0.949    -.0880057    .0939553 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0360871   .0379972     0.95   0.342    -.0383861    .1105603 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0827186   .0253676     3.26   0.001      .032999    .1324382 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .7840244   .1293858     6.06   0.000     .5304329    1.037616 
    fall2009 |   .8272965   .1353677     6.11   0.000     .5619806    1.092612 
  spring2010 |   .4407506   .1492194     2.95   0.003     .1482859    .7332153 
    fall2010 |   .0971935   .1245279     0.78   0.435    -.1468766    .3412637 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .4501265   .1864638     2.41   0.016     .0846642    .8155888 
        ExYu |   .5398108   .2725944     1.98   0.048     .0055357    1.074086 
       _cons |  -.1936744   .2697992    -0.72   0.473    -.7224711    .3351224 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |   1.812919   .6233813     2.91   0.004     .5911145    3.034724 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |  -.0941128   .0525655    -1.79   0.073    -.1971392    .0089136 
          3  |   -.301125   .0547341    -5.50   0.000     -.408402   -.1938481 
          4  |  -.5472021   .0709902    -7.71   0.000    -.6863403   -.4080639 
          5  |  -.6263997   .0818443    -7.65   0.000    -.7868117   -.4659878 
          6  |  -.6872733     .08061    -8.53   0.000    -.8452661   -.5292805 
          8  |  -.6785404   .0782045    -8.68   0.000    -.8318184   -.5252624 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1559645   .1194936    -1.31   0.192    -.3901676    .0782386 
          3  |  -.4368566   .1466541    -2.98   0.003    -.7242933     -.14942 
          4  |  -.7265158   .1477463    -4.92   0.000    -1.016093   -.4369385 
          5  |  -.9444108   .1417958    -6.66   0.000    -1.222326   -.6664962 
             | 
       gdppc |  -3.52e-06   .0000145    -0.24   0.808     -.000032    .0000249 
        gdpg |   .0512198   .0084849     6.04   0.000     .0345896      .06785 
       lgdpg |  -.0156935   .0121154    -1.30   0.195    -.0394393    .0080523 
         inf |   .0334569   .0458027     0.73   0.465    -.0563148    .1232285 
        linf |   -.068762    .034807    -1.98   0.048    -.1369824   -.0005416 
          un |   .0511563   .0425439     1.20   0.229    -.0322283    .1345409 
         lun |   -.044644   .0384074    -1.16   0.245    -.1199212    .0306332 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .0256265   .1175464     0.22   0.827    -.2047603    .2560133 
        1 3  |   .0906518   .1468487     0.62   0.537    -.1971663    .3784699 
        1 4  |   .1354479     .16012     0.85   0.398    -.1783815    .4492774 
        1 5  |     .08483    .185469     0.46   0.647    -.2786826    .4483425 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0002627   .0000767    -3.42   0.001    -.0004131   -.0001123 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0590862   .0256623     2.30   0.021      .008789    .1093833 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |     .01844   .0144983     1.27   0.203    -.0099762    .0468561 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.1134563   .0957244    -1.19   0.236    -.3010726    .0741601 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |    .123245   .0841898     1.46   0.143     -.041764    .2882539 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0944517   .0142892    -6.61   0.000     -.122458   -.0664453 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0515095   .0223653     2.30   0.021     .0076744    .0953446 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0736684   .0330666    -2.23   0.026    -.1384778   -.0088591 
     h_aged3 |  -.1150697   .0393074    -2.93   0.003    -.1921108   -.0380286 
    h_female |   .0154243   .0164267     0.94   0.348    -.0167716    .0476201 
  h_edu_high |    .068159   .0513734     1.33   0.185     -.032531     .168849 
h_edu_medium |  -.0167283   .0368666    -0.45   0.650    -.0889855    .0555289 
   h_retired |   .0471759   .0279349     1.69   0.091    -.0075755    .1019273 
   h_student |   .1592117   .0379082     4.20   0.000      .084913    .2335104 
h_unemployed |  -.0092597   .0322585    -0.29   0.774    -.0724851    .0539658 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1239819   .0454602     2.73   0.006     .0348815    .2130822 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1465609   .0238269     6.15   0.000     .0998609    .1932608 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2148013   .0370724     5.79   0.000     .1421408    .2874618 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5386393   .0892219     6.04   0.000     .3637676     .713511 
    fall2009 |   .5638787    .090571     6.23   0.000     .3863628    .7413947 
  spring2010 |   .2339405   .0457647     5.11   0.000     .1442434    .3236375 
    fall2010 |   .0984916   .0825811     1.19   0.233    -.0633643    .2603475 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .2023327   .0950962     2.13   0.033     .0159476    .3887179 
        ExYu |   .0235969   .1628609     0.14   0.885    -.2956045    .3427984 
       _cons |    .337212   .2476796     1.36   0.173    -.1482312    .8226551 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .6412994   .0532155    12.05   0.000     .5369988    .7455999 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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         rho |   .5657836   .0361806                      .4907128    .6325166 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  145.226    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      39970 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q11_7 3.q11_7 4.q11_7 5.q11_7 6.q11_7 8.q11_7 2.q22f_1 
3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 
spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0807687   .0124343    -6.50   0.000    -.1051394    -.056398 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |  -.0139002   .0095116    -1.46   0.144    -.0325425    .0047421 
          3  |  -.0544248   .0111533    -4.88   0.000    -.0762848   -.0325647 
          4  |   -.088723   .0140704    -6.31   0.000    -.1163005   -.0611454 
          5  |  -.1031062   .0121889    -8.46   0.000     -.126996   -.0792163 
          6  |  -.1234991    .012853    -9.61   0.000    -.1486905   -.0983076 
          8  |  -.1052968   .0131382    -8.01   0.000    -.1310472   -.0795463 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0447741   .0290895    -1.54   0.124    -.1017886    .0122404 
          3  |  -.1084718   .0306453    -3.54   0.000    -.1685355   -.0484081 
          4  |  -.1578457   .0357847    -4.41   0.000    -.2279825    -.087709 
          5  |  -.1889213   .0358357    -5.27   0.000     -.259158   -.1186846 
             | 
       gdppc |  -9.00e-06   3.07e-06    -2.94   0.003     -.000015   -2.99e-06 
        gdpg |   .0117595   .0030406     3.87   0.000        .0058    .0177189 
       lgdpg |   .0053614   .0037617     1.43   0.154    -.0020113    .0127341 
         inf |   .0074522   .0061531     1.21   0.226    -.0046077     .019512 
        linf |  -.0175774   .0060519    -2.90   0.004     -.029439   -.0057159 
          un |  -.0079014   .0044346    -1.78   0.075    -.0165931    .0007902 
         lun |   .0049576    .004671     1.06   0.289    -.0041973    .0141126 
     h_aged2 |  -.0081025     .00537    -1.51   0.131    -.0186276    .0024225 
     h_aged3 |  -.0141548   .0071086    -1.99   0.046    -.0280874   -.0002222 
    h_female |  -.0014285    .002624    -0.54   0.586    -.0065715    .0037145 
  h_edu_high |   .0143293    .012059     1.19   0.235    -.0093059    .0379645 
h_edu_medium |   .0019966   .0097451     0.20   0.838    -.0171034    .0210965 
   h_retired |  -.0066127   .0054436    -1.21   0.224     -.017282    .0040566 
   h_student |    .017995   .0085785     2.10   0.036     .0011814    .0348086 
h_unemployed |  -.0027494   .0066707    -0.41   0.680    -.0158237    .0103248 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0060401   .0072268     0.84   0.403    -.0081241    .0202043 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0117335   .0061029     1.92   0.055     -.000228    .0236949 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0214034   .0045409     4.71   0.000     .0125033    .0303035 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1349878   .0189421     7.13   0.000      .097862    .1721136 
    fall2009 |   .1422346   .0203821     6.98   0.000     .1022865    .1821827 
  spring2010 |   .0727635   .0238312     3.05   0.002     .0260551    .1194719 
    fall2010 |    .018172   .0180758     1.01   0.315    -.0172559    .0535999 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0726529   .0267319     2.72   0.007     .0202594    .1250463 
        ExYu |   .0771981   .0314543     2.45   0.014     .0155487    .1388474 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 6.16b: SUR (with peprceptions/expectations about the fin. 
stability of a country financial situation of a household) 
 
 
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA i.q11_7 i.q1_15 i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf 
linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf 
i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 
spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU 
ExYu) (ExpESagree = i.CBA i.q11_7 i.q1_19 i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf 
un lun CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf 
i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 
spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU 
ExYu) [pweight = weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      39970 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -34203.631                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.1520624   .9837009    -0.15   0.877    -2.080081    1.775956 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |    -.02873   .0476476    -0.60   0.547    -.1221175    .0646576 
          3  |  -.1545973   .0465852    -3.32   0.001    -.2459027   -.0632919 
          4  |  -.2779233   .0654515    -4.25   0.000    -.4062059   -.1496407 
          5  |  -.3558385   .0625037    -5.69   0.000    -.4783435   -.2333335 
          6  |  -.4922696   .0602984    -8.16   0.000    -.6104524   -.3740868 
          8  |  -.3362193   .0537945    -6.25   0.000    -.4416547   -.2307839 
             | 
       q1_15 | 
          2  |  -.0553798   .0617069    -0.90   0.369    -.1763231    .0655635 
          3  |  -.2770282   .0811622    -3.41   0.001    -.4361032   -.1179531 
          4  |  -.6316818   .1066597    -5.92   0.000    -.8407309   -.4226326 
          5  |  -.8145978   .0928597    -8.77   0.000    -.9965995   -.6325962 
          6  |  -1.098572   .1149829    -9.55   0.000    -1.323935     -.87321 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1736488   .1084165    -1.60   0.109    -.3861412    .0388436 
          3  |  -.4212887   .1043778    -4.04   0.000    -.6258655   -.2167119 
          4  |  -.6610554   .1436401    -4.60   0.000    -.9425848    -.379526 
          5  |  -.9014311   .1424219    -6.33   0.000    -1.180573   -.6222892 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000221   .0000151    -1.47   0.142    -.0000517    7.43e-06 
        gdpg |   .0536944   .0157783     3.40   0.001     .0227695    .0846194 
       lgdpg |   .0512756   .0285378     1.80   0.072    -.0046574    .1072086 
         inf |   .0092604   .0396722     0.23   0.815    -.0684957    .0870164 
        linf |  -.0651006   .0341711    -1.91   0.057    -.1320748    .0018735 
          un |  -.0394455   .0297812    -1.32   0.185    -.0978156    .0189245 
         lun |   .0226835   .0304169     0.75   0.456    -.0369326    .0822995 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1466195   .1737006     0.84   0.399    -.1938274    .4870664 
        1 3  |   .2028699    .212207     0.96   0.339    -.2130481    .6187879 
        1 4  |   .1412054    .262629     0.54   0.591    -.3735379    .6559487 
        1 5  |    .318604   .2201637     1.45   0.148     -.112909     .750117 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000797   .0001044    -0.76   0.445    -.0002843    .0001249 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
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          1  |  -.0481084   .0486374    -0.99   0.323     -.143436    .0472193 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0365886   .0281136    -1.30   0.193    -.0916903    .0185131 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1612807    .173886     0.93   0.354    -.1795295    .5020909 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.1399554   .1564709    -0.89   0.371    -.4466327    .1667219 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0313068   .0467105    -0.67   0.503    -.1228577    .0602441 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0381451   .0604623     0.63   0.528    -.0803588    .1566489 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0049769   .0292533    -0.17   0.865    -.0623123    .0523584 
     h_aged3 |  -.0294567   .0405984    -0.73   0.468     -.109028    .0501146 
    h_female |  -.0189161   .0184043    -1.03   0.304    -.0549879    .0171557 
  h_edu_high |   .0039003   .0645757     0.06   0.952    -.1226658    .1304664 
h_edu_medium |  -.0115074   .0541267    -0.21   0.832    -.1175937     .094579 
   h_retired |  -.0353782   .0287802    -1.23   0.219    -.0917864      .02103 
   h_student |   .0466227   .0591498     0.79   0.431    -.0693088    .1625542 
h_unemployed |   .0447296   .0326045     1.37   0.170    -.0191741    .1086332 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0994695   .0521576    -1.91   0.057    -.2016966    .0027575 
    h_inc_d3 |  -.0294131   .0380971    -0.77   0.440     -.104082    .0452558 
    h_inc_d4 |  -.0617243   .0290752    -2.12   0.034    -.1187108   -.0047379 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .6050469   .1248855     4.84   0.000     .3602758    .8498181 
    fall2009 |   .6588362   .1205954     5.46   0.000     .4224736    .8951987 
  spring2010 |   .4209644   .1380082     3.05   0.002     .1504734    .6914554 
    fall2010 |   .1060336   .1124205     0.94   0.346    -.1143065    .3263737 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |    .375276   .1475771     2.54   0.011     .0860302    .6645219 
        ExYu |   .4353452   .2226044     1.96   0.051    -.0009515    .8716419 
       _cons |   .2506427   .2491495     1.01   0.314    -.2376814    .7389667 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |    1.95127   .7002705     2.79   0.005     .5787655    3.323776 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |   -.096872   .0480908    -2.01   0.044    -.1911282   -.0026158 
          3  |  -.2706846   .0514646    -5.26   0.000    -.3715534   -.1698158 
          4  |  -.4690208   .0670074    -7.00   0.000    -.6003529   -.3376887 
          5  |  -.5077971   .0746689    -6.80   0.000    -.6541455   -.3614488 
          6  |  -.5467712    .070426    -7.76   0.000    -.6848037   -.4087387 
          8  |  -.5515888    .072827    -7.57   0.000    -.6943271   -.4088505 
             | 
       q1_19 | 
          2  |   .0365802   .0443279     0.83   0.409    -.0503009    .1234614 
          3  |   -.107519   .0414414    -2.59   0.009    -.1887426   -.0262955 
          4  |  -.5722645   .0395419   -14.47   0.000    -.6497652   -.4947637 
          5  |  -.8093817   .0600572   -13.48   0.000    -.9270917   -.6916718 
          6  |  -1.029151   .0682891   -15.07   0.000    -1.162995   -.8953065 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1252155   .1195193    -1.05   0.295    -.3594691    .1090381 
          3  |  -.3583385   .1415783    -2.53   0.011    -.6358269   -.0808502 
          4  |  -.6200489   .1386685    -4.47   0.000    -.8918342   -.3482635 
          5  |  -.8055048   .1349871    -5.97   0.000    -1.070075   -.5409349 
             | 
       gdppc |   .0000143   .0000184     0.78   0.437    -.0000218    .0000504 
        gdpg |   .0387282    .008598     4.50   0.000     .0218763      .05558 
       lgdpg |  -.0194126   .0125687    -1.54   0.122    -.0440468    .0052217 
         inf |   .0277417   .0397477     0.70   0.485    -.0501622    .1056457 
        linf |  -.0422456   .0249794    -1.69   0.091    -.0912044    .0067132 
          un |   .0998336   .0486402     2.05   0.040     .0045006    .1951666 
         lun |  -.0841439   .0424628    -1.98   0.048    -.1673696   -.0009183 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0325263   .1154851    -0.28   0.778    -.2588729    .1938204 
        1 3  |   .0131179   .1377567     0.10   0.924    -.2568802    .2831159 
        1 4  |   .0435243   .1556898     0.28   0.780    -.2616221    .3486707 
        1 5  |   .0145816   .1674684     0.09   0.931    -.3136504    .3428135 
             | 
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 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |    -.00025   .0000873    -2.86   0.004    -.0004211   -.0000789 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0837947   .0288821     2.90   0.004     .0271867    .1404026 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |   .0275129   .0170577     1.61   0.107    -.0059195    .0609454 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.1772083   .1156104    -1.53   0.125    -.4038005     .049384 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .1665561   .1007165     1.65   0.098    -.0308446    .3639568 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.1126915   .0191067    -5.90   0.000    -.1501399   -.0752431 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0662842   .0248332     2.67   0.008     .0176121    .1149563 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0246121   .0370814    -0.66   0.507    -.0972903    .0480662 
     h_aged3 |  -.0229294    .042397    -0.54   0.589     -.106026    .0601672 
    h_female |    .022447   .0155183     1.45   0.148    -.0079684    .0528624 
  h_edu_high |   .0176508    .046142     0.38   0.702    -.0727859    .1080875 
h_edu_medium |  -.0457273   .0307056    -1.49   0.136    -.1059091    .0144545 
   h_retired |   .0991414    .030323     3.27   0.001     .0397094    .1585733 
   h_student |   .1176668   .0355125     3.31   0.001     .0480636    .1872701 
h_unemployed |   .0184153   .0339238     0.54   0.587    -.0480742    .0849047 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0561855   .0380301     1.48   0.140    -.0183522    .1307232 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1073541     .02077     5.17   0.000     .0666456    .1480626 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1310351   .0337248     3.89   0.000     .0649356    .1971345 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .4057003   .0886031     4.58   0.000     .2320415    .5793591 
    fall2009 |     .44267   .0797663     5.55   0.000      .286331     .599009 
  spring2010 |   .2052799   .0419681     4.89   0.000      .123024    .2875358 
    fall2010 |   .1618184    .089841     1.80   0.072    -.0142667    .3379035 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1077225    .123189     0.87   0.382    -.1337235    .3491685 
        ExYu |  -.1727395   .2271256    -0.76   0.447    -.6178976    .2724186 
       _cons |   .3902073   .3120597     1.25   0.211    -.2214184    1.001833 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .5376547   .0494761    10.87   0.000     .4406833     .634626 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .4912106   .0375381                      .4142107    .5612294 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  118.091    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      39970 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q11_7 3.q11_7 4.q11_7 5.q11_7 6.q11_7 8.q11_7 2.q1_15 3.q1_15 
4.q1_15 5.q1_15 6.q1_15 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf 
un lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 2.q1_19 3.q1_19 4.q1_19 5.q1_19 6.q1_19 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0733105   .0089496    -8.19   0.000    -.0908515   -.0557695 
             | 
       q11_7 | 
          2  |  -.0094121   .0082297    -1.14   0.253    -.0255419    .0067178 
          3  |   -.036096   .0082454    -4.38   0.000    -.0522566   -.0199353 
          4  |  -.0602145    .010363    -5.81   0.000    -.0805256   -.0399034 
          5  |  -.0701235   .0092437    -7.59   0.000    -.0882407   -.0520062 
          6  |  -.0847133   .0087122    -9.72   0.000    -.1017889   -.0676378 
          8  |  -.0699509   .0092032    -7.60   0.000    -.0879889   -.0519129 
             | 
       q1_15 | 
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          2  |  -.0086552   .0097412    -0.89   0.374    -.0277476    .0104371 
          3  |  -.0424625   .0130444    -3.26   0.001    -.0680291   -.0168959 
          4  |  -.0909231   .0164796    -5.52   0.000    -.1232225   -.0586238 
          5  |  -.1119814   .0146423    -7.65   0.000    -.1406798    -.083283 
          6  |   -.138537   .0155009    -8.94   0.000    -.1689183   -.1081557 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0369557   .0250901    -1.47   0.141    -.0861314      .01222 
          3  |  -.0877597   .0263516    -3.33   0.001     -.139408   -.0361115 
          4  |  -.1296362   .0302154    -4.29   0.000    -.1888573   -.0704152 
          5  |  -.1553521    .030426    -5.11   0.000    -.2149858   -.0957183 
             | 
       gdppc |  -5.57e-06   2.79e-06    -2.00   0.046     -.000011   -1.07e-07 
        gdpg |   .0081927   .0022445     3.65   0.000     .0037936    .0125919 
       lgdpg |   .0050812   .0029836     1.70   0.089    -.0007666     .010929 
         inf |   .0043317   .0056736     0.76   0.445    -.0067884    .0154518 
        linf |  -.0116998   .0052028    -2.25   0.025    -.0218971   -.0015025 
          un |  -.0019338   .0043386    -0.45   0.656    -.0104373    .0065698 
         lun |   .0003179   .0046034     0.07   0.945    -.0087045    .0093404 
     h_aged2 |  -.0017393    .004844    -0.36   0.720    -.0112333    .0077547 
     h_aged3 |  -.0047585   .0065313    -0.73   0.466    -.0175597    .0080427 
    h_female |  -.0013793   .0022031    -0.63   0.531    -.0056973    .0029388 
  h_edu_high |   .0012892   .0094159     0.14   0.891    -.0171657    .0197441 
h_edu_medium |  -.0035173    .008045    -0.44   0.662    -.0192853    .0122507 
   h_retired |  -1.62e-06   .0041029    -0.00   1.000    -.0080433      .00804 
   h_student |   .0112017    .007898     1.42   0.156    -.0042781    .0266815 
h_unemployed |   .0064859   .0049151     1.32   0.187    -.0031475    .0161194 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0100424   .0064945    -1.55   0.122    -.0227714    .0026866 
    h_inc_d3 |    .001123   .0053403     0.21   0.833    -.0093438    .0115897 
    h_inc_d4 |  -.0018942   .0042938    -0.44   0.659      -.01031    .0065215 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .0947967   .0176186     5.38   0.000     .0602648    .1293286 
    fall2009 |   .1032649    .016641     6.21   0.000     .0706492    .1358807 
  spring2010 |    .062483   .0190822     3.27   0.001     .0250825    .0998835 
    fall2010 |   .0207046   .0142792     1.45   0.147    -.0072821    .0486913 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0523064   .0171571     3.05   0.002     .0186791    .0859337 
        ExYu |    .047252   .0188233     2.51   0.012     .0103591     .084145 
             | 
       q1_19 | 
          2  |   .0012276   .0014847     0.83   0.408    -.0016823    .0041375 
          3  |  -.0039216   .0014477    -2.71   0.007    -.0067591   -.0010842 
          4  |  -.0260858   .0021262   -12.27   0.000     -.030253   -.0219186 
          5  |  -.0400489   .0036369   -11.01   0.000     -.047177   -.0329208 
          6  |  -.0538146    .004028   -13.36   0.000    -.0617094   -.0459199 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
Appendix 6.16c: SUR (Semi-annual macroeconomic data instead of 
quarterly (country as a cluster) 
 
 
. *with samiannual 
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc sagdpg sainf saun i.CBA#i.q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.sagdpg i.CBA#c.sainf i.CBA#c.saun h_aged2 h_aged3 
h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 
h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) (ExpESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc sagdpg sainf 
saun i.CBA#i.q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.sagdpg i.CBA#c.sainf i.CBA#c.saun 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) [pweight = weight], 
vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      46943 
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                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -44107.109                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |   .4850851   1.517036     0.32   0.749    -2.488251    3.458421 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1924566   .1247761    -1.54   0.123    -.4370132       .0521 
          3  |  -.4980603   .1238231    -4.02   0.000     -.740749   -.2553716 
          4  |  -.7476508   .1742412    -4.29   0.000    -1.089157   -.4061444 
          5  |  -1.058127   .1606086    -6.59   0.000    -1.372914   -.7433397 
          8  |  -.6756066   .1349833    -5.01   0.000     -.940169   -.4110441 
          9  |  -.3933069   .1595948    -2.46   0.014    -.7061068   -.0805069 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000257   .0000162    -1.58   0.114    -.0000575    6.13e-06 
      sagdpg |   .1104907   .0330365     3.34   0.001     .0457403    .1752411 
       sainf |  -.0739961    .028746    -2.57   0.010    -.1303373   -.0176549 
        saun |  -.0162531    .012851    -1.26   0.206    -.0414406    .0089344 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .0804692   .1619766     0.50   0.619    -.2369991    .3979375 
        1 3  |   .1894933   .1841924     1.03   0.304    -.1715171    .5505037 
        1 4  |    .140461   .2555431     0.55   0.583    -.3603943    .6413162 
        1 5  |   .3348885   .1916877     1.75   0.081    -.0408125    .7105896 
        1 8  |   .7369746   .2631085     2.80   0.005     .2212915    1.252658 
        1 9  |   .1274537   .3493869     0.36   0.715    -.5573321    .8122395 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0001265   .0001512    -0.84   0.403    -.0004228    .0001699 
             | 
CBA#c.sagdpg | 
          1  |  -.0214902   .0226874    -0.95   0.344    -.0659567    .0229763 
             | 
 CBA#c.sainf | 
          1  |  -.0090728   .0310732    -0.29   0.770    -.0699752    .0518295 
             | 
  CBA#c.saun | 
          1  |  -.0159739   .0258727    -0.62   0.537    -.0666835    .0347356 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0468915   .0287165    -1.63   0.102    -.1031749    .0093918 
     h_aged3 |  -.0792976   .0445098    -1.78   0.075    -.1665351      .00794 
    h_female |  -.0236856    .014774    -1.60   0.109    -.0526421    .0052709 
  h_edu_high |   .0872418    .061164     1.43   0.154    -.0326375    .2071211 
h_edu_medium |   .0109913   .0519866     0.21   0.833    -.0909007    .1128832 
   h_retired |  -.0510175   .0449317    -1.14   0.256    -.1390819     .037047 
   h_student |   .1112822   .0578165     1.92   0.054    -.0020362    .2246005 
h_unemployed |  -.0027833   .0433381    -0.06   0.949    -.0877245    .0821579 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0140408   .0402533    -0.35   0.727    -.0929357    .0648542 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0647854   .0414079     1.56   0.118    -.0163727    .1459434 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1340585   .0284226     4.72   0.000     .0783513    .1897657 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .6277682   .1428561     4.39   0.000     .3477754    .9077609 
    fall2009 |   .6780951   .1870201     3.63   0.000     .3115423    1.044648 
  spring2010 |    .336058   .1584717     2.12   0.034     .0254592    .6466569 
    fall2010 |   .1556302   .0974324     1.60   0.110    -.0353337    .3465942 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .3354602   .1790581     1.87   0.061    -.0154873    .6864076 
        ExYu |   .4176772   .2808134     1.49   0.137    -.1327071    .9680614 
       _cons |  -.3658572   .2420076    -1.51   0.131    -.8401834     .108469 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |   1.050494   .9646246     1.09   0.276    -.8401351    2.941124 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1575553    .129619    -1.22   0.224    -.4116037    .0964932 
          3  |  -.4638736    .151031    -3.07   0.002    -.7598889   -.1678583 
          4  |  -.7628214   .1579837    -4.83   0.000    -1.072464    -.453179 
          5  |  -1.026688   .1443854    -7.11   0.000    -1.309679   -.7436983 
          8  |  -.7127662   .1560734    -4.57   0.000    -1.018665   -.4068679 
          9  |  -.6460577    .136873    -4.72   0.000    -.9143239   -.3777916 
             | 
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       gdppc |  -2.46e-06   .0000131    -0.19   0.851    -.0000282    .0000233 
      sagdpg |   .0283869   .0117702     2.41   0.016     .0053178     .051456 
       sainf |  -.0456076   .0139266    -3.27   0.001    -.0729032   -.0183119 
        saun |   .0081032   .0078252     1.04   0.300    -.0072339    .0234404 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .0257085   .1327313     0.19   0.846      -.23444    .2858571 
        1 3  |   .0951469   .1628554     0.58   0.559    -.2240438    .4143376 
        1 4  |   .1368712   .1803777     0.76   0.448    -.2166625    .4904049 
        1 5  |   .0998462   .2215163     0.45   0.652    -.3343178    .5340102 
        1 8  |   .2474875   .1997444     1.24   0.215    -.1440042    .6389793 
        1 9  |   .3427923   .3651045     0.94   0.348    -.3727994    1.058384 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0001534   .0001086    -1.41   0.158    -.0003663    .0000595 
             | 
CBA#c.sagdpg | 
          1  |   .0156733   .0227404     0.69   0.491    -.0288971    .0602437 
             | 
 CBA#c.sainf | 
          1  |   .0004253    .027532     0.02   0.988    -.0535364    .0543871 
             | 
  CBA#c.saun | 
          1  |  -.0324155   .0194814    -1.66   0.096    -.0705984    .0057674 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0748153   .0330042    -2.27   0.023    -.1395023   -.0101284 
     h_aged3 |  -.1171265   .0433681    -2.70   0.007    -.2021265   -.0321265 
    h_female |  -.0099938   .0164758    -0.61   0.544    -.0422857    .0222981 
  h_edu_high |   .1063401   .0472278     2.25   0.024     .0137754    .1989048 
h_edu_medium |  -.0076289   .0374782    -0.20   0.839    -.0810849    .0658271 
   h_retired |    .031766   .0307227     1.03   0.301    -.0284493    .0919812 
   h_student |   .1779555   .0346399     5.14   0.000     .1100626    .2458483 
h_unemployed |  -.0065881   .0298336    -0.22   0.825    -.0650609    .0518846 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0964881   .0398768     2.42   0.016      .018331    .1746452 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1691396   .0231845     7.30   0.000     .1236988    .2145804 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2495905   .0391256     6.38   0.000     .1729058    .3262752 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .3302846   .0659485     5.01   0.000     .2010279    .4595413 
    fall2009 |   .3801239   .0607004     6.26   0.000     .2611532    .4990946 
  spring2010 |   .2070716   .0540348     3.83   0.000     .1011653    .3129779 
    fall2010 |   .0596824   .0552054     1.08   0.280    -.0485182     .167883 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1126538   .1018009     1.11   0.268    -.0868723      .31218 
        ExYu |  -.0332062   .1528895    -0.22   0.828    -.3328641    .2664516 
       _cons |   .1463411   .2492888     0.59   0.557     -.342256    .6349382 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .6749724   .0519107    13.00   0.000     .5732293    .7767155 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .5882412   .0339482                       .517727    .6508175 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  169.067    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      46943 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 8.q22f_1 9.q22f_1 gdppc 
sagdpg sainf saun 
               h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed 
               h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 
               spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0825686   .0113451    -7.28   0.000    -.1048046   -.0603327 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0533748   .0344267    -1.55   0.121    -.1208499    .0141002 
          3  |  -.1272763   .0360319    -3.53   0.000    -.1978975   -.0566552 
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          4  |  -.1778841   .0425142    -4.18   0.000    -.2612104   -.0945579 
          5  |  -.2145547   .0410014    -5.23   0.000    -.2949159   -.1341935 
          8  |  -.1503883   .0379742    -3.96   0.000    -.2248163   -.0759603 
          9  |   -.120905   .0367084    -3.29   0.001    -.1928522   -.0489578 
             | 
       gdppc |  -7.97e-06   3.99e-06    -2.00   0.046    -.0000158   -1.46e-07 
      sagdpg |   .0170776   .0049627     3.44   0.001     .0073509    .0268043 
       sainf |  -.0131493   .0031815    -4.13   0.000     -.019385   -.0069137 
        saun |  -.0026086   .0016575    -1.57   0.116    -.0058573    .0006401 
     h_aged2 |  -.0103647   .0054258    -1.91   0.056     -.020999    .0002696 
     h_aged3 |  -.0170851   .0081443    -2.10   0.036    -.0330477   -.0011226 
    h_female |  -.0039259   .0021294    -1.84   0.065    -.0080993    .0002476 
  h_edu_high |   .0177358   .0102091     1.74   0.082    -.0022737    .0377453 
h_edu_medium |   .0012439   .0090305     0.14   0.890    -.0164555    .0189433 
   h_retired |  -.0059454   .0075092    -0.79   0.429    -.0206632    .0087724 
   h_student |   .0246165   .0090544     2.72   0.007     .0068703    .0423627 
h_unemployed |  -.0007164   .0072198    -0.10   0.921    -.0148669    .0134342 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0024975   .0066573     0.38   0.708    -.0105505    .0155456 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0174186    .006941     2.51   0.012     .0038146    .0310227 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0313137   .0055366     5.66   0.000     .0204622    .0421652 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1071329   .0206143     5.20   0.000     .0667297    .1475362 
    fall2009 |   .1168221   .0285709     4.09   0.000     .0608241    .1728202 
  spring2010 |   .0587763   .0261185     2.25   0.024      .007585    .1099677 
    fall2010 |   .0255136   .0153913     1.66   0.097    -.0046528    .0556799 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |    .054241   .0280776     1.93   0.053      -.00079     .109272 
        ExYu |   .0593624   .0369713     1.61   0.108       -.0131    .1318248 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
Appendix 6.16d: SUR (large dataset; trust in govrenment variable 
excluded) 
.  
. generate EU=0 
 
. replace EU=1 if country==4 | country==6 | country==7 | country==10 | 
country==11 
(34925 real changes made) 
 
.  
. generate ExYu=0 
 
. replace ExYu=1 if country==2 | country==3 | country==5 | country==8 
(27317 real changes made) 
 
.  
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun i.CBA#c.gdppc 
i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) (ExpESagree = i.CBA gdppc 
gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg 
i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 
h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 
spring2011 EU ExYu) [pweight = weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      69540 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -68976.912                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |   .3230513   .6748362     0.48   0.632    -.9996033    1.645706 
       gdppc |   .0000175   .0000145     1.21   0.226    -.0000108    .0000458 
        gdpg |   .0609695    .011313     5.39   0.000     .0387964    .0831426 
       lgdpg |   .0773295   .0247174     3.13   0.002     .0288843    .1257747 
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         inf |   .0444308   .0482019     0.92   0.357    -.0500432    .1389048 
        linf |  -.0820098   .0389017    -2.11   0.035    -.1582558   -.0057638 
          un |  -.0363613    .020406    -1.78   0.075    -.0763562    .0036337 
         lun |   .0394456   .0228982     1.72   0.085    -.0054342    .0843253 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000346   .0000662    -0.52   0.601    -.0001644    .0000951 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0438725   .0169048    -2.60   0.009    -.0770054   -.0107397 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0456315   .0204798    -2.23   0.026    -.0857711   -.0054919 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .0323852   .0428293     0.76   0.450    -.0515587    .1163291 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.0535471   .0475234    -1.13   0.260    -.1466913    .0395971 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0103551    .025538    -0.41   0.685    -.0604086    .0396984 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |  -.0005205   .0251521    -0.02   0.983    -.0498177    .0487767 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0632679   .0230333    -2.75   0.006    -.1084123   -.0181235 
     h_aged3 |  -.0726609   .0440095    -1.65   0.099    -.1589179    .0135961 
    h_female |  -.0069546   .0206698    -0.34   0.737    -.0474667    .0335576 
  h_edu_high |   .1758221   .0534595     3.29   0.001     .0710435    .2806007 
h_edu_medium |   .0602424   .0457131     1.32   0.188    -.0293536    .1498385 
   h_retired |  -.0320623   .0347539    -0.92   0.356    -.1001788    .0360541 
   h_student |   .0547223   .0443765     1.23   0.218     -.032254    .1416987 
h_unemployed |  -.0382679   .0331504    -1.15   0.248    -.1032416    .0267057 
    h_inc_d1 |    .020354   .0407612     0.50   0.618    -.0595365    .1002446 
    h_inc_d3 |    .091128   .0364521     2.50   0.012     .0196831    .1625729 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1410363   .0390573     3.61   0.000     .0644854    .2175872 
  spring2008 |  -.1437447   .1610413    -0.89   0.372    -.4593798    .1718905 
    fall2008 |  -.1127657   .1689643    -0.67   0.505    -.4439297    .2183983 
  spring2009 |   .6769159   .1305004     5.19   0.000     .4211397    .9326921 
    fall2009 |   .8655046   .2311431     3.74   0.000     .4124725    1.318537 
  spring2010 |   .4920515   .1368972     3.59   0.000     .2237378    .7603651 
    fall2010 |   .1440123   .0790338     1.82   0.068     -.010891    .2989157 
  spring2011 |  -.0853101   .1262675    -0.68   0.499    -.3327898    .1621696 
          EU |   .1521179   .1956914     0.78   0.437    -.2314301    .5356659 
        ExYu |   .1705624   .2471597     0.69   0.490    -.3138617    .6549864 
       _cons |  -1.669059   .1874445    -8.90   0.000    -2.036443   -1.301674 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |   .4274507   .3059433     1.40   0.162    -.1721871    1.027089 
       gdppc |  -4.33e-06   6.42e-06    -0.67   0.500    -.0000169    8.26e-06 
        gdpg |   .0548651   .0134355     4.08   0.000     .0285319    .0811982 
       lgdpg |   .0072638   .0088638     0.82   0.413     -.010109    .0246366 
         inf |   .0223325   .0336745     0.66   0.507    -.0436682    .0883333 
        linf |  -.0619043   .0288608    -2.14   0.032    -.1184704   -.0053382 
          un |  -.0246605   .0238779    -1.03   0.302    -.0714603    .0221394 
         lun |   .0320967    .023616     1.36   0.174    -.0141898    .0783833 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000467   .0000364    -1.28   0.200     -.000118    .0000247 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |    -.02981   .0129549    -2.30   0.021    -.0552012   -.0044188 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |   .0093996   .0146513     0.64   0.521    -.0193164    .0381155 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0163402    .039789    -0.41   0.681    -.0943253    .0616448 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.0064674   .0450122    -0.14   0.886    -.0946898     .081755 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |   .0315683   .0122664     2.57   0.010     .0075265      .05561 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
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          1  |  -.0541712    .014103    -3.84   0.000    -.0818127   -.0265298 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0861097   .0291112    -2.96   0.003    -.1431666   -.0290529 
     h_aged3 |  -.0930957   .0497509    -1.87   0.061    -.1906056    .0044142 
    h_female |   .0067644   .0168468     0.40   0.688    -.0262547    .0397836 
  h_edu_high |   .1757704   .0334324     5.26   0.000     .1102442    .2412966 
h_edu_medium |    .036093   .0269249     1.34   0.180    -.0166789     .088865 
   h_retired |   .0033406    .031128     0.11   0.915    -.0576691    .0643504 
   h_student |   .1342767   .0347919     3.86   0.000     .0660858    .2024677 
h_unemployed |   -.080341   .0305464    -2.63   0.009     -.140211   -.0204711 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0675206   .0360117     1.87   0.061    -.0030611    .1381023 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1612331   .0282673     5.70   0.000     .1058303    .2166359 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2344869   .0333191     7.04   0.000     .1691827    .2997912 
  spring2008 |   .0202557   .1242649     0.16   0.871    -.2232991    .2638104 
    fall2008 |   -.041388   .1143738    -0.36   0.717    -.2655566    .1827806 
  spring2009 |   .4660043   .1206812     3.86   0.000     .2294736    .7025351 
    fall2009 |   .5641897   .1385925     4.07   0.000     .2925533     .835826 
  spring2010 |   .2677478    .119732     2.24   0.025     .0330774    .5024183 
    fall2010 |    .004991   .1051216     0.05   0.962    -.2010436    .2110256 
  spring2011 |  -.0962644   .0921134    -1.05   0.296    -.2768033    .0842745 
          EU |   .2551145   .0545893     4.67   0.000     .1481214    .3621076 
        ExYu |   .1485295   .0584215     2.54   0.011     .0340254    .2630336 
       _cons |  -.6183298    .173079    -3.57   0.000    -.9575583   -.2791013 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .7735342    .036155    21.39   0.000     .7026717    .8443968 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .6489798   .0209274                      .6060608    .6881309 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =  457.743    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      69540 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female 
h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
               h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 
               spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0967493   .0286505    -3.38   0.001    -.1529033   -.0405953 
       gdppc |   1.33e-06   3.29e-06     0.40   0.687    -5.13e-06    7.78e-06 
        gdpg |   .0118074   .0020787     5.68   0.000     .0077333    .0158816 
       lgdpg |   .0120086   .0035404     3.39   0.001     .0050695    .0189477 
         inf |   .0093236   .0081959     1.14   0.255      -.00674    .0253872 
        linf |  -.0185455   .0065182    -2.85   0.004    -.0313209   -.0057701 
          un |  -.0074254   .0030401    -2.44   0.015    -.0133839   -.0014669 
         lun |    .007892   .0035957     2.19   0.028     .0008445    .0149394 
     h_aged2 |  -.0154019   .0052595    -2.93   0.003    -.0257103   -.0050935 
     h_aged3 |  -.0173519    .009961    -1.74   0.082    -.0368751    .0021713 
    h_female |  -.0007508   .0041074    -0.18   0.855    -.0088012    .0072996 
  h_edu_high |   .0391139   .0099387     3.94   0.000     .0196344    .0585934 
h_edu_medium |   .0120008   .0087308     1.37   0.169    -.0051112    .0291128 
   h_retired |   -.005078   .0071692    -0.71   0.479    -.0191294    .0089735 
   h_student |    .016793   .0083703     2.01   0.045     .0003875    .0331985 
h_unemployed |  -.0109563   .0070264    -1.56   0.119    -.0247279    .0028152 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0072665   .0079046     0.92   0.358    -.0082263    .0227593 
    h_inc_d3 |    .024344   .0075955     3.21   0.001     .0094572    .0392308 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0368029   .0078158     4.71   0.000     .0214842    .0521215 
  spring2008 |  -.0224596   .0324795    -0.69   0.489    -.0861184    .0411991 
    fall2008 |  -.0209444   .0326644    -0.64   0.521    -.0849655    .0430767 
  spring2009 |   .1383563      .0216     6.41   0.000     .0960211    .1806915 
    fall2009 |   .1750654   .0383886     4.56   0.000     .0998252    .2503057 
  spring2010 |   .0964502   .0251719     3.83   0.000     .0471142    .1457863 
    fall2010 |   .0239693    .015484     1.55   0.122    -.0063788    .0543174 
  spring2011 |  -.0196157   .0235512    -0.83   0.405    -.0657753    .0265438 
          EU |   .0398225   .0353403     1.13   0.260    -.0294432    .1090881 
        ExYu |   .0366677   .0414749     0.88   0.377    -.0446216    .1179569 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
  563 
 
Appendix 6.16e: SUR (without interaction terms) 
 
 
. biprobit (ESagree = i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu) (ExpESagree = i.CBA 
i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inflinf un lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high 
h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 
spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU 
ExYu) [pweight = weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Seemingly unrelated bivariate probit              Number of obs   =      39970 
                                                  Wald chi2(6)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -36778.608                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ESagree      | 
       1.CBA |  -.3604046   .0832703    -4.33   0.000    -.5236114   -.1971977 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1607931   .1069597    -1.50   0.133    -.3704302     .048844 
          3  |  -.4499396   .1065291    -4.22   0.000    -.6587329   -.2411464 
          4  |  -.7277317   .1430519    -5.09   0.000    -1.008108   -.4473552 
          5  |  -.9924866   .1428234    -6.95   0.000    -1.272415    -.712558 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000275   .0000207    -1.33   0.185    -.0000681    .0000131 
        gdpg |   .0714228   .0199492     3.58   0.000     .0323231    .1105225 
       lgdpg |   .0439408   .0186283     2.36   0.018       .00743    .0804516 
         inf |  -.0112575   .0459026    -0.25   0.806    -.1012249    .0787099 
        linf |  -.0620738   .0388355    -1.60   0.110      -.13819    .0140423 
          un |   -.051128   .0350309    -1.46   0.144    -.1197874    .0175313 
         lun |   .0328467   .0362353     0.91   0.365    -.0381732    .1038667 
     h_aged2 |   -.034135   .0285047    -1.20   0.231    -.0900032    .0217332 
     h_aged3 |  -.0611878   .0399508    -1.53   0.126    -.1394898    .0171143 
    h_female |  -.0220066   .0189605    -1.16   0.246    -.0591685    .0151552 
  h_edu_high |   .1182564   .0740654     1.60   0.110    -.0269092     .263422 
h_edu_medium |   .0340926   .0566372     0.60   0.547    -.0769143    .1450995 
   h_retired |  -.0756958   .0377122    -2.01   0.045    -.1496103   -.0017814 
   h_student |   .0638665   .0581384     1.10   0.272    -.0500828    .1778157 
h_unemployed |  -.0275756   .0452603    -0.61   0.542    -.1162842     .061133 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0066037   .0480164    -0.14   0.891    -.1007141    .0875067 
    h_inc_d3 |    .049142   .0381362     1.29   0.198    -.0256036    .1238875 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1062814   .0263306     4.04   0.000     .0546744    .1578884 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .7635746   .1249571     6.11   0.000     .5186631    1.008486 
    fall2009 |   .8117251   .1511758     5.37   0.000      .515426    1.108024 
  spring2010 |   .4386554   .1397555     3.14   0.002     .1647396    .7125711 
    fall2010 |   .1345271   .1204429     1.12   0.264    -.1015367    .3705909 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .3868562   .2095316     1.85   0.065    -.0238182    .7975305 
        ExYu |   .4826099   .3027416     1.59   0.111    -.1107527    1.075972 
       _cons |  -.4503718   .3128697    -1.44   0.150    -1.063585    .1628416 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ExpESagree   | 
       1.CBA |  -.2794196   .0944549    -2.96   0.003    -.4645478   -.0942914 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1694278   .1048986    -1.62   0.106    -.3750253    .0361696 
          3  |  -.4688665    .124472    -3.77   0.000    -.7128272   -.2249059 
          4  |  -.7677041   .1276139    -6.02   0.000    -1.017823   -.5175854 
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          5  |  -1.019928   .1215659    -8.39   0.000    -1.258193   -.7816631 
             | 
       gdppc |  -3.52e-06   .0000159    -0.22   0.825    -.0000347    .0000276 
        gdpg |   .0372219   .0092767     4.01   0.000     .0190399    .0554038 
       lgdpg |   .0033771   .0105703     0.32   0.749    -.0173403    .0240945 
         inf |    .008195    .045145     0.18   0.856    -.0802876    .0966776 
        linf |  -.0409841   .0367834    -1.11   0.265    -.1130782      .03111 
          un |   .0260437   .0400858     0.65   0.516    -.0525231    .1046105 
         lun |  -.0200711   .0358229    -0.56   0.575    -.0902826    .0501405 
     h_aged2 |  -.0692563    .033073    -2.09   0.036    -.1340783   -.0044344 
     h_aged3 |  -.1081874   .0389704    -2.78   0.006     -.184568   -.0318068 
    h_female |   .0052444   .0166692     0.31   0.753    -.0274266    .0379154 
  h_edu_high |   .1203898   .0490952     2.45   0.014      .024165    .2166146 
h_edu_medium |   .0031809   .0350573     0.09   0.928    -.0655301    .0718919 
   h_retired |   .0225218     .02602     0.87   0.387    -.0284765      .07352 
   h_student |     .14185   .0376559     3.77   0.000     .0680457    .2156543 
h_unemployed |  -.0233756   .0333848    -0.70   0.484    -.0888086    .0420575 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1071295   .0474088     2.26   0.024     .0142099     .200049 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1636228   .0248537     6.58   0.000     .1149105    .2123351 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2394056   .0401861     5.96   0.000     .1606422     .318169 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .4523603   .0914784     4.94   0.000     .2730659    .6316547 
    fall2009 |   .4914643   .1125304     4.37   0.000     .2709089    .7120197 
  spring2010 |   .2328489   .0550078     4.23   0.000     .1250355    .3406623 
    fall2010 |   .0801262   .0779256     1.03   0.304     -.072605    .2328575 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1491864   .1258423     1.19   0.236      -.09746    .3958328 
        ExYu |  -.0001684   .1718339    -0.00   0.999    -.3369566    .3366198 
       _cons |   .0459747   .2715678     0.17   0.866    -.4862885    .5782378 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     /athrho |   .6634994   .0529445    12.53   0.000       .55973    .7672687 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .5806875   .0350917                      .5077771    .6453384 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Wald test of rho=0:                 chi2(1) =   157.05    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      39970 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree=1,ExpESagree=1), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0580669   .0114917    -5.05   0.000    -.0805902   -.0355435 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0497464    .033889    -1.47   0.142    -.1161676    .0166747 
          3  |  -.1236915   .0352366    -3.51   0.000     -.192754   -.0546289 
          4  |  -.1764183   .0408244    -4.32   0.000    -.2564328   -.0964039 
          5  |  -.2100096   .0409045    -5.13   0.000     -.290181   -.1298382 
             | 
       gdppc |  -4.11e-06   2.54e-06    -1.62   0.106    -9.09e-06    8.71e-07 
        gdpg |   .0119835   .0032195     3.72   0.000     .0056733    .0182937 
       lgdpg |   .0064663   .0027003     2.39   0.017     .0011739    .0117587 
         inf |  -.0012361   .0064358    -0.19   0.848      -.01385    .0113778 
        linf |  -.0108157   .0064733    -1.67   0.095    -.0235031    .0018716 
          un |  -.0061326   .0057715    -1.06   0.288    -.0174446    .0051793 
         lun |   .0037848   .0060828     0.62   0.534    -.0081372    .0157068 
     h_aged2 |  -.0081163    .005432    -1.49   0.135    -.0187629    .0025303 
     h_aged3 |   -.013808   .0074215    -1.86   0.063    -.0283538    .0007379 
    h_female |  -.0029165   .0027254    -1.07   0.285    -.0082582    .0024251 
  h_edu_high |    .022569   .0117148     1.93   0.054    -.0003916    .0455296 
h_edu_medium |   .0050431     .00945     0.53   0.594    -.0134786    .0235647 
   h_retired |  -.0098238   .0057424    -1.71   0.087    -.0210786     .001431 
   h_student |   .0157552   .0089786     1.75   0.079    -.0018426     .033353 
h_unemployed |  -.0050447   .0074047    -0.68   0.496    -.0195576    .0094682 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0040246   .0076919     0.52   0.601    -.0110512    .0191004 
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    h_inc_d3 |   .0146516   .0063968     2.29   0.022     .0021141    .0271891 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0263741   .0052426     5.03   0.000     .0160987    .0366494 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1306408   .0181919     7.18   0.000     .0949854    .1662962 
    fall2009 |     .13937   .0241901     5.76   0.000     .0919582    .1867817 
  spring2010 |   .0737957   .0231027     3.19   0.001     .0285153    .1190761 
    fall2010 |   .0230363   .0187669     1.23   0.220    -.0137462    .0598188 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0624743   .0308578     2.02   0.043      .001994    .1229545 
        ExYu |   .0692908   .0380818     1.82   0.069    -.0053481    .1439297 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
Appendix 6.17: Subjective assessments - Single equations - 
Perceptions about economic situation in a country (country as a 
cluster)   
  
Appendix 6.17a: Subjective assessments - Single equation - 
Perceptions about economic situation in a country (country as a 
cluster), unweighted and weighted  
 
. **with trust in government and interactions; controlled for group dummies 
(EU and ExYu) 
. probit ESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un 
i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3  h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 
spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu, vce(cluster 
country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -15384.869                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1266 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     ESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   -.095989   1.137832    -0.08   0.933    -2.326098     2.13412 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.2058163   .1203126    -1.71   0.087    -.4416247    .0299921 
          3  |  -.5025882   .1197214    -4.20   0.000    -.7372377   -.2679386 
          4  |  -.7856292   .1652838    -4.75   0.000     -1.10958   -.4616789 
          5  |  -1.085066   .1579536    -6.87   0.000    -1.394649   -.7754823 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000285   .0000204    -1.39   0.163    -.0000685    .0000115 
        gdpg |   .0703399   .0218462     3.22   0.001     .0275221    .1131578 
       lgdpg |    .056306   .0325195     1.73   0.083    -.0074311    .1200431 
         inf |   .0189342   .0437553     0.43   0.665    -.0668246     .104693 
        linf |  -.0886961   .0341788    -2.60   0.009    -.1556852   -.0217069 
          un |  -.0926051     .03017    -3.07   0.002    -.1517372   -.0334729 
         lun |   .0682598   .0292681     2.33   0.020     .0108955    .1256242 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .0878657   .1620743     0.54   0.588    -.2297941    .4055256 
        1 3  |   .1690795   .2084812     0.81   0.417    -.2395361    .5776952 
        1 4  |    .173777   .2484106     0.70   0.484    -.3130989    .6606528 
        1 5  |   .3431324   .2070592     1.66   0.097    -.0626962    .7489609 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000924   .0001176    -0.79   0.432    -.0003228    .0001381 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0458023   .0494897    -0.93   0.355    -.1428004    .0511958 
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             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0483161   .0350753    -1.38   0.168    -.1170625    .0204303 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1530653   .1897935     0.81   0.420    -.2189231    .5250537 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.1118962   .1653132    -0.68   0.498    -.4359041    .2121116 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0069534   .0523672    -0.13   0.894    -.1095912    .0956844 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0082925   .0710106     0.12   0.907    -.1308857    .1474708 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0436536   .0278716    -1.57   0.117    -.0982809    .0109736 
     h_aged3 |  -.0740553   .0429716    -1.72   0.085    -.1582782    .0101675 
    h_female |  -.0276321   .0149333    -1.85   0.064    -.0569008    .0016366 
  h_edu_high |   .0858167   .0838598     1.02   0.306    -.0785455    .2501789 
h_edu_medium |   .0190583   .0623159     0.31   0.760    -.1030786    .1411951 
   h_retired |  -.0410111   .0536627    -0.76   0.445    -.1461881    .0641658 
   h_student |   .0466245   .0511638     0.91   0.362    -.0536546    .1469036 
h_unemployed |  -.0371475    .046627    -0.80   0.426    -.1285349    .0542398 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0244587   .0513707    -0.48   0.634    -.1251434     .076226 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0463902   .0385488     1.20   0.229    -.0291642    .1219445 
    h_inc_d4 |    .118223   .0281371     4.20   0.000     .0630753    .1733707 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .7390459    .128094     5.77   0.000     .4879862    .9901056 
    fall2009 |   .7534122   .1462741     5.15   0.000     .4667202    1.040104 
  spring2010 |   .4359496   .1619743     2.69   0.007     .1184858    .7534133 
    fall2010 |    .067209   .1363799     0.49   0.622    -.2000907    .3345086 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |    .398559   .2043824     1.95   0.051    -.0020231    .7991412 
        ExYu |   .6026106   .3134964     1.92   0.055    -.0118311    1.217052 
       _cons |  -.2800597   .3067428    -0.91   0.361    -.8812644    .3211451 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0961481   .0126898    -7.58   0.000    -.1210196   -.0712765 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0596066   .0336362    -1.77   0.076    -.1255324    .0063193 
          3  |  -.1352757   .0355204    -3.81   0.000    -.2048944   -.0656571 
          4  |  -.1940064   .0437023    -4.44   0.000    -.2796612   -.1083515 
          5  |  -.2353001    .042192    -5.58   0.000    -.3179949   -.1526053 
             | 
       gdppc |  -9.17e-06   4.81e-06    -1.90   0.057    -.0000186    2.66e-07 
        gdpg |    .013038   .0046884     2.78   0.005     .0038489    .0222272 
       lgdpg |    .010028   .0055054     1.82   0.069    -.0007624    .0208185 
         inf |   .0093112   .0074569     1.25   0.212     -.005304    .0239264 
        linf |  -.0223914   .0068846    -3.25   0.001    -.0358849   -.0088978 
          un |  -.0195241   .0049218    -3.97   0.000    -.0291706   -.0098777 
         lun |   .0145025   .0043166     3.36   0.001     .0060421    .0229629 
     h_aged2 |  -.0090886   .0057778    -1.57   0.116    -.0204128    .0022356 
     h_aged3 |  -.0154182    .009032    -1.71   0.088    -.0331205    .0022842 
    h_female |   -.005753   .0031127    -1.85   0.065    -.0118538    .0003479 
  h_edu_high |   .0178669   .0173564     1.03   0.303     -.016151    .0518848 
h_edu_medium |   .0039679   .0129477     0.31   0.759    -.0214091    .0293449 
   h_retired |  -.0085385   .0111467    -0.77   0.444    -.0303856    .0133087 
   h_student |   .0097071    .010766     0.90   0.367    -.0113939    .0308082 
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h_unemployed |  -.0077341   .0096856    -0.80   0.425    -.0267175    .0112494 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0050923   .0106487    -0.48   0.633    -.0259633    .0157788 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0096584   .0080719     1.20   0.231    -.0061624    .0254791 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0246138   .0062243     3.95   0.000     .0124144    .0368132 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1538681   .0247116     6.23   0.000     .1054343    .2023019 
    fall2009 |   .1568592   .0289602     5.42   0.000     .1000983    .2136201 
  spring2010 |    .090764   .0352505     2.57   0.010     .0216743    .1598536 
    fall2010 |   .0139928    .028649     0.49   0.625    -.0421582    .0701438 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0829793   .0428412     1.94   0.053    -.0009878    .1669465 
        ExYu |   .1254625   .0631999     1.99   0.047      .001593    .2493321 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
. probit ESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un 
i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 
spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu [pweight = 
weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -14865.717                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1276 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     ESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0574936   1.145192    -0.05   0.960    -2.302029    2.187042 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1965323    .121788    -1.61   0.107    -.4352324    .0421678 
          3  |  -.4898408   .1186708    -4.13   0.000    -.7224313   -.2572504 
          4  |  -.7622636   .1634706    -4.66   0.000     -1.08266   -.4418672 
          5  |  -1.070521   .1570058    -6.82   0.000    -1.378247    -.762795 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000293   .0000209    -1.40   0.161    -.0000703    .0000117 
        gdpg |   .0710486   .0213166     3.33   0.001     .0292689    .1128283 
       lgdpg |    .056462   .0335151     1.68   0.092    -.0092265    .1221505 
         inf |   .0107269   .0496344     0.22   0.829    -.0865548    .1080085 
        linf |  -.0820572   .0394599    -2.08   0.038    -.1593971   -.0047172 
          un |  -.0843601   .0301353    -2.80   0.005    -.1434242    -.025296 
         lun |   .0619836   .0302604     2.05   0.041     .0026744    .1212929 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1001737   .1548983     0.65   0.518    -.2034213    .4037687 
        1 3  |     .17934   .1981966     0.90   0.366    -.2091182    .5677982 
        1 4  |     .12819   .2594812     0.49   0.621    -.3803838    .6367639 
        1 5  |   .3553745    .197757     1.80   0.072    -.0322221     .742971 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000993   .0001196    -0.83   0.406    -.0003337    .0001351 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0487551   .0535585    -0.91   0.363    -.1537279    .0562177 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0467484   .0345349    -1.35   0.176    -.1144356    .0209388 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1730873   .1963833     0.88   0.378    -.2118169    .5579916 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.1300101   .1726961    -0.75   0.452    -.4684882     .208468 
             | 
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    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0101282   .0522681    -0.19   0.846    -.1125718    .0923155 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0115107   .0708774     0.16   0.871    -.1274065    .1504279 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0401163   .0271062    -1.48   0.139    -.0932435    .0130108 
     h_aged3 |  -.0554025   .0410449    -1.35   0.177    -.1358491     .025044 
    h_female |  -.0280654   .0178092    -1.58   0.115    -.0629709      .00684 
  h_edu_high |   .1103671   .0763332     1.45   0.148    -.0392432    .2599774 
h_edu_medium |   .0332574   .0592729     0.56   0.575    -.0829153    .1494301 
   h_retired |  -.0723894   .0414008    -1.75   0.080    -.1535335    .0087547 
   h_student |   .0546859   .0603628     0.91   0.365    -.0636229    .1729948 
h_unemployed |  -.0229488   .0486117    -0.47   0.637    -.1182259    .0723283 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0120356   .0469279    -0.26   0.798    -.1040127    .0799415 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0568039   .0381286     1.49   0.136    -.0179268    .1315346 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1177731   .0279758     4.21   0.000     .0629417    .1726046 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .7590503   .1340593     5.66   0.000     .4962989    1.021802 
    fall2009 |   .7971931   .1392404     5.73   0.000     .5242869    1.070099 
  spring2010 |   .4606127   .1562883     2.95   0.003     .1542932    .7669322 
    fall2010 |   .0846217   .1366048     0.62   0.536    -.1831187    .3523621 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .4372395   .2017855     2.17   0.030     .0417471    .8327319 
        ExYu |   .6112134   .3105738     1.97   0.049        .0025    1.219927 
       _cons |  -.3818205    .317191    -1.20   0.229    -1.003503    .2398624 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0947886   .0126258    -7.51   0.000    -.1195347   -.0700425 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0553019   .0333255    -1.66   0.097    -.1206186    .0100149 
          3  |  -.1293352   .0345602    -3.74   0.000     -.197072   -.0615983 
          4  |  -.1871685   .0428705    -4.37   0.000    -.2711931   -.1031439 
          5  |  -.2279306   .0413407    -5.51   0.000    -.3089569   -.1469042 
             | 
       gdppc |  -9.53e-06   4.99e-06    -1.91   0.056    -.0000193    2.52e-07 
        gdpg |   .0128841   .0046445     2.77   0.006     .0037809    .0219872 
       lgdpg |   .0099563     .00564     1.77   0.078    -.0010979    .0210105 
         inf |   .0083183   .0087065     0.96   0.339    -.0087462    .0253827 
        linf |  -.0214608    .007865    -2.73   0.006    -.0368759   -.0060457 
          un |  -.0177003    .004909    -3.61   0.000    -.0273217   -.0080789 
         lun |    .013149   .0046076     2.85   0.004     .0041183    .0221797 
     h_aged2 |   -.008247   .0055669    -1.48   0.138    -.0191579    .0026638 
     h_aged3 |  -.0113895   .0084907    -1.34   0.180     -.028031    .0052519 
    h_female |  -.0057696   .0036802    -1.57   0.117    -.0129826    .0014433 
  h_edu_high |    .022689   .0154771     1.47   0.143    -.0076456    .0530236 
h_edu_medium |    .006837    .012131     0.56   0.573    -.0169394    .0306133 
   h_retired |  -.0148817   .0085059    -1.75   0.080     -.031553    .0017897 
   h_student |   .0112422   .0125456     0.90   0.370    -.0133467    .0358311 
h_unemployed |  -.0047178   .0099801    -0.47   0.636    -.0242783    .0148428 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0024743   .0096265    -0.26   0.797    -.0213418    .0163933 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0116776   .0078997     1.48   0.139    -.0038054    .0271607 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0242115   .0061014     3.97   0.000      .012253      .03617 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1560439   .0256385     6.09   0.000     .1057934    .2062944 
    fall2009 |   .1638852   .0268989     6.09   0.000     .1111643    .2166061 
  spring2010 |   .0946918   .0338752     2.80   0.005     .0282975     .161086 
    fall2010 |   .0173963    .028405     0.61   0.540    -.0382764    .0730691 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
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          EU |   .0898868   .0417957     2.15   0.032     .0079686    .1718049 
        ExYu |   .1256519   .0615976     2.04   0.041     .0049229    .2463809 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
 
Appendix 6.17b Subjective assessments - Single equation – 
*Perceptions about economic situation in a country (region as 
cluster), unweighted and weighted  
 
. **with trust in government and interactions; controlled for group dummies 
(EU and ExYu) 
. probit ESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un 
i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3  h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 
spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu, vce(cluster 
h_region) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(40)   =    3149.77 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -15384.869                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1266 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     ESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   -.095989   1.308138    -0.07   0.942    -2.659893    2.467915 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.2058163   .0660267    -3.12   0.002    -.3352262   -.0764064 
          3  |  -.5025882   .0719346    -6.99   0.000    -.6435773    -.361599 
          4  |  -.7856292   .0855292    -9.19   0.000    -.9532634   -.6179951 
          5  |  -1.085066   .0793783   -13.67   0.000    -1.240644    -.929487 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000285   .0000116    -2.46   0.014    -.0000512   -5.80e-06 
        gdpg |   .0703399   .0129019     5.45   0.000     .0450527    .0956272 
       lgdpg |    .056306   .0181793     3.10   0.002     .0206752    .0919368 
         inf |   .0189342   .0304633     0.62   0.534    -.0407728    .0786412 
        linf |  -.0886961   .0280016    -3.17   0.002    -.1435783   -.0338139 
          un |  -.0926051   .0244225    -3.79   0.000    -.1404723   -.0447378 
         lun |   .0682598   .0217753     3.13   0.002      .025581    .1109387 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .0878657   .1010178     0.87   0.384    -.1101256    .2858571 
        1 3  |   .1690795   .1122181     1.51   0.132     -.050864    .3890231 
        1 4  |    .173777   .1347471     1.29   0.197    -.0903225    .4378764 
        1 5  |   .3431324   .1219251     2.81   0.005     .1041636    .5821011 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000924   .0001485    -0.62   0.534    -.0003835    .0001988 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0458023   .0611966    -0.75   0.454    -.1657454    .0741408 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0483161   .0291407    -1.66   0.097    -.1054307    .0087986 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1530653   .1734378     0.88   0.377    -.1868666    .4929971 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.1118962   .1445257    -0.77   0.439    -.3951615     .171369 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0069534   .0555826    -0.13   0.900    -.1158932    .1019864 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
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          1  |   .0082925   .0596545     0.14   0.889    -.1086281    .1252132 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0436536   .0242097    -1.80   0.071    -.0911038    .0037966 
     h_aged3 |  -.0740553   .0320281    -2.31   0.021    -.1368292   -.0112815 
    h_female |  -.0276321   .0186152    -1.48   0.138    -.0641172     .008853 
  h_edu_high |   .0858167   .0550798     1.56   0.119    -.0221377    .1937712 
h_edu_medium |   .0190583   .0434274     0.44   0.661    -.0660579    .1041745 
   h_retired |  -.0410111   .0396971    -1.03   0.302    -.1188161    .0367938 
   h_student |   .0466245   .0443676     1.05   0.293    -.0403343    .1335833 
h_unemployed |  -.0371475   .0317967    -1.17   0.243     -.099468    .0251729 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0244587   .0462816    -0.53   0.597     -.115169    .0662516 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0463902   .0356506     1.30   0.193    -.0234837     .116264 
    h_inc_d4 |    .118223   .0384369     3.08   0.002     .0428881    .1935579 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .7390459   .0800796     9.23   0.000     .5820929     .895999 
    fall2009 |   .7534122   .1203731     6.26   0.000     .5174853     .989339 
  spring2010 |   .4359496   .0894597     4.87   0.000     .2606118    .6112873 
    fall2010 |    .067209   .0759245     0.89   0.376    -.0816004    .2160183 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |    .398559   .1722928     2.31   0.021     .0608714    .7362466 
        ExYu |   .6026106   .2073612     2.91   0.004     .1961901    1.009031 
       _cons |  -.2800597   .1962038    -1.43   0.153    -.6646121    .1044928 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0961481   .0174977    -5.49   0.000     -.130443   -.0618531 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0596066   .0183486    -3.25   0.001    -.0955692    -.023644 
          3  |  -.1352757     .01978    -6.84   0.000    -.1740439   -.0965076 
          4  |  -.1940064   .0220441    -8.80   0.000     -.237212   -.1508008 
          5  |  -.2353001    .020773   -11.33   0.000    -.2760145   -.1945857 
             | 
       gdppc |  -9.17e-06   5.75e-06    -1.59   0.111    -.0000204    2.11e-06 
        gdpg |    .013038   .0032103     4.06   0.000     .0067459    .0193302 
       lgdpg |    .010028   .0031994     3.13   0.002     .0037573    .0162987 
         inf |   .0093112   .0075984     1.23   0.220    -.0055813    .0242037 
        linf |  -.0223914   .0068022    -3.29   0.001    -.0357235   -.0090593 
          un |  -.0195241   .0048864    -4.00   0.000    -.0291013   -.0099469 
         lun |   .0145025   .0043823     3.31   0.001     .0059133    .0230916 
     h_aged2 |  -.0090886   .0050368    -1.80   0.071    -.0189605    .0007833 
     h_aged3 |  -.0154182   .0066571    -2.32   0.021    -.0284658   -.0023706 
    h_female |   -.005753   .0038535    -1.49   0.135    -.0133056    .0017997 
  h_edu_high |   .0178669   .0114287     1.56   0.118     -.004533    .0402668 
h_edu_medium |   .0039679   .0090358     0.44   0.661    -.0137419    .0216777 
   h_retired |  -.0085385   .0082613    -1.03   0.301    -.0247302    .0076533 
   h_student |   .0097071   .0092564     1.05   0.294    -.0084351    .0278494 
h_unemployed |  -.0077341   .0065988    -1.17   0.241    -.0206674    .0051993 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0050923   .0096518    -0.53   0.598    -.0240095     .013825 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0096584   .0074462     1.30   0.195     -.004936    .0242527 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0246138   .0080836     3.04   0.002     .0087702    .0404574 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1538681   .0171591     8.97   0.000     .1202369    .1874993 
    fall2009 |   .1568592    .025587     6.13   0.000     .1067096    .2070087 
  spring2010 |    .090764   .0195193     4.65   0.000     .0525069     .129021 
    fall2010 |   .0139928   .0159591     0.88   0.381    -.0172864     .045272 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0829793   .0356383     2.33   0.020     .0131295    .1528291 
        ExYu |   .1254625   .0424667     2.95   0.003     .0422294    .2086957 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. probit ESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun CBA#q22f_1 
i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf i.CBA#c.un 
i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired 
h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 
spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu [pweight = 
weight], vce(cluster h_region) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(40)   =    2629.13 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -14865.717                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1276 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     ESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0574936   1.379043    -0.04   0.967    -2.760369    2.645381 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1965323   .0703781    -2.79   0.005    -.3344708   -.0585937 
          3  |  -.4898408   .0743114    -6.59   0.000    -.6354884   -.3441933 
          4  |  -.7622636   .0873391    -8.73   0.000    -.9334451   -.5910822 
          5  |  -1.070521   .0828203   -12.93   0.000    -1.232846    -.908196 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000293    .000012    -2.44   0.015    -.0000528   -5.80e-06 
        gdpg |   .0710486   .0131177     5.42   0.000     .0453383    .0967589 
       lgdpg |    .056462   .0184503     3.06   0.002     .0203002    .0926239 
         inf |   .0107269   .0318367     0.34   0.736     -.051672    .0731257 
        linf |  -.0820572   .0301413    -2.72   0.006    -.1411331   -.0229813 
          un |  -.0843601   .0267643    -3.15   0.002    -.1368173    -.031903 
         lun |   .0619836   .0243554     2.54   0.011     .0142478    .1097194 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |   .1001737   .1026825     0.98   0.329    -.1010804    .3014278 
        1 3  |     .17934   .1109207     1.62   0.106    -.0380606    .3967407 
        1 4  |     .12819   .1395907     0.92   0.358    -.1454028    .4017828 
        1 5  |   .3553745   .1225794     2.90   0.004     .1151233    .5956257 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0000993   .0001573    -0.63   0.528    -.0004075    .0002089 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |  -.0487551   .0656639    -0.74   0.458     -.177454    .0799438 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |  -.0467484   .0291148    -1.61   0.108    -.1038123    .0103155 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |   .1730873   .1774443     0.98   0.329    -.1746971    .5208717 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |  -.1300101   .1487593    -0.87   0.382     -.421573    .1615528 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0101282   .0544103    -0.19   0.852    -.1167704     .096514 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0115107    .058257     0.20   0.843     -.102671    .1256924 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0401163   .0247819    -1.62   0.105    -.0886879    .0084552 
     h_aged3 |  -.0554025   .0325578    -1.70   0.089    -.1192146    .0084096 
    h_female |  -.0280654   .0175301    -1.60   0.109    -.0624237    .0062928 
  h_edu_high |   .1103671   .0510669     2.16   0.031     .0102778    .2104564 
h_edu_medium |   .0332574   .0412709     0.81   0.420    -.0476321    .1141468 
   h_retired |  -.0723894   .0369472    -1.96   0.050    -.1448046    .0000259 
   h_student |   .0546859   .0495242     1.10   0.269    -.0423797    .1517515 
h_unemployed |  -.0229488   .0344047    -0.67   0.505    -.0903808    .0444832 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0120356   .0473683    -0.25   0.799    -.1048758    .0808046 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0568039   .0362173     1.57   0.117    -.0141806    .1277884 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1177731    .038637     3.05   0.002      .042046    .1935003 
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  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .7590503   .0868719     8.74   0.000     .5887846     .929316 
    fall2009 |   .7971931   .1156142     6.90   0.000     .5705935    1.023793 
  spring2010 |   .4606127   .0897072     5.13   0.000     .2847898    .6364357 
    fall2010 |   .0846217   .0724038     1.17   0.243    -.0572871    .2265305 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .4372395   .1718079     2.54   0.011     .1005022    .7739769 
        ExYu |   .6112134   .2091369     2.92   0.003     .2013125    1.021114 
       _cons |  -.3818205    .212969    -1.79   0.073    -.7992321    .0355911 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ESagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.0947886   .0168003    -5.64   0.000    -.1277166   -.0618606 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0553019   .0191125    -2.89   0.004    -.0927618    -.017842 
          3  |  -.1293352   .0199989    -6.47   0.000    -.1685323    -.090138 
          4  |  -.1871685   .0222268    -8.42   0.000    -.2307322   -.1436048 
          5  |  -.2279306   .0209472   -10.88   0.000    -.2689863   -.1868748 
             | 
       gdppc |  -9.53e-06   6.09e-06    -1.56   0.118    -.0000215    2.41e-06 
        gdpg |   .0128841   .0033413     3.86   0.000     .0063353    .0194329 
       lgdpg |   .0099563   .0032339     3.08   0.002     .0036179    .0162946 
         inf |   .0083183   .0079014     1.05   0.292    -.0071682    .0238047 
        linf |  -.0214608    .007125    -3.01   0.003    -.0354255   -.0074961 
          un |  -.0177003   .0053704    -3.30   0.001     -.028226   -.0071746 
         lun |    .013149   .0049528     2.65   0.008     .0034416    .0228564 
     h_aged2 |   -.008247   .0050973    -1.62   0.106    -.0182375    .0017434 
     h_aged3 |  -.0113895   .0066924    -1.70   0.089    -.0245064    .0017273 
    h_female |  -.0057696   .0035858    -1.61   0.108    -.0127977    .0012584 
  h_edu_high |    .022689   .0103945     2.18   0.029     .0023162    .0430618 
h_edu_medium |    .006837    .008459     0.81   0.419    -.0097424    .0234163 
   h_retired |  -.0148817   .0075831    -1.96   0.050    -.0297443    -.000019 
   h_student |   .0112422   .0101892     1.10   0.270    -.0087283    .0312127 
h_unemployed |  -.0047178    .007055    -0.67   0.504    -.0185453    .0091098 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0024743    .009745    -0.25   0.800     -.021574    .0166255 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0116776   .0074862     1.56   0.119     -.002995    .0263502 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0242115   .0080264     3.02   0.003     .0084801     .039943 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1560439   .0186316     8.38   0.000     .1195266    .1925612 
    fall2009 |   .1638852   .0244887     6.69   0.000     .1158883    .2118822 
  spring2010 |   .0946918   .0195627     4.84   0.000     .0563496    .1330339 
    fall2010 |   .0173963   .0150748     1.15   0.249    -.0121498    .0469425 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0898868   .0350826     2.56   0.010     .0211261    .1586474 
        ExYu |   .1256519   .0423637     2.97   0.003     .0426206    .2086832 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 6.18: Subjective assessments - Single equations - 
Expectations about economic situation in a country (country as a 
cluster)   
 
Appendix 6.18a: Subjective assessments - Single equation - 
Expectations about economic situation in a country (country as 
cluster) weighted and unweighted 
 
. **with trust in government and interactions; controlled for group dummies 
(EU and ExYu) 
. probit ExpESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu, 
vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -25058.004                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0862 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |    1.77919   .6056883     2.94   0.003     .5920632    2.966318 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1377106    .137593    -1.00   0.317     -.407388    .1319667 
          3  |  -.4499712   .1638365    -2.75   0.006    -.7710848   -.1288576 
          4  |  -.7626509   .1680983    -4.54   0.000    -1.092117   -.4331844 
          5  |  -1.002083   .1577211    -6.35   0.000    -1.311211   -.6929556 
             | 
       gdppc |  -6.17e-07   .0000139    -0.04   0.965    -.0000279    .0000266 
        gdpg |   .0519816   .0084203     6.17   0.000     .0354781    .0684851 
       lgdpg |  -.0152657   .0121843    -1.25   0.210    -.0391465    .0086151 
         inf |   .0262861   .0410186     0.64   0.522    -.0541089    .1066812 
        linf |  -.0731254   .0328771    -2.22   0.026    -.1375634   -.0086874 
          un |   .0317725   .0403704     0.79   0.431     -.047352    .1108969 
         lun |  -.0248064    .036042    -0.69   0.491    -.0954474    .0458347 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0360406   .1382351    -0.26   0.794    -.3069765    .2348953 
        1 3  |   .0374416   .1673515     0.22   0.823    -.2905613    .3654444 
        1 4  |   .1014195   .1818753     0.56   0.577    -.2550496    .4578885 
        1 5  |   .0494376   .2140633     0.23   0.817    -.3701188    .4689941 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0002429   .0000768    -3.16   0.002    -.0003935   -.0000923 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0585344   .0263434     2.22   0.026     .0069024    .1101665 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |   .0131603    .014709     0.89   0.371    -.0156688    .0419893 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0849588   .0961891    -0.88   0.377     -.273486    .1035684 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .1091577   .0843956     1.29   0.196    -.0562545      .27457 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0835897   .0091317    -9.15   0.000    -.1014875   -.0656918 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0357339   .0182738     1.96   0.051    -.0000821    .0715499 
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             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0714252   .0293443    -2.43   0.015     -.128939   -.0139115 
     h_aged3 |  -.0950748    .038848    -2.45   0.014    -.1712155   -.0189341 
    h_female |  -.0008272   .0116472    -0.07   0.943    -.0236552    .0220009 
  h_edu_high |   .1230199   .0502314     2.45   0.014     .0245681    .2214717 
h_edu_medium |   .0081703   .0341406     0.24   0.811    -.0587441    .0750846 
   h_retired |   .0410903    .029205     1.41   0.159    -.0161505     .098331 
   h_student |   .1330883   .0324766     4.10   0.000     .0694353    .1967413 
h_unemployed |   -.022706   .0335226    -0.68   0.498    -.0884091    .0429971 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1208637   .0465022     2.60   0.009     .0297211    .2120063 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1758661   .0233378     7.54   0.000     .1301249    .2216073 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2546854   .0335568     7.59   0.000     .1889153    .3204554 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5332758   .0816041     6.53   0.000     .3733348    .6932169 
    fall2009 |     .53567   .0964144     5.56   0.000     .3467013    .7246388 
  spring2010 |   .2251846   .0494836     4.55   0.000     .1281985    .3221706 
    fall2010 |   .0640221   .0820847     0.78   0.435     -.096861    .2249051 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1335062   .0943206     1.42   0.157    -.0513587    .3183711 
        ExYu |     .04716   .1604327     0.29   0.769    -.2672823    .3616024 
       _cons |   .0059773   .2465066     0.02   0.981    -.4771668    .4891214 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpESagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   -.198459   .0134693   -14.73   0.000    -.2248584   -.1720597 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0548045   .0400125    -1.37   0.171    -.1332275    .0236185 
          3  |  -.1697527   .0478708    -3.55   0.000    -.2635777   -.0759277 
          4  |  -.2815875   .0492456    -5.72   0.000     -.378107   -.1850679 
          5  |  -.3646377   .0470404    -7.75   0.000    -.4568351   -.2724403 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000165   6.80e-06    -2.43   0.015    -.0000298   -3.17e-06 
        gdpg |   .0220995   .0027456     8.05   0.000     .0167183    .0274807 
       lgdpg |  -.0044573   .0035098    -1.27   0.204    -.0113364    .0024219 
         inf |   .0035025   .0101077     0.35   0.729    -.0163084    .0233133 
        linf |  -.0182623    .008724    -2.09   0.036    -.0353611   -.0011635 
          un |   .0055128   .0140086     0.39   0.694    -.0219435    .0329692 
         lun |  -.0062819   .0131431    -0.48   0.633     -.032042    .0194782 
     h_aged2 |  -.0249788   .0102399    -2.44   0.015    -.0450486   -.0049091 
     h_aged3 |  -.0332496   .0135947    -2.45   0.014    -.0598946   -.0066045 
    h_female |  -.0002893   .0040746    -0.07   0.943    -.0082754    .0076969 
  h_edu_high |   .0430225    .017503     2.46   0.014     .0087174    .0773277 
h_edu_medium |   .0028573   .0119439     0.24   0.811    -.0205524     .026267 
   h_retired |   .0143701   .0101889     1.41   0.158    -.0055997    .0343399 
   h_student |   .0465437    .011143     4.18   0.000     .0247038    .0683835 
h_unemployed |  -.0079407   .0117174    -0.68   0.498    -.0309063    .0150249 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0422685   .0162895     2.59   0.009     .0103417    .0741952 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0615039    .008394     7.33   0.000     .0450519    .0779559 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0890686   .0120277     7.41   0.000     .0654947    .1126425 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1864973    .028861     6.46   0.000     .1299307    .2430639 
    fall2009 |   .1873346   .0332047     5.64   0.000     .1222545    .2524146 
  spring2010 |   .0787516   .0172779     4.56   0.000     .0448876    .1126156 
    fall2010 |   .0223898   .0287242     0.78   0.436    -.0339087    .0786883 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0466898   .0329984     1.41   0.157    -.0179859    .1113655 
        ExYu |   .0164928   .0561121     0.29   0.769     -.093485    .1264706 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. probit ExpESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu EU 
ExYu[pweight = weight], vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: EU omitted because of collinearity 
note: ExYu omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -24359.927                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0880 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   1.485591   .5816606     2.55   0.011     .3455574    2.625625 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1477704   .1358238    -1.09   0.277    -.4139802    .1184395 
          3  |   -.456481    .157838    -2.89   0.004    -.7658379   -.1471241 
          4  |  -.7645512   .1613295    -4.74   0.000    -1.080751   -.4483512 
          5  |  -1.017984   .1512693    -6.73   0.000    -1.314467    -.721502 
             | 
       gdppc |  -1.18e-06   .0000133    -0.09   0.930    -.0000273     .000025 
        gdpg |   .0508649    .008547     5.95   0.000      .034113    .0676168 
       lgdpg |  -.0129965   .0124497    -1.04   0.297    -.0373976    .0114045 
         inf |   .0235332   .0451069     0.52   0.602    -.0648748    .1119412 
        linf |  -.0687025   .0359283    -1.91   0.056    -.1391206    .0017157 
          un |   .0361811   .0418335     0.86   0.387     -.045811    .1181732 
         lun |  -.0270294   .0380412    -0.71   0.477    -.1015888      .04753 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0094146   .1367814    -0.07   0.945    -.2775012     .258672 
        1 3  |   .0615952   .1639351     0.38   0.707    -.2597116     .382902 
        1 4  |   .1132402   .1797205     0.63   0.529    -.2390054    .4654858 
        1 5  |   .0704982   .2138114     0.33   0.742    -.3485645    .4895609 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |   -.000214   .0000737    -2.90   0.004    -.0003585   -.0000695 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0518602   .0266204     1.95   0.051    -.0003149    .1040353 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |   .0092571   .0149411     0.62   0.536     -.020027    .0385412 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0731861   .0945357    -0.77   0.439    -.2584726    .1121004 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .1012788   .0831865     1.22   0.223    -.0617636    .2643213 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0861229   .0093273    -9.23   0.000    -.1044041   -.0678416 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0449326    .017967     2.50   0.012     .0097179    .0801473 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0662319   .0316636    -2.09   0.036    -.1282914   -.0041725 
     h_aged3 |  -.1053276   .0379397    -2.78   0.006    -.1796881   -.0309671 
    h_female |   .0021836   .0166505     0.13   0.896    -.0304508     .034818 
  h_edu_high |   .1212856   .0480526     2.52   0.012     .0271042    .2154671 
h_edu_medium |   .0078786   .0347091     0.23   0.820      -.06015    .0759072 
   h_retired |   .0314923   .0290781     1.08   0.279    -.0254998    .0884844 
   h_student |   .1443992   .0345856     4.18   0.000     .0766127    .2121858 
h_unemployed |  -.0184873   .0335612    -0.55   0.582     -.084266    .0472914 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1127532   .0449837     2.51   0.012     .0245867    .2009196 
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    h_inc_d3 |   .1675145   .0262941     6.37   0.000     .1159791    .2190499 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2500885   .0397753     6.29   0.000     .1721303    .3280467 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5260226   .0850481     6.19   0.000     .3593315    .6927137 
    fall2009 |   .5354261   .0979377     5.47   0.000     .3434718    .7273804 
  spring2010 |   .2321196   .0500412     4.64   0.000     .1340407    .3301985 
    fall2010 |   .0750792   .0871805     0.86   0.389    -.0957915      .24595 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1443451   .0917998     1.57   0.116    -.0355793    .3242695 
        ExYu |   .0098705   .1506125     0.07   0.948    -.2853246    .3050656 
          EU |          0  (omitted) 
        ExYu |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -.0141503   .2406294    -0.06   0.953    -.4857751    .4574746 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpESagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.1884554    .015449   -12.20   0.000    -.2187348   -.1581759 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0566183   .0395615    -1.43   0.152    -.1341573    .0209208 
          3  |   -.170312   .0460897    -3.70   0.000    -.2606462   -.0799777 
          4  |  -.2809025   .0472296    -5.95   0.000    -.3734708   -.1883341 
          5  |   -.367357   .0452013    -8.13   0.000    -.4559499   -.2787641 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000148   6.81e-06    -2.18   0.029    -.0000282   -1.49e-06 
        gdpg |   .0211732   .0028235     7.50   0.000     .0156392    .0267071 
       lgdpg |  -.0038923   .0035654    -1.09   0.275    -.0108803    .0030958 
         inf |   .0032432   .0113015     0.29   0.774    -.0189073    .0253936 
        linf |  -.0170458   .0092959    -1.83   0.067    -.0352654    .0011739 
          un |   .0067661   .0144083     0.47   0.639    -.0214737    .0350059 
         lun |  -.0063633   .0137248    -0.46   0.643    -.0332634    .0205369 
     h_aged2 |  -.0230165   .0109773    -2.10   0.036    -.0445316   -.0015014 
     h_aged3 |  -.0366027   .0131813    -2.78   0.005    -.0624377   -.0107678 
    h_female |   .0007588   .0057837     0.13   0.896    -.0105771    .0120947 
  h_edu_high |   .0421484   .0165599     2.55   0.011     .0096916    .0746051 
h_edu_medium |   .0027379   .0120631     0.23   0.820    -.0209054    .0263812 
   h_retired |    .010944   .0100865     1.09   0.278    -.0088252    .0307131 
   h_student |   .0501806   .0118455     4.24   0.000     .0269638    .0733975 
h_unemployed |  -.0064246   .0116532    -0.55   0.581    -.0292644    .0164153 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0391832   .0156755     2.50   0.012     .0084598    .0699067 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0582135   .0093554     6.22   0.000     .0398773    .0765497 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0869091   .0141448     6.14   0.000     .0591858    .1146323 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1827998   .0297817     6.14   0.000     .1244287    .2411709 
    fall2009 |   .1860676   .0335815     5.54   0.000     .1202491    .2518862 
  spring2010 |   .0806646   .0173387     4.65   0.000     .0466813    .1146479 
    fall2010 |    .026091   .0302892     0.86   0.389    -.0332747    .0854567 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0501618    .031971     1.57   0.117    -.0125001    .1128238 
        ExYu |   .0034301   .0523441     0.07   0.948    -.0991625    .1060227 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 6.18b: Subjective assessments - *Expectations about 
economic situation in a country (region as a cluster) 
 
. **with trust in government and interactions; controlled for group dummies 
(EU and ExYu) 
. probit ExpESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu, 
vce(cluster h_region) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(40)   =    2352.86 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -25058.004                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0862 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |    1.77919   1.030858     1.73   0.084    -.2412536    3.799635 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1377106   .0780543    -1.76   0.078    -.2906942     .015273 
          3  |  -.4499712   .0854116    -5.27   0.000    -.6173748   -.2825675 
          4  |  -.7626509   .0878159    -8.68   0.000    -.9347669   -.5905349 
          5  |  -1.002083    .080207   -12.49   0.000    -1.159286   -.8448805 
             | 
       gdppc |  -6.17e-07   8.55e-06    -0.07   0.942    -.0000174    .0000161 
        gdpg |   .0519816   .0096623     5.38   0.000     .0330439    .0709193 
       lgdpg |  -.0152657   .0085012    -1.80   0.073    -.0319277    .0013963 
         inf |   .0262861   .0279387     0.94   0.347    -.0284727    .0810449 
        linf |  -.0731254   .0262145    -2.79   0.005     -.124505   -.0217458 
          un |   .0317725   .0297882     1.07   0.286    -.0266114    .0901563 
         lun |  -.0248064   .0265951    -0.93   0.351    -.0769317     .027319 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0360406   .1213543    -0.30   0.766    -.2738906    .2018094 
        1 3  |   .0374416   .1156026     0.32   0.746    -.1891353    .2640185 
        1 4  |   .1014195   .1178352     0.86   0.389    -.1295332    .3323721 
        1 5  |   .0494376    .115984     0.43   0.670    -.1778869    .2767622 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |  -.0002429   .0001203    -2.02   0.043    -.0004786   -7.21e-06 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0585344   .0460364     1.27   0.204    -.0316952     .148764 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |   .0131603   .0206851     0.64   0.525    -.0273817    .0537022 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0849588   .1237212    -0.69   0.492    -.3274478    .1575302 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .1091577   .0991041     1.10   0.271    -.0850827    .3033981 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0835897    .045244    -1.85   0.065    -.1722664     .005087 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0357339   .0455494     0.78   0.433    -.0535413    .1250091 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0714252   .0233012    -3.07   0.002    -.1170948   -.0257557 
     h_aged3 |  -.0950748   .0331393    -2.87   0.004    -.1600266   -.0301229 
    h_female |  -.0008272   .0140228    -0.06   0.953    -.0283114     .026657 
  h_edu_high |   .1230199   .0325285     3.78   0.000     .0592653    .1867745 
h_edu_medium |   .0081703   .0257818     0.32   0.751    -.0423611    .0587016 
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   h_retired |   .0410903     .02631     1.56   0.118    -.0104764    .0926569 
   h_student |   .1330883    .041291     3.22   0.001     .0521595    .2140171 
h_unemployed |   -.022706   .0258999    -0.88   0.381    -.0734688    .0280569 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1208637   .0361829     3.34   0.001     .0499465    .1917809 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1758661   .0212802     8.26   0.000     .1341578    .2175745 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2546854    .030133     8.45   0.000     .1956257     .313745 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5332758   .0738645     7.22   0.000     .3885041    .6780476 
    fall2009 |     .53567   .0791627     6.77   0.000     .3805141     .690826 
  spring2010 |   .2251846   .0596552     3.77   0.000     .1082625    .3421067 
    fall2010 |   .0640221    .050568     1.27   0.205    -.0350894    .1631335 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1335062   .1029714     1.30   0.195    -.0683139    .3353264 
        ExYu |     .04716   .1270599     0.37   0.711    -.2018728    .2961929 
       _cons |   .0059773   .1465767     0.04   0.967    -.2813077    .2932624 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpESagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   -.198459     .02283    -8.69   0.000     -.243205    -.153713 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0548045    .024099    -2.27   0.023    -.1020377   -.0075713 
          3  |  -.1697527    .025867    -6.56   0.000     -.220451   -.1190544 
          4  |  -.2815875   .0264067   -10.66   0.000    -.3333437   -.2298312 
          5  |  -.3646377   .0241902   -15.07   0.000    -.4120496   -.3172259 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000165   8.50e-06    -1.94   0.052    -.0000331    1.75e-07 
        gdpg |   .0220995   .0041138     5.37   0.000     .0140366    .0301624 
       lgdpg |  -.0044573   .0027461    -1.62   0.105    -.0098396    .0009251 
         inf |   .0035025   .0112918     0.31   0.756     -.018629    .0256339 
        linf |  -.0182623    .010022    -1.82   0.068    -.0379051    .0013805 
          un |   .0055128   .0102007     0.54   0.589    -.0144802    .0255058 
         lun |  -.0062819   .0094874    -0.66   0.508    -.0248769    .0123131 
     h_aged2 |  -.0249788    .008117    -3.08   0.002    -.0408879   -.0090697 
     h_aged3 |  -.0332496   .0115285    -2.88   0.004     -.055845   -.0106541 
    h_female |  -.0002893   .0049043    -0.06   0.953    -.0099016     .009323 
  h_edu_high |   .0430225   .0113297     3.80   0.000     .0208167    .0652283 
h_edu_medium |   .0028573   .0090187     0.32   0.751    -.0148191    .0205337 
   h_retired |   .0143701   .0091824     1.56   0.118    -.0036271    .0323673 
   h_student |   .0465437   .0143898     3.23   0.001     .0183402    .0747471 
h_unemployed |  -.0079407    .009051    -0.88   0.380    -.0256804    .0097989 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0422685   .0125456     3.37   0.001     .0176795    .0668574 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0615039   .0074016     8.31   0.000     .0469971    .0760108 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0890686   .0104814     8.50   0.000     .0685255    .1096117 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1864973    .025809     7.23   0.000     .1359125    .2370821 
    fall2009 |   .1873346   .0275761     6.79   0.000     .1332864    .2413827 
  spring2010 |   .0787516   .0208933     3.77   0.000     .0378014    .1197017 
    fall2010 |   .0223898   .0177054     1.26   0.206    -.0123121    .0570917 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0466898   .0359301     1.30   0.194    -.0237319    .1171115 
        ExYu |   .0164928   .0444329     0.37   0.710     -.070594    .1035796 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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. probit ExpESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
CBA#q22f_1 i.CBA#c.gdppc i.CBA#c.gdpg i.CBA#c.lgdpg i.CBA#c.inf i.CBA#c.linf 
i.CBA#c.un i.CBA#c.lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium 
h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 
fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu EU 
ExYu[pweight = weight], vce(cluster h_region) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: EU omitted because of collinearity 
note: ExYu omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      40832 
                                                  Wald chi2(40)   =    1589.30 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -24359.927                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0880 
 
                              (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in h_region) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |   1.485591    1.08212     1.37   0.170    -.6353256    3.606508 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1477704   .0785415    -1.88   0.060    -.3017088     .006168 
          3  |   -.456481   .0848056    -5.38   0.000     -.622697   -.2902651 
          4  |  -.7645512   .0881741    -8.67   0.000    -.9373692   -.5917331 
          5  |  -1.017984   .0818372   -12.44   0.000    -1.178382   -.8575866 
             | 
       gdppc |  -1.18e-06   8.59e-06    -0.14   0.891     -.000018    .0000157 
        gdpg |   .0508649   .0097057     5.24   0.000      .031842    .0698878 
       lgdpg |  -.0129965    .008677    -1.50   0.134    -.0300031      .00401 
         inf |   .0235332   .0298818     0.79   0.431    -.0350342    .0821005 
        linf |  -.0687025   .0284587    -2.41   0.016    -.1244805   -.0129244 
          un |   .0361811   .0317653     1.14   0.255    -.0260778      .09844 
         lun |  -.0270294   .0281807    -0.96   0.337    -.0822626    .0282038 
             | 
  CBA#q22f_1 | 
        1 2  |  -.0094146   .1268644    -0.07   0.941    -.2580643    .2392351 
        1 3  |   .0615952   .1169419     0.53   0.598    -.1676067     .290797 
        1 4  |   .1132402   .1197147     0.95   0.344    -.1213962    .3478766 
        1 5  |   .0704982    .117294     0.60   0.548    -.1593939    .3003903 
             | 
 CBA#c.gdppc | 
          1  |   -.000214   .0001262    -1.70   0.090    -.0004613    .0000333 
             | 
  CBA#c.gdpg | 
          1  |   .0518602   .0483749     1.07   0.284    -.0429529    .1466733 
             | 
 CBA#c.lgdpg | 
          1  |   .0092571   .0207531     0.45   0.656    -.0314182    .0499324 
             | 
   CBA#c.inf | 
          1  |  -.0731861     .13324    -0.55   0.583    -.3343317    .1879595 
             | 
  CBA#c.linf | 
          1  |   .1012788   .1074815     0.94   0.346     -.109381    .3119387 
             | 
    CBA#c.un | 
          1  |  -.0861229   .0434267    -1.98   0.047    -.1712377    -.001008 
             | 
   CBA#c.lun | 
          1  |   .0449326     .04344     1.03   0.301    -.0402082    .1300735 
             | 
     h_aged2 |  -.0662319   .0242253    -2.73   0.006    -.1137126   -.0187513 
     h_aged3 |  -.1053276   .0331586    -3.18   0.001    -.1703173   -.0403379 
    h_female |   .0021836    .016262     0.13   0.893    -.0296894    .0340566 
  h_edu_high |   .1212856   .0339593     3.57   0.000     .0547267    .1878446 
h_edu_medium |   .0078786   .0261823     0.30   0.763    -.0434377    .0591949 
   h_retired |   .0314923   .0279108     1.13   0.259    -.0232118    .0861964 
   h_student |   .1443992    .043209     3.34   0.001     .0597111    .2290873 
h_unemployed |  -.0184873   .0280643    -0.66   0.510    -.0734923    .0365178 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1127532    .034475     3.27   0.001     .0451835    .1803229 
  580 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1675145   .0236991     7.07   0.000      .121065     .213964 
    h_inc_d4 |   .2500885   .0331809     7.54   0.000     .1850551    .3151219 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .5260226   .0824906     6.38   0.000     .3643439    .6877013 
    fall2009 |   .5354261   .0837331     6.39   0.000     .3713121      .69954 
  spring2010 |   .2321196   .0624414     3.72   0.000     .1097367    .3545025 
    fall2010 |   .0750792   .0547768     1.37   0.170    -.0322814    .1824398 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1443451   .1067198     1.35   0.176    -.0648218    .3535121 
        ExYu |   .0098705   .1361078     0.07   0.942    -.2568959    .2766369 
          EU |          0  (omitted) 
        ExYu |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -.0141503   .1543724    -0.09   0.927    -.3167145     .288414 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. margins, dydx(_all) post  
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =      40832 
Model VCE    : Robust 
 
Expression   : Pr(ExpESagree), predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.CBA 2.q22f_1 3.q22f_1 4.q22f_1 5.q22f_1 gdppc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un 
lun h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 
fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.1884554   .0274797    -6.86   0.000    -.2423145   -.1345962 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.0566183   .0244431    -2.32   0.021    -.1045258   -.0087107 
          3  |   -.170312   .0257581    -6.61   0.000    -.2207968   -.1198271 
          4  |  -.2809025   .0265004   -10.60   0.000    -.3328424   -.2289626 
          5  |   -.367357    .024527   -14.98   0.000     -.415429    -.319285 
             | 
       gdppc |  -.0000148   8.96e-06    -1.66   0.098    -.0000324    2.72e-06 
        gdpg |   .0211732   .0042272     5.01   0.000      .012888    .0294583 
       lgdpg |  -.0038923   .0028167    -1.38   0.167     -.009413    .0016284 
         inf |   .0032432   .0121457     0.27   0.789     -.020562    .0270483 
        linf |  -.0170458    .010815    -1.58   0.115    -.0382428    .0041513 
          un |   .0067661   .0107917     0.63   0.531    -.0143852    .0279175 
         lun |  -.0063633   .0099939    -0.64   0.524    -.0259509    .0132243 
     h_aged2 |  -.0230165   .0083827    -2.75   0.006    -.0394463   -.0065867 
     h_aged3 |  -.0366027   .0114402    -3.20   0.001     -.059025   -.0141804 
    h_female |   .0007588   .0056502     0.13   0.893    -.0103154    .0118331 
  h_edu_high |   .0421484   .0116852     3.61   0.000     .0192457     .065051 
h_edu_medium |   .0027379   .0090953     0.30   0.763    -.0150885    .0205643 
   h_retired |    .010944   .0096831     1.13   0.258    -.0080346    .0299226 
   h_student |   .0501806   .0149752     3.35   0.001     .0208298    .0795314 
h_unemployed |  -.0064246    .009742    -0.66   0.510    -.0255186    .0126694 
    h_inc_d1 |   .0391832   .0118693     3.30   0.001     .0159198    .0624466 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0582135   .0081975     7.10   0.000     .0421467    .0742803 
    h_inc_d4 |   .0869091   .0114319     7.60   0.000      .064503    .1093151 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .1827998    .028691     6.37   0.000     .1265664    .2390332 
    fall2009 |   .1860676   .0289667     6.42   0.000      .129294    .2428413 
  spring2010 |   .0806646   .0217351     3.71   0.000     .0380646    .1232646 
    fall2010 |    .026091   .0190492     1.37   0.171    -.0112448    .0634268 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .0501618   .0370076     1.36   0.175    -.0223717    .1226953 
        ExYu |   .0034301   .0473009     0.07   0.942    -.0892779    .0961381 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
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Appendix 6.19: Multinomial probits (with ‘do not know’ category and 
without interaction terms) and comparison with probits without the 
interaction terms  
 
Perceptions about the economic situation in a country 
 
. tab q1_01, missing 
 
   Currently, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
 COUNTRY] is very | 
             good |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |        571        1.17        1.17 
            Agree |      1,714        3.50        4.66 
   Somewhat agree |      4,810        9.82       14.48 
Somewhat disagree |      7,744       15.81       30.29 
         Disagree |     13,956       28.48       58.77 
Strongly disagree |     19,149       39.08       97.85 
      Do not know |        845        1.72       99.58 
        No answer |        208        0.42      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     48,997      100.00 
 
. drop if q1_01==9 
(208 observations deleted) 
 
Multinomial perceptions model (dnk incdluded, interation terms excluded) 
 
. *for multinomial (perceptions about the economic situation) 
. generate MESagree=0 
 
. replace MESagree=1 if  q1_01==4 |  q1_01==5 |  q1_01==6 
(40849 real changes made) 
 
. replace MESagree=2 if  q1_01==8 
(845 real changes made) 
 
. replace MESagree=3 if  q1_01==1 |  q1_01==2 |  q1_01==3 
(7095 real changes made) 
 
. drop if MESagree==0 
(0 observations deleted) 
 
. mprobit MESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gpdpc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun h_aged2 
h_aged3 h_female h_e 
> du_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 
h_inc_d4 spring2008 f 
> all2008 spring2009 fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu 
[pweight = weight], vce(cl 
> uster country) nolog 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Multinomial probit regression                     Number of obs   =      48789 
                                                  Wald chi2(7)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -20979.722                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    MESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1            |  (base outcome) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
       1.CBA |   -.421208   .1739341    -2.42   0.015    -.7621125   -.0803035 
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             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.3085397   .1253617    -2.46   0.014    -.5542442   -.0628352 
          3  |  -.3280448   .1092325    -3.00   0.003    -.5421366   -.1139529 
          4  |  -.5589871    .132154    -4.23   0.000    -.8180042     -.29997 
          5  |  -.5721847   .1270423    -4.50   0.000     -.821183   -.3231864 
          8  |   1.011981   .1617604     6.26   0.000     .6949369    1.329026 
             | 
       gpdpc |  -.0000758    .000043    -1.76   0.078      -.00016    8.41e-06 
        gdpg |   .0820697   .0330147     2.49   0.013     .0173621    .1467774 
       lgdpg |   .0920704   .0343485     2.68   0.007     .0247486    .1593922 
         inf |   .0209492   .0865296     0.24   0.809    -.1486456    .1905441 
        linf |  -.1092435   .0666642    -1.64   0.101    -.2399029    .0214159 
          un |  -.0898081    .074125    -1.21   0.226    -.2350904    .0554742 
         lun |    .000667   .0677844     0.01   0.992    -.1321879    .1335219 
     h_aged2 |  -.1388631   .0548727    -2.53   0.011    -.2464117   -.0313145 
     h_aged3 |  -.0600093   .0657616    -0.91   0.361    -.1888997    .0688811 
    h_female |   .1446382   .0506566     2.86   0.004      .045353    .2439234 
  h_edu_high |  -.4207703   .1285525    -3.27   0.001    -.6727286    -.168812 
h_edu_medium |  -.2759745   .1006606    -2.74   0.006    -.4732655   -.0786834 
   h_retired |   .1039608   .0777917     1.34   0.181    -.0485081    .2564296 
   h_student |   .1388329   .0950523     1.46   0.144    -.0474661    .3251319 
h_unemployed |   .0632302   .0918092     0.69   0.491    -.1167125     .243173 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1148062   .0677948     1.69   0.090    -.0180693    .2476816 
    h_inc_d3 |  -.2160305    .073195    -2.95   0.003      -.35949   -.0725711 
    h_inc_d4 |  -.1786169   .1032621    -1.73   0.084    -.3810068     .023773 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .9215578    .244806     3.76   0.000     .4417467    1.401369 
    fall2009 |   1.282406   .1691299     7.58   0.000     .9509174    1.613894 
  spring2010 |    .852405   .1781438     4.78   0.000     .5032496    1.201561 
    fall2010 |   .1149388   .1658123     0.69   0.488    -.2100473    .4399249 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   2.194222    .335137     6.55   0.000     1.537366    2.851079 
        ExYu |   2.674077   .5924567     4.51   0.000     1.512883    3.835271 
       _cons |  -2.634832   .6414322    -4.11   0.000    -3.892016   -1.377648 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
       1.CBA |  -.5571321   .1249791    -4.46   0.000    -.8020865   -.3121776 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.2518528   .1449305    -1.74   0.082    -.5359114    .0322059 
          3  |  -.6427567   .1549757    -4.15   0.000    -.9465035     -.33901 
          4  |  -1.012043   .2116585    -4.78   0.000    -1.426886   -.5971998 
          5  |  -1.376904   .2027385    -6.79   0.000    -1.774264   -.9795438 
          8  |   -.680827   .2030977    -3.35   0.001    -1.078891   -.2827629 
             | 
       gpdpc |  -.0000518   .0000319    -1.62   0.104    -.0001143    .0000107 
        gdpg |   .0999652   .0273532     3.65   0.000     .0463538    .1535765 
       lgdpg |   .0644139   .0274204     2.35   0.019     .0106709    .1181569 
         inf |  -.0696822   .0806376    -0.86   0.388    -.2277291    .0883646 
        linf |   -.042264   .0721621    -0.59   0.558     -.183699    .0991711 
          un |  -.0767206   .0510029    -1.50   0.133    -.1766845    .0232432 
         lun |   .0452086   .0547463     0.83   0.409     -.062092    .1525093 
     h_aged2 |  -.0638336    .041661    -1.53   0.125    -.1454877    .0178204 
     h_aged3 |  -.0872652   .0549975    -1.59   0.113    -.1950584     .020528 
    h_female |  -.0413644   .0180435    -2.29   0.022     -.076729   -.0059997 
  h_edu_high |   .1304651   .0953655     1.37   0.171    -.0564479    .3173781 
h_edu_medium |   .0299316   .0728441     0.41   0.681    -.1128401    .1727034 
   h_retired |  -.0802017    .060778    -1.32   0.187    -.1993244    .0389209 
   h_student |   .0774172   .0854287     0.91   0.365      -.09002    .2448543 
h_unemployed |  -.0228555      .0705    -0.32   0.746    -.1610329    .1153219 
    h_inc_d1 |   -.051076    .058061    -0.88   0.379    -.1648734    .0627214 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0675252    .052945     1.28   0.202    -.0362452    .1712955 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1646683    .035982     4.58   0.000     .0941449    .2351917 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .9621442   .2229591     4.32   0.000     .5251523    1.399136 
    fall2009 |   .9604317   .1765764     5.44   0.000     .6143483    1.306515 
  spring2010 |   .5583662    .186741     2.99   0.003     .1923605    .9243719 
    fall2010 |    .152989     .16933     0.90   0.366    -.1788917    .4848697 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .6147369    .273182     2.25   0.024     .0793101    1.150164 
        ExYu |   .7793424   .4403949     1.77   0.077    -.0838157    1.642501 
       _cons |  -.4254379   .4844977    -0.88   0.380    -1.375036    .5241602 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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*Probit perceptions model (no dnk) interaction terms excluded  
 
. drop if q1_01==8 
(845 observations deleted) 
 
.  
. generate ESagree=0 
 
. replace ESagree=1 if  q1_01==1 |  q1_01==2 |  q1_01==3 
(7095 real changes made) 
 
 
tab q1_01 ESagree, missing 
 
   Currently, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
 COUNTRY] is very |        ESagree 
             good |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |         0        571 |       571  
            Agree |         0      1,714 |     1,714  
   Somewhat agree |         0      4,810 |     4,810  
Somewhat disagree |     7,744          0 |     7,744  
         Disagree |    13,956          0 |    13,956  
Strongly disagree |    19,149          0 |    19,149  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    40,849      7,095 |    47,944 
 
. probit ESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gpdpc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun h_aged2 
h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu [pweight = weight], vce(cluster 
country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      47944 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -17157.756                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1204 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     ESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.3882001   .0883593    -4.39   0.000    -.5613812   -.2150189 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1770382   .1027016    -1.72   0.085    -.3783297    .0242533 
          3  |  -.4585276   .1102165    -4.16   0.000    -.6745479   -.2425074 
          4  |  -.7197175   .1502158    -4.79   0.000    -1.014135   -.4252999 
          5  |  -.9822554   .1441878    -6.81   0.000    -1.264858   -.6996524 
          8  |  -.5244681   .1380446    -3.80   0.000    -.7950306   -.2539055 
             | 
       gpdpc |  -.0000352   .0000222    -1.59   0.112    -.0000786    8.25e-06 
        gdpg |   .0712601   .0198284     3.59   0.000     .0323971    .1101231 
       lgdpg |   .0448614   .0194202     2.31   0.021     .0067986    .0829243 
         inf |  -.0489688   .0566941    -0.86   0.388    -.1600872    .0621497 
        linf |  -.0296208   .0509037    -0.58   0.561    -.1293901    .0701486 
          un |  -.0535161   .0363592    -1.47   0.141    -.1247788    .0177467 
         lun |   .0323824   .0393257     0.82   0.410    -.0446946    .1094595 
     h_aged2 |  -.0427379    .029417    -1.45   0.146    -.1003941    .0149184 
     h_aged3 |  -.0629649   .0397159    -1.59   0.113    -.1408066    .0148767 
    h_female |  -.0322482   .0132472    -2.43   0.015    -.0582122   -.0062842 
  h_edu_high |   .0997339   .0667408     1.49   0.135    -.0310756    .2305434 
h_edu_medium |   .0253639    .052037     0.49   0.626    -.0766267    .1273546 
   h_retired |  -.0599637   .0421937    -1.42   0.155    -.1426619    .0227344 
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   h_student |   .0557709   .0608125     0.92   0.359    -.0634193    .1749611 
h_unemployed |  -.0128946   .0501739    -0.26   0.797    -.1112337    .0854445 
    h_inc_d1 |  -.0383262   .0408755    -0.94   0.348    -.1184408    .0417883 
    h_inc_d3 |   .0550249   .0385762     1.43   0.154    -.0205831    .1306329 
    h_inc_d4 |   .1215234   .0257322     4.72   0.000     .0710893    .1719576 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .6821184   .1585472     4.30   0.000     .3713716    .9928651 
    fall2009 |   .6778877   .1279946     5.30   0.000     .4270229    .9287525 
  spring2010 |   .3899604   .1346854     2.90   0.004     .1259818     .653939 
    fall2010 |   .1109357    .120145     0.92   0.356    -.1245443    .3464156 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .4182277   .1948645     2.15   0.032     .0363003    .8001551 
        ExYu |   .5284134   .3074271     1.72   0.086    -.0741327     1.13096 
       _cons |  -.3279713   .3380073    -0.97   0.332    -.9904534    .3345109 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
Expectations about the economic siatution in a country 
 
. tab q1_02, missing 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
    COUNTRY] will | 
          improve |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
   Strongly agree |      1,257        2.57        2.57 
            Agree |      4,766        9.73       12.29 
   Somewhat agree |     11,567       23.61       35.90 
Somewhat disagree |      9,163       18.70       54.60 
         Disagree |      9,889       20.18       74.78 
Strongly disagree |      8,162       16.66       91.44 
      Do not know |      3,815        7.79       99.23 
        No answer |        378        0.77      100.00 
------------------+----------------------------------- 
            Total |     48,997      100.00 
 
Multinomial expectations model (with dnk group and no interaction terms)  
 
drop if q1_02==9 
 
. *for multinomial (expectations about the economic situation) 
. generate MExpESagree=0 
 
. replace MExpESagree=1 if  q1_02==4 |  q1_02==5 |  q1_02==6 
(27214 real changes made) 
 
. replace MExpESagree=2 if  q1_02==8 
(3815 real changes made) 
 
. replace MExpESagree=3 if  q1_02==1 |  q1_02==2 |  q1_02==3 
(17590 real changes made) 
 
. drop if MExpESagree==0 
(0 observations deleted) 
 
. mprobit MExpESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gpdpc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun 
h_aged2 h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student 
h_unemployed h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 
fall2009 spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu EU ExYu[pweight = weight], 
vce(cluster country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
note: EU omitted because of collinearity 
note: ExYu omitted because of collinearity 
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Multinomial probit regression                     Number of obs   =      48619 
                                                  Wald chi2(7)    =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -39482.517                 Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 MExpESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1            |  (base outcome) 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
       1.CBA |  -.5763391   .1065122    -5.41   0.000    -.7850993    -.367579 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1210399     .12147    -1.00   0.319    -.3591168    .1170369 
          3  |  -.1668611   .1075108    -1.55   0.121    -.3775783    .0438562 
          4  |  -.4028524   .1100234    -3.66   0.000    -.6184943   -.1872106 
          5  |  -.5275517   .0994335    -5.31   0.000    -.7224378   -.3326656 
          8  |   .6917325   .1445285     4.79   0.000     .4084619    .9750032 
             | 
       gpdpc |  -.0000496   .0000119    -4.17   0.000    -.0000729   -.0000262 
        gdpg |   .0280574     .01735     1.62   0.106     -.005948    .0620629 
       lgdpg |   .0582985   .0118387     4.92   0.000     .0350952    .0815019 
         inf |  -.0066684   .0542421    -0.12   0.902     -.112981    .0996441 
        linf |  -.0471587   .0458579    -1.03   0.304    -.1370386    .0427211 
          un |  -.0679785   .0443266    -1.53   0.125    -.1548571    .0189001 
         lun |   .0188422   .0412534     0.46   0.648     -.062013    .0996974 
     h_aged2 |  -.0525363   .0327051    -1.61   0.108    -.1166371    .0115645 
     h_aged3 |  -.0398542   .0361226    -1.10   0.270    -.1106532    .0309448 
    h_female |   .1568288   .0317182     4.94   0.000     .0946623    .2189953 
  h_edu_high |  -.2111094   .0890122    -2.37   0.018    -.3855702   -.0366487 
h_edu_medium |  -.1717483   .0606605    -2.83   0.005    -.2906408   -.0528559 
   h_retired |   .1026231   .0576181     1.78   0.075    -.0103063    .2155524 
   h_student |   .1047327   .0731371     1.43   0.152    -.0386134    .2480787 
h_unemployed |   .0860522   .0655549     1.31   0.189    -.0424331    .2145375 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1869073    .075973     2.46   0.014     .0380031    .3358116 
    h_inc_d3 |  -.1091793   .0238394    -4.58   0.000    -.1559037   -.0624549 
    h_inc_d4 |  -.0688452   .0517224    -1.33   0.183    -.1702191    .0325288 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .3786784   .1424221     2.66   0.008     .0995363    .6578206 
    fall2009 |   .6857763   .1168952     5.87   0.000      .456666    .9148867 
  spring2010 |   .4348849   .1076785     4.04   0.000     .2238389    .6459309 
    fall2010 |  -.0178572   .0963085    -0.19   0.853    -.2066184     .170904 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   1.197418   .1345005     8.90   0.000     .9338014    1.461034 
        ExYu |   1.201814   .1707367     7.04   0.000     .8671758    1.536451 
          EU |          0  (omitted) 
        ExYu |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -1.002482   .2092178    -4.79   0.000    -1.412542   -.5924228 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
       1.CBA |  -.3448771   .1306258    -2.64   0.008    -.6008989   -.0888553 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.2072232   .1383268    -1.50   0.134    -.4783388    .0638923 
          3  |  -.6197928   .1663803    -3.73   0.000    -.9458921   -.2936935 
          4  |  -1.034944   .1756033    -5.89   0.000    -1.379121   -.6907684 
          5  |  -1.378223    .162283    -8.49   0.000    -1.696292   -1.060154 
          8  |  -.9096707    .180996    -5.03   0.000    -1.264416    -.554925 
             | 
       gpdpc |  -1.94e-06   .0000224    -0.09   0.931    -.0000459     .000042 
        gdpg |   .0463567   .0134452     3.45   0.001     .0200045    .0727089 
       lgdpg |   .0016412   .0141042     0.12   0.907    -.0260027     .029285 
         inf |   .0164777   .0589506     0.28   0.780    -.0990633    .1320188 
        linf |  -.0589067   .0478743    -1.23   0.219    -.1527387    .0349253 
          un |   .0246969   .0491029     0.50   0.615     -.071543    .1209368 
         lun |  -.0139726    .044882    -0.31   0.756    -.1019397    .0739945 
     h_aged2 |  -.1014515   .0443303    -2.29   0.022    -.1883372   -.0145657 
     h_aged3 |   -.140167   .0564601    -2.48   0.013    -.2508267   -.0295072 
    h_female |   .0009766   .0237605     0.04   0.967    -.0455931    .0475463 
  h_edu_high |   .1737109   .0583485     2.98   0.003       .05935    .2880719 
h_edu_medium |   .0153793   .0470527     0.33   0.744    -.0768424     .107601 
   h_retired |   .0279712   .0392608     0.71   0.476    -.0489785     .104921 
   h_student |    .186568   .0495761     3.76   0.000     .0894005    .2837354 
  586 
h_unemployed |  -.0191213   .0480737    -0.40   0.691    -.1133441    .0751015 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1427985   .0611855     2.33   0.020     .0228772    .2627198 
    h_inc_d3 |   .2155027   .0309938     6.95   0.000     .1547559    .2762495 
    h_inc_d4 |   .3273626   .0524275     6.24   0.000     .2246066    .4301187 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .6076461   .1286704     4.72   0.000     .3554568    .8598355 
    fall2009 |    .639581   .1448706     4.41   0.000     .3556399    .9235222 
  spring2010 |   .3140802   .0819859     3.83   0.000     .1533908    .4747695 
    fall2010 |   .1288611   .1050833     1.23   0.220    -.0770983    .3348205 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1895243   .1698542     1.12   0.265    -.1433839    .5224324 
        ExYu |  -.0559184   .2485309    -0.22   0.822    -.5430301    .4311932 
          EU |          0  (omitted) 
        ExYu |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |  -.0154098   .3987294    -0.04   0.969     -.796905    .7660854 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Probit expectations model – no dnk and no interactions 
 
. drop if q1_02==8 
(3815 observations deleted) 
 
. generate ExpESagree=0 
 
. replace ExpESagree=1 if  q1_02==1 |  q1_02==2 |  q1_02==3 
(17590 real changes made) 
 
. tab q1_02 ExpESagree, missing 
 
    Over the next | 
  five years, the | 
         economic | 
 situation of [MY | 
    COUNTRY] will |      ExpESagree 
          improve |         0          1 |     Total 
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
   Strongly agree |         0      1,257 |     1,257  
            Agree |         0      4,766 |     4,766  
   Somewhat agree |         0     11,567 |    11,567  
Somewhat disagree |     9,163          0 |     9,163  
         Disagree |     9,889          0 |     9,889  
Strongly disagree |     8,162          0 |     8,162  
------------------+----------------------+---------- 
            Total |    27,214     17,590 |    44,804  
. probit ExpESagree i.CBA i.q22f_1 gpdpc gdpg lgdpg inf linf un lun h_aged2 
h_aged3 h_female h_edu_high h_edu_medium h_retired h_student h_unemployed 
h_inc_d1 h_inc_d3 h_inc_d4 spring2008 fall2008 spring2009 fall2009 
spring2010 fall2010 spring2011 EU ExYu [pweight = weight], vce(cluster 
country) nolog 
 
note: spring2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: fall2008 omitted because of collinearity 
note: spring2011 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      44804 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =          . 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =          . 
Log pseudolikelihood = -26825.424                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0837 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  ExpESagree |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1.CBA |  -.2447416   .0959269    -2.55   0.011    -.4327549   -.0567282 
             | 
      q22f_1 | 
          2  |  -.1503669   .0995376    -1.51   0.131    -.3454569    .0447232 
          3  |  -.4491461   .1189124    -3.78   0.000    -.6822101   -.2160821 
          4  |  -.7523661   .1257815    -5.98   0.000    -.9988933   -.5058389 
          5  |  -1.001901   .1165112    -8.60   0.000    -1.230259   -.7735437 
  587 
          8  |  -.6805531   .1287364    -5.29   0.000    -.9328719   -.4282343 
             | 
       gpdpc |  -5.47e-07   .0000169    -0.03   0.974    -.0000336    .0000325 
        gdpg |   .0339117   .0101298     3.35   0.001     .0140576    .0537658 
       lgdpg |   .0010238   .0103951     0.10   0.922    -.0193503    .0213979 
         inf |   .0119211   .0434042     0.27   0.784    -.0731496    .0969917 
        linf |  -.0433036   .0344837    -1.26   0.209    -.1108903    .0242832 
          un |    .021135   .0356618     0.59   0.553     -.048761    .0910309 
         lun |  -.0127816   .0325319    -0.39   0.694     -.076543    .0509798 
     h_aged2 |  -.0692598   .0324587    -2.13   0.033    -.1328777   -.0056418 
     h_aged3 |  -.1016431    .040072    -2.54   0.011    -.1801826   -.0231035 
    h_female |  -.0014063   .0173503    -0.08   0.935    -.0354123    .0325996 
  h_edu_high |   .1263511   .0437932     2.89   0.004     .0405179    .2121842 
h_edu_medium |   .0112717   .0346779     0.33   0.745    -.0566957    .0792391 
   h_retired |   .0173363   .0279129     0.62   0.535    -.0373719    .0720445 
   h_student |   .1393883   .0355079     3.93   0.000     .0697942    .2089824 
h_unemployed |  -.0093097   .0341093    -0.27   0.785    -.0761628    .0575434 
    h_inc_d1 |   .1001607   .0433827     2.31   0.021     .0151321    .1851893 
    h_inc_d3 |   .1620532   .0224766     7.21   0.000     .1179999    .2061064 
    h_inc_d4 |    .242279   .0383755     6.31   0.000     .1670643    .3174937 
  spring2008 |          0  (omitted) 
    fall2008 |          0  (omitted) 
  spring2009 |   .4447649   .0939907     4.73   0.000     .2605464    .6289834 
    fall2009 |   .4705363   .1078354     4.36   0.000     .2591828    .6818899 
  spring2010 |   .2269547   .0609604     3.72   0.000     .1074745     .346435 
    fall2010 |   .0936596   .0756222     1.24   0.216    -.0545573    .2418764 
  spring2011 |          0  (omitted) 
          EU |   .1288353   .1265158     1.02   0.309     -.119131    .3768017 
        ExYu |  -.0507254   .1825957    -0.28   0.781    -.4086064    .3071557 
       _cons |  -.0265767   .2960729    -0.09   0.928     -.606869    .5537155 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
